CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013100030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelli~ence Bulletin
Secret
.90
12 February 1969
State Dept. review completed
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No. 0037/69
12 February 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR - West Germany: Chances that Bonn will sign the
nonproliferation treaty are improved. (Page 2)
Italy: Secretary General Longo's speech at the Com-
munist Party congress apparently displeased both hard-
and soft-liners in East European delegations. (Page 3)
Finland-USSR: A Soviet press attack has elicited a
low-key reaction in Finland. (Page 4)
Greece: Chances appear slight for a quick resumption
of pc5Titical activity. (Page 6)
Dominican Republic: The extreme left is striving to
create an air of violence. (Page 7)
India: Order is returning to Bombay after three days
of riots . (Page 9)
.Mauritius: Preparations for elections may bring
greater unrest over the next few weeks. (Page 11)
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Yugoslavia - Communist China: Trade delegation (Page 13)
Chile: Squatter invasions (Page 14)
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Major Target Struck by Communists 10-11 Feb.
SOUTH VIETNA
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South Vietnam: The Communists stepped up the
pace of their military actions on 10-11 February,
shelling several urban centers and allied bases
from Da Nang southward to the Mekong Delta.
At least four provincial capitals were taken
under enemy rocket: and mortar fire, with the city
of Cheo Reo in the central highlands hardest hit.
Although the action at Cheo Reo, which also included
limited ground probes, was directed largely against
government headquarters installations within the
city, it nonetheless resulted in fairly sizable cas-
ualti.es--24 killed, 33 wounded--to both South Viet-
namese civilian and military personnel.
The allied air base at Da Nang along with a net-
work of infantry and artillery bases northwest of
Saigon in Tay Ninh Province were among the more sig-
nificant military objectives struck by the Communists.
These attacks may be followed by an increase in en-
emy activity prior to and possibly during the Tet
holiday period (17-19 February)
The Communists have set the propaganda stage to
justify whatever military action they may have in mind
for Tet. A Liberation Radio broadcast of 10 February
threatened Communist military retaliation in response
to any allied "violations" of the Front's seven-day
cease-fire (15-22 :February), The broadcast said
that the Communists would strike wherever the "vio-
lation occurs, in an urban area or in a liberated
area." The Communists used a similar line to ex-
plain away their Tet offensive of 1968.
(Map)
12 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR - West Germany: A recent Soviet note to
West Germany on the nonproliferation treaty has im-
proved the chances that Bonn will sign the treaty.
The note, which Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin
delivered to Foreign Minister Brandt on 7 February,
spelled out Soviet understanding of Germany's rights
under the treaty.f. The two met again yesterdays pre-
sumably for further discussion on the subject. The
note made no reference to articles 53 and 107 6
the UN Charter--the "enemy states" articles--which
Moscow has claimed give it the right to intervene
to prevent a revival of Naziism in West Germany.
It does, however, refer to a Security Council res-
olution that holds out the prospect of Council pro-
tection for states under nuclear attack or the
threat of attack, and implicitly recognizes West
Germany's right to participate in collective secu-
rity arrangements. Thus it meets Bonn's wishes to
some extent.
Initial West German comment has been favorable.
A high-level West German diplomat observed that,
while the Soviet statement does not resolve the
problem, it does represent an important effort on
Moscow's part to facilitate Bonn's signature.
Chancellor Kiesinger's intentions are not yet known,
but this development, along with the impetus that
presumably will be provided by US actions, may clear
the way for Germany's signature before next fall's
general election campaign warms up.
Tsarapkin said he was not linking Soviet move-
ment on the treaty with other issues, but that if
Bonn were to reconsider its stand on holding its
presidential election in Berlin, relations between
the two countries would be improved.
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Italy: The leadership of the Italian Commu-
nist Party has made clear that it will maintain
its position on the Czechoslovak situation but
will avoid giving fresh offense to Moscow.
Secretary General Longo, in his opening ad-
dress to the party congress, reaffirmed the party's
stand of "dissent and disapproval" on Czechoslo-
vakia, and insisted on full respect for the "au-
tonomy and sovereignty of every Communist party
and Socialist state." He asked full support for
the Czechoslovak. leadership, and while calling
for a neutral Italy outside NATO, indicated that
this should occur within the context of a Euro-
pean security settlement.
Longo had cautiously favorable words for
the Moscow conference of Communist parties sched-
uled for next May, thus confirming recent state-
ments of intention to participate.
The speech seems to have displeased both
hard- and soft-liners among delegations from East-
ern Europe. Later the chief Soviet delegate de-
fended his government's action in Czechoslovakia,
but quickly passed on to less controversial sub-
jects.
This reaction accords with the handling of
Longo's speech in the Soviet press, which has
featured his comments on the Communist confer-
ence, but has all but ignored his remarks on
Czechoslovakia. Moscow, nevertheless, must cer-
tainly be unhappy over the Italians' performance,
which demonstrated again how difficult the Czech-
oslovak issue is to bury. F77 I
12 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Finland-USSR: Reaction in Finland to Pravda's
criticism of alleged Finnish right-wing efforts to
undermine relations with the Soviet Union has been
remarkably low key.
In a recent article signed "Observer," usually
indicative of an authoritative source, Pravda as-
serted that flourishing Finnish-Soviet economic re-
lations were a vital component of friendship between
the two nations. Pravda alleged that arguments in
the Finnish Parliament and press against the pur-
chase of Soviet electric locomotives were inspired
by "extreme right-wing circles closely connected
with Western monopoly capital." These arguments,
Pravda alleged, had also stimulated the re-emergence
of right-wing elements in such groups as the Social
Democratic Party, even though the party was pledged
to advance the cause of Finnish-Soviet friendship.
The reason for the Soviet press attack is un-
clear, although such a practice has been used as a
means to soften up small West European countries.
The Finns decided in December after long public
debate to suspend a five-year-old parliamentary
resolution calling for the purchase of domestically
built locomotives. Parliament instead gave the
government a free hand to purchase Soviet locomo-
tives, with the phrase "if economically justified"
thrown in as a sop to the opposition.
Some interpretations of the article foresee a
period of strained relations between Finnish Social
Democrats and the USSR. Others view the article
as an admonition to Finnish Communists to cease
their internal squabbling and instead advance the
cause of closer Finnish-Soviet relations. Prime
Minister Koivisto, however, believes that it is
concerned with the future development of Finnish-
Soviet trade in connection with Finnish plans for
participation in the Nordic Economic Union (Nordec)
and he commented that Soviet attitudes would be
plumbed before any final decisions were made.
(continued)
12 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Discussions on Nordec probably will be high
on the Finnish foreign minister's agenda when he
starts a one-week official visit to Moscow on 17
February. The Soviets will presumably make their
views known at that time.
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Greece: The chances for any speedy resumption
of political activity in Athens seem slight, and
the military government's control remains unchal-
lenged.
Premier Papadopoulos recently told foreign
newsmen that the time is not yet ripe for relaxa-
tion of political restrictions, and he could not
forecast when new political parties would be al-
lowed to form. Moreover, he said, when such condi-
tions do arise, the multiplicity of parties which char-
acterized Greek politics before the military take-
over of April 1967 will not be permitted; the people
must become oriented toward a system with only two
or three parties. Although confident that his gov-
ernment could win any early election, Papadopoulos
said quick elections would risk a return to the
situation which existed prior to April 1967 because
"some weaknesses in the Greek mentality" persist.
Although Papadopoulos' opinion of his govern-
ment's popularity with the electorate may be ques-
tionable, no alternative to military rule is emerg-
ing. The slow progress of the "revolution"--Papa-
dopoulos recently told a US official that his pro-
gram is six months behind schedule--irks the ex-
politicians, but has produced no real reaction from
the populace who apparently are still uncommitted.
The loudest criticism still comes from West European
quarters which continue to question whether Greece
will ever return to representative government.
12 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Dominican Republic: Elements of the extreme left
appear increasingly willing to engage in political as-
sassinations and risk military reprisals in order to
create a favorable atmosphere for violent agitation.
The slaying of an army captain in early November
was quickly followed by a joint army/police raid on a
labor union headquarters in the vicinity of the murder.
The Communist Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) pub-
licly claimed credit in December for killing a former
Trujillo henchman, and last week it announced regret
over the failure of its attempt to assassinate a po-
lice captain. Possibly in response to the leftist
violence, a suspected Communist was slain on 7 Feb-
ruary by unknown assailants.
The MPD, like all of the Communist left, has
lost ground since 1965 as the security forces have
disrupted its activities and the movement has splin-
tered. Its stated intention to conduct further as-
sassinations is probably designed to stir additional
extremist opposition against the government. Its
actions may also provoke indiscriminate retaliation
from the armed forces that could alienate the moder-
ate left from the military-backed government.
12 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Police Restoring Order in Bombay
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MILES 400
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India: Police appear gradually to be restoring
order in Bombay after three days of serious rioting,
although new outbreaks could occur.
The disturbances were sparked by the Shiv Sena,
one of the local chauvinistic movements that have
proliferated in India over the last two years. The
trouble began when Shiv Sena followers, protesting
the central government's failure to settle a long-
standing border dispute between Maharashtra state
and neighboring Mysore, tried to block the entry of
Deputy Prime Minister Desai into the city. Lower
class Maharashtrians, with Shiv Sena encouragement,
then began turning on the economically more advanced
south Indians of ]Bombay, and other antisocial elements
joined in the looting and destruction. At least one
Hindu-Muslim clash was also reported.
A curfew has been imposed on the city and ad-
ditional police have been brought in from neighbor-
ing states. Army units reportedly are on standby
alert and could be rapidly deployed if necessary.
The Shiv Sena had experienced a rapid rise in
Bombay, but recently has been on the decline. It
retains, however, a nuisance value in the city.
Largely the personal vehicle of its fiery and un-
stable leader, Bal Thackeray, the party champions
the cause of native Maharashtrians--the largest and
one of the poorest of the many minority groups in
cosmopolitan Bombay. (Map)
12 F' eb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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O 15
MILES
MAURITIUS
AND DEPENDENCIES
COMPARATIVE DATA
Area Population (est.)
Mauritius 720 sq. mi. 800,000
Oahu, Hawaii 598 sq. mi. 500,000
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Mauritius: Preparations for municipal elections
may bring greater unrest over the next few weeks.
Elections for municipal councils are scheduled
for 30 March, and the communal-oriented political
parties are already maneuvering for support. The
Creole-dominated Mauritian Social Democratic Party
(PMSD) controls four of the five municipal councils,
but there are reports that the PMSD has lost strength.
PMSD leader Gaetan Duval has charged that the Inde-
pendence Party, a coalition of Hindu and Muslim groups
which controls the national government, instigated
a dock workers strike to gain support among the nor-
mally pro-PMSD Creole workers. He also charged that
the Independence Party is sending agents to stir up
trouble between Muslims and Creoles.
Over the past several weeks there has been a
slight increase in violent incidents of a communal
nature. Vandalism against a mosque brought inflam-
matory statements and pamphlets from Muslim extrem-
ists. The government banned the meetings of these
Muslims, seized their pamphlets, and arrested their
leaders.
Mauritius, independent since. last March, has a
history of racial violence. British troops were re-
quired to quell fighting between Muslim and Creole
gangs in January 1968. The Mauritian security forces
have received additional training and personnel, how-
ever, and are believed ca able of handling most in-
cidents. Map)
12 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Yugoslavia - Communist China: The expected
arrival of an official Yugoslav trade delegation
in Peking at the end of February will mark the
highest level trade talks between the two coun-
tries in a decade. The renewal of direct nego-
tiations is not likely to have any immediate eco-
nomic significance and probably will not create
much discomfort in the USSR. It could, however,
be interpreted to mean that Belgrade and Peking
may be willing to submerge their differences in re-
action to Moscow's domineering tactics. Belgrade
wants to demonstrate its sovereignty by maintain-
ing correct relations with all Communist coun-
tries, and the Chinese apparently are willing to
cooperate. F7 I
(continued)
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Chile: Clashes last weekend between squatters
and national police resulted in many injuries when
the squatters, claiming the Housing Ministry had
not delivered on a promise of land as part of a
self-help program, twice invaded public lands in
a low-income suburb of Santiago. A Socialist
candidate for the congressional elections on 2
March played a prominent role in the first inva-
sion, and two leading Communist candidates later
led squatters into the same area. The opposition
is likely to continue such tactics in an effort
to put the government in an unfavorable light
prior to the elections.
12 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 14
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