CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013100130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 25, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
5!
25 February 1969
State Dept. reviewApopmr(pvletWor Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A013100130001-1
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No. 0048/69
25 February 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Berlin: Chances for removing the presidential elec-
tion from Berlin remain uncertain. (Page 3)
Communist China: The ninth party congress, now nine
years overdue, is likely to be held in March. (Page 4)
Czechoslovakia: The authorities in Prague are deal-
ing confidently with the Soviet occupiers and
their sympathizers. (Page 6)
France-Africa: French-speaking countries around the
world have created a new cultural and technical co-
operation agency. (Page 8)
India: The Left Communists will dominate the new
coalition government in West Bengal. (Page 9)
Panama: The deportation of Colonel Martinez leaves
National Guard Commander Torrijos as sole strong man
in the military government. (Page 10)
Dominican Republic: Student demands for more money
for t e University of Santo Domingo have resulted in
violence. (Page 11)
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Korea: Agent boat (Page 13)
Communist China: Diplomatic relations (Page 13)
Guatemala: Resignation of defense minister (Page 14)
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Vietnam: The Communists appear to be planning
to follow the spate of weekend incidents with ground
attacks by at least some main force units.
Prisoners taken on 23 February as they probed
allied positions in widely scattered areas of the
country claim that they were ordered to open approach
corridors for other enemy units soon to follow. These
prisoners assert that the main enemy blows are yet
to come.
discussing the role of guerrilla and local forces in
the current offensive suggest that the Communists in-
tend to sustain their military activity at a fairly
high level for some weeks rather than to put all their
effort into a relatively brief burst of activity.
President Thieu's calm and reasoned view of the
upsurge in Communist activity appears to characterize
general South Vietnamese political reaction. Thieu
told the press that the Communists' actions were
those of an "enemy in a confused and weakened posi-
tion." Vice President Ky in characteristic fashion
told the press that "the South Vietnamese Air Force
is ready to bomb North Vietnam," and that he would
urge Thieu to approve such action if the Communists
persist in shelling South Vietnamese cities. Ky's
attitude later, however, was to dismiss the Commu-
nist action out of hand.
Preliminary reaction by the South Vietnamese
press ran the gamut from those who urged caution in
reacting to others who advocated breaking off the
Paris talks. Several papers expressed a belief that
the Communist shelling of Saigon reflected an inabil-
ity to muster an attack similar to the 1968 Tet of-
fensive.
(continued)
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Vietnam Communist propaganda reaction has been
predictably swift and full of bravado. Hanoi and
Liberation radios have portrayed the attacks as an
"offensive" launched in response to Ho Chi Minh's
recent call for continued attacks. The Communists
have been particularly careful to assert that their
shellings of South Vietnamese cities were directed
specifically against military and government posi-
tions in an effort to counter charges that they in-
discriminately struck civilian areas.
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[Berlin: Chances for removing the presidential
election from Berlin remain uncertain.
Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin, in his meeting
with Chancellor Kiesinger on 23 February, appar-
ently encouraged the West Germans to believe that
the East Germans might go beyond the concessions
suggested by Ulbricht in his letter of 21 February.
In that letter, Ulbricht said "positive considera-
tion"' would be given to the possibility of opening
the Berlin Wall for visits this Easter if Bonn
would relocate the election scheduled for 5 March.
Mayor Schuetz has indicated that he and Chan-
cellor Kiesinger are agreed that any pass agreement
must last for at least a year, and presumably
cover all major holiday periods, not just Easter.
They also require that an agreement on passes be
firm prior to switching the venue of the election.
The East Germans offered to negotiate a pass agree-
ment following the announced change of site.
Schuetz has been authorized by the Chancellor
to sound out the East German authorities, but thus
far there has been no reported contact between the
two sides. Schuetz has told Western Allied offi-
cials that he has until 28 February to inform Bonn
whether a decision is still to be made not to hold
the election in Berlin. A Bonn official spokesman
has also emphasized that speed is essential to the
successful conclusion of a deal.
The mayor said he expects the pros and cons
of the proposed deal to be hotly debated in West
Berlin political circles. It is probable that the
bulk of the West Berliners would be willing to sac-
rifice the presidential election and its emphasis
on Bonn-Berlin ties for the chance to see their
relatives and friends in East Berlin once more.
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Communist China: Most signs now point to a
convening of the ninth party congress, now nine
years overdue, sometime in March.
On 5 February, Premier Chou En-lai is said to
have told that the con-
gress woul probably be e in March, though no
final decision had yet been made. This is the
most authoritative statement on the timing of the
congress.
After the twelfth plenum of the central com-
mittee last October, Peking announced that the
party congress would be held "at an appropriate
time." About a third of China's provinces held
provincial-level congresses of party members in
November and December to discuss the proposed new
party constitution and to prepare for the congress.
This was the first important activity entrusted to
the remnant party organization since it was torn
to pieces by the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Pre-
sumably, this stage has now been completed through-
out the country.
I claimed a month ago to
have reliable information that high-level prepara-
tory meetings for the ninth congress were held in
Peking from the end of December to 15 January.
Observers in Peking have noted that some dele-
gations to the congress were already in Peking and
that massive preparations are under way for the
congress. Provincial broadcasts in mid-February
urged listeners to greet the "imminent" ninth party
congress.
Other reports received this year have mentioned
dates running from late February to late spring,
but centering on March. This wide range of dates is
further evidence that some slippage has been caused
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by backstage disagreements among the leadership
over the form and membership of the reconstituted
party. As there has been no apparent resolution
of the problems, further slippage is possible. On
the other hand, Peking could decide to go ahead
with a congress that is lar el ro forma.
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Czechoslovakia: The authorities in Prague
are dealing more confidently with the Soviet oc-
cupiers and their sympathizers.
The government has decided to take action
against individuals responsible for distributing
clandestine pro-Soviet and conservative publica-
tions which technically are illegal. These pub-
lications include Zpravy, the official paper of
the Soviet occupation forces, and anonymous pub-
lications that have slandered some Czechoslovak
leaders.
Three prominent conservatives have been put
on the defensive. Youth organizations in Prague
have filed a libel suit against party secretary
Alois Indra for suggesting that the death by fire
of the student martyr, Jan Palach, and youth and
journalist meetings in Prague were all progressive
plots organized by one "stage director."
Vilem Novy, another outspoken hard-liner, has
said that he has been "misunderstood" and has de-
cided to retire from membership in the central com-
mittee and the federal assembly. Former deputy
interior minister Viliam Salgovic, who was charged
with collaboration last August, has denied that he
had a role in the invasion and has declared his
support for Dubcek's reform program.
Czechoslovak officials appear to have fared
much better than the population had expected during
recent negotiations with the Soviets to iron out
housekeeping details of the occupation. For exam-
ple, the Czechoslovaks reportedly managed to get
postponed a decision to build new housing for So-
viet officers by arguing that the decision would
contradict the basic treaty agreement on the "tem-
porary" nature of the occupation. The Czechoslovaks
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have announced that the various Soviet command head-
quarters in Prague districts would be consolidated
into a single headquarters "in a few days." The
leadership also has announced it had requested that
Soviet soldiers--like Czechoslovak soldiers--should
not be allowed to carry live ammunition when off
duty. 1 771
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France-Africa: At French impetus, French-speak-
ing countries around the world have created a new
cultural and technical cooperation agency.
Delegates from some 30 countries, most of them
African, met in Niamey, Niger, from 17-20 February,
and appointed Niger President Diori to direct the
preparatory work for the new agency. A team of ex-
perts headed by a Canadian is to draft statutes and
propose concrete actions in the educational and cul-
tural fields to Diori within six months. The new
organization will receive an initial French grant
of perhaps $3 million.
French Minister for Cultural Affairs Andre Mal-
raux at the opening session depicted French culture
in the modern world as the successor to that of the
ancient Greeks. Among the countries represented
were South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Lebanon, Haiti,
Belgium, and most of the French-speaking countries
of Africa. Algeria's expected delegate unaccount-
ably did not appear in Niamey.
Canada was well represented with a national
delegation plus delegates from Quebec, New Bruns-
wick, and Ontario. Agence France Presse singled
out Quebec's participation for specia mention at
the expense of Canada wherever possible.
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:India: The Left Communists will dominate the
new coalition government scheduled to be formed to-
day in strategic West Bengal and will be in position
to extend their influence further in the state.
After prolonged negotiations among the 12 par-
ties in the United Front over the distribution of
cabinet posts, a compromise strongly favoring the
Left Communists was worked out. Ajoy Mukherjee,
the leader of a small party made up largely of Con-
gress Party defectors, will be the chief minister.
Mukherjee, a politician
who headed an ear i.er ni ec .ron government, will
probably be little more than a pliant front man for
the Left Communists, who will have control of the
most important governmental activities.
Left Communist leader Jyoti Basu is slated to
be deputy chief minister in charge of the state po-
lice and civil service--key responsibilities charged
to Mukherjee in the first United Front government.
This will give the party power to reward officials
who further its purposes and to punish those who try
to block its aims.
The other eight cabinet posts awarded to the
Left Communists are concerned with matters vital to
those sectors of West Bengal society that the party
is most interested in further penetrating. Govern-
ment activities concerning landless peasants, fac-
tory workers, students, teachers, and refugees will
all be under the ministerial supervision of Left
Communists.
The Left Communists can look forward to domi-
nating the West Bengal government for some time.
The United Front has a substantial majority in the
state assembly, and even a split between the Commu-
nist and non-Communist members of the coalition
would probably not bring the government down. The
United Front will probably seek to avoid giving New
Delhi any justification for reimposing direct rule
on the state. F77 I
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Panama: The arrest and political exile of
Colonel Martinez and several of his supporters
yesterday leave National Guard Commander Torrijos
as sole strong man in the military government.
Martinez, who triggered the guard take-over
that ousted Arnulfo Arias last October, has been
the driving force in pushing reform under the "rev-
olutionary" government, but his impulsive and high-
handed methods as military chief of staff had for
some time caused resentment among military as well
as civilian circles.
Recent junta announcements abolishing political
parties and promising major land reform--probably
instigated by Martinez--may have brought pressure
from wealthy oligarchs to have Torrijos remove him.
Torrijos, who now commands the allegiance of key
staff officers, is more likely to accommodate the
old-line elite politicians, who had been under
heavy fire during Martinez' ascendance in policy-
making.
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Dominican Republic ' : Student demands that the
government increase its budget for the University
of Santo Domingo have already resulted in violence,
and further disorders are likely.
On 20 February a student member of the Commu-
nist Dominican Popular Movement was killed by po-
lice during a secondary school demonstration. The
police succeeded in preventing any serious violence
during his funeral on 21 February, but students
will almost certainly continue efforts to make a
martyr of their comrade. Student agitation in re-
cent weeks has been marked-by increased militancy.
Small-scale disturbances and bomb explosions, which
occurred both in the capital and interior cities
in the last week, are likely to continue in view
of the support of secondary school students for
the university's position.
The university's recurrent budget problem,
which has served as a rallying point for leftist
forces, last year led to violent clashes between
students and government forces. Some of the Com-
munist factions at the university have formed a
"united front" for this year's budget struggle,
and the leftist, major opposition Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party has also supported university de-
mands. The university council, alleging insuffi-
cient funds, has voted to suspend the salaries of
teaching and administrative personnel beginning on
1 March, probably in an effort to force a showdown.
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NOTES
Korea: On 24 February, a South Korean de-
stroyer exchanged fire with what probably was a
North Korean agent boat off the South Korean west
coast. When engaged, the North Korean boat was
rapidly withdrawing from South Korean waters, pos-
sibly after landing agents. So far, however, there
have been no reports of contacts with infiltrators
in the area. The agent boat apparently was hit,
but escaped into North Korean waters. The South
Korean destroyer sustained four casualties and
minor damage.
Communist China: There are new indications
that Peking may send ambassadors abroad in the
near future. Chinese ambassadors were recalled for
revolutionary reindoctrination in 1967, and only
one has remained at his post.
Chinese diplomats have in-
-ica a a? severa ambassadorial posts in Asia
and Western Europe will be filled sometime this
spring.
These remarks apparently reflect the belief
that the forthcoming ninth party congress will
have a "normalizing" effect on Chinese foreign re-
lations. F__ 7
(continued)
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Guatemala: Defense Minister Chinchilla's
resignation late last week follows closely on his
withdrawal as the ruling party's presidential can-
didate for 1970. Estrangement between President
Mendez and Chinchilla developed following a dis-
agreement with party leaders several weeks ago.
Mendez' lack of support for Chinchilla during the
clash probably convinced him that his dismissal
would come soon. Chinchilla's replacement, General
Reyes, although reported to be a relatively color-
less and cautious individual, is loyal to the Pres-
ident. These changes are not expected to cause
adverse reaction within the military.
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