CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014200060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 26, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
r
26 July 1969
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No. 0178/69
26 July 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Communist China: "War preparations" have become a
major domestic propaganda theme. (Page 2)
USSR: The effect of mascons may have contributed
to the crash of Luna 15. (Page 4)
El Salvador - Honduras: OAS delegates are convening
today in a less than optimistic mood. (Page 5)
Okinawa-US: Leftist elements are trying to intensify
their struggle against the presence of US bases.
(Page 7)
USSR: A prominent economist advocates cutting in
half the number of construction projects in the USSR.
(Page 8)
Brazil: Armed forces commanders are concerned about
a possible loss of public confidence in the govern-
ment. (Page 9)
Morocco-Algeria: Difficulties in relations have
developed. (Page 11)
Italy:
Political developments
(Page 12)
Kenya:
Government appointments
(Page 12)
Colombia-USSR: Cultural exchange visa (Page 12)
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(Vietnam: There have been no major Communist-
initiated military actions in the past few days, and
most indications point toward only scattered, small-
scale attacks in the near future.
There is growing evidence that the Communists
are putting greater long-term emphasis on the use
of guerrilla tactics, and of accompanying political
action, throughout much of South Vietnam. This de-
velopment often is consuming assets which previously
had been used in main force, large-unit warfare.
Prisoners and captured documents reflect wide-
spread efforts to upgrade Viet Cong guerrilla activ-
ities and to rely more heavily on sapper units both
now and in future offensive periods. There are some
reports of personnel transfers from main force units
downward into local and guerrilla units. Recent re-
ports from areas around Saigon indicate that allied
pre-emptive operations have made use of regular in-
fantry tactics virtually impossible for the Commu-
nists without unacceptable losses to their forces.
Most sources suggest the enemy does not intend to
press main force warfare in the immediate Saigon
vicinity.
This shift in Communist tactics in South Viet-
nam may be an outgrowth of an evolving Hanoi strat-
egy which evidently calls for a sharp decline in the
number of replacements coming from North Vietnam dur-
ing the next few months at least. Greater use of
guerrilla warfare could help to reduce personnel
losses during this period and still maintain a cred-
ible Communist military threat...
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Communist China: "War preparations" have be-
come a major domestic propaganda theme in recent
months but there are no signs that the Chinese are
making efforts at military mobilization.
Peking apparently continues to believe that
the recent border incidents with the Soviets justify
giving high priority to military preparedness, but
the regime's propaganda has been restrained and
stops short of creating war hysteria. Moreover,,
many aspects of the war readiness propaganda are
obviously designed to further important domestic
goals. Appeals to prepare for war are repeatedly
linked to the need to restore political unity and
discipline, to stimulate industrial and agricultural
production, and to restrict consumer consumption.
Radiobroadcasts from provinces in the border
regions are predictably most alarmist regarding the
Soviet threat. Heilungkiang radio recently went so
far as to cite "Soviet revisionism" as China's
"principal and most dangerous 25X1
scattered
Uld5s meetings were pre aredness is d against
the Soviet threat, but there is 25X1
no talk of carrying the attack to the enemy, no
evidence of general air raid drills, and only isolated
me on of shelter building. 25X1
I Iconsumer rationing, rest
leave, and the levy of a ten-percent. grain tax in
rural areas as measures of war preparedness.
Western diplomats in Peking suggest that the
central leadership may be preparing to place more
emphasis on national defense industries and perhaps
has reached agreement to strengthen certain branches
of the armed forces. There is little evidence to
support this speculation, although Premier Chou En-
lai reportedly delivered a speech after the ninth
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party congress in which he gave first priority to
defense-related production.
At this stage, Peking appears to be preparing
primarily for an extended period of heightened ten-
sion with Moscow rather than for any imminent Soviet
military action.
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USSR: The effect of lunar mass concentrations--
calledmascons--may have been a contributing factor
in the crash of Luna 15 following an attempt at, what
apparently was to have been a soft landing.
The spacecraft almost certainly deviated from
its planned trajectory during its orbital flight due
to irregularities in the force of the moon's gravity
caused by mascons. Mascons--discovered by US scien-
tists less than a year ago--are large masses of dense
material at or near the lunar surface which disturb
the path of objects in lunar orbit. These orbital
perturbations are cumulative, increasing with each
succeeding revolution.
The Soviets may not have anticipated the magni-
tude of the problem despite published US concern.,
They may be able to use the information collected
as a result of the Luna 15 mission, however, to al-
low planning for future flights using orbits similar
to those of Luna 15.
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El Salvador - Honduras.- Delegates to the OAS
foreign ministers meeting are convening this after-
noon in a less than optimistic mood.
C Seventeen foreign ministers are attending the
first session, but their governments had hesitated
to support the meeting with high-level representa-
tion, and many apparently will decline to collaborate
in the formation of an Inter-American Peace Force
(IAPF). Although Mexico is sending its foreign
minister, it would have preferred the OAS meeting on
a level below cabinet rank? since the resolutions
coming out of the meeting are likely to be punitive.
Brazilian Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto is not
planning to attend today's meeting. The authorita-
tive Jornal Do Brazil quotes foreign office sources
to the effect that Magalhaes may attend later ses-
sions depending on developments.
The Costa Rican foreign minister is attending,
but is under instructions that leave him little
maneuverability. He is to avoid branding El Salvador
an aggressor even if the Salvadorans fail to pull
their troops out of Honduras, and he cannot agree to
motions toward establishing an IAPF.
Colombian Foreign Minister Lopez Michelson
changed his plans for making preliminary mediation
efforts in San Salvador en route to Washington, be-
cause there was "no point" in stopping there. Lopez
commented pessimistically that "most of the foreign
ministers have other things to do while the inter-
American system sinks."
Honduras remains tense? and a leader of the
opposition Liberal Party claims that unless Salva-
doran
mitted
forces have
by 27 July,
withdrawn or an IAPF
Honduras will launc
has been com-
h an all-out
attack
drive the enemy trop s out.
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In Teguci-
galpa unsigned flysheets are urging President Lopez
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to fight again. Criticism of the Lopez government
for inaction against the occupation appears to be
gaining momentum.
In El Salvador, government--controlled broad-
casts continue to stress anti-Honduran propaganda
but have softened attacks against the OAS. Privately
owned radio stations, however, continue to exhort
the government not to accede to OAS pressure.
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Okinawa-US: Leftist elements are trying to in-
tensify their struggle against the presence of US
military bases by exploiting the recent "nerve gas"
incident.
The leftists plan a large demonstration on 29
July to demand the immediate and complete withdrawal
of all chemical warfare weapons from Okinawa. The in-
fluential Okinawa Teachers Association, one of the
more moderate groups in the reversion movement, has
announced that it will try to "maximize" participa-
tion in the demonstration.
The demonstration is also being called to build
support for a "second wave" strike by the military
Workers Union. The strike, now tentatively set for
three days next week, will protest disciplinary ac-
tion taken by US authorities against Okinawan base
workers after a strike last month in which some of
the workers clashed with US soldiers. The union
leadership is, however, having trouble deciding what
tactics to follow.
The announcement by US authorities that "cer-
tain" chemical warfare agents would be removed from
Okinawa has not completely soothed the islanders'
emotions; on 25 July 75 leftist students protesting
chemical agents brokq into the mound of the US
civil administrator,
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USSR: A prominent Soviet economist advocates
cutting in half the number of construction projects
in the USSR because he believes that delays in con-
struction are responsible for the Soviets' techno-
logical lag behind the West.
V. A. Trapneznikov claims in Pravda that intro-
ducing new technology into Soviet industry takes al-
most twice the time that it should. He says this is
the result of delays in project documentation, insuf-
ficient financing, and inadequate supplies of con
struction materials, mechanized equipment, and labor.
The Soviet construction industry is chronically
inefficient and consistently fails to meet the ambi-
tious investment plans of the leadership. Last year
the value of unfinished construction amounted to a
record of 80 percent of the total value of the year's
investment program. In order to reduce this backlog
and concentrate on priority projects, Gosplan chair-
man Baybakov announced last December that the number
of new construction projects planned, for this year
would be approximately half the number planned for
1968.
Last month Moscow issued three decrees directed
at basic problems of the Soviet construction industry.
The decrees authorize bonuses for the timely comple-
tion of projects and for high-quality work; they also
establish new planning methods to ensure greater con-
trol over the construction process and to improve de-
sign and estimate work. Similar decrees in the past
have not resulted in significant improvements in So-
viet construction practices.
Although delays in construction, inhibit techno-
logical progress in the USSR, this is only one of
many factors responsible for the technological gap
between the developed West and the USSR, Closing
this gap probably will remain an unattainable goal
for the Soviets without a basic reform in their
present system of planning priorities, and economic
administration. The current economic reform involves
no such fundamental changes.
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Brazil: Armed forces commanders are concerned
that recent criticism of the government combined
with continuing terrorism will undermine public con-
fidence.
A pending investigation into charges of corrup-
tion and nepotism against President Costa e Silva
may further strain military unity. The charges, by
a maverick hard-line general, have weakened the au-
thority of the army minister
Ho e
ey ar - ine officers, while granting that the al-
legations may be true, feel that their circulation
has undermined the loyalty of the officer corps.
Military commanders at the same time are worried
about the effect of continuing terrorism on the pub-
lic. In Sao Paulo, the city most affected by terror-
ism during the past year, the past week saw new rob-
beries of banks and commercial firms, three cases of
possible arson, and threats of new attacks against
a building housing several US firms that was bombed
just prior to Governor Rockefeller's visit. Some
Sao Paulo residents fear that the next level of ter-
rorism will be kidnapings to obtain funds to finance
the terrorists' activities.
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The commander of the Second Army, which is based
in Sao Paulo, has proposed that he and the commanders
of Brazil's other three army regions assume full re-
sponsibility for all security forces and declare all-
out war on terrorists and subversives. To increase
its effectiveness, the army is enlarging its garrisons
in the city and state of Sao Paulo and tightening
its control of Brazil's state militia.
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Morocco-Algeria: Postponement of King Hassan's
official visit to Algiers is the first snag to ap-
pear during the year-long detente in relations between
Morocco and Algeria. The action could stir up some
of the undercurrents of animosity that run within
each government.
Hassan's visit, intended to reciprocate one by
Boumediene to Rabat last January, is now planned for
late September. It had been scheduled for early
August, although specific dates had not been set.
The snag apparently involves differences between
Morocco and Algeria over Spanish Sahara, which both
Morocco and Mauritania covet and in which Algeria
has x ressed an interest. The King
I I asked Boumediene for
assurances that Algeria woulcL not cause difficulties
in the event Rabat could make a deal with Mauritania
d S anish Sahara between them.
Boumediene favors accommodating the King,
but the awks" within the Algerian Government hold
out for unspecified concessions on the part of
Morocco,
I the Algerians asked
that Morocco abandon its claim to the mineral-rich
Tindouf area of southwestern Algeria, and they would
not accept oral assurances that this claim would not
be pressed.
77
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NOTES
Ital The right-wing Socialists yesterday
rejects emier Rumor's effort to re-form a Chris-
tian Democratic-Socialist coalition, thus prolonging
the government crisis. President Saragat may now
ask the Christian Democrats to form a minority gov-
ernment alone. That party's left wing may make dif-
ficulties, however, since it--unlike the party
majority--wants left-wing Socialists in any new gov-
ernment even if the right-wing Socialist party still
refuses to participate.
Keen a: The government has taken a first step
toward easing the tensions aroused after the assas-
sination of Tom Mboya by appointing three of his
fellow Luo 'tribesmen to high government posts.
Mboya's crucial portfolio for economic development
was given to Joseph Odero--Jowi, until now Minister
for East African Affairs and a former close associate
who is capable and pro-Western. These appointments
may allay the Luos' fears that their archrivals
from the Kikuyu tribe are seeking to eliminate them
completely from the government.
Colombia-USSR, President Lleras reportedly
will not further facilitate the entry into Colombia
of the growing number of Soviet cultural exchange
representatives.
eras may feel that the visits
of
S
i
artistic? athletic, and labor delegations
come too frequent,, but he did not rule out
have
the
ov
be-
use
of courtesy visas like those issued recently to a
large Soviet ballet troupe.
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