CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A014100090001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 3, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 14, 1969
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A014100090001-5.pdf349.95 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0141 - DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret 50 14 July 1969 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014100090001-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14100090001-5 Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14100090001-5 Approved For Release 200?,&71v-`ClA-RDP79TO0975AO14100090001-5 No. 0167/69 14 July 1969 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1) Laos: The government's effort to recapture Muong Sou shows signs of floundering. (Page 3) El Salvador - Honduras: Salvadoran incursions and planne Honduran troop movements will seriously in- crease tensions. (Page 5) Senegal - Nationalist China: Restoration of diplo- matic relations (Page 7) SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014100090001-5 Approved For Release 2ooSiWR.k'TA-RDP79T00975A014100090001-5 I South Vietnam: Communist military activity re- mained at a low level throughout the country over the weekend. There were persistent indications, however, that the enemy is preparing for another spurt of attacks in the near future to climax the so-called "July ac- tion phase." The evidence suggests that these attacks like earlier "highpoints" this summer, will consist largely of localized hit-and-run shellings, some in- terspersed with limited ground probes. Meanwhile, some Communist regular units may be adopting sapper and guerrilla tactics and discarding their conventional main force tactics in order to economize troops and supplies. A recent prisoner from a Communist subregion northwest of Saigon claims that two of three main force regiments assigned to that operational sector were converted to sapper units. This change, according to the captive, was dictated by the success of allied terrain-clearing operations and th heavy losses incurred by the sub- region's forces. 14 Jul 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14100090001-5 Approved For Release 2003/c BCI J DP79T00975A014100090001-5 LAOS: Current Situation Caleieng Dat JAHRES mv frooo huiltfi,n IMUM -t-Mk Iocmo . 4.W CO THAILAND 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014100090001-5 Approved For Release 2003/0&I]IQRIE-'DP79T00975A014100090001-5 Laos: The government's effort to recapture Muong Soui shows signs of floundering. Government troops captured a number of strate- gic hill positions within two miles of the base late last week, but little progress has been made to follow up these gains. At least one close-in position has since been lost to the enemy. Bad weather is severely curtailing air support--on which the government heavily depends--and is en- abling the Communists to truck in supplies and pos- sibly reinforcements from the.Plaine des Jarres. Meo General Vang Pao is considering committing additional battalions to breathe new life into the Muong Soui campaign. A sharp Communist counterat- tack, however, appears to be only a matter of time. In recent days enemy troops have been moving in on Bouam Long, a guerrilla base north of Muong Soui, and Xieng Dat, where neutralist troops have been holed up since retreating from Muong Soui two weeks ago. Government leaders, meanwhile, are apprehensive about what they regard as a growing threat to the royal capital of Luang Prabang. The Communists have rebuffed the government's attempts to clear the lower portions of the Nam Cu Valley and probes have been made as far south as Pak Ou on. the Mekong River. Although it is too early to tell how serious the flurry of activity is, three North Vietnamese battalions appear to have moved south from the Nam Bac area for this campaign, raising the possibility that the Communists may intend to isolate Luang Pra- bang. (Map) Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014100090001-5 Approved For Release 2003/(?BdRDP79T00975A014100090001-5 El Salvador-Honduras Dispute Complicated by Armed Clashes 'KMEX1C ) SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14100090001-5 Approved For Release 2003F&1 .EI -RDP79T00975A014100090001-5 ( El Salvador - Honduras: Fighting has broken out along the border and there is concern in Honduras that this may be a prelude to an invasion. Salvadoran and Honduran patrols clashed Sunday morning at El Poy and press reports indicate that fighting was resumed in this area in mid-afternoon.] On 11 July, a small Salvadoran force reportedly penetrated Honduran territory and was repulsed with four killed. This had been the first actual clash between troops of the two countries and the first combat deaths reported since El Salvador broke dip- lomatic relations on 26 June.. Honduran medical personnel have been sent to the frontier, and Honduran President Lopez has in- dicated that troop reinforcements will also be dis- patched. In addition, units from home garrisons near the capital and San Pedro Sula have reportedly been moved to within a few miles of the-border. Fears among the large Salvadoran community in Honduras can be expected to increase in spite of a Honduran pledge of protection renewed on 12 July. Many of these Salvadorans may join the more than 16,000 who have already fled Honduras. A continued exodus would further complicate efforts to defuse the.ssituation,and would reinforce pressures on Sal- vadoran President Sanchez for an invasion. (Map) Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014100090001-5 Approved For Release 2003/SkMPRDP79T00975A014100090001-5 NOTES 25X1 Senegal Nationalist China: Senegal will soon restore diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, Relations between the two countries were severe in September 1964 after the Senegalese ex- pelled the Chinese charge.for alleged involvement in internal Senegalese politics. The two main reasons for the resumption of relations appear to be President Senghor's belief that Chinese Commu- nist-influenced elements were behind recent serious student disorders, and Senghor's appreciation of the efforts of the Nationalist Chinese rice mission that had remained on the job despite the rupture in Central Intelligence Bulletin 7 SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14100090001-5