CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014200080001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 29, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Secret
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29 July 1969
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No. 0180/69
29 July 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Pakistan: President Yahya Khan has suggested that
elections could be delayed indefinitely. (Page 3)
United Kin dom: London is taking new soundings in
Paris about broadening British participation in
European affairs. (Page 4)
Algeria-France: Relations may soon begin to improve.
(Page 5)
Guinea-USSR: The Guineans may soon quietly request
the recall of the Soviet ambassador. (Page 6)
El Salvador - Honduras: Situation report (Page 7)
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GULP OP
SIAM
AVERAGE STRENGTH 110
OF ENEMY UNITS
Regiment: VC 1,000-1,500
NVA .1,200-2,000
SOUTH VIETNAM
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
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E South Vietnam: Military action remained gener-
ally light throughout the country on 27-28 July.
The success of recent Communist penetration
efforts against the South Vietnamese Government's
propaganda operations in the coastal II Corps province
of Ninh Thuan underscores the effectiveness of the
enemy's mass manipulation tactics at the rice roots
level.
In mid-June, South Vietnamese security services
in Ninh Thuan Province uncovered a seven-man Commu-
nist cell among the 14-man GVN armed propaganda team
operating in that province. Armed propaganda teams
are composed of ex - Viet Cong working for the govern-
ment propagandizing against the Communists and seeking
to encourage Viet Cong to rally to the GVN. The
local Communist organization in Ninh Thuan, however,
29 Jul 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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through a combination of meticulous background in-
vestigations, realistic propaganda appeals, and the
use of physical t::hreats, was able to persuade the
armed propaganda team chief and six of his fellows
to resume working for, the Viet Cong cause.
These dou.bl agents,, in the course of their
participation in the provincial GVN propaganda ef-
fort, contacted local families who were known to have
relatives in, the Viet Cong. Instead of encouraging
them to rally to the CVN, they belittled the govern-
ment and built ccp the Commianists' image among these
people.
The views of the team chief as to why he agreed
to resume working for the Viet Cong indicate that
among the relatively unsophisticated populace in this
province, and probably elsewhere as well, the propa-
ganda rhetoric of the Communists still appears to
best the CNN's efforts. He stated that he was im-
pressed by the .logic of the Communists' propaganda
and by their use of threats at the most opportune
time in their recruitment pitch. The Viet Cong, the
team chief claims, displayed "generosity" and "leni-
ency" by allowing him and those team members he
subsequently recruited to "'atone for the error of
their ways."
The Viet Cong employment of credible and im-
pressive examples,, coupled with plain and simple
ideas that are easily understood in all their forms
of propaganda, has been one of the keys to the suc-
cess and resiliency of their movement. Viet Cong
propaganda also carries with it an implied or ex-
plicit threat which the people know the Viet Cong
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Pakistan: President Yahya Khan has suggested
that e ections could be delayed indefinitely by a
failure to resolve a number of current political
problems.
In a speech to the nation on 28 July, Yahya
reviewed recent developments and presented plans for
a return to civilian rule. He disclosed that he
would appoint a civilian advisory council to allow
for greater public participation in his administra-
tion, but did not reveal the names of the new ad-
visers. He also named a Supreme Court justice from
East Pakistan as chief election commissioner and
said that preparation for elections should not take
more than 18 months--after a new constitution is
worked out.
Although setting forth these first steps toward
a restoration of civilian control, Yahya warned that
controversial issues such as the provisions of a new
constitution, autonomy for East Pakistan, and the
basis for allocating seats in a central parliament
would have to be resolved before an election campaign
could begin.
Resolution of these problems could take years,
however, and Yahya's warning raises the possibility
that martial law may continue indefinitely. Such a
prospect could lead to fresh troubles in East Paki-
stan, where the present government is regarded as
little more than alien rule, and might also arouse
antagonism within the military. Reports indicate
that a rift is already growing in the Karachi area
between younger officers and their seniors because
of the military government's failure to eradicate
corruption.
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United Kingdom: London is beginning to take
new soundings in Paris over the question of Brit-
ain's broader participation in European affairs.
Contrary to previous reports, a decision to
begin a dialogue with the new French government on
the topic apparently was reached at a meeting of UK
ambassadors to Common Market countries on 24-25 June.
The UK ambassador to France, Christopher Soames, had
his first meeting with the French foreign minister
on 11 July and expects to have a second session this
week.
The British emphasize that the dialogue will
not cover issues to be treated subsequently in Com-
munity-wide negotiations. Rather, London hopes to
demonstrate its sincerity about entering Europe, to
clear the general atmosphere between the two coun-
tries, and to determine what specific questions and
problems the new government may have with British
entry.
A British official has indicated that the topic
of possible French-UK nuclear cooperation has not
yet been raised directly by either country. Should
the question arise, the British plan to listen but
not encourage discussions at this time.
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Algeria-France: Relations between Algiers and
Paris, which were expected to deteriorate further
after the resignation of De Gaulle, may soon begin
to improve instead.
French officials in Paris are reported to be
somewhat optimistic that present "not bad" relations
could get better. A favorable sign is the recent
meeting between Algerian Premier Boumediene and the
French minister of cultural affairs, who visited
Algiers briefly to attend the opening of the Pan-
African Cultural Festival.
plans are now under way
for Foreign Minister Schumann to visit Algiers this
fall. A scheduled visit of former foreign minister
Debre was postponed after De Gaulle resigned.
the Algerians
seemed interested in lessening their dependence on
the Soviets in the military area. I the
French had recently sold 28 Fouga trainers to the
Algerians, who had also requested an increase in
French training of Algerian pilots.
the French put no stock in press rumors,
which have recently turned up again that there are
Soviet "missile bases" in Algeria.
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Guinea-USSR: The Guineans may soon request the
recal. of the Soviet ambassador, although the affair
is likely to be handled quietly.
The ambassador is in trouble with the Guineans
for failing to report contacts his embassy has ap-
parently had with a man claiming to be an accomplice
in the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President
Although there is no evidence that the Soviets
were involved in the assassination attempt, the
Guineans clearly regard the ambassador's failure to
report the contacts with the "accomplice" as a seri-
ous omission. The incident is unlikely, however,
to lead to a major disruption of Guinea's close ties
with the Communist world? Any public crisis would
be awkward for Guinea, whose propaganda has been
linking the assassination attempt with antiregime
il
ex
es s ern "imperialists."
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El Salvador - Honduras: Pressure for military
action against Salvadoran occupation forces is build-
ing in Honduras. OAS observers have reported tense
conditions on the southern front., with both sides
"inching forward." Without rapid motion toward a
workable formula by the OAS foreign ministers, the
chances of an incident breaking the cease-fire will
increase. Sanctions against El Salvador will be
under consideration at the OAS meeting today.
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Secret
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