CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014000080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50,
27 June 1969
State Dept. review completed
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No. 0153/69
27 June 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
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Gibraltar: Spain's latest harassment is timed to
stress disapproval of elections under Gibraltar's
new constitution. (Page 4)
Uruguay: There is still some doubt that congress
will approve the President's state of siege.
(Page 5)
El Salvador - Honduras: Relations continue to de-
teriorate. (Page 6)
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Argentina: Proposed aircraft purchase (Page 7)
Greece: Cabinet changes (Page 8)
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NORTH
VIETNAM
Demilitarized- Zone
AVERAGE STRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
Battalion: VC 200- 400
NVA 300- 500
VC 1,000-1,500
NVA 1,200-2,000
Division: VC 5,000-7,000
NVA 5,0008,000
SOUTH VIETNAM
I
190
MILES
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C South Vietnam: The doubts held by some South
Vietnamese military officers in the provinces about
allied prospects at the Paris talks have emerged.
According to a small sampling of views made
recently by US officials, some senior and middle-
echelon officers are disturbed by what they view as
a series of unilateral allied concessions, made to
soothe domestic US pressure. They believe that re-
cent movement toward the concept of Communist par-
ticipation in South Vietnam's political life may
culminate in elections leading to a coalition govern-
ment. They doubt the survivability of their own
government, much less the political parties, in a
postwar struggle with the Communists. Some cite
superior Communist political and electioneering
abilities while others claim the Communists would
circumscribe ground rules for elections.
While these views are fairly widespread, they
do not necessarily indicate any lessening of the
military's loyalty to Saigon at present. They may
be indicative of the limits within which President
Thieu must operate if he is to avoid open conflict
with the military, particularly as "Vietnamization"
proceeds and he is increasingly dependent on the
South Vietnamese Army.
Military activity remained light and scattered.
Ground action was negligible. The Communists again
shelled Ben Het and a military encampment just out-
side Tay Ninh.
Viet Cong defections in the Mekong Delta this
year are running over double those of 1968, but US
observers think many of these are refugees.
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
7
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EBy the end of May, the number of defectors in
the delta had already exceeded the total for all of
last year. Some US officials believe, however, that
over half of these might better be considered refu-
gees rather than soldiers. Many have served the
Viet Cong as laborers for short periods and brought
in no weapons. Such defections nevertheless often
reduce the manpower pool available to the Communists
and add to the already acute Viet Gong manpower
problem in the delta. However, in some cases de-
fectors return to their home areas and again be-
come available to Communist recruiters.
on balance, it appears that growing defections
have damaged the Viet Cong. The Communists have
moved a regiment largely made up of North Vietnamese
regulars from III Corps into the upper delta to
maintain their strength. Additionally, Communist
military operations have decreased during the past
year. Viet Cong battalions remain in the field,
however, and the Communist political apparatus is
still strong and active in much of the delta.
(Map) ,
27 Jun 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
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Gibraltar: Spain's latest harassment of Gi-
braltar, the closure of the ferry service from
Algeciras, is timed to stress Madrid's disapproval
of the first general election campaign under the
new constitution.
Foreign Minister Castiella, who has made a hard
line on Gibraltar a main point of his foreign policy,
may have found an additional incentive for pushing
an end to ferry service now. There are rumors that
he will lose his post in impending cabinet changes.
The only remaining transportation link, other
than ship, is the weekly British European Airways
flight that stops in Madrid en route to Gibraltar.
Spain could also cut water, cable, and telephone
communications.
Spain's latest move, in itself, is unlikely to
affect the outcome of the elections of 30 July. The
two leading parties strongly support Gibraltar's
link with Britain. None of the Rock's political
groups are pro-Spanish, and only a few Gibraltarian,s
desire complete independence. The new constitution
states that the colony will not be turned over
S ain a ainst the wishes of its inhabitants.
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Uruguay: There is still some doubt that con-
gress will approve President Pacheco's decree of
24 June instituting a limited state of siege.
The general assembly (the combined house and
senate) so far has failed to meet on the issue for
lack of a quorum. When it does, the decisive voice
.is likely to be that of a key opposition senator who
backed the government in maintaining a previous
state of siege but has now become disenchanted with
the regime.
In the meantime, Pacheco is vigorously enforc-
ing the siege provisions. More than 160 labor lead-
ers have been arrested and the military are occupy-
ing key public services to prevent sabotage. Par-
tial work stoppages and strikes are continuing, how-
ever, and the Communist Party plans to see that more
take place in the next few days.
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El Salvador - Honduras: Relations between the
two countries continue to deteriorate.
Attempts by El Salvador to ease tensions through
quiet bilateral negotiations have been temporarily
frustrated by political pressure within El Salvador
to halt the exodus of Salvadorans from Honduras. El
Salvador is overpopulated, and for years it has re-
lied on its neighbor to absorb its population sur-
plus.
Fearing violence in their host country, over
6,000 of the more than 250,000 Salvadorans in Hon-
duras have returned home, even though the Honduran
Government has promised them protection.
President Sanchez of El Salvador has accused
Honduras of genocide and has petitioned the OAS Hu-
man Rights Commission to investigate the situation.
Honduras has requested an OAS investigation, charg-
ing that El Salvador was merely trying to block ne-
gotiations on an outstanding border dispute. These
recriminations may further inflame nationalistic
passions in both countries and impede any normaliza-
tion of relations. Pressure may develop in Honduras
for ending Salvadoran immigrationrand Honduras' vol-
untary boycott of Salvadoran goods may disrupt eco-
nomic relations between the two countries and be-
tween them and the Central American Common Market.
D
Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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Argentina: The navy intends to request the
Rockefeller mission's help in facilitating the pur-
chase of aircraft from the US, including the Douglas
A-4 jet fighter. This plane would be assigned to
the used aircraft carrier purchased last year from
the Netherlands. The air force has obtained 50 of
these aircraft since 1966, but the Argentines have
been informed that the US Government would not ap-
prove the sale of attack aircraft--such as the A-4--
to the navy. If the A-4s are not made available,
the navy reportedly will negotiat for similar
aircraft from Britain or Italy.
(continued)
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Greece-: Premier Papadopoulos reportedly has
agreed to a partial reshuffle of his cabinet. It
will affect the ministries of justice, communica-
tions, and agriculture, as well as education, whose-
minister resigned last week. The shifts are intended
to placate the military junta's hard-line young of-
ficers, who recently petitioned the premier to drop
all ministers they consider "socialist" and to re-
place them with right-wingers. Papadopoulos re-
portedly claims that he is not in a position to oust
all the "liberal" elements in his cabinet, and for
the present, at least, his explanation is being
accepted. F77 I
27 Jun 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 8
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