CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006700080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 8, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 November 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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2. USSR: Khrushchev's remarks at 7 November re-
ception. (Page i i)
3. Cuba: Remarks of Soviet Ambassador at Havana
reception. (Page iv)
4. USSR: Large naval ballistic missile noted for
first time in Moscow parade. (Page v)
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*USSR: Khrushchev's remarks at a 7 November
Kremlin reception provide further evidence that the
Soviet leaders contemplate a period of relative in-
action and consolidation while they assess the effects
of the Cuban crisis on the USSR's world position and
study the future course of US policy.
Moscow appears to feel that the outcome of the
Cuban affair has reduced Soviet bargaining power and
that there would be no prospect of gaining Western
concessions in new negotiations on such issues as
Berlin and Germany in the near future.
Khrushchev implied that he has abandoned his
earlier plan to come to the US to attend the UN Gen-
eral Assembly and to meet with President Kennedy.
He said such a meeting is not necessary at this time
and that he would favor heads-of-government talks
only "if it is question of peace and war:'
The Soviet premier failed to use this opportunity
to renew pressure for a Berlin settlement. He rid-
iculed Western press speculation regarding a Soviet
"timetable" for a separate peace treaty with East
Germany and said only that "we need a treaty" and
that the Berlin question "must be solved:'
Khrushchev displayed considerable sensitivity
to Western views that he had backed down in the
Cuban crisis and that the West should now adopt a
tougher stance in dealing with the USSR. He defended
the necessity of "flexibility" in foreign policy and
8 Nov 62
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suggested that it was futile to ask "who won and who
lost:' He also attempted to minimize the significance
of "40 rockets" in Cuba, saying that "even 140 wouldn't
be enough:'
Khrushchev acknowledged that Castro has op-
posed his decision to remove the missiles. He claimed
that Moscow had assured the Cubans that it would not
abandon them but, at the same time, had warned
them that if Khrushchev did not agree to a settlement,
"it would mean war:'
His remarks also suggest that he may be antic-
ipating a situation in which the US, after the rapid re-
moval of missiles from Cuba without UN inspection
and verification, may decline to implement President
Kennedy's offer of assurances against an invasion.
He said that the Soviet leaders, unlike the Cubans,
believed that the President would "keep his word:'
He warned, however, that if a formal US guarantee
is not forthcoming, this would "put us back to a posi-
tion of catastrophe:'
Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union would end
its current nuclear test series on 20 November.
In reply to a question, Khrushchev said "it is a
good time" for a nuclear test ban agreement and
claimed that the Soviet and US positions are "very
close together:' He immediately qualified this opti-
mism, however, by saying that US tests "will start
up again" and by indicating that Soviet scientists 25X1
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would continue preparations for "future experiments.
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*Cuba: At Havana's celebration of the 45th an-
niversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, major speeches
were delivered by Soviet Ambassador Alekseyev and
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, president of the agrarian
reform institute and seventh ranking leader of the
Cuban political machine. Mikoyan was on the speak-
ers' platform with President Dorticos, but Fidel
and Raul Castro and Che Guevara were apparently
absent.
The Soviet ambassador's speech was replete
with references to Fidel Castro as "Cuba's legendary
national hero" and the Cuban people's "supreme
leader." He appeared to go out of his way to stress
that Cuban-Soviet friendship is based on "mutual re-
spect" and "complete equality." In this speech, which
must have received prior approval from Mikoyan,
the Soviet ambassador added that his government sup-
ports "the legitimate demands of the revolutionary
government of Cuba which are aimed at guaranteeing
the sovereignty and security of the country, formu-
lated by Comrade Fidel in his five-point communique."
The general tenor of the Soviet ambassador's
speech suggests a concerted effort to mollify the
Cuban leaders, whereas the absence of the three high-
est ranking Cubans could have been a protest against
Soviet pressures.
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*USSR: The USSR exhibited a large naval bal-
listic-missile for the first time in the October Rev-
olution parade in Moscow on 7 November.
According to Izvestia this weapon "can be fired
from any position both above and below the water:'
A tentative analysis I indicate 25X1
that the missile is 50-60 feet long and consists of
three sections of different diameters. The aftermost
and largest section has a diameter of about six feet
which comprises about half the length of the missile.
This overall length would prohibit the use of the
missile in any known Soviet submarine unless a stage
were removed. The size also implies a range con-
siderably greater than that of any known missile now
operational in the Soviet Navy.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
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in Algeria'
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(Advance conclusions are normally distributed
within 24 hours of USIB approval and the printed
text within five days)
07
( The United States Intelligence Board on 7 No-
vem er 1962, approved the following national intel-
ligence estimat)
(NIE 62-2-62: "The Short Term Outlook
N
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The- Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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