CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 8, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
July 29, 1968
Content Type: 
REPORT
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Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A011 t1-0 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret STATE review(s) completed. 29 July 1968 STATE review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 Approved For Release 2003/J CX DP79T00975A011700100001-0 No. 0220/68 29 July 1968 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS Czechos lovakia-USSRm The meeting of leaders may be going on, under pressure of new Soviet military moves. (Page 1) Vietnam-. Situation report, (Page 3) Finland-USSR.- A canal reopening will mark unusual cooperation between the two countries. (Page 5) Southern Yemen.- Dissension in the back country may cause the army to take over the government, (Page 7) Mexicom A violent, clash between students and police has taken place in Mexico City, (Page 8) Iraq.- Differences within government. (Page 9) Syria.- Nervousness over possible coup (Page 9) Israel., New Eshkol appointment (Page 9) Bolivia: New cabinet (Page 10) Cuba.- Castro speech (Page 10) SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05'fig-MWDP79T00975A011700100001-0 I Czechoslovakia-USSR; The meeting of the Czech- oslovak party presidium and the Soviet politburo may be going on, under pressure of further Soviet military moves, Prague Radio announced yesterday afternoon that most of the Czechoslovak presidium had left for the meeting and would be joined by the rest on the spot. President Ludvik. Svoboda also was included in the delegation, The Soviet leaders may be traveling by train. Western news reports indicate that the meet- ing will take place aboard a special Czechoslovak train, The site of the confrontation is the Slovakian village of Cierna? just across the border from the Soviet railroad town of Chop, according to a report of a Bratislava radiobroadcastT Neither Prague nor Moscow showed any signs of give in their respective positions as the time for the meeting approached., On 27 July,, Czechoslovak party leader Dubcek assured the nation over radio and television that the presidium intended to stand firm, especially in view of the massive citizen sup- port he had received in the past few days d Despite official disclaimers, rumors persist that the pre- sidium is split over how to deal with the Soviets,, Even as the presidium left for the meeting, the Soviet propaganda barrage continued, apparently hop- ing to convince Czechoslovak conservatives that Mos- cow will be obliged to intervene if the conservatives do not act to reverse the process of "democrati- zation." On. Sunday? Pravda called on the Czechoslovaks] 29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin I SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003 1* 77Oj TjT-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 [to "bar the way to counterrevolution," and threaten- ingly added that "the Communists and working people of Czechoslovakia" are warned "that there is no time to waste ?" Pravda implicitly linked its demands to the politburo-presidium confrontation, emphasizing that "our party and our people attach much importance to that meeting." Moscow probably hopes that it can intimidate some of the more conservative members of the presidium who may be wavering in their support of Dubcek 29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001 -0 Approved For Release 2003/0514(WAERbP79T00975A011700100001-0 [South Vietnam: The lull in the ground war con- tinue over the weekend. Enemy-initiated activity was limited to a few light shellings and minor probes of government para- military outposts. Allied units were unable to ini- tiate any prolonged engagements with Communist forces. Reports continue to come in, however, that the enemy is gearing up for a major offensive sometime next month. The only important Communist force which appears to be currently on an offensive footing is the Viet Cong's 9th Division, whose elements are ar- rayed near Tay Ninh city. Despite recent efforts to establish its anti- Communist credentials, the Huong government is still under attack from hardliners. The Prime Minister was sharply criticized in the National Assembly this weekend for recent re- marks suggesting that at one time there were some genuine nationalists in the National Liberation Front (NLF). Huong's subsequent statements that such nationalists have long since been purged did not mollify his critics in the Senate. Efforts by government supporters and independents to shut off Senate debate on Huong's position regarding the NLF were swept aside by a coalition of Revolutionary Dal Viets and northern Catholics clearly anxious to em- barrass the Prime Minister. 29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05t 1 bP79T00975A011700100001-0 Finnish-Soviet Canal to Reopen in August SECRET (Ceded tc(5?SR [, Peaty of Moscow 1940-- I,ttkc Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RD 79T009 1]11 1700100 - Approved For Release 2003/ RVATRDP79T00975A011700100001-0 Finland-USSR,. An unusual experiment in Finnish- Soviet cooperation will get under way in early August when the reconstructed and modernized Saimaa Canal, is reopened., The canal has not been used since 1944 when the Karelian isthmus was turned over to the Soviet Union. The new border bisected the canal, leaving its south- ern half and Baltic terminus in Soviet hands The possibility of reopening the canal was first raised by the Finns in the early 1950s. .It was not until 1962;; however;; when relations between Moscow and Helsinki were more cordial that the USSR agreed to lease to Finland for 50 years a narrow corridor along the canal and its outlet near Vyborg on the Gulf of Finland,, To lease a part of its territory to a foreign country is without precedent for the Soviet Union, The lease arrangement aroused controversy in Finland. Critics, including trucking companies and industrial interests? argued that the more than $60 million invested in the canal should have been used to improve the road and rail network in the area rather than for a waterway suitable only for small vessels and open only part of the year. Political considerations appear to have won out, however? and President Kekkonen has pointed to the canal deal as further eviddnce of the success of his policy of friendship with the Soviet Union. There have so far been no public references in Finland to a possible future redrawing of the border, but many Finns probably view the arrangement as a first step to regain a ortion of Karel.i.a, lost after World War II,., 29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5 . SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05/AJk6P79T00975A011700100001-0 Dissident Areas in Southern Yemen Yemen has no establisA,d boundaries in the east. S. LOWER YAFA `d. FADH L! 10, AUDHALI It. DATHINAH SECRET Approved For Releasef 3/~% :I, - I - Approved For Release 2003/05/?PCtA=RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 25X1? Southern Yemen: Dissension in the back country provinces may lead the army to crack down and pos- sibly take over the National Liberation Front gov- vernment. Rumors of unrest in the tribal areas along the Yemen border continue to circulate in Aden, which itself is quiet but tense. Yesterday the government radio announced that Saudi Arabia and "international imperialist intelligence services" were fostering the dissension. The unrest stems from popular dissatisfaction with the present weak government, rather than from the usual intrigues of political groups. One of the most powerful tribal groups is reportedly demanding a "national unity" government, representing all po- litical and social groups except "the godless Commu- nists," the leaders of the Egyptian-sponsored Front for the Liberation of South Yemen, and the former sultans. The army has been placed on alert and the de- mobilized People's Guard recalled to duty, steps which may cause armed clashes between these two rival forces. The army already has virtually taken over the functions of government in some tribal areas, although it apparently stood aside during recent disorders in Dar Saad and other rural areas. If the army can overcome divisions in its own ranks, it may feel that it now has enough tribal backing to take over and form a "unity government" which can procure vital foreign budgetary assistance. I 29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 Approved For Release 2003/0J ~,: ' DP79T00975A011700100001-0 Mexico: A major clash between students and police on 26 July in the heart of downtown Mexico City resulted in scores wounded and many arrested, including five Communist leaders. The violent outbreak occurred after several hundred Communist youth celebrating the anniversary of the Cuban revolution merged with a separate, larger student group that had permission to protest the police methods used against demonstrating tech- nical students a few days earlier. The Communist agitators succeeded in luring the technical stu- dents to Mexico City's main plaza, where attacks on stores and other buildings precipitated the clash with riot police. The police announcement of the arrest of the Communists described them as the intellectual au- thors of a preplanned riot. Police also raided the office of the Mexican Communist Party and seized an alleged half ton of propaganda inciting students to riot. The National Federation of Tech- nical Students which sponsored the original peace- ful march has condemned the Communist youth group for "acts of vandalism." The US Embassy comments that the incident is far from over and that further demonstrations may occur. The rapid and rough police intervention in the riot and the authorities' quick focusing of responsibility on the Communists, however, serve as a strong warning that the government will act severely to put down subsequent threats to order. F 29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 8 SECRET Approved For Release 203/ /9 : - D T 9 - Approved For Release 2003/05' MkDP79T00975A011700100001-0 25X1 25X1 Iraq Differences between President Ahmad Hasan Bakr, a "moderate" Baathist, and Prime Min- ister Abd al-Raggaz Nayif are said to be serious. the prime minister an other military try to force Bakr and his supporters out of the government by the end of the month. The ouster of the Baath- ists would almost certainly result in continuing factional maneuvering and instability in Baghdad. 25X1 Syria: The military-dominated radical Baath- ist regime is obviously nervous about the possibil- ity of a coup attempt in the wake of the recent successful coup in Baghdad. Syria's prime minister warned the Lebanese Government on 27 July against harboring "imperialist agents to operate against Syria," a reference to former Syrian Baathist lead- ers who have been in Lebanon since 1966. The Beirut press claims the military leaders in Damascus are planning to remove key civilians from their posts and set up a new all-military overnment. Israel: The appointment of Finance Minister Pinhass Sapir to replace Golda Meir as secretary- general of the Israel Labor Party probably is at least in part another move by Prime Minister Eshkol to block Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's drive to become prime minister. This move may further strain relations between Eshkol and Dayan, but prob- ably will not split the party at this time. Sapir has been head of the party committee charged with ironing out differences over its forthcoming con- vention. His appointment preserves the balance of Power within the party and the government, 29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05i2 (Z I'fP79T00975A011700100001-0 Bolivia: President Barrientos, in another move to deal with the political crisis caused by the "Che" Guevara diary scandal, named a new cab- inet of military cronies on 27 July. Although some elements of the military reportedly are un- happy over Barrientos' handling of the crisis, the composition of the cabinet, along with the apparent continued support of the armed forces commander ought to strengthen Barrientos' hand in dealing with opposition groups. There has so far been no significant popular the new cabinet. I I Cuba: Fidel Castro, probably concerned with the unpopularity of the harsh reforms he launched last March, made an apparent attempt to modify some of them in his speech on 26 July. Despite his fre- quent denunciations earlier this year of the con- cept of material incentives, Castro said that "some measures" are necessary to reward workers materially. He made no new demands on. the population, and even promised workers more c-onQIIMj=-,- goods and benefits. 29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA- - SecretApproved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0 Secret Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0