CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET 11 May 1966
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Copy No. C160
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
State Dept. review completed. On file USAID release instructions apply.
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11 May 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. Communist China: Mao Tse-tung's reappearance
does not dispell all questions raised by his long
absence. (Page 4)
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4. Pakistan: Ayub determined to match Indian arms
buildup. (Page 6)
5. Congo (Leopoldville) - Belgium: Congolese dele-
gation in Brussels to discuss financial issues.
(Page 7)
6. Iraq: Tentative moves being taken to settle Kurdish
rebellion. (Page 8)
7. Rumania-USSR: Brezhnev's Bucharest visit may be
to remind Rumanians of their limited maneuverability
between Moscow and Peking. (Page 9)
8. Notes
(Chile; Guatemala. (Page 10)
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III
AT M-OW MEN TATION
i f" i ` Foe its
he of c u ch
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11 May 615 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Photo
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 May 1966
*Vietnam: (Information as of 4-030 AM EDT)
The Military Situation in North Vietnam: DRV
aircraft attacked US planes with air-to-air missiles for
the first time on 10 May. According to an initial de-
briefing of US pilots, three MIG-17s attacked two US
AlE Skyraiders and two helicopters which had just
retrieved a downed pilot in the vicinity of Yen Bai in
the' northwestern DRV. US pilots reported that two
missiles, which appeared similar to the US Sidewinder
missile, were fired by the MIGs. No further details
of the encounter are presently available. There was
no reported damage to the US aircraft.
It appears.from the pilot descriptions that the
North Vietnamese MIGs were equipped with the AA-2
Atoll, an infrared, heat-seeking missile believed to be
a duplicate of the US Sidewinder heat-seeking missile.
The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No signifi-
cant military engagements have been reported during
the past 24 hours.
Interrogation of a North Vietnamese soldier
indicates
that the North Vietnamese 304th Division may be in the
Laos-Cambodia-South Vietnamese border area I
the
entire division was infiltrated into the highlands In-
formation from a notebook taken from a dead Communist
soldier lends credence to the captive's statements Con-
firmation of this information would place two North Viet-
namese divisions--the 325th and the 304th--in the high-
lands area.
(continued)
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11 May btj CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
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Political Developments-in South Vietnam ; Buddhist
leaders, although exercising a ,restraining influence with
regard to potentially violent issues, are engaging in wide-
spread political maneuverings.
[Buddhist monks recently approached Premier Ky
with suggestions that he either assume "one-man rule"
to prevent disruptive forces from interfering with plans
for constitutional assembly elections, or purge con-
troversial members from the ruling Directorate and
the cabinet,
0
In I Corps, Buddhist struggle leaders have been
pressuring local authorities to remove a district chief
in the Hue area who has refused to support their move-
ment.
I Premier y has decided to postpone the
o ing of local elections, scheduled late this month, to
replace one-third of the provincial and municipal coun-
cil members elected in May 1965. Although most of
11 May 66
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the incumbent councilors 'dad favored such a postpone-
ment, the government's action may be seized upon by
its critics as a further indication, that it is uninterested
in this summer's constitutional. assembly elections.
he government commissioner for montagnard
affairs,, Paul Nur, has informed a US AID officer that
preliminary agreement was reached in negotiations this
week with representatives of the dissident tribal move-
ment FULRO. Although still awaiting approval from
government and FULRO leaders, the agreement would
provide the phased return of FULRO troops and sup-
porters to government control in return for firm ov-
ernment concessions on certain tribal dema d
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ME
E MEN
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Photo, released by NCNA of Mao's first appearance in six months.
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Communist China., Mao Tse-tung's reappearance
coincides with signs that a serious intraparty struggle
may be developing.
The Chinese clearly felt constrained to display
Mao for their Albanian ideological allies. Failure to
do so would have come close to admitting the worst of
foreign rumors--that Mao was no longer a significant
factor in internal Chinese developments. The circum-
stances around his return do not dispel the questions
concerning his health and the extent to which he has
been exercising leadership during the six months that
he was completely out of sight.
Mao's re-emergence comes at a time when Peking
has just asserted that it is engaged in a "life and death
struggle" with antiparty elements. This assertion was
immediately followed by a highly unusual attack by one
party newspaper against another. The Liberation
Army Paily, which recently has spearheaded the war
on intellectuals, charged on 8 May that Peking Daily
was trying to cover up for the guilty elements by pulling
its punches in a "sham criticism" of them. Pekin
Daily, which is the organ of the city's party committee,
published an abject confession of its error the next day.
This exchange may be the surface manifestation
of deeper problems. Serious charges of antiparty ac-
tivities have been raised against a group of lesser of-
ficials of the Peking municipal party committee and
higher officials may ultimately be imljlicatew.__t~
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Pakistan., President Ayub has reiterated his de-
termination to expand Pakistani military strength in the
face of a continuing Indian arms buildup.
In recent conversation with Ambassador McConaughy,
Ayub alleged that India is widening the margin between
the military strength of the two countries by acquiring
combat military equipment from the USSR, Britain, and
other sources. Asserting that Pakistan must, maintain
a deterrent military posture vis-a-vis India, Ayub
warned McConaughy that if Pakistan were blocked from
US sources for procurement of lethal weapons, it would
be necessary to turn elsewhere, "even to the devil him-
self"- -presumably meaning Communist China.
The Pakistanis think that the US decision in Feb-
ruary to resume shipments only of nonlethal military
equipment does not satisfy their needs. They note that
since the US aid cutoff last September they have been
largely confined to such limited supplies as could be ob-
tained from Turkey and Iran or from international arms
dealers at "black market prices. 11 They point to a need
to replace combat losses in armor and aircraft and to
obtain spare parts for other lethal items.
Peking has
ance,
including s
already provided some military assist-
mall arms, P-Ps5f.'Viw
artillery, ta ks, and.a nLIm-
ber of MIG- 19s. I
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I Pakistan' s
minister of commerce who is now, touring Western
Europe has contracted with France for three submarines
to be delivered in two years.
It is not clear whether Pakistan will cut back on
its economic development program in order to finance
procurement of arms. In recent weeks Finance Minis-
ter Shoaib has made conflicting statements~,O McConaughy
Ion the question of financing.
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Congo (Leopoldville) - Belgium: A delegation headed
by Premier Mulamba is scheduled to arrive in Brussels
tomorrow to discuss outstanding financial issues.
Behind the issues themselves, which relate to the
old debts of the Congo when it was under Belgian rule,
is President Mobutu's concern over the continued pre-
eminence of Belgian interests in the Congolese economy.
In the past few weeks he has become hypersensitive to
reminders of the Belgian presence.
(Mobutu's attitude stems partly from rumors that
Belgian financial and business interests are supporting
an attempt by former Premier Tshombe to return to
the Congo)
Mobutu is also eager to prove that he is a true
African nationalist and not a Belgian lackey. The
recent announcement of a rise in copper prices by
Brussels-based Union Miniere without prior consulta-
tion prompted Mobutu to demand that all Congolese
enterprises locate their main offices in the Congo. He j
also raised copper export duties to drain off some of
the profits earned by foreign business.
Mobutu seems intent upon finding some new means
to demonstrate his control of the Congo,, There has
been talk that he might nationalize foreign enterprises)
but both Mulamba and Foreign Minister Bomboko, who
is accompanying the premier to Brussels, are less
volatile than Mobutu and are likely to settle for mod-
erate concessions.
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economic agreements but might make gestures to ap-
pease Mobutu. I _1
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Iraq: [The Baghdad regime is making tentative
moves toward a settlement of the Kurdish rebellion in
northern Iraq, but prospects are far from bright)
1
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(Although the regime probably is willing to concede
some nominal form of autonomy for the Kurdish region,
major problems remain to be solved. The question of
disbanding the Kurdish guerrilla forces, for example,
has not yet been discussed. A recent upsurge of fight-
ing in the north may also discourage further moves
toward a settlement)
rThe Iranians, who have provided major assistance
to the rebel movement, would prefer to see the war
continue in order to keep the Iraqi regime off balance
and to maintain their own leverage on Baghdad.
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Rumania-USSR-. Party General Secretary Brezh-
nev's visit to Bucharest suggests, in part, a Soviet
effort to remind the Rumanians of their narrowing
room for maneuver between Moscow and Peking.
According to press reports, Konstantin Rusakov,
a Soviet specialist in relations with ruling Asian Com-
munist parties, is accompanying Brezhnev. The Rus-
sians will undoubtedly go over international Communist
problems with the Rumanians with a particular eye to
Chou En-lai's trip to Rumania later this month.
During his three-day visit, Brezhnev probably
intends also to review with Rumanian leaders plans for
a high-level meeting of Warsaw Pact members re-
portedly to be held in Bucharest in mid-July. Earlier,
Rumanian leaders were said to have been reluctant to
attend a Warsaw Pact meeting.
In a highly nationalistic speech on 7 May opening
the Rumanian party's 45th anniversary celebrations,
party chief Ceausescu, criticized Soviet party interfer-
ence in Rumanian affairs through such organizations
as the Comintern and the Cominform. He also re-
iterated the Rumanian view that the existence of mili-
tary blocs is an anachronism and that they must cease.
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a n America.
o
reign ministers and hopes to
obtain a UN investigation of the risk of radiati n
damage to L t
French ambassador. The government is seeking a e
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meeting of west coast f
Chile: Chilean opinion is becoming increasingly
vocal and indignant against scheduled French nuclear
tests in the Pacific. Protests in information media
and by all political parties- -especially the opposition
Communist- Socialist Popular Action Front--are forc-
ing the government to consider more drastic action
than the two recent representations it has made to th
*Guatemala.- Provisional President Peralta
declared a 30-day state of seige last night because of
increased terrorism and kidnaping of key officials in the
capital, rThe decree will reportedly have the support and
approval of the new congress which was installed on
5 Mayj A curfew may be imposed, constitutional guar-
ant
h
ees
ave been suspended, and the militar
on certain police functions,
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MEMMMMM
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistants to the President
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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