CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A011800090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 10, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
10 August 1968
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No. 0231/68
10 August 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Laos: Government troops are making modest gains
against the Communists. (Page 3)
Communist China: In at least two provinces "revo-
utionary factions are being suppressed or dis-
solved. (Page 5)
Czechoslovakia: There are signs of disapproval
from some of Prague's allies. (Page 7)
Poland-Rumania: The two countries are engaging in
public polemics. (Page 9)
Greece: Papandreou is stepping up agitation for
open resistance to the junta. (Page 11)
South Korea - West Germany: Relations are improv-
ing. (Page 12)
USSR: Mediterranean squadron (Page 13)
Syria-Lebanon: Strained relations (Page 13)
East Africa - Communist China: Tan-Zam railroad
arrangements (Page 13)
Uruguay: Student demonstrations (Page 14)
Panama: Samudio rebuked (Page 14)
Guyana-Venezuela: Border dispute (Page 14)
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South Vietnam: Reports from the provinces re-
flec increasing Communist attempts to set up local
administrative structures in preparation for employ-
ing political tactics following a settlement.
A captured political cadre recently said that
existing Communist quasi-governmental organizations
at the local levels in his province were being re-
placed by "people's revolutionary committees" under
the new peace alliance. F _j
reflects Communist plans for a series
of elections beginning at the local level and eventu-
ally culminating in a general election on the basis
of "one man, one vote" to unify the country.
President Thieu presumably had these considera-
tions in mind when he recently reiterated his support
of the new South Vietnamese political front, the Lien
Minh. Thieu emphasized that such a broadly based
political organization was essential because of the
possibility of an end to the war. He stressed that
the Communists consider the political aspects of the
struggle even more important than the military.
10 Aug 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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LAOS: Current Situation
/?.
Muong So 10 8Phou
Ph!
Muong Son- Thp
Valley
`V_ IENT_UANE
t t C H I N A
Contested territory
O 25
, 5O 75 11
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O A 50 75 If> Kilamele:s
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Laos: Government troops are making modest gains
as they move gingerly to offset Communist dry season
advances.
The month-old campaign to regain the Muong Son
Valley in North Laos, nearing completion, is meeting
only light enemy resistance. The government plans to
establish an air navigational facility at Muong Son
to replace the one lost at Phou Pha Thi last March.
Vientiane also hopes that Muong Son can eventually
be used to help rebuild shattered government assets
in the northeast.
In the south, a multibattalion operation is mak-
ing some progress clearing Communist troops from an
area west of Savannakhet town. Indications of an
enemy withdrawal farther east along Route 9 has
raised hopes that Muong Phalane, lost last February,
can be reoccupied in the next few weeks without a
major effort.
The government is doing little, however, to
strengthen its badly eroded position in the stra-
tegic Bolovens Plateau area. North Vietnamese and
Pathet Lao troops are still entrenched in the Se-
done Valley, and the provincial capitals of Attopeu
and Saravane are still virtually surrounded. In
addition, government troops have abandoned Lao Ngam,
which had been successfully defended against two
heavy North Vietnamese attacks during the dry season.
The Communists have not demonstrated any incli-
nation to take advantage of shaky government morale
and unusually good fighting weather to press their
offensive into government-held territory. They are
probably not willing to expend much effort to defend
certain fringe areas, but the continuing presence of
a substantial number of North Vietnamese troops is a
clear sign that the Communists intend to hold on to
most of their dry seasons gains.
10 Aug 68
(Map)
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Radical Factions Suppressed in Two Provinces
rCmnt*n : ONG KONG (UK)
MACAO
(Port.)
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'Communist China: In the aftermath of Peking's
recent strictures against violence, "revolutionary"
factions are being suppressed or dissolved in at
least two provinces.
J the
army., in its recent crackdown on unruly factional-
ists in Kwangtung, has dealt much more harshly with
the radical Red Flag faction than with its rival.
The army, which was not empowered to act this firmly
last summer at the height of factional fighting, has
now greatly weakened the Red Flag organization. It
has occupied Red Flag headquarters throughout Canton,
arrested its leaders, including the Red Flag repre-
sentative in the provincial government, and apparently
is taking steps to silence its propaganda media. Mem-
bers of the more "conservative" East Wind faction
have been deputized as members of a special civil-
ian police force and reportedly have been arresting
their hated rivals in the Red Flag organization.
During much of 1967 the Red Flag faction carried
on a running feud with senior officers in the Canton
Military Region. At one point the military tried to
ban the group as "counterrevolutionary" but this or-
der was countermanded by Peking. After September
1967, the Re4 he military
command, but underlying
hostilities persisted. Until now, the army--under
strict orders not to suppress any faction in official
favor--has not acted against the Red Flags openly.
The Red Flag faction has in the past been supported
both by the Cultural Revolution Group and by major
groups in the Peking Red Guard congress.
According to a provincial broadcast on 6 August,
all factions in Liaoning have recently dissolved
"voluntarily." These factions include two particu-
larly troublesome groups who, like the Red Flags in
Canton, have a record of opposition to local Military
Region commanders and have operated with the support
and protection of the same radical forces in Peking.
(continued)
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The Shen-yang Military Region commander, con-
firmed last May as chairman of a new "revolutionary"
government in Liaoning, presided over a "dissolution"
ceremony.
It is too early to tell if these developments
are the beginning of a nationwide trend. If so, it
would be a major step in strengthening the authority
of the regional military commanders and stabilizing
the political structure in the provinces.
The touchy issue of how far to go in damping
the Cultural Revolution may be creating new strains
in Peking, however. On 6 August two nationally prom-
inent newspapers in Shanghai denounced unnamed forces
that were allegedly trying to engineer the dismissal
of members of the Cultural Revolution Group. In un-
usually lurid language, one newspaper accused these
"enemies" of following traditional tactics of "elimi-
nating those who are close to the emperor" with the
ultimate aim of removing his lieutenant.
(Map)
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ECzechoslovakia: There are new signs of disap-
prove from some of Prague's allies.
Parliamentary chief Smrkovksy told a party gath-
ering on 8 August that he did not think the other
delegations in Bratislava were persuaded that the
Czechoslovak road is the right one. Hungarian sources
have indicated that the Soviet and other Eastern
European leaders who met in Bratislava now expect
a political crisis in the Czechoslovak party by the
time it convenes in extraordinary congress on 9
September. According to these sources, Dubcek's
allies will expect him to handle such a crisis with
a strong hand and to apply brakes on further liberal-
ization.
The Hungarian party press said yesterday that
there will be new consultations on Czechoslovakia
"in the near future." This may indicate that there
will be a new Communist summit meeting in Prague in
connection with the party congress. Presumably the
leaders inimical to Prague's reforms will attend in
order to attempt to promote the election of a new
party leadership in Czechoslovakia which would in-
clude at least some orthodox Communists.
From the point of view of the Soviets and the
Eastern Europeans, developments in Prague must ap-
pear unsatisfactory. Tito is receiving a hero's
welcome in Prague, conservatives are again being
removed from party office, Dubcek is being attacked
by liberals for his handling of the Prchlik affair,
and some news media are showing little respect for
the regime's appeal for voluntary restraint. In
addition, the cabinet apparently is considering a
new constitutional guarantee of the inviolability
of private ownership, and has resolved to present
to its CEMA partners a series of proposals for ex-
panding trade in the West.
(continued)
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[There have even been renewed unofficial fore-
casts on the radio that diplomatic relations with
West Germany may come fairly soon. These develop-
ments are in effect tests of how far the Dubcek re-
gime is resolved to live up to its promises at Cierna
and a reconnoitering by liberals of permissible limits.
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Poland-Rumania: Rumania's note of 30 July pro-
testing alleged Polish interference in Rumania's in-
ternal affairs has reignited accumulated grievances
in Warsaw and Bucharest.
The main party daily in Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu,
on 7 August revealed that the Rumanian note had
been rejected by the Poles as "groundless." In an
accompanying commentary, the daily refuted the
Rumanian charge that Polish criticism of Bucharest's
foreign policy--made during a recent Warsaw'televi-
sion program--constituted interference in Rumania's
internal affairs. According to Trybuna Ludu, "We
consider it our duty to criticize the positions of
fraternal parties when they come into conflict with
the vital interests of other parties and the inter-
national forces of socialism." This reflects much
the same rationale as that used against the Czech-
oslovak-regime by Moscow's loyal Eastern European
allies, who failed to invite Rumania to the Warsaw
conference in mid-July or to the later meeting in
Bratislava.
The Polish party daily also took the opportunity
to surface old peeves against Bucharest, such as
Rumania's establishment of diplomatic relations with
Bonn in January 1967, its walkout from the Communist
consultative meeting in Budapest last April, and its
"reluctance" to develop closer CEMA ties. The Ru-
mahians-answered on 9 August with a lengthy editorial
taking strong exception to the Polish charges.
The nature and the timing of the Rumanian-Po-
lish polemic indicate that the exchange is more re-
lated to issues stemming from the Czechoslovak-so-
viet confrontation than to strictly bilateral mat-
ters. The Rumanian note, published by the Rumanians
while the Cierna talks were being held, clearly sup-
ported Prague.
(continued)
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Both Bucharest and Warsaw probably view each
other's actions as a breach of a tacit agreement
against public polemics. In view of the stern tone
of the Rumanian editorial of 9 A t- it is ]I likely
that Warsaw will remain silent. T7 -1
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Greece: Exiled opposition leader Andreas Papan-
dreou has stepped up agitation for an open resistance
to the junta.
Papandreou and the Greek Communists reportedly
have agreed on the general objective of resistance
to the junta and on the need to coordinate resistance
activities in Greece and abroad in anticipation of the
constitutional plebiscite on 29 September. A joint
statement to this effect has been issued in Rome by
Papandreou's Panhellenic Liberation Movement and the
"Patriotic Front." The Front was formed by EDA, the
domestic arm of the outlawed Greek Communist Party,
in mid-1967 in an attempt to organize an antiregime
alliance with the non-Communist opposition.
The Liberation Movement and the "Patriotic
Front" invited all political parties to assume a
common posture against the plans of the junta to
"install a totalitarian constitution." Papandreou
subsequently told reporters in Stockholm that he had
cabled former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis,
a conservative now living in Paris, proposing a meet-
ing "as a first step toward a joint stand."
The Greek Government is publicizing these moves
by Papandreou as proof of the collusion between the
center and Communist elements in Greece and abroad.
Greek papers carried statements by former parliament
deputies denouncing the Rome pact as a new Communist
attempt to undermine Greece's "struggle for democ-
racy." Another article charged that Papandreou
would cooperate with "any enemy of Greece."
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South Korea - West Germany: Relations between
Seoul and Bonn are showing considerable improvement.
A West German parliamentarian is planning to
visit Seoul soon, and it now appears that a visit
to South Korea by the chairman of the Bundestag
Foreign Assistance Committee that had been canceled
may be rescheduled. Seoul is also hopeful that
Bonn will again offer favorable credit arrangements
for South Korean industrial purchases from West
Germany.
Relations between the two countries cooled
noticeably after South Korean security authorities
spirited the South Korean members of a North Korean
spy ring out of West Germany last year. The South
Korean Supreme Court's decision on 30 July ordering
the retrial of 12 of the members of the ring, in-
cluding all who had received sentences of death or
long-term imprisonment, undoubtedly was influenced
by a desire to ease frictions with West Germany.
The Germans have reacted favorably to the court's
action, but complete restoration of relation-s would
be difficult unless the group is given executive
clemency when the judicial process is completed.
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USSR: The Soviet naval squadron in the Mediter-
ranean is returning to its normal strength with the
arrival of new units from the Black Sea. It is ex-
pected that the squadron will level off at 30-35
ships--its average during the past year--after the
current turnover is completed. The squadron now
includes about ten submarines, one of them probably
nuclear powered, and more than a dozen surface com-
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bat ships. F
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Syria-Lebanon: Syria may shortly "cut" its al-
ready strained relations with Lebanon,
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The two countries have never
exchanged formal diplomatic missions even though they
have recognized each other. Plotting by Syrian ex-
iles in Lebanon is at the root of Syria's unhappiness
with the Lebanese Government. Damascus has applied
various pressures to back up its demands that the
exiles' activities be curtailed and apparently is
considering further measures.
- Communist China: Eight Chinese
are now in Lusaka to arrange for the arrival next
month of the 300 Chinese technicians who will sur-
vey the Zambian segment of the Tan-Zam railroad.
A similar detailed engineering survey under way in
Tanzania for several months is due to be completed
by late 1969.
Tanzania's plans call for Peking to supply all roll-
ing stock and signaling and communications equip-
ment and to furnish maintenance crews for at least ten
years while Africans are being trained to take over.
Zambia would prefer Western
equipment compatible with its present system, but
has had to go along with Tanzania for lack of any
alternative.
(continued)
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Uruguay: Police raids on the national univer-
sity yesterday have touched off violent student demon-
strations. President Pacheco seized upon the kidnap-
ing of the President of the National Power and Tele-
phone Company by a terrorist organization as a justi-
fication for a raid to uncover arms and subversive
literature. Spurred on by their leftist rector,,the
students have been staging antigovernment demonstra-
tions and acts of violence for several months. If
the demonstrations continue, Pacheco will have an ex-
cusetobring the university under stricter government
Panama: Persistent plotting by defeated presi-
dential candidate David Samudio suffered another set-
back on 7 August, when all top national guard officers
publicly reaffirmed their loyalty to Commandant Valla-
rino. This rebuke will not necessarily deter Samudio,
but his efforts to enlist support among the officers
for a move to prevent Arnulfo Arias' assumption of
the presidency on 1 October have little chance of
success.
Guyana-Venezuela: A company of Guyanese soldiers
has reportedly set up camp about ten miles from Ankoko
Island--a disputed island in the river that forms the
boundary between Venezuela and Guyana. The soldiers
will patrol the area and escort any Venezuelan intrud-
ers back to the border, using force if necessary.
Prime Minister Burnham is concerned that his political
opposition could make an issue of the country's inad-
equate defense capabilities and has apparently decided
to improve the situation, even at the risk of another
border incident.
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