CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A011900070002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 22, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
22 August 1968
State Dept. review completed
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No. 0241/68
22 August 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
USSR-Czechoslovakia: Situation report. (Page 1)
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 5)
Mongolia: The fourth five-year economic plan is
working unsatisfactorily, despite large infusions
of Soviet aid. (Page 7)
Korea: South Korean naval forces seize North Korean
agent boat. (Page 9)
Communist China: Peking's efforts to form new gov-
ernments in the provinces again pick up momentum.
(Page 11)
Bolivia: President Barrientos announces the dis-
covery of a coup plot. (Page 12)
South Africa: Student demonstrations increase.
(Page 13)
Guyana: Strike (Page 14)
Macao: New British consul (Page 14)
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Clashes Between Czechoslovak Civilians and Soviet Troops, 21 August
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CUSSR-Czechoslovakia: (Information of 2300 EDT)
Soviet forces and their Warsaw Pact allies have
gained control of most of the major Czechoslovak ur-
ban centers without encountering any resistance from
the Czechoslovak military forces.
The swift and well-coordinated advance by the
intervening forces resulted in the seizure of the
Czech capital with a suddenness that left the Czech
leaders with virtually no alternative but to accept
the fait accompli.
There is still no reliable estimate of the num-
ber of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces which are oc-
cupying Czechoslovakia but it has been reported that
one Soviet airborne division and one Soviet motorized
rifle division as well as other smaller units are in
Prague. It is likely that most, if not all, of the
units which were moved into position near the Czech-
oslovak border--as many as 20 divisions--are involved.
In contrast to their determined military inter-
vention, the Soviets seem to be acting cautiously in
what may be an effort to minimize the political im-
pact of their action. Moscow may have in mind work-
ing with the present Czechoslovak party presidium
rather than replacing it completely. Czechoslovak
leaders reportedly met the morning of 21 August with
unidentified Soviets in Prague, presumably to dis-
cuss changes in the party and government leadership.
Moscow later in the day categorically rejected rumors
circulating in Czechoslovakia that it has any inten-
tion to bring back Novotny as the leader. Another
meeting reportedly is scheduled for this morning at
the Soviet Embassy. Elsewhere in Czechoslovakia,
the behavior of the Russian forces has reportedly
been generally correct.
Ambassador Beam in Prague has pointed out that
the Soviet effort to put as good a face as possible
22 Aug 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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C on the intervention and the failure to produce "their"
regime quickly may create a sticky situation for the
USSR.
One of the first Soviet targets on entering
Czechoslovakia was apprehension of the most liberal
of the Czechoslovak leaders. During the day, at
least eight were taken into custody, including party
chief Dubcek, Prime Minister Cernik, party secretary
Cisar, and National Assembly chairman Smrkovsky. At
the same time, however, the Soviets did not attempt
to prevent the leading organs of the regime from
convening.
The Soviets also refrained from any immediate
concerted effort to close down Czech communications
media. Czechoslovak papers reportedly continued to
print unmolested yesterday, distributing their edi-'
Lions free. By late last night, however, Czech radio
stations were being closed down, and only one,
"Radio Free Czechoslovakia," is still on the air.
Despite the fact that Czech military units were
not ordered to resist the intervention and the pop-
ulation was ordered to remain calm, there was spo-
radic and spontaneous civil resistance reported in
several areas.
Prague announced yesterday that six citizens
had been killed and 47 wounded in a clash with "oc-
cupation troops" in northwestern Czechoslovakia.
In the eastern part of the country ten persons
were reported killed and others wounded, including
some Soviet soldiers. In still another clash, two
Soviet vehicles were reportedly set afire by Molo-
tov cocktails. There are also reliable reports of
scattered fighting in Prague and of Soviet tanks
firing point blank into several buildings includ-
ing Prague Radio. I
(continued)
22 Aug 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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The population also reacted with a one-minute
nationwide work stoppage, and all buses and street-
cars in Prague reportedly ceased their runs by mid-
afternoon. Although the Czech regime has held out
the prospect of a general strike only as a last re-
sort, a spontaneous national work stoppage may be
a more real possibility.
Eastern European participants have echoed the
Soviet rationale for the intervention. The first
Polish announcement justified the intervention as
being in response to a request by the Czechoslovak
"party and government leadership." The underlying
argument in the Polish statement, however, seems
to reflect an unwillingness to accept changes in
another Eastern European country which could pos-
sibly affect the stability of pro-Soviet regimes.
Gomulka may also feel constrained to cooperate with
the Soviets in the interests of assuring his own
survival in the bitter internal Polish party strug-
gle.
In an address to a joint session of the party and
government and mass organizations, Rumanian leader
Ceausescu on 21 August expressed full solidarity with
the Czechoslovak people and the Czechoslovak Com-
munist Party and harshly condemned the USSR's "un-
justified" intervention. A statement by Tito was
softer in tone, probably a reflection of his con-
cern that unrest might be sparked in Yugoslavia.
Access to West Berlin has thus far been unimpeded.
The rapid transit system between the two parts of the
city was closed for approximately 45 minutes early on
21 August by the East Germans, allegedly because of a
"power failure." East German border patrols along
the Wall were doubled. Map),
22 Aug 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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106
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E Vietnam: Communist forces shifted the focus of
their current offensive to the Mekong Delta on 21
August.
The Communists struck more than 20 South Viet-
namese provincial capitals, district towns, and air-
fields in the delta early on the morning of the 21st
with mortar and/or ground assaults. Allied casual-
ties have been light thus far, but all sources con-
tinue to indicate that the coordinated action in IV
Corps is just a prelude to heavier fighting.
Elsewhere in South Vietnam, Communist units
maintained heavy pressure on allied positions in
northern III Corps and conducted light and scattered
actions throughout the central and northern prov-
inces. Late press reports indicate that Saigon was
shelled for the first time in two months.
It now appears that the attacks of the past few
days are only the beginning of a countrywide enemy
offensive which may continue for an extended period
and will strive for dramatic results. The situation
in I Corps is particularly ominous, and there is
strong evidence that new attacks are set for the near
future in the other corps areas.
Hanoi propaganda has strongly defended the So-
viet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. North
Vietnam is the only Communist country not actually
involved in the occupation to come to Moscow's imme-
diate propaganda support. In an early morning broad-
cast on the 21st, Hanoi radio called the move a
"noble effort" and a response to a Czech request.
This wholehearted endorsement is in marked con-
trast to Hanoi's noncommittal public attitude on
22 Aug 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
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[Moscow-Prague differences before the Soviet interven-
tion. Prior to the occupation there was only limited
propaganda commentary and no gesture of support to
either side. North Vietnam may have initially had
some sympathy for Czech aspirations for independence,
but this apparently has been susperseded by Hanoi's
concern that the Soviets might lose interest in Viet-
nam and curtail their massive assistance program.
(Map) 7
22 Aug 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Mongolia: Mongolia's fourth five-year economic
plan is working unsatisfactorily, despite large in-
fusions of Soviet aide
A Mongolian State Planning Commission report
states that although the 1967 goals of Mongolia's
fourth plan (1966-70) had been "basically" fulfilled,
performances in livestock raising and processing of
animal products for export, Mongolia's chief indus-
tries, were disappointing. The commission blamed
severe weather, which in 1967 killed about 17 per-
cent _of Mongolia's estimated 23 million domestic
animals. It also criticized the 1967 performance
of the animal processing industry for waste, poor
quality of export products, and inefficiency.
The report claimed that agriculture in 1967
was able to supply all the needs of Mongolia's let
million people. It added, however, that in the fu-
ture emphasis will be placed on growing fodder for
livestock.
Despite 1.3 billion dollars of Soviet aid for
the current five-year plan, only 70 of 170 planned
construction projects were completed during 1967.
The commission blamed the low quality of Mongolian
labor and management. The Chinese had provided
much of the skilled labor on construction projects
until all aid to Mongolia was withdrawn by China
after 1966.
Mongolia's economy can be expected to remain
livestock centered for the foreseeable future, with
a few modern industrial sites--such as the new city
of Darkhan--built largely by S "et and East Euro-
Pan and workers.
22 Aug 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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South Korean Naval Forces Seize North Korean 'Agent Boat
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Korea: South Korean naval forces seized a
North Korean agent boat off the southern coast early
on 21 August.
This 50- to 75-ton boat was intercepted and
disabled as it left Cheju Island, where four infil-
trators had been put ashore several hours earlier.
The boat sank as the South Koreans were towing it
into shore. Eight North Koreans were killed and two
captured on the boat. All four of the agents who
had landed on Cheju Island were killed.
According to South Korean officials, the North
Koreans were trying to rescue a leader of a Commu-
nist underground organization. The South Koreans re-
portedly planned their operation on the basis of in-
formation obtained during the roundup of a spy net
in southern South Korea late last month.
This is the second confirmed North Korean sea
infiltration attempt this year. Two agents who
landed on the southwestern coast on 29 July were
killed the next day. (Map)
22 Aug 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Status of Provincial Level Governments
11 Revolutionary Committee
Preparatory Group for Revolutionary
Committee
^ Military Control Committee
{ HAINAIV
__ 1
Revolutionary Committee* Date Formed Chairmanship
1967
Heilungkiang 31 Jan. Civilian
Shanghai 5 Feb. Civilian
Kweichow 14 Feb. Military
Shantung 23 Feb. Civilian
Shansi 18 Mar. Civilian
Peking 20 Apr. Civilian
Tsinghai 12 Aug. Military
Inner Mongolia i Nov. Military
Tientsin 6 Dec. Civilian
*A Maoist form of local government created during the Cultural
Revolution to replace discredited party and government units.
~I~HC NL K.)
Revolutionary Committee* Date Formed Chairmanship
1968
Kiangsi 5 Jan. Military
Kansu 24 Jan. Military
Horan 27 Jan. Civilian
Hopeh 3 Feb. Civilian
Hupeh 5 Feb. Military
Kwangtung 21 Feb. Military
Kirin 6 Mar. Military
Kiangsu 23 Mar. Military
Chekiang 24 Mar. Military
Hunan 9 Apr Military
Ningsia 10 Apr. Military
Anhwei 18 Apr. Military
Shensi 1 May Civilian
Liaoning 10 May Military
Szechwan 31 May Military
Yunnan 13 Aug. Military
Fukien 19 Aug. Military
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Communist China: Peking's efforts to form new
governments in the provinces are once again picking
up momentum.
Following recent steps to moderate the course
of the Cultural Revolution, "revolutionary commit-
tees" have been formed in both Yunnan and Fukien
provinces within the past week. These are the first
provincial governments to be established since 31
May. There now remain only three provinces--Kwangsi,
Sinkiang, and Tibet--where new government bodies
have yet to be formed. Even in these areas there
are signs that the impasse in Peking concerning the
local leadership has been broken. Peking media have
been underscoring the need to complete this process
"as soon as possible."
Like most of the provincial governing bodies
formed this year, Yunnan and Fukien are dominated
by military officials. In each case, former pro-
vincial government officials have been included in
the new ruling committees probably in an effort to
project an image of joint participation, as well as
to take advantage of their expertise. Representa-
tives of local Red Guard and "revolutionary" mass
organizations--who are supposed to be a major com-
ponent of Maoist provincial governments--are, how-
ever, conspicuously excluded from the published
namelists of top officials.
The renewed drive to set up army-dominated
provincial governments is in line with other signs
that the army has been given greater authority in
recent weeks to suppress Red Guard violence in the
provinces. Reports of continued disturbances in
many areas of China, however, suggest that the army
is not yet acting with uniform vigor. In some areas
the military has been split over which faction to
support, and such differences may still persist.
(Map )
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Bolivia: President Barrientos has announced
the discovery of a coup plot and the arrest of sev-
eral persons involved in it.
The President said that the coup attempt was
headed by the recently dismissed army chief of staff,
General Marcos Vasquez, and also involved the Bolivian
Socialist Falange, an opposition political party.
Vasquez' announcement over La
Paz radio on 20 August that he was in open revolt
against the Barrientos government was apparently in-
tended as a belated signal for his followers to make
their move.
This call to revolt by General Vasquez was an-
swered by armed forces commander General Ovando, who
stated that dialogue had not produced positive re-
sults and that the army now would take an active role
in preventing anarchy. This new tough line by Ovando
may indicate that the armed forces, which had pre-
viously tried to disassociate themselves from the
Barrientos administration during this political
crisis, are prepared to take a much stronger hand
in the government.
The increasing student violence has probably
helped prompt the army to take a more active role.
On the evening of 20 August, police clashed with
students in La Paz, and in the ensuing melee the
Bolivian-American Center s extensively damaged.
I
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South Africa: Student demonstrations, now in
their second week, have increased in size and mili-
tancy.
The demonstrations began on 14 August as a small,
orderly sit-in at the University of Cape Town to pro-
test the government-ordered dismissal of a recently
appointed African professor. Protest fever quickly
spread to other English-speaking universities, and
in Johannesburg students held "solidarity" parades
and a public meeting. When the demonstrators began
to focus on the issue of government control over
universities, faculty members lent their support.
Prime Minister Vorster ordered university au-
thorities to solve their problem and threatened to
take charge if they could not. The Johannesburg
demonstration was short-lived, and many of the par-
ticipants were roughly treated by Afrikaner toughs.
The Cape Town protesters, who had the forethought
to hire protection, still persist, although some
division among the students reportedly arose when
their leaders focused attention on the whole ques-
tion of South Africa's rigid racial policy--a step
further than most students are willing to go.
Although the protesters represent only a small
minority of the students, their willingness to take
to the streets is unique in South Africa, where the
government can exert considerable influence over
their future careers. The demonstrations will in-
crease Vorster's problems with the ultrarightists
within his party a ainst whom he has publicly moved
in recent weeks.
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NOTES
Guyana: A strike organized by supporters of
leftist opposition leader Cheddi Jagan has all but
paralyzed Guyana's vital sugar industry. The majority
of sugar workers belong to a progovernment union,
but delays in promised wage and benefit increases--
together with the use of threats and violence by
the Jagan forces--have kept them off the job. If
the pro-Jagan union can force wage increases now,
its prospects for gaining the loyalty of all the
workers would be much enhanced. Sugar is a mainstay
of Guyana's economy, and control of the sugar workers
would creatl strengthen ~Jagan's political position.
Macao: A British consul will soon be assigned
to the Portuguese colony. The British consular staff
withdrew from Macao in May 1967 when violent demon-
strations by Chinese militants brought the consulate's
activities to a standstill. The new consul, whose
appointment has reportedly been accepted by the Macao
Government, will reside in Hong Kong, probably to
avoid possible harassment by Chinese activists.
22 Aug 68
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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