CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 8, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 29, 1968
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0.pdf | 487.42 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A011 t1-0
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
STATE review(s) completed.
29 July 1968
STATE review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
Approved For Release 2003/J CX DP79T00975A011700100001-0
No. 0220/68
29 July 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Czechos lovakia-USSRm The meeting of leaders may be
going on, under pressure of new Soviet military
moves. (Page 1)
Vietnam-. Situation report, (Page 3)
Finland-USSR.- A canal reopening will mark unusual
cooperation between the two countries. (Page 5)
Southern Yemen.- Dissension in the back country may
cause the army to take over the government, (Page 7)
Mexicom A violent, clash between students and police
has taken place in Mexico City, (Page 8)
Iraq.- Differences within government. (Page 9)
Syria.- Nervousness over possible coup (Page 9)
Israel., New Eshkol appointment (Page 9)
Bolivia: New cabinet (Page 10)
Cuba.- Castro speech (Page 10)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
Approved For Release 2003/05'fig-MWDP79T00975A011700100001-0
I Czechoslovakia-USSR; The meeting of the Czech-
oslovak party presidium and the Soviet politburo may
be going on, under pressure of further Soviet military
moves,
Prague Radio announced yesterday afternoon that
most of the Czechoslovak presidium had left for the
meeting and would be joined by the rest on the spot.
President Ludvik. Svoboda also was included in the
delegation, The Soviet leaders may be traveling by
train. Western news reports indicate that the meet-
ing will take place aboard a special Czechoslovak
train,
The site of the confrontation is the Slovakian
village of Cierna? just across the border from the
Soviet railroad town of Chop, according to a report
of a Bratislava radiobroadcastT
Neither Prague nor Moscow showed any signs of
give in their respective positions as the time for
the meeting approached., On 27 July,, Czechoslovak
party leader Dubcek assured the nation over radio
and television that the presidium intended to stand
firm, especially in view of the massive citizen sup-
port he had received in the past few days d Despite
official disclaimers, rumors persist that the pre-
sidium is split over how to deal with the Soviets,,
Even as the presidium left for the meeting, the
Soviet propaganda barrage continued, apparently hop-
ing to convince Czechoslovak conservatives that Mos-
cow will be obliged to intervene if the conservatives
do not act to reverse the process of "democrati-
zation." On. Sunday? Pravda called on the Czechoslovaks]
29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin I
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
25X1
Approved For Release 2003 1* 77Oj TjT-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
[to "bar the way to counterrevolution," and threaten-
ingly added that "the Communists and working people
of Czechoslovakia" are warned "that there is no time
to waste ?" Pravda implicitly linked its demands to
the politburo-presidium confrontation, emphasizing
that "our party and our people attach much importance
to that meeting." Moscow probably hopes that it can
intimidate some of the more conservative members of
the presidium who may be wavering in their support of
Dubcek
29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001 -0
Approved For Release 2003/0514(WAERbP79T00975A011700100001-0
[South Vietnam: The lull in the ground war con-
tinue over the weekend.
Enemy-initiated activity was limited to a few
light shellings and minor probes of government para-
military outposts. Allied units were unable to ini-
tiate any prolonged engagements with Communist forces.
Reports continue to come in, however, that the
enemy is gearing up for a major offensive sometime
next month. The only important Communist force which
appears to be currently on an offensive footing is
the Viet Cong's 9th Division, whose elements are ar-
rayed near Tay Ninh city.
Despite recent efforts to establish its anti-
Communist credentials, the Huong government is still
under attack from hardliners.
The Prime Minister was sharply criticized in
the National Assembly this weekend for recent re-
marks suggesting that at one time there were some
genuine nationalists in the National Liberation
Front (NLF). Huong's subsequent statements that
such nationalists have long since been purged did
not mollify his critics in the Senate. Efforts by
government supporters and independents to shut off
Senate debate on Huong's position regarding the NLF
were swept aside by a coalition of Revolutionary Dal
Viets and northern Catholics clearly anxious to em-
barrass the Prime Minister.
29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/05t 1 bP79T00975A011700100001-0
Finnish-Soviet Canal to Reopen in August
SECRET
(Ceded tc(5?SR
[, Peaty of Moscow 1940--
I,ttkc
Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RD 79T009 1]11 1700100 -
Approved For Release 2003/ RVATRDP79T00975A011700100001-0
Finland-USSR,. An unusual experiment in Finnish-
Soviet cooperation will get under way in early August
when the reconstructed and modernized Saimaa Canal,
is reopened.,
The canal has not been used since 1944 when the
Karelian isthmus was turned over to the Soviet Union.
The new border bisected the canal, leaving its south-
ern half and Baltic terminus in Soviet hands
The possibility of reopening the canal was first
raised by the Finns in the early 1950s. .It was not
until 1962;; however;; when relations between Moscow
and Helsinki were more cordial that the USSR agreed
to lease to Finland for 50 years a narrow corridor
along the canal and its outlet near Vyborg on the
Gulf of Finland,, To lease a part of its territory
to a foreign country is without precedent for the
Soviet Union,
The lease arrangement aroused controversy in
Finland. Critics, including trucking companies and
industrial interests? argued that the more than $60
million invested in the canal should have been used
to improve the road and rail network in the area
rather than for a waterway suitable only for small
vessels and open only part of the year.
Political considerations appear to have won out,
however? and President Kekkonen has pointed to the
canal deal as further eviddnce of the success of his
policy of friendship with the Soviet Union. There
have so far been no public references in Finland to
a possible future redrawing of the border, but many
Finns probably view the arrangement as a first step
to regain a ortion of Karel.i.a, lost after World
War II,.,
29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
. SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
Approved For Release 2003/05/AJk6P79T00975A011700100001-0
Dissident Areas in Southern Yemen
Yemen has no establisA,d
boundaries in the east.
S. LOWER YAFA
`d. FADH L!
10, AUDHALI
It. DATHINAH
SECRET
Approved For Releasef 3/~% :I, - I -
Approved For Release 2003/05/?PCtA=RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
25X1?
Southern Yemen: Dissension in the back country
provinces may lead the army to crack down and pos-
sibly take over the National Liberation Front gov-
vernment.
Rumors of unrest in the tribal areas along the
Yemen border continue to circulate in Aden, which
itself is quiet but tense. Yesterday the government
radio announced that Saudi Arabia and "international
imperialist intelligence services" were fostering
the dissension.
The unrest stems from popular dissatisfaction
with the present weak government, rather than from
the usual intrigues of political groups. One of the
most powerful tribal groups is reportedly demanding
a "national unity" government, representing all po-
litical and social groups except "the godless Commu-
nists," the leaders of the Egyptian-sponsored Front
for the Liberation of South Yemen, and the former
sultans.
The army has been placed on alert and the de-
mobilized People's Guard recalled to duty, steps
which may cause armed clashes between these two
rival forces. The army already has virtually taken
over the functions of government in some tribal
areas, although it apparently stood aside during
recent disorders in Dar Saad and other rural areas.
If the army can overcome divisions in its own ranks,
it may feel that it now has enough tribal backing to
take over and form a "unity government" which can
procure vital foreign budgetary assistance.
I
29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
Approved For Release 2003/0J ~,: ' DP79T00975A011700100001-0
Mexico: A major clash between students and
police on 26 July in the heart of downtown Mexico
City resulted in scores wounded and many arrested,
including five Communist leaders.
The violent outbreak occurred after several
hundred Communist youth celebrating the anniversary
of the Cuban revolution merged with a separate,
larger student group that had permission to protest
the police methods used against demonstrating tech-
nical students a few days earlier. The Communist
agitators succeeded in luring the technical stu-
dents to Mexico City's main plaza, where attacks
on stores and other buildings precipitated the
clash with riot police.
The police announcement of the arrest of the
Communists described them as the intellectual au-
thors of a preplanned riot. Police also raided
the office of the Mexican Communist Party and
seized an alleged half ton of propaganda inciting
students to riot. The National Federation of Tech-
nical Students which sponsored the original peace-
ful march has condemned the Communist youth group
for "acts of vandalism."
The US Embassy comments that the incident is
far from over and that further demonstrations may
occur. The rapid and rough police intervention
in the riot and the authorities' quick focusing
of responsibility on the Communists, however, serve
as a strong warning that the government will act
severely to put down subsequent threats to order.
F
29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 8
SECRET
Approved For Release 203/ /9 : - D T 9 -
Approved For Release 2003/05' MkDP79T00975A011700100001-0
25X1
25X1
Iraq Differences between President Ahmad
Hasan Bakr, a "moderate" Baathist, and Prime Min-
ister Abd al-Raggaz Nayif are said to be serious.
the prime
minister an other military try to
force Bakr and his supporters out of the government
by the end of the month. The ouster of the Baath-
ists would almost certainly result in continuing
factional maneuvering and instability in Baghdad.
25X1
Syria: The military-dominated radical Baath-
ist regime is obviously nervous about the possibil-
ity of a coup attempt in the wake of the recent
successful coup in Baghdad. Syria's prime minister
warned the Lebanese Government on 27 July against
harboring "imperialist agents to operate against
Syria," a reference to former Syrian Baathist lead-
ers who have been in Lebanon since 1966. The Beirut
press claims the military leaders in Damascus are
planning to remove key civilians from their posts
and set up a new all-military overnment.
Israel: The appointment of Finance Minister
Pinhass Sapir to replace Golda Meir as secretary-
general of the Israel Labor Party probably is at
least in part another move by Prime Minister Eshkol
to block Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's drive to
become prime minister. This move may further
strain relations between Eshkol and Dayan, but prob-
ably will not split the party at this time. Sapir
has been head of the party committee charged with
ironing out differences over its forthcoming con-
vention. His appointment preserves the balance of
Power within the party and the government,
29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/05i2 (Z I'fP79T00975A011700100001-0
Bolivia: President Barrientos, in another
move to deal with the political crisis caused by
the "Che" Guevara diary scandal, named a new cab-
inet of military cronies on 27 July. Although
some elements of the military reportedly are un-
happy over Barrientos' handling of the crisis, the
composition of the cabinet, along with the apparent
continued support of the armed forces commander
ought to strengthen Barrientos' hand in dealing
with opposition groups. There has so far been no
significant popular the new cabinet.
I I
Cuba: Fidel Castro, probably concerned with
the unpopularity of the harsh reforms he launched
last March, made an apparent attempt to modify some
of them in his speech on 26 July. Despite his fre-
quent denunciations earlier this year of the con-
cept of material incentives, Castro said that "some
measures" are necessary to reward workers materially.
He made no new demands on. the population, and even
promised workers more c-onQIIMj=-,- goods and benefits.
29 Jul 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA- -
SecretApproved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700100001-0