CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008500080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET 10 September 1965
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Copy o . 132
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NAT[ONAL SECURITY
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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING C R ET
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DIA and DOSAF ASSIflScA Wb"8
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10 September 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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j
j 2. India-Pakistan: Current situation report. (Page 3)
3. Dominican Republic: With the ouster of General
Wessin, the provisional government appears to have
weathered its first major crisis. (Page 6)
4. Venezuela: Ideological differences are increasing
within Communist Party. (Page 7)
5. GATT: US position against granting tariff preferences
to less developed countries is threatened. (Page 8)
6. Brazil: President Branco may propose indirect
election of President. (Page 9)
7. France: De Gaulle's criticism of the EEC and NATO
is intended to establish a firm French position prior
to forthcoming negotiations. (Page 10)
8. Notes:
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I.
Colombia (2), (Page 12)
i
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
Order of Battle
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10 Sep 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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j India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
No major military gains were registered by either
side in yesterday?s heavy fighting, but there were in-
dications that the warfare along the Punjab border may
j intensify with both sides throwing in units heretofore
held in reserve
,
A Pakistani counterattack in the Lahore area,
launched on 8 September, appears to have halted the
Indian advance there and may have thrown the Indian
forces back across the border in some sectors
.
ea units pene-
trated a considerable distance across the Indian border.
The initial Indian attach: toward Lahore apparently con-
sisted of about four brigades, leaving the Indian 1st
Armored Division `and the equivalent of nearly three in-
fantry divisions in reserve which New Delhi would -
he Indian 10th Division has move from its
regular station in Southern India to Pathankot in the
Punjab, adding about 12,000 troops to the forces avail-
able for the attack on Sialkot. Sketchy reports indicate
9
most certainly order into action if faced with major
military defeat in the Lahore.-Amritsar area.]
The two-pronged Indian attack toward Sialkot from
Jammu and the Jessar area thirty miles north of
Amritsar may represent a major Indian effort to cut'
off the Pakistani brigades involved in.the 1 September
thrust toward Akhnur. The US Army Attache in New
Delhi speculates that the Indian forces committed to the
Sialkot attack may include the 26th Infantry Division at
Jammu, two independent brigades in the Punjab, and an
armored brigade.
from Jammu are within, artillery range of Sialkot.
has made little progress, while the forces attackin
that the Indian advance toward Sialkot from the southeast
On the Rajasthan front farther south, Indian forces
do not appear to have advanced beyond their initial gain
of six miles. The Indians do not appear to be committing
a significant number of troops to the move toward Hyder-
abad and it is doubtful that their plans call for taking the
(continued)
10 Sep 65
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EAST PAKISTAN
0
50 100 150 200
Statute Miles
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10 Sep 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE :BULLETIN Map
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or I/
11
city. A Pakistani spokesman said that a "massive
counterattack" was in the makingf but Pakistan prob-
ably has little more than a brigade in the area
Trucks full of tribal irregulars reportedly were
leaving Peshawar yesterday. Their mission is not
clear, but Pakistan may hope to use them to augment
forces in the Lahore and Sialkot areas by patrolling
rear areas, guarding prisoners, or even serving as a
reserve force for the regulars.
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I lIndian
army units egan moving into forward pose ions on 8
September along the East Pakistan border, replacing
border police. The border police, normally subordinate
to the state governments, have been placed under Indian
Army command to provide rear support for the army
units on the borderoj
[The Indian Defense Ministry has directed the Navy
to draw up plans for a sea blockade of Pakistan,
India is probably concerned
that military aid may be offered to Pakistan by such
countries as Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran, and that the
materiel will be shipped by seal The Indians are de-
taining all Pakistani ships in Indian ports as hostages
for two Indian merchant ships reportedly seized in
Karachi.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto, when told by
our ambassador that the US was concerting its resources
behind UN peace efforts, said that if the only reason for
the US-Pakistan bilateral agreement was to refer Paki-
stan to the UN, "then Pakistan might as well not have
that agreement:' Bhutto reiterated Pakistan's demand
that India withdraw from Kashmir- -which Bhutto ap-
parently now regards as part of Pakistan--and said that
if India wouldn't agree, "then let them destroy Pakistan.
President Kaunda of Zambia reportedly said yester-
day that negotiations were in progress concerning the
composition of a commonwealth peace team, and that
he had suggested Britian, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania,
(continued)
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and New Zealand as members. Its formation may be
announced soon.
Chou En-Lai continued the Chinese propaganda
effort aimed at shaking Indian resolve in the conflict
by "sternly warning" New Delhi yesterday that India
must bear responsibility for "all the consequences
arising from its extended aggression:" Chou followed
in the pattern of other Chinese statements on the
crisis by avoiding any specific threat of Chinese action.
He emphasized charges that the US and the USSR were
particularly responsible for India's "large scale armed
attack on Pakistan." He charged that the Indian
"military venture" would not have been possible with-
out US consent and support and that recent Soviet state-
ments regarding Kashmir encouraged India to carry
out military operations against Pakistan:
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*Dominican Republic: With the ouster of General
Elias Wessin y Wessin on 9 September the provisional
government appears to have weathered its first major
crisis.
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Provisional President Garcia Godoy said in a
speech last night that 'Wessin had been retired and that
he had accepted the post of Dominican Consul-General
in Miami. Until shortly before his departure last night
aboard a US Air Force plane bound for Panama, the
former commander of the Armed Forces Training
Center had openly defied an order by Garcia Godoy to
leave the country or retire. Wessin failed in his efforts
to gain support from the other military leaders who
continued to accept the President's decision that the
departure of the controversial general was necessary
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a majority of
officers and enlisted men disagreed with the handling
and timing of Wessin's ousteGarcia Godoy's state-
ment last night that his government has decided. not to
make changes in the leadership of the armed forces at
present, however, may reduce military opposition to
the provisional government.
It is expected that the provisional regime will now
turn its attention to the disarmament of the rebel zone.
Until now, rebel leaders have made their compliance
with the Act of Reconciliation, which calls for the dis-
armament of the rebel. militia,, dependent upon the
departure of Wessin.
[Meanwhile., leaders of the Communist Dominican
Popular Movement (MFD), in preparation for a guerrilla
warfare campaign, have been reconnoitering the coun-
trside in the northern province of Puerto Plata
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ie mn) as re- 25X1 j
cently accepted a Communist Chinese offer to train MFD j
members in guerrilla warfare in China.1
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Venezuela: Lbisruptive ideological differences
within the Venezuelan Communist Partv (P V) and the
Communist- dominated Armed Forces of National
liberation (FALN) appear to be increasing sharply.,'
ostility directed toward "soft-liners" in the
part-y is now reported in both the party proper and
the FALN, its paramilitary arm. A small, tightly
knit group of "soft-linell members is attempting to
create a movement of sufficient strength within the
PCV to replace the "hard-line" leadership. Their
quarrel is basically over the degree of emphasis to
be placed on armed struggle as o posed to achievement
of party aims by political means.,j
could signal trouble. He has reportedly threatened to
eanwhile, the party's politburo is also under
attack from the other side. Some of the more radical
hard-line members of the FALN believe the politburo has
compromised with the soft-liners. The imminent return
to Venezuela of one of the FALN's hard-line leaders,
who has been representing the organization in Cuba,
10 Sep 65
pp
M(i
Ifunseat" the PCV polit:buroj
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GATT: [A serious threat is shaping up in GATT
to the US position against granting tariff preferences
to less developed countries'`
[The challenge is likely to arise next week when
a GATT working party considers an Australian plan
to give selected less developed countries (LDCs)
preferential access to the Australian market. The
plan would require a GATT waiver to forestall
possible retaliation against Australia by other GATT
contracting parties which might consider their
interests hurt J
[Should the Australians press for a waiver, US
opposition in GATT could be overruled by the LDCs.
Some of the developed countries favor some sort of
preferences for the LDCs and would probably not
oppose a waiver. The impending US-Canadian agree-
ment on free trade for automotive equipment has been
cited by some--most recently by Japan--as weakening
the US argument against preferences.
he GATT secretary general has agreed with the
French delegate that the outvoting of a major trading
power on an important issue would be "disastrous for
the GATT. " He is apparently trying to avoid a waiver
vote by recommending the establishment of an over-all
system of waivers for preferences to LDCs "under
certain prescribed circumstances, " Such a system,
however, would presumably not apply to the US-
Canadian. agreement.
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Brazil: 'resident Castello Branco appears
increasingly inclined toward proposing indirect
election of the next president by Congress.)
Castello Branco believes such a change may be nec-
essary to assure that Governor Carlos Lacerda, now
the leading candidate, does not gain the presidency in
the November 1966 election. Castello Branco considers
Lacerda too rash and not sufficiently dedicated to con-
tinuing the reform policies of the present administration,
constitutional amendment providing for such a
change would not be placed before Congress until
October at the earliest,
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Presumably, the outcome of the gubernatorial 25X1
elections on 3 October will influence Castello
Branco's final decision,_'
.n adminstration effort to revamp basic electoral
procedures would probably evoke considerable resistance
in Congress from many of the regime's adherents as
well as the opposition. Some elements of the military,
particularly supporters of Lacerda would also strongly
resent such a proposals,'
p2
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France: De Gaulle's criticism of the EEC and
NATO in his press conference yesterday is intended to
establish a firm French position prior to important
negotiations in which lie hopes toweaken the suprana-
tional aspects of both organizations.
In a direct slap at the EEC Commission., De Gaulle
emphasized that all future decisions of consequence must
be taken by the national governments. He tied France's
withdrawal from EEC activities to his opposition to its
supranational development. He stressed the impor-
tance to France of achieving a common agricultural
policy but implied that: settlement of this issue should
be on a government-to- government basis.
De Gaulle's statement that France will not permit
its hands to be tied by the majority voting provisions of
the treaty due to come into effect in 1966 is a further
indication that resumption of French participation will
depend on some modification of these provisions. There
is strong opposition to this among -the other EEC mem-
-
r
bers, howeverL and
negotiated and conducted on a bilateral basis.
France might accept a
"gentleman's agreemeHE71-n-Rot to override any one nation
rather than require direct treaty amendment
By stating that France's "subordination" to NATO
must be ended by 1969 "at the latest, 11 De Gaulle reit-
erated his broad opposition to the structure of the or-
ganization without putting forth any precise changes.
[In the past he has indicated that future military rela-
tionships between France and the US will have to be
The French President's general references to,
Kashmir and the need for neutralizing Southeast Asia
indicate he sees no important role for France to play
in either situation at this time.
(continued)
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De Gaulle refused to answer a question on whether
he would run for another term in the presidential elec-
tion on 5 December. His references to the need for
continued political stability and the importance he
attached to settlement of the EEC and NATO questions,
however, appear to indicate that he does intend to be
around to see French interests defended,
10 Sep 65
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NOTES
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I
on
Colombia: Two high-ranking members of the
Colombian Communist, Party--Marxist/Leninist
(PCC-ML) are leaving for Communist China on
21 September and are scheduled to bring back a
large sum of money for., the party's activities,
The PUU-ML, having broken with a orthodox
Communist Party, has been seeking funds for
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guerrilla activity and urban terrorism which it
has already be "n on a small scale
Colombia: The government apparently intends to
permit a rally of transport workers to be conducted in
Bogota today by Camilo Torres, a def rocked priest who
has been inciting strikers and other discontented groups
to rebellion "by force if necessary, " The authorities
probably believe that it will be easier to contain the
demonstration than to prevent it. Communist Party
leaders have instructed their followers to support
Torres, and the Communists probably are the prime
organizers of the rally which was called to protest a
proposed gasoline tax., I
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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