CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 23, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01460Se1 i
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
5O
23 September 1969
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14600040001-5
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/gcpt"I DP79T00975AO14600040001-5
No. 0228/69
23 September 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Fighting in Que Son Valley. (Page 1)
Communist China: The Chinese are trying to counter
rumors that Mao is in critical condition. (Page 2)
USSR - Arms Control: Moscow's draft CBW convention
will be hotly debated in the UN. (Page 4)
Jordan: The internal situation is deteriorating.
Page 5)
Cuba: The new antihijacking law contains no impor-
tant concessions. (Page 6)
Brazil: Urban terrorism continues to be a big prob-
lem. (Page 7)
El Salvador - Honduras: Domestic considerations are
impairing prospects for compromise. (Page 8)
El Salvador: The government has taken action to
conserve foreign exchange reserves. (Page 9)
Bolivia: Armed forces commander Ovando's resignation
could portend a coup. (Page 10)
India: Hindu-Muslim riots (Page 11)
Morocco: Communist sentenced (Page 11)
Approved For Release 2004/0A/Rt.j ~A-fDP79T00975A01 46000400
 Approved For Release 2004/uSAMI Y L"1A`RDP79T00975AO14600040001-5
NORTH `
VIETNAM
AVERAGESTRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
Battalion:
VC
200- 400
NVA
300- 500
Regiment:
VC
1,000-1,500
NVA
1,200-2,000
Division:
VC
5,000-7,000
NVA
5,000-8,000
Da Nang
5` CORPS
CAM
RANK
SOUTH VIETNAM
25X1
MILES
Demilitarized Zone
%
1taI Iey%
Approved For Release 2004) EC ,: -RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/0 ]3CpI~i-11DP79T00975A014600040001-5
C South Vietnam: There was little military ac-
tion of significance yesterday, except in the Que
Son Valley, south of Da Nang.
In the Que Son fighting, enemy ground fire
downed three helicopters during an assault by ele-
ments of the US Army's Americal Division against
North Vietnamese regulars entrenched in the hills
ringing the valley.
Recent reports from scattered locations in
South Vietnam suggest that friction between North
Vietnamese troops and local Viet Cong personnel is
becoming more serious. A North Vietnamese defector
I
reports a ri icule
by southerners le to 1st ights before he deserted.
Similar incidents have been reported by North Viet-
namese prisoners captured in IV Corps. According
to a document captured in Dinh Tuong Province, the
Communist leaders are aware of this dissension and
have recommended measures to im rove north-south re-
lations among their forces.
23 Sep 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/1 E kFF79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/03J P79T00975A014600040001-5
Communist China: The Chinese are trying to
counter rumors out of Moscow that Mao Tse-tung is
in critical condition.
A Chinese Embassy spokesman in Moscow scoffed
at such rumors and Peking radio on 20 September an-
nounced that Mao signed a recent order granting
awards to members of the army who had fought the
Soviets along the border.
Despite Peking's efforts to undercut the Soviet-
inspired rumors of Mao's incapacity, several recent
developments tend to support reports that he is not
well. Mao failed to show up at the North Vietnamese
Embassy to offer condolences on the death of Ho Chi
Minh and he has not appeared in public since 19 May.
This is his longest absence since 1966. Prepara-
tions for the celebration of Communist China's 20th
anniversary on 1 October indicate that it will be
unusually low-keyed, whereas such an historic occa-
sion normally would produce a major celebration.
Moreover, the slogan "long life to Chairman Mao,"
which formerly led off every official domestic news
wire dispatch, was dropped in July.
Explanations other than illness are possible
for each of these events, however. Mao has been ab-
sent for long periods before and has reappeared to
confound speculation about his health. A better
reading on the state of Mao's health ought to come
on 1 October. Mao has not missed the anniversary
show in 20 years.
If Mao has been incapacitated by a stroke, the
Chinese Communist leadership faces an extraordinar-
ily strained situation. Should there be any chance
of Mao recovering, the other leaders would be re-
luctant to take any major initiative for fear of re-
prisals once he returns to action. Yet, the Kosygin
23 Sep 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2004/Q ~; DP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/03/'I`1"~tA`RDP79T00975AO14600040001-5
initiative in meeting with Chou En-lai would already
have forced the other leaders to deal with a major
policy decision. If Mao is permanently incapacitated,
a brief period of collective leadership with Lin Piao
as at least nominal chief would probably result.
Lin Piao is Mao's designated successor but he
is also believed to be in poor health and, like Mao,
has not appeared since 19 May. Even were Lin able
to step into Mao's shoes, the bitter personal and
ideological rivalries which divide the leadership
would make renewed infighting very likely within the
near future. Lin in no way carries the same weight
as Mao and he would be far more restricted than Mao
in dealing with contention among his colleagues.
23 Sep 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2004/03Sff OC bP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/0'DP79T00975A014600040001-5
USSR - Arms Control: The Soviet draft conven-
tion on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) en-
sures a hot debate on this subject at the UN General
Assembly.
Moscow's proposal would prohibit the develop-
ment, production, and stockpiling of CBW agents.
Parties to the convention would be required to de-
stroy existing stocks or divert them to peaceful
uses, No provision for verification of compliance
is made. The proposal also refers with approval to
the sections of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concern-
ing the nonuse of CBW but avoids the especially con-
tentious issue of whether use of tear gas in war is
covered under existing international law.
A number of other proposals for UN General As-
sembly resolutions on CBW have been presented at the
Geneva disarmament talks. The most prominent is the
Swedish initiative, which cites "a customary rule of
international law" prohibiting the usage in war of
CBW1 including tear gas and other nonlethal sub-
stances. Canada has made little headway at Geneva
with a similar draft, probably because it also sup-
ports a British initiative which deals only with
biological warfare. Most of the Geneva conferees
are disturbed by any implication that chemical weap-
ons might be separated from biological ones for arms
control purposes.
The outlook is that the Soviet initiative will
gain considerable support. There will, however, be
criticism of its lack of inspection arrangements.
There may also be extended debate on terms of the
Geneva Protocol, especially regarding its applica-
bility to nonuse of tear gas. Recent CBW incident
will certainly be raised.
23 Sep 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 200`BVR]fg-RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/"- RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
Jordan: The internal security situation is
deteriorating.
The US Embassy in Amman reports that fedayeen
cockiness and disrespect for authority are increas-
ing. The police, most of whom are Palestinians,
are unwilling to confront the fedayeen. Over the
past few weeks, the police have refused to take ac-
tion in at least two cases where fedayeen killed
prominent members of the Christian and Circassian
communities. The police also would not intervene
in the kidnaping of a newspaper editor or in a youth
riot at a downtown movie theater and hotel. More-
over, storekeepers have begun to complain that the
fedayeen are taking advantage of the situation to
extort greater contributions.
To meet the growing demands for police protec-
tion, the government is relying more and more on
bedouin security forces. Many ordinary citizens,
worried over the lack of normal security measures,
reportedly are arming themselves and some are
setting up their own vigilante units. A number of
army officers also are becoming critical of the
government's ineffectiveness. The embassy believes
that the government must soon take firm action to
establish its authority or lose the backing of its
traditional elements of support.
23 Sep 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/OSKCR c DP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/03f'f1ctlk-F~DP79T00975A014600040001-5
Cuba: Havana's new and much publicized antihi-
jacking law contains no important concessions.
The law, ostensibly Cuba's answer to growing
international criticism of those countries harboring
hijackers, contains stipulations that preclude an
easy solution to the hijacking problem. Extradition
of offenders would take place only on the basis of
reciprocal bilateral treaties that would still pre-
serve Havana's right to offer asylum.
Among the Western Hemisphere countries that have
been victimized by air piracy, only Mexico has rela-
tions with Cuba. Havana's call for bilateral anti-
hijacking treaties is heavily larded with anti-US
propaganda and is directed at the other Latin Ameri-
can nations and their policy of keeping Cuba in dip-
lomatic isolation. Cuba and Mexico had been close
to signing a hijacking agreement when relations be-
tween them suddenly chilled, partly over the issue
of asylum to air pirates.
Colombian Foreign Minister Lopez Michelson has
indicated that the Latin American missions at the
UN will study the Cuban proposal. He rejected the
possibility that his government would sign an agree-
ment with Cuba on air piracy.
23 Sep 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/5i3RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/03 Y'T'I C4Z- P79T00975A014600040001-5
25X1
Brazil: Urban terrorism is continuing to be a
major problem for the government.
The terrorists' latest target was the Brazilian
police security unit that protects the US consulate
general in Sao Paulo. Last Friday six young men
wounded two of the three policemen on duty and fire--
bombed their car. The men fled the scene without
leaving behind any of the pamphlets that character-
ize most other terrorist attacks.
The triumvirate has taken several measures to
try to halt the terrorism. A draft law that may
already have gone into effect provides that persons
who are accused of revolutionary or subversive ac-
tivity will be tried by a special "council of jus-
tice." If found guilty, they may be subject to ex-
ecution by firing squad.
Security forces in Rio de Janeiro have arrested
at least three sts in the kidnaping of US Am-
bassador Elbrickusec
25X1
Further stern measures against terrorism are
likely, particularly because of pressure from mili-
tary officers who were angered by the government's
release of 15 of their prize prisoners in exchang
for Ambassador Elbrick.
23 Sep 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
Approved For Release 2004/03A1VC 'BP79T00975A014600040001-5
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004I03: A-RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
El Salvador - Honduras: In both countries,
domestic considerations are further impairing
prospects for compromise.
Salvadoran President Sanchez reportedly is
preoccupied with the congressional elections
scheduled for March and is afraid to adopt a con-
ciliatory policy toward Honduras that might damage
his or his party's popular standing. Honduran
President Lopez also is worried about his popular
image. As a result of internal political pressures,
he has been unwilling to restore commercial re-
lations with El Salvador or to use his prestige to
end discrimination against Salvadoran residents.
The drift toward politics as usual in both
countries has resulted, in part, from the wide
gulf between government and opposition concepts of
national unity. In Honduras, for example, ruling
National Party spokesmen tend to interpret national
unity in terms of absolute and unquestioned loyalty
to the Lopez administration. Opposition elements
are demanding substantial reform in domestic pol-
icy and in government personnel policies as the
price for continued collaboration. As a result,
President Lopez is currently pessimistic about
the chances of forming a "conciliation government".
The national unity movement is in even greater
disarray in El Salvador. The important Christian
Democratic opposition party, irritated by its
inability to influence government policy, has
already ended its collaboration with the govern-
ment.
23 Sep 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2004/031 . &A R'DP79T00975A014600040001-5
04
 Approved For Release 2004/03/SE(WEJP79T00975A014600040001-5
El Salvador: The government has taken action
to conserve foreign exchange reserves depleted by
the war with Honduras.
El Salvador last week reimposed measures to
reduce imports and other demands on foreign exchange.
Prior deposits of 100 percent are again required on
many imports, and sales of foreign exchange to tourists
and to students and other citizens living abroad are
to be halved.
The measures were prompted by reduced exports
and plans for arms purchases. Exports to Nicaragua
and Costa Rica are only 25-30 percent of normal
because Honduras has closed the Pan American Highway.
Exports to Honduras have ceased entirely. The in-
creased arms imports are foreshadowed by a $12-
million public bond issue. Even with controls,
foreign exchange is expected to fall to about $23
million by December compared with $48 million before
the fighting began last June. Because the projected
December reserves equal only one month's imports,
further government action will probably be needed.
23 Sep 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 %D 79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/0Wfljf1~DP79T00975A014600040001-5
C Bolivia: Armed forces commander General
Ovando's resignation yesterday following charges
that his presidential campaign is being financed by
US oil companies could be the forerunner of a mili-
tary coup.
Ovando took a strong anti-US position at the
press conference in which he announced his resigna-
tion and named the armed forces chief of staff, Gen-
eral Ruiz, as his replacement. An opposition deputy
charged in congress last Friday that Ovando had re-
ceived $600,000 from Gulf Oil and another company
to finance his campaign for the presidency in the
elections next May. In his defense, General Ovando
and his supporters claimed that the charge is a US
plot to discredit him. Ovando said at the press
conference that the "imperialists do not favor my
candidacy because of my nationalist position" and
that he would "unmask the enemies of the nation
who...serve the foreign occupation."
Ovando's new strongly anti-American line may
generate the popular support that he has thus far
failed to attract, while the charges against him
that probably cannot be proved may provide the pre-
text for a coup that would install a government
more favorable to Ovando's candidacy.
23 Sep 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/0~VC.RC"DP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 20049'I'1`:IA-RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
NOTES
India: The army is making progress toward
restoring order after three days of violent Hindu-
Muslim rioting in Ahmadabad and neighboring towns
in western India. The number of deaths and injuries
is high even by Indian standards, but the cause ap-
pears to have been the same as for most such com-
munal clashes: a spontaneous local dispute between
poor sections of the communities. Authorities in
Bombay, 300 miles to the south, are taking measures
to prevent any clashes there tomorrow at the con-
clusion of a local Hindu religious festival. There
are no signs yet, however, that the violence will
s read to other areas of the county .
Morocco: Communist leader Ali Yata, who was
arrested last month on charges of reconstituting a
legally dissolved association, has been found guilty
and sentenced to ten months' imprisonment. The
court ruled that Ali Yata's new Party of Liberation
and Socialism, which had been legally sanctioned
15 months ago, was "only an emanation" of the Moroc-
can Communist Party that was ordered to dissolve in
1960. The dissolution of the new party and the
seizure of its assets were also directed by the
court because its objectives were contrary to pub-
lic order and "the sacred principles of the coun-
try."
23 Sep 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/0~c&YRDP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/ct'1'~.U-R DP79T00975A014600040001-5
Ahmadabad
11*
NEPAL v SIKKI
Kathmandu.
I N D I A
Bhopal,
Koh;
ng
GOA
CEYLON
*Colombo
PAKISTAN
State capita
Mate boundary
MILES 400
400 KILOMETERS
,Port Blair
Andaman is,
Nicobar Is.
Approved For Release 200RLgigpEqA-RDP79T00975A014600040001-5
 Secrftproved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14600040001-5
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14600040001-5