CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A012400100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
31 October 1968
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No. 0301/68
31 October 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Panama: Junta suspends certain civil rights. (Page 2)
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Chile-Bolivia: Relations again strained by Bolivia's
aspiration to regain a port. (Page 5)
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Iceland: Broader coalition which might include
Communists 'reportedly under discussion. (Page 7)
UN - Communist China: Efforts to seat the Communist
Chinese are likely to fail again. (Page 8)
Iran: Ruling party wins municipal elections. (Page 9)
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Tunisia: Bourguiba continues to seek international
commitments for his country's security. (Page 11)
South Africa: Bantustan program is pursued as a
solution to racial problems. (Page 13)
Ghana: Government revises timetable for restoring
civilian rule. (Page 14)
Warsaw Pact: Moscow meeting (Page 15)
Yugoslavia: Demonstrations (Page 15)
Eastern Europe: Hoof and mouth (Page 16)
Nicaragua: Party feud (Page 16)
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I South Vietnam: Ground action on 29-30 October
continued light.
The most significant action occurred in An Xuyen
Province when US Navy patrol boats moved into a river
near the U Minh forest, which has been a traditional
Communist supply base. Over 240 Viet Cong sampans
and an extensive complex along the river bank were
reported to have been destroyed or damaged in a fire
fight between the US Navy boats and enemy forces
ashore. F7 I
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Panama: The junta has arbitrarily suspended
certain civil rights, in open violation of the con-
stitution. The move is probably intended to give
the national guard a free hand in dealing with its
opponents.
The military government has revoked an article
of the constitution prohibiting the "penalty of
death, expatriation or confiscation of property."
Although there is no indication that the junta will
actually invoke the death penalty, some government
officials may threaten to do so to intimidate oppo-
nents. Other constitutional privileges suspended
for the first time in Panama s history include the
guarantee of trial by competent authority, protection
against double jeopardy, and the right to have un-
constitutional orders or injunctions revoked.
Senior guard officers, meanwhile, have been
pressing the civilian cabinet members to give offi-
cial positions to "friends," some of them unqualified
but closely linked to the guard. There are also in-
dications of dissension within the cabinet over the
extent of reform measures to be proposed. The min-
isters pushing for a more radical approach are those
most closely associated with the military. The mod-
erates appear to be gaining some support among the
business community, which has withheld its backing
in the hope of exacting a firm commitment from the
junta for a return to ci government.
31 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Bolivia Seeks to Regain an "Outlet to the Sea"
AREA OF MAP
PERU f, ( BRAZIL
BOLIVIA
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Chile-Bolivia: Relations are again strained as
a result of Bolivia's aspiration to regain a port on
the Pacific Ocean.
Bolivian President Barrientos revived this per-
ennial dispute in a speech on 21 October commemorating
the centennial of the port of Antofagasta, formerly
part of Bolivia but now in Chilean hands. He labeled
Chile an "aggressor and usurper" and called for the
return of the coastal lands seized by Chile in 1879.
Shortly thereafter a Chilean flag was burned in La
Paz. The two governments have exchanged heated pro-
test notes, and newspapers in both countries have
given the incident full play.
In response to earlier Bolivian efforts to re-
gain an "outlet to the sea," Chile granted Bolivia
the use of port facilities in Arica and Antofagasta
in northern Chile, but has not permitted the Boliv-
ian flag to fly there. Bolivia also had duty-free
use of an oil pipeline and a railroad in the area.
Bolivia broke diplomatic relations with Chile in
1962 in a dispute over the use of the waters of the
Lauca River, which drains both countries.
This latest flurry probably will die down fairly 25X1
soon, but the emotional residue will ham er coo era-
tion on economic integration projects.
(Map)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Iceland: The government and opposition parties
are sago be discussing the formation of an all-
party government which might include the Communists.
The reported discussions are an extension of
talks which began in early September and which focus
on long-range measures to cope with Iceland's pro-
longed economic crisis. If the negotiations succeed,
Prime Minister Benediktsson's coalition of the Inde-
pendence (Conservative) and Social Democratic parties
might be broadened to bring in the Progressives and
the Communist-front Labor Alliance. The Alliance is
an important political force by virtue of its control
of a considerable portion of organized labor.
The entry of these two parties into the govern-
ment probably would not have an immediate impact on
such questions as membership in NATO and the contin-
ued stationing of US forces in Iceland. In the longer
run, however, the participation of these parties,
both of which advocate removing US troops, could
jeopardize the current good working relations between
US and Icelandic officials on defense matters.
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UN - Communist China: Efforts to seat the Com-
munist Chinese appear likely to fail again this year.
A group led by the Albanian delegation has once
more submitted a draft resolution calling for ejection
of the Chinese Nationalists from the Security Council
in favor of a delegation from Communist China. A UN
official has suggested that debate in the General As-
sembly begin on 11 November.
The US and other supporters of the Chinese Na-
tionalists are again contending that any question of
Chinese representation is an Important Question and,
therefore, that any change requires a two-thirds ma-
jority in the Assembly. Under the Charter, the Im-
portant Question doctrine may be invoked by a majority
of the Assembly.
The vote on the Important Question issue prob-
ably will decide the substantive question as well.
If the Albanian group could win over a simple major-
ity to defeat the Important Question proposal, it
might well have sufficient support to pass the seat-
ing resolution by a simple majority. If the group
loses the Important Question vote, however, it will
also fail to muster the two-thirds majority needed
to approve the seating change, According to present
indications, a simple majority will vote with the
US again this year to apply the Important Question
doctrine and defeat efforts to seat Communist China.
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Iran: Elections held on 4 October to form Iran's
first municipal councils resulted in a predictably
massive victory for the ruling Iran Novin Party.
An extremely low turnout of voters reflected
both widespread apathy and the belief that the elec-
tions would be government-controlled. In fact, how-
ever, the authorities apparently intervened directly
only to ensure that the minority parties would gain
some representation on the councils.
The Ministry of Interior says it is anxious to
delegate as much authority as possible to the new
councils and to enlist their help in executing Iran's
development program. Such decentralization might
well produce a sense of participation at the local
level, and help to alleviate public apathy. It re-
mains to be seen, however, whether the central gov-
ernment will actually be willing to delegate real
authority and whether local officials--accustomed
to following Tehran's dictates--will have the ini-
tiative to participate effectively.
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Tunisia: President Bourguiba continues to search
for international commitments that would assure Tuni-
sia's security.
On 25 October, Bourguiba again indicated to the
US that Tunisia feels isolated in the wake of its boy-
cott of the Arab League and his feud with Nasir. The
Tunisian ambassador in Washington made the same point
last month.
Bourguiba's fears of possible Algerian or Egyp-
tian subversion or aggression have been compounded
by his growing anxiety over Soviet expansion in the
Mediterranean. This concern has heightened since
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Bourguiba's
forthright condemnation of the action.
n ecem er 1967,
he publicly raised the issue of a military alliance
and implied that only France or the US would qualify
as a partner. The subject of "cooperation in the
field of security" was reportedly raised with De
Gaulle when the Tunisian secretary of state for the
presidency visited Paris earlier this month, and may
have been broached during the subsequent visit of
the Turkish foreign minister. France and Turkey,
as well as the US, are helping to train and equip
the small Tunisian armed forces.
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South Africa Expands Bantustan Program
ANC )IA
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SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
(International Territoryi
Bantustan or Homeland Cape
Town
MANQUES
Li
(+!)MHA ANE
SWAZILAND
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South Africa: A recent flurry of activity in
South Africa's Bantustan program again illustrates
Pretoria's dedication to "separate development" as a
solution to the country's racial problems.
The Transkei, the country's oldest and most po-
litically advanced Bantustan, went to the polls on
23 October to elect a new legislative assembly. Be-
cause the South African Government retains the right
to appoint a number of tribal chiefs to the assembly,
the chief minister, backed by South Africa, could not
have been turned out. Nevertheless, the election
campaign was fairly open, and afforded the Transkei
population an opportunity to debate political ques-
tions--including such unlikely topics as "immediate
independence"--in a manner that may whet the Africans'
appetite for true political authority.
In South West Africa, the South Africans--in
defiance of world-wide criticism--acted earlier this
month to establish a Bantustan (homeland) for the
Ovambo tribe. A legislative council was appointed
that provided an extremely limited degree of self-
rule as a theoretical predecessor to eventual "in-
dependence."
On the heels of the Transkei elections, officials
announced that the Ciskei area would receive "self-
rule" in November and the Tswana tribal area in De-
cember, to be followed next year by "limited self-
rule" for other tribal groups.
Despite the use of such terms as "independence"
and "self-rule," nothing in Pretoria's action so far
lends much credibility to its claim of nurturing po-
litical freedom in the Bantustans. None of the ex-
isting or proposed Bantustans is economically viable,
and South Africa tightly controls the purse strings.
Several of the proposed Bantustans are noncontiguous
bits of territory scattered over a wide geographic
area. Yet, the Bantustan is still the keystone of
Pretoria's apartheid policy, and no significant ele-
ment of the South African electorate is looking for
any other racial policy. 25X1
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Ghana: The military government has made signifi-
cant revisions in its timetable for returning the
country to civilian rule next year.
General Joseph Ankrah, chairman of the ruling
National Liberation Council, announced in a nation-
wide address on 28 October that the council has de-
cided to move up by several months the date for con-
voking a constituent assembly to review a draft con-
stitution, The assembly may meet before the end of
the year. Under the revised plan, the majority of
the assembly's 150 members are to be nominated by
major interest groups; one third will be elected in-
directly. The assembly was originally slated to con-
vene in May 1969, and was to be composed entirely of
delegates elected on a nonpartisan basis.
Ankrah also confirmed that the government plans
an early removal of the ban on political parties.
Civilian political aspirants have long been restive
over the proscription of parties and have engaged in
unofficial politicking. The ban may be lifted in
January or possibly earlier, and all Ghanaians, ex-
cept some ranking members of Nkrumah's old party,
will be eligible to seek public office. Some council
members, notably Ankrah himself, harbor political
ambitions and may be anxious to have the ban on po-
litical activity lifted in order to build bases of
political support for themselves.
These long-rumored changes are designed to en-
able the council to meet its September 1969 target
date for restoration of civilian government. The
original timetable, highly unrealistic, would have
permitted only one or two months for political par-
ties to organize and campaign. A number of other
delays in election preparations have also occurred,
making it necessary for the council to seek short-
cuts.
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NOTES
Warsaw Pact: The defense ministers of the
Warsaw Pact states, including Rumania and Czecho-
slovakia, met in Moscow on 29-30 October. A Moscow
announcement said only that "questions of strengthening
the Warsaw Pact" were discussed and that the talks had
produced an "identity of views?" The ministers may
have gone over plans for next year's Pact training
cycle, which reportedly may include a combined ex-
ercise on Rumanian soil? They may also have taken
up plans for creating a multinational Pact staff.
Whatever the substance of the talks, Moscow un-
doubtedly feels that this show of Pact unity is a
political bonus at the present time.
Yugoslavia: A number of locally prominent
educators and teachers have been arrested for taking
part in recent "anti-Yugoslav" demonstrations in the
autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija (the
Kosmet), along the border with Albania. The demon-
strations, almost unprecedented in this area, re-
flect the nationalist aspirations of the large Al-
banian minority for greater equality in Yugoslav
affairs. Belgrade has shown its concern by pub-
licizing the demonstrations in the leading daily,
Borba, and blaming them on "foreign intelligence
services."
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The question of raising the Kosmet to the
status equivalent to a republic will probably be
a bone of contention between the Serbs and the Al-
banian minority at the Serbian Party Congress,
scheduled to convene on 21 November. 25X1
(continued)
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Eastern Europe: The first outbreaks of hoof
and mouth disease in nearly a year have been re-
ported in Eastern Europe, Italy has banned live-
stock imports from Rumania, Yugoslavia, and pos-
sibly Hungary through mid-November. Should the
ban be extended, hard currency earnings by these
countries would be seriously reduced. Yugoslavia's
exports of cattle to the European Common Market
area, especially Italy, are already down this year
Nicaragua: A personalistic feud in the Tradi-
tionalist Conservative Party, Nicaragua's main
opposition party, could spark violence at the na-
tional convention on 3 November. Both Fernando
Aguero, party leader since 1960 and defeated 1967
presidential candidate, and Pedro Chamorro, out-
spoken editor of the country's largest newspaper,
are already seeking the party's 1972 presidential
nomination, This convention, which will choose the
party president for two years, will provide a test
of strength, Although delegate support heavily
favors Aguero, Chamorro's followers did succeed in
disrupting and dissolving some of the earlier de-
partmental conventions, d spite being outnumbered.
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