CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A007000260001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 May 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
3. USSR-Cuba, Khrushchev's speech suggests con-
tinued caution in the Caribbean. (Page 3)
4. USSR-Berlin: Moscow protests Adenauer's plans
to accompany President Kennedy to West Berlin.
(Page 5)
6. Indonesia: Far-reaching domestic consequences
may result if American oil companies withdraw.
(Page 7)
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Brazil: Some violence may soon break out be-
tween extreme leftists and their opponents.
(Page 9)
25X1 9. Notes:
(Page 1
]South Vietnam.
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. *USSR-Cuban Khrushchev's speech at the Soviet,
Cuban "friend.-Zip rally" in Moscow yesterday sug
gests, that the USSR intends to. continue its present
cautious line of easing.tensions in the Caribbean and
avoiding provocations to the US.
Although Khrushchev warned that. US moves to
aggravate the situation "might" create a crisis more
dangerous than.the October missile crisis, his reaf
.firmation of the USSR's pledge to come to Cuba's as-
sistance was. less explicit than some. of his previous
pronouncements. There was no hint of a formal
Soviet-Cuban defense pact.
The speech provided no indications of Soviet in-
tentions regarding further withdrawals of military
personnel, transfer of Soviet- controlled military
equipment to the Cubans, or new economic commit-
ments. Khrushchev also avoided references to such
potentially dangerous issues as US overflights and
the status of the Guantanamo base.
The thrust of Khrushchev's remarks on Cuban
internal affairs was that the Castro regime should
concentrate. on consolidation and economic develop-
ment rather than foreign revolutionary adventures.
He ridiculed "imperialist" charges that Latin Ameri-
can revolutionary movements are directed by "some
mythical hand of Moscow!'
The speech reflected the importance the Soviet
leaders attached to Castro's visit as a symbol of Cu-
ban support of the Soviet position on Communist strat-
egy prior to the confrontation with the Chinese Com-
munists in bilateral talks in July. Khrushchev adopted
the posture of a militant Bolshevik, stressed his
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devotion to Communist unity, and strongly implied
that Castro had endorsed Moscow's views. He hailed
the visit as a."contribution" to strengthening the co-
hesion of the world Communist movement.
Although Khrushchev pledged that the Soviet party
would do its "utmost" in talks with the Chinese to re-
move differences in the "interpretation of certain
questions," the emptiness of this pledge was evident
.in his uncompromising restatement of Soviet positions
and the customary indirect attack on. those of the Chi-
nese.
Castro's response, as broadcast by Moscow, ap-
peared intended to indicate that he and the Soviet lead-
ers had reached agreement on.major policy questions
and that the frictions produced by the missile crisis
have been overcome. In contrast to his earlier criti-
cisms of Khrushchev's behavior, Castro praised the
"timely and energetic" actions of the USSR which, he
said, demonstrated Soviet readiness to risk every-
thing to protect Cuba. He also expressed gratitude
to Khrushchev personally for "tirelessly forging"
Soviet-Cuban friendship and for the USSR's "decisive
and invaluable" assistance.
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USSR-Berlin: (Moscow has protested Adenauer's
plans to accompany President Kennedy during his
visit to West Berlin
(in an oral protest delivered 22 May to Ambas-
sador Kohler, Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin asked
whether the US has approved Adenauer's "openly
provocative" intentions. In the protest and in the
subsequent discussion, Zorin stressed that Moscow
considers.Adenauer's plans are aimed at creating
difficulties for th bilateral US-Soviet talks on Ber-
lin and Germany,
(Zorin did not say, however, that continuation of
the talks depended on cancellation of Adenauer's
plans. His protest may be the first in a series of
divisive tactics aimed at exploiting West German re-
sentment over the negative attitude of the US, UK,
and France toward convening the Bundestag in West
Berlin last month.)
Zorin also reiterated Moscow's standard point
that West Berlin is not part of West Germany, Mos-
cow and East Berlin regularly attack visits to West
Berlin by Bonn government leaders, claiming that
Soviet propaganda has to date devoted 1' tle at-
tention to the President's forthcoming visit. I
Bonn has no legal jurisdiction over West Berlin
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properties in. the fall of 19574)
Indonesia: bar-reaching domestic consequences
would follow from steps which the two large American
oil companies operating in Indonesia are conside ing
if negotiations with the Sukarno government fail.
Ambassador Jones believes that rioting and loot-
ing would be the most immediate danger at the com-
panies' installations if Caltex and Stanvac evacuate
dependents of American employees. Labor unions?
possibly acting at Communist orders, might try to
take control of the installations, as they did Dutch
The companies have threatened to halt operations
if no agreement has been reached by 15 June. Within
a matter of days. after the distribution of oil stops,
according to the ambassador, Indonesia's transporta-
tion system would come to. a halt, creating food scarcity
in many. areas" The absence of kerosene supplies
would strike the general public hardest, since kero-
sene is the major fuel for cooking and lighting. Ten-
sion and unrest lready evident in Indonesia's cities
would intensify)
While the government might put on a show of
reasonableness to get things moving again, the In-
donesians would at once seek alternatives to reduce
their dependence on the American companies. Such
alternatives would almost certainly include an in
technicians to come in and
vitatlon to Soviet bloc
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run the oil propertiesp
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 Brazil: ome violence between the extrem
leftists ana tE
heir opponents may occur shortlyi.
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Increasing agitation centers around government-
sponsored demands for action on agrarian reform.
The Com munist- dominated General Workers" Com-
mand is reportedly sponsoring a 24-hour general
strike, probably to emphasize the demand for reform.
Leftist federal deputy Leonel Brizola, Goulart's
brother-in-law, appears to be stepping up his efforts
to foment unrest by inflammatory speeches calling
or quick action.)
.(President Goulart's opponents, on the other hand,
)elieve that the agrarian reform agitation is primarily
lesigned to bring about a modification of the consti-
;utional amendment procedure. They suspect that
Goulart seeks such a modif ication in order to permit
.iis perpetuation in office. They are probably also
oncerne over the apparent imminence of cabinet
hanges which could result in the removal of the anti-
ommunist war ministerJ
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NOTES
South Vietnam: The current of unrest among
Buddhist elements still appears to be running strongly,
but President Diem has indicated that he plans little
further action to meet Buddhist demands for better
treatment from the government. Diem made it clear
during a recent talk with the US ambassador that he
believes terrorists rather than security forces were
responsible for deaths among a Buddhist crowd in
Hud two weeks ago and that the source of the agita ion
is a. small group of self-seeking Buddhist leaders.I
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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