CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A012200110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 4, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Department review completed
159
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4 October 1268
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No. 0278/68
4 October 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR-Czechoslovakia: The Soviets may tell the Dubcek
delegation that Prague must comply immediately with
Moscow's demands. (Page 3)
Greece: Little change is foreseen in the aftermath
of the constitutional plebiscite. (Page 5)
Portugal: Caetano is off to a good start as prime
minister. (Page 6)
Lebanon: President Hilu plans a cabinet reshuffle.
(Page 7)
Peru: The new rulers have met little resistance.
(Page 8)
Uruguay: Proposed legislation to control political
activity at the national university will increase
friction between the President and Congress. (Page 9)
Mexico: Further conflict between students and security
forces is likely. (Page 10)
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68 CIA
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Vietnam:
South Vietnam: The Thuong Duc Special Forces
camp was again shelled on 2-3 October with sporadic
mortar fire but there was no ground action around
the camp.
Elsewhere in South Vietnam action remained
light as it has for the last several days.
Security in Go Cong Province has recovered
slowly but steadily during the last eight months
and is again at, about the level achieved before
the government temporarily abandoned the country-
side to the Viet Cong during the Tet offensive.
The government, however, still faces major problems
in luring away major elements of the population
from support of the Communists.
Under the leadership of its aggressive new
chief, who was appointed on 1 April, Go Cong has
become one of the more secure provinces in IV Corps.
Viet Cong military forces appear to have been put
on the defensive as a result of a concerted govern-
ment military effort.
On the other hand, the province is still
plagued by weak officials below the province chief
and by generally poor district staffs. The rural
population apparently recognizes this, and most
display disrespect for the government and its pro-
grams. At the same time, they retain considerable
respect and sympathy for the Viet Cong.
The Saigon government originally formed Go
Cong Province in 1964 from the two eastern dis-
tricts of Dinh Tuong Province in order to combat
the nearly complete control of the Viet Cong. Ex-
cept for a brief time before and during the Tet
offensive, the government has made some military
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[progress under the new setup, and the Communists
are no longer safe in one of their two Go Cong
base areas.
Unless the government can come up with large
numbers of competent personnel to staff offices at
all levels from hamlet to provincial level, however,
it will be very difficult to reduce Communist in-
fluence much further among the people of Go Cong.
North Vietnam: Another poor rice crop is in
prospect in North Vietnam, leaving Hanoi even more
dependent on food imports. According to an August
issue of the party daily, the major tenth month
crop about to be harvested was planted late and
was hit by flooding.
The autumn crop accounts normally for two
thirds of the total North Vietnam rice production.
To add to Hanoi's food woes, the early crop this
year is estimated to have been some 200,000 tons
short of the average 1.5 million-ton spring crop.
Food delivered by sea to North Vietnam during
the first nine months of this year totaled 562,000
tons, a 72-percent increase over the same period
of 1967. These food imports--mostly from the So-
viet Union and Communist China--have been crucial
for maintaining the level of rations in the cities
of North Vietnam. Latest reports indicate that up
to 50 percent of the urban "rice" ration is being
adulterated with substitutes, including imported
wheat flour.
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USSR-Czechoslovakia: The cold Soviet reception
of the Czechoslovak leaders who arrived in Moscow
yesterday may mean that Moscow intends to insist
that Prague comply immediately with its demands.
The three-man Czechoslovak delegation--party
chief Dubcek, Premier Cernik, and Slovak party leader
Husak--did not receive the attention normally ac-
corded high-level delegations, although they were
quietly met by the Soviet triumvirate of Brezhnev,
Kosygin, and Podgorny. The TASS announcement of
their arrival failed to cite their official positions,
identifying them only as a "delegation of the central
committee" of the Czechoslovak party, but it also
did not identify the Soviets present by position.
President Svoboda and National Assembly Presi-
dent Smrkovsky are conspicuously absent from the
talks. The Soviets reportedly have been opposed for
some time to including Smrkovsky in the delegation.
The unexplained absence of Svoboda, who played a
crucial role in August, could weaken the Czechoslovak
position during the talks. Earlier reports indicated
that the Czechoslovak leaders were at odds on how to
handle the Soviets. It is not known whether these
differences were resolved before Dubcek left for
Moscow, but the composition of the delegation could
bode ill for the unity of the Czechoslovak leadership.
One source of the US Embassy in Prague believes
that the composition of the delegation is "very un-
pleasant" because Cernik and.Husak are now "opposing"
Dubcek. There is no other indication that the Czech-
oslovak leaders :have broken their pledge to stand
or fall together. It is not clear whether the source
was reporting his own opinion or that of the party
leadership. The same source claimed that the dele-
gation is expected to stay for only one day, but
press reports indicate the talks will be more extended.
(continued)
4 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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There are other indications of a growing hard-
ness in the Soviet line. Before the Czechoslovak
delegation arrived, Pravda loosed another blast at
Prague for failing to take strong measures against
"counterrevolutionaries." In the last few days,
the Soviet press has directed heavy fire at the
Czechoslovak press and members of the now banned
non-Communist political clubs.
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Greece; Little change is foreseen in the Greek
political scene in the wake of the overwhelming vote
for the new constitution.
The government interprets the vote as a sign
that its brand of rule has widespread acceptance.
Its spokesmen insist that they will continue at a
measured pace toward fulfilling the aims of the
"revolution."
Although some elements in the military regime
may favor modest steps toward freer political activ-
ity, other forces will almost certainly oppose any
significant relinquishment of power soon. Few of
the institutions needed for an orderly return to
democratic politics have been established, nor is
there any clear picture of the regime's designs for
them. Moreover, despite exile propaganda, no organ-
ized or effective opposition has yet surfaced to
challenge the junta's intention to create a new
Greece in its own image.
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Portugal: Judging from initial reaction in
Lisbon, Marcello Caetano is off to a good start as
prime minister.
Caetano has shown thus far a determination to
prove that he is his own man. Nevertheless, he will
probably try to demonstrate the orthodoxy expected
by hard-line supporters of Salazar. His inaugural
speech struck a neat balance between affirming a
continuation of Salazar's policies and hinting at
cautious and gradual changes. The speech pleased
newspapers both to the left and right of Caetano
whose editors read into it what they wished to see.
Certain independent papers have appealed for
more liberalization of government, including relaxa-
tion of censorship. The very fact that the appeals
were printed reveals some loosening in the previously
rigid censorship. There is further evidence of re-
laxation in the fact that the press has run unusual
coverage on the prime minister's movements and more
explicit information on Salazar's condition. Accord-
ing to one Portuguese newspaper editor, the policy
is to relax censorship but make no formal legal
changes for the present.
At his first cabinet meeting on 1 October,
Caetano presented general policy lines for improving
public administration, intensifying economic develop-
ment, and promoting social welfare. Reportedly the
pace of activity in government has already picked
up, and old methods and policies are being questioned.
Changes in economic and financial policies to stimu-
late growth are in the offing, 25X1
As with censorship, however,
these changes will be made gradually.
Caetano appears to expect no difficulties from
the secret police or the armed forces. He reportedly
is reassured both by the control the prime minister
has over the secret police and by the fact that the
current armed forces chief of staff is a trusted
friend.
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Lebanon: President Hilu expects soon to re-
shuffle the cabinet in an attempt to prevent further
deterioration of the political situation.
Hilu plans to have Prime Minister Yafi form a
new cabinet with greater participation by members of
the pro-Western Tripartite Maronite Christian Alli-
ance. He hopes thus to end the present parliamentary
logjam resulting from the impasse between the Alli-
ance and the supporters of ex-president Shihab. In
parliamentary elections during March and April, the
Alliance won a one-seat edge over the Shihabists.
The Alliance has not been able to convert this narrow
victory into effective political power because, with
the present parliament electing a new president next
year, the Shihabists have been unwilling to cooper-
ate.
The Lebanese President believes that coopera-
tion between the two factions to undertake a number
of national reforms, particularly in education, is
necessary to forestall trouble, which he fears will
be sparked by leftist exploitation of student dis-
affection. Hilu, however, appears to be exaggerating
the extent of social unrest in the country at large,
and it is doubtful that the two factions can be con-
vinced that the need to cooperate is urgent.
I I
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[Peru: The armed forces, led by army commander
General Juan Velasco, have met little active resist-
ance since ousting President Belaunde and taking
over the government.
Operating under long-established contingency
plans, the army was in control of the key points
throughout the country before any opposition could
be organized. The swift and efficient movement of
tanks and troops into Lima to occupy key government
and communications installations indicates that the
coup was carefully planned and coordinated. Presi-
dent Belaunde was forcibly arrested and put on a
plane for Argentina, while those leaders of the air
force and navy who were reported to have differences
with General Velasco were placed under house arrest.
A top leader of APRA, a party which has long
been at odds with the military, went on the radio
within hours of the coup to exhort his followers to
"defend constitutional order." Thus far, however,
only minor clashes between troops and students have
been reported. APRA labor leaders have reportedly
decided to call a general strike, and there are re-
ports of labor disturbances in some of the outlying
provinces. The US Embassy states that labor opposi-
tion increases the possibility of violence, but is
not likely to be strong enough to reverse the coup.
An all-military government has been established
under the presidency of General Velasco, according
to Lima radiobroadcasts,
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Uruguay: An executive move to control polit-
ical activity at the national university will in-
crease friction between President Pacheco and Con-
gress.
A bill sent to Congress on 1 October would im-
pose heavy penalties for failure to vote in elections
to the university governing body. It is designed to
undercut leftist dominance by forcing participation
in university government by the democratically ori-
ented but politically apathetic students, alumni,
and professors, who far outnumber the radicals.
The bill is certain to be condemned by both
leftists and rightists as a violation of traditional
university autonomy. Many congressmen favor limit-
ing leftist influence on campus but will be reluc-
tant to endorse anything smacking of direct inter-
ference with the university. Strong student protest
again t the bill may lead to renewed disorders.
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I Mexico: The international'Olympic committee
announced yesterday that the games will proceed as
scheduled, but further conflict between students and
security forces is likely.
The growing extremism of the student movement
is indicated in the students' obvious willingness
to provoke armed clashes, apparently in the belief
that the losses they take will gain them still more
adherents for the campaign against the government.
The students are in an ugly mood, and are reported
to be considering sabotaging Olympic installations
and some government offices.
Foreign journalists are receiving warnings to
evacuate Mexico, "which is in the middle of a civil
war," in leaflets issued by the "constitutionalist
army of liberation"--presumably student propaganda
to undermine confidence in the government's ability
to secure order.
The fact that the violence on 2 October raised
questions among Olympic officials about the practi-
cality of continuing with their schedule will prob-
ably be interpreted by the strikers as at least a
minor victory. The US Embassy does not expect sig-
nificant disruption of the games or serious incon-
venience to visitors, and there has been no harass-
ment of the more than 50 teams alread in Mexico City.
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