CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008700150001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET January 1966
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NAVY review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
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5 January 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
0
2. Indonesia- Sukarno may soon leave the country.
(Page 4)
3. Thailand-. Communists to step up subversion,
(Page 5)
4. UK-Rhodesia- African leaders continue pressure
on Wilson to use force against Smith government.
(Page 6)
5. Bolivia. Political instability may result from
Barrientos' resignation. (Page 8)
1
M 0
6. Dominican Republic-. Godoy's efforts to ease
tensions frustrated. (Page 10)
7. Notes. Upper Volta; Central African Republic;
ublic;
Turkey; R; India. (Page 11
M USSR; )
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Indonesia. Djakarta is still abuzz with rumors
that Sukarno will soon leave the country.
The President is known to be in need of medical
attention and may be planning to go to Switzerland or
Austria for treatment of his kidney condition. Ever
since the abortive coup of 1 October there have been
periodic reports that Sukarno was going abroad. The
recent rumors., however, have been unusually per-
sistent and may have more substance to them.
j The President is reported to be planning to
j
take a large entourage with him, including a number
of political personalities in bad odor with the army.
Several of these people would be fearful to remain
in Indonesia with Sukarno abroad,
Should Sukarno leave he probably would hope
that economic and administrative problems would
mount during his absence so that he could return pos-
ing as ':the savior of his country. He has used this
tactic in the past. [The army, however, apparent-.
ly feels that in the present circumstance it can pro- 25X1
mote the idea that Suka.r.me for
Indonesia's various His
5 Jan 66
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l'.. UAOhan,
h akle
Nakhon Phanorrr`l. -
Prov.
,r
BODI:
Phnom
Penh #
' MALAYSIA?
(80323
THAILAND
5 Jan 66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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 Thailand: The Communists appear determined
to step up the pace of subversion in the coming year.
A statement by the Peking-based Thai Patriotic
Front, marking its first anniversary, specifically
calls for an expansion of the "armed struggle" into a
"people's war." A Chinese official echoed this theme
at a reception in Peking on I January. He said that
the Patriotic Front would "undoubtedly" make a
greater contribution in the new year to the fight
against "US imperialism. 11
Although the Front's statement includes a stand-
ard attack on the "Thanom-Praphat lackey" government,
it appears to put greater emphasis than usual on the
expanding US presence in Thailand, apparently in an
effort toportray the Communist movement as a strug-
gle for independence.
A marked increase in the pace of Communist
terrorism, 'training, and recruiting in Thailand has
been noted over the past six months, principally in
the northeast provinces of Nakhon Phanom and Ubon.
[The first terrorist attack on a government post was
recorded late last month]
N response to this at-tack, government police
and army elements are currently sweeping an iso-
lated area of Nakhon Phanom Province. Only limited
contact with the guerrillas, estimated at between 100
and 200 in the area, has been reported thus far] F___
5 Jan 66
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UK-Rhodesia: African leaders are continuing
their pressure on Britain's Prime Minister Wilson to
use more forceful measures against the Smith govern,-
menu
[Britain will be on the spot at the Commonwealth
conference on Rhodesia now officially called for 11-
12 January. Wilson has been unwilling to undermine
the position of Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa--
already suspect in the eyes of some Africans--by
quashing the Nigerian initiative for the conference,:
but he may still try to get the meeting postponed un-
til February. Wilson hopes he might then be able to
point to some success of actions already-taken to
weaken Rhodesia and strengthen Zambia]
He also will try to get Balewa to persuade Tan-
zania and Ghana to reverse their decision not to at-
tend. Tanzania probably is staying out of the confer-
ence in order to be free to attack its decisions. Ghana
appears to intend to boycott the Commonwealth.
[Wilson will urge moderate Commonwealth mem-
bers to send high-ranking representatives. If numer-
ous other prime ministers stay away, he might send
Commonwealth Relations Secretary Bottomley and
Lord Chancellor Gardiner to represent himl
[Radical African leaders are campaigning against-
the meeting of OAU heads of state proposed for 19 Jan-
uary in Addis Ababa. Some moderate Africans had
hoped that this meeting would ease the pressure on
them to break relations with London in accordance
with last month's OAU resolution. Only 14 states
have accepted the proposal and the necessary two-
thirds endorsement seems unlikelyj
r-
Ghana has called a meeting of the OAU?s mili-
tary action committee in Accra on 6 January, and
(continued)
5 Jan 66 6
MIN
EN,
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may urge a campaign of sabotage and terrorism in
Rhodesia. The militants hope to make it an effective
instrument in forging African policy toward Rhodesia
[Zambia's lack of confidence in the British de-
termination to crush the Smith government is increas-
ingly evident. Vice President Kamanga reportedly
reacted angrily to Smith's weekend offer to ease the
way for Zambian procurement of oil and coal. He
charged that the offer represented UK-Rhodesian
collusion to ease Zambian-Rhodesian tensions so that
London could avoid a choice between the Africans and
its Rhodesian kith and kin. j
There are growing indications that British policy
makers may be considering that ultimately military
intervention may be necessary to bring down the Rho-
desian regime and preserve some British influence in
Africa. A Commonwealth Relations Office official
has informally approached Kenya's President Kenyatta
with the suggestion that British troops be stationed in
Kenya. Kenyatta replied that this would be politically
possible only if he could assure his cabinet that the
troops will leave Kenya for action against Rhodesia
within a definite time period.
5 J
66
 0
11
MINE
*Boliviao. C o-President Barrientos' resignation
from the milkary junta may usher in a period of
acute political instability./
[Barrientos says he resigned late yesterday in
order to comply with the constitutional requirement
that presidential candidates must resign from office
six months prior to elections. Elections have been
set for 3 July; his resignation is effective 3 January.
He also told a US Embassy official that, by resigning,
he wished to demonstrate to his critics that he is
neither ov?r, bW 0 nor desires to establish a
dictatorsh,P.Y am i ioi
[There is some evidence, however, that Bar-
F_
rientos' resiaYnation was not entirely voluntary.
~arrientos plans to depart from Bolivia this
morning for Panama and Switzerland, claiming poor
health is his reason for leaving. He says he will re-
turn in 15 to 20 days and begin his presidential cam -
paign as a civilianj
leneral Alfredo Ovando takes over as sole head
CG
of the junta and commander-in-chief of the armed
[With Barrientos out of the country, it seems
likely that the political situation will become highly
agitated. Barrientos planned to tour military installa-
tions last night to squelch rumors that he is a prisoner
and is being shipped out of the country.]
(continued)
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The junta is
also reported be extremely concerned about the
high degree of unrest in the tin mines. If Bar-
rientos does not leave the country today, but goes
to his native Cochabamba, an armed showdown with
his opponents is possible..
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r _ -
-:` "`II AL AFRICAML
aC PUBLIC
Yil
ETH$OPIA
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*Dominican Republic: President Garcia Godoy7s
efforts to ease tensions, ht'ceightened by the shooting
incident in Santiago last month, are being frustratedj
[in a speech on 3 January Godoy informed the
Dominican people that he was going to send selected
military personnel overseas on various missions.
As yet, none has left;~
~ the leaders of -the
armed forces have decided n-o-Ufo go. Godoy insisted
two days ago that should Rivera Caminero and navy
chief Jimenez refuse their support, he would-resign
and turn the government over to the military-j
~Meanwhile, Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD) has reneged on its earlier reported
promise to stand aside onthe deportation issue, and
has withdrawn its support of the provisjo)aal govern-
ment because Garcia Godoy has not removed any high
level military chiefs. In addition, rebel leader Caama-
no's political mentor, Hector Aristy, said in a press
conference on 4 January that, the "Constittitionalists"
would have to renounce -the provisional government and
called for a rekindling of "peaceful revolution.")
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Cso long as the problem of removing -troublesome
military personnel continues to be post oned the
situation will remain highly volafflej.
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SOVIET NAVAL FORCE
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0 00
Turkey. he Turkish Senate debate on Cyprus,
which begins tomorrow, may bring on a new outburst
of anti-Americanism. The opposition, which last
month was silenced by a cloture vote in the National
Assembly, will probably renew charges of unwarranted
US influence on Turkey's foreign policy. The govern-
ment lacks the votes to shut off debate in the Senate.
Anti-American elements in the press will probably
exploit any disclosures of US pressures for Turkish
restraint.rd arding Cyprus
1.1.
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Upper Volta: The intervention of. Joseph
Ouedraogo, who has strong local support in the
capital and is a long-term political rival of ousted
President Yameogo, may complicate Col. Lamizana's
problems in stabilizing the situation following the
military takeover on 3 January. Ouedraogo, to-
gether with other labor leaders who had spearheaded
the revolt, yesterday led an enthusiastic crowd of
several thousand in demanding assurances that
Lamizana was actually installing a new government.
Lamizana's actions this week indicate that he may
be susceptible to pressures from civilians who can
turn out crowds in the capita
Central African Republic- The country remains
calm in the wake of army chiefBokassa's military
coup of 1 January. Army officers and conservative
civilian holdovers from the Dacko regime hold key
positions in Bokassa's government. The gendarmerie,
which had seemed a potential source of trouble, ap-
pears mollified by extra rations and promises of
promotion. Bokassa continues to appear impulsive
and eccentric and is showing signs of becoming a
demagogue.
 2
USS : i~A Soviet naval force consisting of two
guided-miss e destroyers, at least one submarine,
and two auxiliaries was sighted in the East China Sea
on 3 January apparently headed for the Philippine Sea.
For some time the Soviets' policy has been to keep
more of their naval forces at sea than formerly. They
have engaged in long-range operations in several
areas, including this particularly sensitive one. The
first deployment of such a force to the East China Sea
- Philippine Sea area occurred almost a year ago~
and the most recent was concluded in Settember.
----In ~ja; ~e ~resjg~na.jono Finanice~inis er
Krishnamachari and his replacement by Sachindra
Chaudhuri brings a political unknown into a vital
cabinet post. The 62-year-old Chaudhuri is regarded
as a brilliant and personable specialist in corporation
law'. His lack of high government experience, how-
ever, will handicap him at a time when the recent war
with Pakistan and the country's worst drought in the
twentieth century have sharply intensified India's eco-
nomic problems. The resignation of the competent
but controversial Krishnamachari apparently was
triggered by his belief that Prime Minister Shastri 25X1
had failed to defend him against charges of corruption
and nepotism, F_
5 Jan 66 12
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Iwo, I
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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