CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A012500050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 8, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DOE review completed.
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Secret
50
8 November 1968
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Sr;UKE 1
No 0308/68
8 November 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Communist China - Laos: The Chinese have apparently
resumed building roads into Laos. (Page 5)
Korea: A large group of North Korean infiltrators
seems trapped in South Korea. (Page 6)
Yemen: A break in royalist ranks may presage an end
to the fighting. (Page 7)
Czechoslovakia: There have been more anti-Soviet
emonstrations. (Page 9)
Zambia-Mozambique: The first known clash between the
armed forces of black-.arid white-ruled states in south-
ern Africa has occurred. (Page 11)
Colombia: The rejection of President Lleras' consti-
tutional reform program may bring growing political
tensions into the open. (Page 12)
Sierra Leone: By-elections (Page 13)
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J.G lsn.r. I
C South Vietnam; Communist military activity on
6-7 November was confined to light mortar attacks
against a few towns and villages.
Three district towns in the Saigon - III Corps
area and civilian hamlets on the outskirts of Quang
Ngai and Hoi An were hit with light mortar fire.
Casualties were light.
A recent survey of Communist intentions in the
Mekong Delta points to increased political agitation
rather than an upsurge in military activity in the
next few months. The delta is traditionally an area
of strong Communist influence and control, but the
25 main force and local battalions which comprise
the enemy's main military strength in the area do not
seem to have recovered from the intensive fighting
of Tet. Except for flurries of mortar attacks against
provincial towns, some sapper attacks, and occasional
heavy resistance to allied sweep operations, these
units have not launched any major attacks since Tet.
The large guerrilla force of some 20,000 men ap-
pears to be operating largely in support of the Com-
munists' stepped-up political program. The Commu-
nist effort to establish "liberation committees"
is especially strong in the delta area, and Communist
propaganda claims indicate that they intend to blanket
the IV Corps area with these committees. These com-
mittees probably function only in areas over which
the Communists have physical control--an area that
includes an estimated 28 percent of the population.
Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) data indicate that
although the number of people living in relatively
secure areas dropped significantly during Tet, the
South Vietnamese Government has now recovered almost
all the ground held before Tet.
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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5hU-K- t
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There are now 48 US and South Vietnamese maneuver
battalions in the delta. They have been engaged in
aggressive search-and-destroy operations for several
months, supported by extensive air strikes and by
artillery and naval units. This sustained pressure
on Viet Cong military units has probably contributed
to Communist inability to mount major military drives
in the delta, but it probably cannot bring about an
early enemy collapse. For some time the Communists
will be able to conduct hit-and-run mortar attacks,
guerrilla raids, terrorism, and political action in
this area while they try to rebuild their worn down
battalions. The Communists have shown a remarkable
ability to regenerate battered combat formations in
the past.
8 Nov 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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5.L LKL 1
Chinese Resume Road Construction in Northern Laos
CHINA
YUNNAN
"Me
Communist-controlled
territory
Luang Prabf i
VIETNAM
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SI C:,Kk 1.
Communist China - Laos: The Chinese have ap-
parently resumed construction of a road from southern
Yunnan Province into northern Laos.
since
early September several thousand Chinese have been
working on a road leading southward from the border
village of Ban Botene. The laborers apparently are
accompanied by Chinese security troops.
the Chinese have told local
officials that the road will continue south to Nam
Tha, with one spur heading southeast toward Muong Sai.
Roads linking Nam Tha and Muong Sai with China
would facilitate the flow of supplies to Pathet Lao
troops in remote areas of northern Houa Khong and
Luang Prabang provinces that are not connected by
road to North Vietnam. The new road construction may
be the Communists' reaction to the increased activity
of government guerrillas in the area during the past
year.
The Chinese have been engaged in intermittent
road building in the area under the terms of an agree-
ment reached with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in
1962. The current activity is the most significant
since 1963, when similar numbers of Chinese laborers
were used to complete the Meng-la - Phong Saly road.
At that time, the Chinese publicly announced plans
to build a road system linking southern Yunnan with
larger Laotian villages across the border. Little
had been done to carry out this plan, however, ex-
cept for sporadic work on the Meng-la - Ban Botene
section of road by small labor gangs.
8 Nov 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Korea: The North Korean guerrillas who landed
on the South Korean east coast on 3 November appear
trapped. More than 15,000 South Korean security
forces, including offshore naval units, have blocked
thus far seven guerrillas have been killed.
The roundup is expected to take considerable time be-
cause of rugged terrain and bad weather.
The North Korean infiltration attempt appears to
be the largest since the Korean war. Another unique
aspect was the forced indoctrination of villagers,
the first instance of "armed propaganda" since the
8 Nov 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Yemen: A major break in Yemeni royalist ranks
may represent a first step toward an end to the
fighting.
On 3 November a prominent royalist, tribal leader,
Qasim Munassir, agreed to end the fighting around
Sana and to merge his tribal forces with those of
the republic
Munassir was rewa.r e by being appointed military
commander of the eastern zone. In addition a council
of elders is to be established before 21 November to
discuss changing the name of the Yemeni Arab Republic
to something more palatable to the strongly Muslim
tribal leaders, such as eliminating the word republic.
Coming at a time when the republic was facing
a new royalist offensive as well as internal disorders
in the capital, this change-over by the most tenacious
of the royalist leaders must be regarded as more than
simple defection. The conditions he extracted from
the republicans appear to support this view.
There is no clear evidence,, however, that his
action is connected with the tenuous peace negotia-
tions which have been dragging on between the two
sides[ I It is
more -Likely that, as the tribal leaders have become
increasingly independent of both royalist and re-
publican governments, they have tended to carry on
their own negotiations, A continued trend among
royalists in switching allegiance to the republicans
could substantially reduce the area of fighting and
might result in a general tribal peace.
Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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SEURK L'
AREAS OF ANTI-SOVIET DEMONSTRATIONS
IN DOWNTOWN PRAGUE
6-7 NOVEMBER 1968
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[Czechoslovakia: There were more anti-Soviet dem-
onstrations in Prague yesterday.
Czechoslovak soldiers and police used force to
attempt to break up crowds shouting anti-Russian slo-
gans. The demonstrators included several thousand
young people, students, workers, and office employees.
The presence of white- and blue-collar workers is a
sign of the unusual depth of the anti-Soviet feeling
in Prague.
Some of the marchers were apparently demonstrat-
ing against their own leaders--including Dubcek--for
participating in ceremonies on 6 and 7 November com-
memorating the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.
Early on 7 November there were manifestations of
anti-Russian sentiment centering on the Esplanade Hotel,
and the police exercised restraint in breaking them up.
During the late afternoon and evening the situation de-
teriorated, especially near the party central committee
building, and the police began using their clubs.
The Soviets seem to have been expecting the dis-
turbances. On 5 November the US Army attache sighted
Soviet combat elements 15 kilometers from the city and
near the best high-speed roads leading to downtown
Prague. He noted some small Soviet units in the out-
skirts of the city where none had previously been
stationed.
Moscow will undoubtedly consider the demonstra-
tions a serious affront. The Soviets will see addi-
tional evidence that the Dubcek leadership is either
unable or unwilling to live up to its promise to con-
trol anti-Soviet manifestations. The Soviets, how-
ever, probably intend to intervene with their troops
only if the situation gets out of control of the Czech-
oslovak security forces.
There may be more demonstrations or even street
clashes on 10 November, when pro-Soviet party conserv-
atives plan to hold a public rally
8 Nov 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Zambia-Mozambique: A clash between Zambian and
Portuguese patrols on 6 November may be the first en-
gagement between regular armed forces of black- and
white-ruled states in southern Africa.
A Zambian Army patrol ambushed a Portuguese
Army patrol just inside Zambia near the Mozambique
border. The Zambian patrol commander claims to have
killed one and wounded two of the Portuguese, who
were looking for Mozambique guerrillas based in Zambia.
Both Lusaka and Lisbon discourage cross-border
operations by military units, although occasional
Portuguese raids have occurred either accidentally
or in hot pursuit. Although the Zambians may exploit
the incident for propaganda purposes, both sides prob-
ably will try to avoid serious disruption of existing
ties. Over the next several years incidents such as
this will nevertheless probably increase between the
of working out some accommodation.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Colombia: The rejection of President Lleras'
constitutional reform program by a Senate committee
on 5 November may bring growing political tensions
into the open.
The defeat reportedly has caused the resignation
of Minister of Government Misael Pastrana, Lleras'
closest Conservative Party collaborator in the Na-
tional Front coalition and a leading contender for
the presidency in the 1970 elections. It also points
up the growing disaffection between Lleras and a part
of his own Liberal Party that resents his high-handed
methods and looks to its own political future. Three
members of this group joined the opposition in the
vote on 5 November, which probably kills the entire
reform bill for the legislative session.
The most important reforms covered in the bill
are strengthening the executive in relation to the
legislative bodies, restoring simple majority rule
in congressional voting, increasing presidential power
in the economic field, restructuring departmental and
municipal governments, and planning for gradual dis-
mantling of the National Front.
Lleras appears to have expected the rebuff and
may already have made plans for a longer range ap-
proach to accomplish the basic reforms he considers
essential to Colombia's development toward political
maturity. The US Embassy comments that he seems
likely to tailor the remaining 21 months of his ad-
ministration to live with the failure of the reform
bill. However, the possibility has been raised that,
because he believes that the dilatory Colombian Con-
gress does not reflect the strong popular support
for his program, he might take the extralegal step
of calling a national plebiscite on the reforms.
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NOTES
Sierra Leone: Violence is mounting as the
country's two tribally and regionally based parties
compete in important parliamentary by-elections.
Prime Minister Stevens, beset by a fractious army
and unable to control extremists in his northern-
based party, has made little effort to reconcile
the country's divergent political forces. Elections
today in parts of the volatile southern half of the
country, where opposition political leaders have made
blatant appeals to tribalism could spark widespread
clashes.
(continued)
8 Nov 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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