CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A011000240001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 27, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
3
27 April 1968
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No. 0141/68
27 April 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Communist China - Vietnam: Peking is accommodating it-
self to Hanoi s acceptance of negotiations. (Page 3)
North Korea: A substantially larger budget for 1968
includes an increase of about a third for defense. (Page 4)
Berlin: Bonn is concerned by East German obstruction
of West Berlin mayor. (Page 5)
USSR: This year's first-quarter increase in civilian
industrial output was less than in the last three com-
parable periods. (Page 6)
Poland: Jewish emigration is increasing as a result
of government anti-Semitism. (Page 7)
Czechoslovakia: Liberal plans to push reforms through
parliament have received a setback. (Page 9)
Czechoslovakia - USSR: Prague is trying to disrupt
Soviet plans for a world Communist conference. (Page 10)
Rumania: The Ceausescu regime says it is correcting
past abuses. (Page 11)
West Africa: A recent summit meeting made little prog-
ress toward creation of a regional economic community.
(Page 13)
British Honduras: Mediation (Page 15)
Japan: Industrial mergers (Page 15)
Cuba: SA-2s (Page 16)
Cyprus: Talks delayed (Page 16)
Sierra Leone: New premier (Page 17)
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South Vietnam: Additional indications of im-
pending enemy attacks have been noted in Quang Tri
and Thua Thien provinces, and in the Saigon area.
The most significant threat appears to be de-
veloping in the vicinity of Hue, F
a
regiment of the North Vietnamese 320th Division
moved south through Quang Tri Province toward
Hue. The 1,500-man unit allegedly has orders to
attack in the Hue - Phu Bai area in May.
A regiment of the 320th would add signifi-
cantly to an already heavy concentration of enemy
troops in the lowlands of Thua Thien Province.
Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 in the A Shau val-
ley, which continues to meet only moderate resist-
ance, could make it difficult for the Communists
to support an offensive against Hue.
To the north, there are agent reports of enemy
troops moving on Quang Tri city from the area of
the Demilitarized Zone.
In the Saigon area,
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a notable increase in e number ot Viet ong
attempts to infiltrate weapons, explosives, and propa-
ganda materials into the city.
Meanwhile, major enemy units continue to avoid
contact with allied forces.
.A new attempt may be made in South Vietnam's
National Assembly to bring to a vote a motion of
no-confidence in Prime Minister Loc. On 23 April,
46 deputies in the Lower House submitted a petition
requesting that the house discuss "the cabinet and
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[the national situation." A no-confidence move has
little chance of success, but submission of the
petition for debate may increase pressure on Pres-
ident Thieu to replace Log and her ministers.
F7 (Map)]
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Communist China - Vietnam: There are indica-
tions that Peking is accommodating itself to Hanoi's
acceptance of negotiations.
Prime Minister Chou En-lai recently outlined
his view of t e mini-
mum conditions" necessary for successful peace-talks
on Vietnam. "total ac-
ceptance" by the US of the "fundamental principles"
of both Hanoi and the Liberation Front was a requisite
of success. He emphasized that the Liberation Front
must be recognized and "included in full" in any talks.
high Chinese
officials consistently opposed a negotiated end to the
Vietnam war but indicated that the decision to enter
into negotiations was up to Hanoi.
Peking propaganda has maintained a hard line on
negotiations, branding them "frauds" of the US and
"Soviet revisionists." The Chinese, however, have
maintained some flexibility on the subject by refus-
ing to comment publicly on Hanoi's stated willinaness
to be in preliminary negotiations.
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North Korea: Pyongyang has announced a substan-
tial budget increase for 1968.
The minister of finance told a session of the
Supreme People's Assembly on 25 April that expendi-
tures for this year will increase 33 percent above
last year. The rise last year was 11 percent and
only 3 percent in 1966.
Announced expenditures on defense will increase
by about a third. Very little is known, however,
about actual workings of the North Korean budget, so
it is difficult to measure the impact of the announced
increase on the military establishment. It is possi-
ble that some of the increase may reflect only changes
in accounting.
The public announcement of such a large budget
increase is probably aimed in part at impressing the
US and South Korea with Pyongyang's strength and re-
solve. The finance minister's speech linked the de-
fense boost to the allegedly increased "war provoca-
tions" of the US and South Korea.
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Berlin: Bonn will view the East German refusal
to allow West Berlin Mayor Schuetz to travel by road
to the Federal Republic as an alarming escalation of
Communist harassment.
The action against Schuetz is the first time
that the East Germans have applied the ban on travel
to and from West Berlin to a West German "higher of-
ficial." The ban was announced on 13 April. In ad-
dition to his duties as mayor, Schuetz is also pres-
ident of the Bundesrat in Bonn, and acting federal
president. In two previous cases, the officials in-
volved were of relatively minor rank.
The Schuetz episode took place despite a formal
Allied protest to the Soviets in East Berlin on 19
April. The Allies reminded the Soviets of Soviet
responsibility to maintain normal traffic on the
autobahn.
The East Germans may use the prospect of new
student demonstrations today in West Germany as an
additional justification for continuing the ban, which
they have said will remain in effect until further no-
tice. More demonstrations are planned for 1, 8, and
11 May.
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USSR: Nonmilitary industrial output is esti-
mated to have increased about 6.5 percent in the
first quarter of this year, somewhat less than dur-
inq the comparable period of the last three years.
All three industrial sectors--materials, civil-
ian machinery, and consumer nondurables--shared in
the downturn. The most significant slowdowns in
the materials sector were construction materials
and forest products. Even the usually growth-
oriented chemicals branch failed to k9ep pace with
its previous rate of expansion.
A comparison of the official growth rate of to-
tal machinery production with estimates for growth
in civilian machinery suggests a slight accelera-
tion in the growth of military and space hardware.
Most civilian machinery items, with the notable ex-
ception of farm machinery, failed to achieve the
growth rates registered during the first quarter of
1967.
Despite the regime's announced intention to
emphasize consumer goods over producer goods, con-
sumer durables and nondurables suffered a signif-
icant decline in growth during the first quarter.
This fall off, mainly in clothing and food, was in
large part the result of a decline in agricultural
output in 1967.
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Poland: Polish Jews from many walks of life,
fearing persecution, appear to be leaving the coun-
try.
Gomulka has restated his offer of 19 March to
permit Jews to leave Poland. This has speeded up
an already substantial outflow since the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict last June sparked new official anti-
Semitism.
The number of Jewish applicants for emigration
to the US has averaged about five a day in recent
weeks. Similar numbers probably are approaching
other Western embassies in Warsaw. The Netherlands
Embassy, which has handled Israeli interests in
Poland since last June, reportedly has been proc-
essing about 100 applicants monthly. Most of these
are being routed to Israel via Jewish relief agen-
cies in Vienna.
The applicants say they can obtain a one-way
travel document from Polish authorities without
much difficulty. The document must be used within
ten days of issuance, and its acceptance constitutes
an act of expatriation.
The current party crisis, in which anti-Semi-
tism disguised as "anti-Zionism" plays a major role,
has resulted in widespread dismissals of Jews from
official positions. Although most of the 30,000
elderly Polish Jews who remain from a prewar figure
of over 3 million are not directly affected by the
purges, the "pogrom" atmosphere fostered by hard-
line propaganda has increased their fears for the
future.
Despite the Gomulka offer, it is unlikely that
the Jews who formerly held important party and gov-
ernment positions will either wish or be permitted
to emigrate. The hard-line press has already
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warned that persons affected by the Official Se-
crets Act cannot be allowed to leave the country
for several years after they quit their jobs.
Jewish intellectuals are staying even though
many of them, such as film director Alexander
Pord and most of his colleagues at the Lodz film
school, have been purged. These people seem to
be waiting for a resolution of the current politi-
cal crisis which, in Ford's words, sill has "many
acts to be played."
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Czechoslovakia: The hopes of the Czechoslo-
vak liberals to push extreme reforms through par-
liament have received a jolt.
On 25 April, several ousted conservative min-
isters were assigned to key parliamentary commit-
tees. In these posts, the conservatives could help
dilute or block progressive legislation to which
the liberal wing of the party aspires. More than
a third of the deputies recently opposed the instal-
lation of reformer Josef Smrkovsky as chairman, in-
dicating considerable conservative strength in par-
liament.
Local and national elections are scheduled for
November, and the lame ducks now in the assembly are
being asked to legislate an electoral reform that
will probably prevent most of them from returning.
It is possible, therefore, that these assignments
were a sop to moderate leaders who fear an open rup-
ture between reformers and hard liners.
Party boss Dubcek is under severe pressure from
liberals who want to oust conservatives from the
party central committee as soon as possible. Within
a month he appears to have reversed field several
times on this issue and obviously hopes to avoid
a showdown until next year when he might be better
prepared.
Yesterday, however, he appeared to bow to the
will of the majority at an important party confer-
ence. He somewhat reluctantly endorsed the idea
of convening an early party congress that will
elect a new central committee and promised to in-
troduce a proposal to that. effect in May to the
current central committee. Because so many con-
servatives are still on the central committee, the
May meeting may become a severe test of Dubcek's
strength.
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Czechoslovakia-USSR: Prague is throwing
wrenches into the machinery the Soviets have set up
to prepare a world Communist conference late this
year.
At the preparatory meeting in Budapest, Josef
Lenart, the head of Prague's delegation, gave a
speech on 25 April in which he decried attempts to
formulate new documents for a world conference "be-
hind closed doors," according to a Prague broadcast.
Lenart called for "broad Public discussion" and came
out against the approval of "only one document cover-
ing all problems in a doctrinal way." The Czecho-
slovaks thus far are the only party that has publi-
cized any of the proceedings.
'Moscow's recent tactics had indicated its hope
that preparations for the conference, particularly
the drafting of what Soviet party Secretary Suslov
called the "main document," would enjoy smooth sail-
ing, with only a minimum of carefully controlled
publicity.
Several other parties share the Czechoslovak
views and Prague's behavior will make it much more
difficult for Moscow to achieve its goals for a con-
ference. Prague's actions are certain to aggravate
tensions with Moscow.
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Rumania: The Ceausescu regime has begun a cam-
paign to correct past abuses.
At an enlarged central committee plenum on 22-26
April, plans were announced to rehabilitate those con-
victed of political crimes in the Stalinist era. In
doing so, party leader Ceausescu broke openly for the
first time with his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej, who
first chartered Rumania's independent course.
In the only action against a member of the pres-
ent regime, the plenum removed Alexandru Draghici
from all his party and government posts for his part
in the Stalinist trials. Investigations are continu-
ing and others may be implicated. Ceausescu's inner
circle of supporters probably will not be affected.
Ceausescu intends that these steps symbolize the
national character of his government and its concern
for the rights and freedoms of individuals. He prob-
ably also hopes these actions will lend credibility
to claims that internal liberalization has been under
way in Rumania since 1965. In his speech at the ple-
num, however, Ceausescu made it unmistakably clear
that nothing like the degree of liberalization taking
place in Czechoslovakia would be allowed.
Discussions on foreign policy at the plenum re-
vealed the regime's chagrin at being left out of the
Dresden meeting, which all the other active members
of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA attended last March. Al-
though that meeting focused on Czechoslovakia, it also
considered the organizational structure of the Warsaw
Pact and tighter coordination in CEMA. Rumania has
been at odds with its allies over these questions for
some time but seems prepared to accept a less active
role.
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NFW WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL GROUP FORMED
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Signatories of protocol of "The Writ Afrtcan Rsgionei Group% "t uF S,l;t 'A
Proposed membership of West African regional economic community
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West Africa: A three-day summit meeting of West
African chiefs of state in Monrovia, Liberia, ended
on 24 April with little real progress toward the crea-
tion of a regional economic community.
The meeting was called by, the four Senegal River
states--Senegal, Mali, Guinea, and Mauritania--but of
the 14 nations invited, only nine showed up. Not rep-
resented were Ivory Coast, Togo, Dahomey, and Niger.
Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny led a last-
minute campaign, encouraged if not prompted by France,
to sidetrack the summit. Sierra Leone, in turmoil
since the coup last week,was unable to participate
formally.
Although the nine countries signed a protocol
establishing a West African Regional Group and issued
a communique urging the absent states to join, the
prospects for this latest venture in West African
regionalism are dim. The French-speaking states are
reluctant to join a community they believe would be
dominated by economically more powerful Nigeria and
Ghana. They also fear that they would jeopardize
their special economic ties with France and the EEC.
The proposed organization, like the rival West
African Community sponsored by the UN Economic Com-
mission for Africa, will continue to encounter the
basic hostility of France. At least while De Gaulle
remains in power, Paris is likely to view any such
community as a threat to the pre-eminent influence
France continues to enjoy in most of French-speaking
West Africa. F7 I (Map)
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BRITISH HONDURAS
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British Honduras: The impending release of the
mediator's recommendations on the dispute over Brit-
ish Honduras is likely to stir a hostile reaction in
Guatemala. Guatemala and the UK severed relations
over the territorial dispute in 1963 and jointly re-
quested US mediation two years later. There is in-
creasing parliamentary pressure in London to grant
the colony independence, preferably with, but if ne-
cessary without, Guatemalan concurrence.
The Guatemala Government, expecting internal
repercussions if treaty conditions are unfavorable,
has been pressing for further delays. If independ-
ence is granted, continued Guatemalan opposition
could take the form of diplomatic pressures against
the new nation and meddling in its internal affairs.
(Map)
Japan: The proposed merger of two leading iron
and steel companies may presage an accelerating trend
toward concentrating ownership in industry and fi-
nance. If the merger between Yamata and Fuji steel
is approved by the government, the resulting company
would be second only to US Steel in the iron and steel
industry. The new company would be the largest cor-
poration in Japan and would have some 35 percent of
the industry's market.
Most Japanese businessmen favor the creation of
larger firms before foreign investment restrictions
are loosened. Tokyo plans to be doing this between
now and the early 1970s. There already have been in-
dications from leading banks and elements of the Fi-
nance Ministry that the steel merger would stimulate
demands for bank mergers.
(continued)
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face-to-air missile sites are currently under con-
struction at Punta Ballenatos, Cojimar, and Santiago.
Cuba: Aerial photography for the first four
months of 1968 shows that the number of operational
SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites has remained at
24. Some formerly active sites have been phased
out and replaced by new ones. Three additional sur-
(Map)
HA'JANA
C imar
Punta Ballenatos ?
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?
49
Cuba: SAM Sites
? Operational SA-2 site
? SAM site under construction
,.P
flolvuin
-?
? Santiago Naval Base
0 ' U'S'
Cyprus: Disagreement over the venue is still
delaying the start of talks between representatives
of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Greek
Cypriot President Makarios insists that the discus-
sions be held on the island; Turkish Cypriot Vice
President Kucuk favors a foreign site. The impasse
over the talks reflects the mutual suspicions between
the two groups. UN Undersecretary Rolz-Bennett will
visit the island this weekend in an attempt to break
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Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens, leader of the
northern-dominated All People's Congress, was ap-
pointed prime minister yesterday by the acting gov-
ernor general after consultations with members of
parliament. Stevens, who apparently will attempt to
form a "national" coalition government, may have al-
ready made a deal by which members of the former rul-
ing party will hold some important posts in the new
government. Whether Sierra Leone's indisciplined
army will allow a return to constitutional rule will
depend to a great extent on assurances of higher pay
and better living conditions.
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