CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A009200060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
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EMDEUDED ND DE
ALA L ,A1,1&TDION MGN~DING
STATE review(s) completed.
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8 September 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
0
CONTENTS
Communist China - US: Chinese statement at
Warsaw meeting breaks no new ground on sub-
stantive issues and is no harsher than usual.
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*Communist China - US: The official Chinese
statement at the Warsaw meeting yesterday broke
no new ground on any substantive issue and was no
harsher than is usual at these talks.
The Chinese attempted to justify their unprece-
dented public release of material from the confi-
dential Warsaw talks by charging that the US had
"leaked" information concerning previous meetings.
Peking, however, does not wish to break off this
contact with the US, and Ambassador Wang pro-
posed 11 January 1967 as the date for the next dis-
cussion. This gap is about as long as that since
the last meeting, which took place in May.
Although uncompromising in language, Wang's
declaration at the 131st meeting advanced no new
propositions, and did nothing more than restate
positions put forward repeatedly by Peking in prop-
aganda statements during the past year. The US
ambassador reports that, despite the abusive
terms used by the Chinese, the over-all atmos-
phere at the meeting was relaxed and Wang did not
appear at any time agitated or excited.
Wang attacked the US "peace talks swindle"
and belabored the Soviet Union for alleged collab-
oration with the US. He reiterated Peking's ada-
mant opposition to negotiations on Vietnam and
asserted once again that China-- "the great rear
area"--would support Hanoi's struggle against
the US to the end.
Peking's motivation in releasing Wang's state-
ment to the press is not entirely clear but the in-
formation available at this time suggests the Chi-
nese hoped in this way to give new weight to old
8 Sep 66
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statements which had lost their impact through constant I repetition. The remarks concerning negotiations on Vietnam were probably intended as a reply to recent
US statements concerning mutual de-escalation of the
war by both sides, designed to encourage Hanoi--
which has already attacked the concept--to stand
firm in the struggle.
Release of the statement could also serve to nip
in the bud any speculation that the comparatively
moderate and reasonable remarks concerning Sino-US
relations by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi II 25X j
signaled a shift
in Chinese policy with regara i.etnam. When j
the US ambassador pointed out the contrast between j
Chen Yi's nd the hard 25X
tone of Wang s statement, the Chinese ambassador
acted surprised. He did not respond at once but at
the end of the meeting reiterated Peking's determi-
nation with regard to Vietnam and asserted that the
statement he had just made represented the "view ME
just
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of the Chinese people.
Chen's reported remarks, presented in a long-
run context, were probably intended to counteract j
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statements emanating the ReTGuards. He
declared that ot everyfrom
demand by the Guards would %
be taken as national policy and stated specifically that Peking's foreign polic will not be changed by
he "cultural revolutiono " 25X1
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NOTES
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ON
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Colombia President Lleras is prevailing in his
confrontation with Communist student agitators. Only
a few students in Medellin remain on strike, the planned
"occupation" of universities has failed, and non-Com-
munist students now are making their weight felt in
opposition to the Communist- dominated National Stu-
dents' Federationo Lleras' success is likely to lessen
student a itation and raise the prestige of his adminis-
tration.
8 Sep 66
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