CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014400110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 30, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
5
30 August 1969
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No. 0208/69
30 August 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Laos: Government forces have chalked up substantial
gains . (Page 3)
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El Salvador - Honduras: Many people in both countries
feel that a resumption of hostilities is inevitable.
(Page 6)
Chile: Student demonstrations over educational re-
forms continue into their second day. (Page 7)
Cirus: Greek Cypriot extremists (Page 8)
Peru-Hungary: Industrial purchase (Page 8)
International Trade: Wheat price (Page 9)
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Demilitarized Zon?
AVERAGE STRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
Saltalion:
VC
200 400
NVA
300 500
Regiment:
VC
1,0001,500
NVA
1,2002,000
Dvision:
VC
5,000 7,000
NVA
5,0003,000
/Q. Son
Valley
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 110
MILES
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C South Vietnam: Sharp fighting continues in the
Que Son valley southwest of Da Nang while Communist
forces elsewhere are preparing for another "high-
point?e in early September.
Enemy attacks against lightly defended villages
and outposts during the last three weeks have been
meeting with some success. These attacks have
featured destruction of government outposts, propa-
ganda harangues, selective assassinations, and on
occasion widespread destruction of civilian housing.
A.vivid example of this kind of operation oc
curred in Quang Ngai Province on 27 August when the
Viet Cong entered a village, gathered the people
for a propaganda session, and finally destroyed
some 260 houses before leaving with 41 civilian
hostages. South Vietnamese Government irregulars
defending the village failed to engage the enemy
during the five hours the Communists were in the
area.
Such tactics, along with terrorist attacks,
are a principal feature of the Communists' current
autumn campaign.
I
30 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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LAOS: Current Situation
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
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Laos: Government forces have chalked up some
substantial gains as they continue to press their
counteroffensive in the north.
Meo leader Vang Pao's guerrilla forces have
pushed deep into the Plaine des Jarres, taking some
positions in Communist hands since 1962. The gov-
ernment advances came with unexpected ease, sug-
gesting that the offensive may have taken the enemy
by surprise.
Originally intended as a diversion, the momen-
tum of the Plaine des Jarres operation may cause
Vang Pao, who has long talked about retaking the
entire Plaine, to expand his objectives. A similar
situation developed in late April when Vang Pao,
heady with his initial successes against the Route
4 area, pressed on to capture the enemy stronghold
of Xieng Khouangville. That offensive precipitated
a sharp enemy rebuff and led to the loss of a num-
ber of government holdings near the Plaine.
There is some tenuous evidence that the gov-
ernment's initial successes against the Plaine may
have been due to an earlier withdrawal of some
North Vietnamese combat troops. Villagers residing
near Route 7, a primary transportation artery link-
ing North Vietnam with north Laos, reported large
numbers of North Vietnamese troops moving east dur-
ing mid-August. The villagers claim the troops told
them they were on their way back to North Vietnam.
The military gains of the past several weeks
are testimony to the resilience of Vang Pao's troops,
as well as the difficulties the Communists have
maintaining combat operations during the height of
the rainy season. Vang Pao's efforts, however, are
not directed toward regaining his bases in Samneua
and-northern Xieng Khouang provinces from which the
guerrillas were driven during the past dry season.
Vang Pao has successfully retaken these bases every
30 Aug 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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year during the rainy season, and unless he does so
again fairly soon, the Communists will be in a
stronger position in the north than they have been
since 1962.
Government forces have also been active in the
south, where they are pushing into long-held enemy
territory south and east of Muong Phalane. Although
the enemy is only slowly reacting to these recent
encroachments, past experience indicates that they
will not accept for long the presence of government
troops near the vital Communist infiltration corri-
30 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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El Salvador - Honduras: CThere is a growing
feeling in both countries--that a resumption of hos-
tilities is inevitable.
The Hondurans have been following Salvadoran
arms purchases with trepidation, and renewed concern
may be aroused by border incidents such as yester-
day's shallow penetration of Honduran territory by
approximately 90 Salvadoran troops. El Salvador
for its part is skeptical that the AS can protect
Salvadorans residing in Honduras or moderate the
climate of anti-Salvadoran feeling. The Honduran
boycott of Salvadoran products and the campaign by
Honduran labor to have Salvadoran employees fired
from their jobs have caused great concern.
Salvadoran President Sanchez and most of the
military high command do not favor aggressive ac-
tion at this time, but the chief of staff has openly
advocated another attack. His views may be received
sympathetically in some military and civilian quar-
ters. The military successes in July left many Sal-
vadorans with a feeling that Honduras could be
easily conquered. Continued press coverage of Hon-
duran mistreatment of Salvadorans will lead to pres-
sure on the government to seek b force what it is
unable to gain by ne otiation.
30 Aug 69
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(Chile: Well-organized student demonstrations
over educational reforms continue into their second
day in Santiago and other cities, and the authorities
promised strong measures to maintain order.
A bystander was seriously injured by police in
Santiago. Should he die, the municipal employees
union, of which he is a member, may join the demon-
strations. Police are using stronger tactics than
they have in the past, and more than 150 students
have been detained.
The demonstrations apparently are led by So-
cialists. Socialists and Communists have condemned
the government's handling of the riots.
30 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Cyprus: President Makarios has outlawed the
extremist National Front because of growing public
indignation over recent acts of terrorism within
the Greek Cypriot community. The front is made up
mostly of former members of the old Greek Cypriot
underground organization who favor the union of
Cyprus with Greece. Makarios by his action has
alienated an important segment of his own political
support. He may feel forced to make some balancing
gesture toward his supporters. This would have an
unsettling effect on the Turkish Cypriot community
and would further complicate the current communal
talks.
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Peru-Hungary: Peru has contracted to purchase
$3.35 ms lion of Hungarian mining equipment, ac-
cording to press reports from Budapest. Other proj-
ects are also being studied, and the president of
one Peruvian mining company has informed the gov-
ernment that he intends to form a point company
with a Hungarian firm. The Velasco government,
which is making a strong effort to attract foreign
financing into the mining sector, has warned large
US mining companies that their concessions will
be opened to international bidding if agreements
are not reached soon on new investments in unex-
ploited holdings.
30 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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International Trade: The grains management
committee of the European Communities (EC) is re-
portedly nearing a decision that would result in
a lower export price for EC wheat. This would
increase the brisk price competition that has re-
cently characterized the international wheat mar-
ket and that has threatened to nullify the Inter-
national Grains Agreement. Consultations among
wheat-exporting countries on the price problem
are likely in the next few weeks. The Dutch have
drawn up proposals calling for a return to the
price levels in effect before July and claim that
Australia and Canada would be willing to cooperate.
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