CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006500150001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. West New Guinea: Subandrio to insist on direct
transfer of territory to Indonesia. (Page i)
2. USSR-Indonesia: Mikoyan visit points up Soviet
concern over Indonesian situation. (Page t t)
3. Peru. (Page iii)
4. Iran: Amini resignation probably means an end
to reform program. (Page iv)
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7. Thailand: Political and military leaders feel let
down by West. (Wage vi)
3. Cairo Economic Conference: Talks for most part
maintained constructive approach to economic
problems. (Page vii)
9. Albania-USSR-China: No improvement noted in
Albanian-Soviet relations. (Page viii)
10. USSR-Cuba: Moscow fails to issue communique
following talks with Raul Castro. (Page ix)
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11. USSR: Replacement of Gosplan chief probably re-
flects continuing investment difficulties. (Page x)
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13. Britain: Little time for "new image" Conservative
government to have effect on electorate. (Page xii)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 July 1962
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West New Guinea:
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The Dutch delegate on 13 July re-
fused a demand for direct transfer, and The Hague
can be expected to continue to reject such a proposal.
ESubandrio had told Ambassador Jones on 16 July
that he was not coming to Washington with an ultima-
tum but would demand an "acceleration" of the trans-
fer of West New Guinea's administration to Indonesia.
He said Sukarno wanted him to return to Djakarta no
later than 5 Augus
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USSR-Indonesia: The announcement that Soviet
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan will visit Indonesia
on 21 July probably reflects Soviet concern over the
current situation. ED- e composition of the delegation
suggests that one subject of discussion will be Indo-
nesia's deteriorating economic situation and its dif-
ficulties in meeting payments for previous Soviet as-
sistance:.] The high-level Foreign Ministry officials
accompanying Mikoyan will probably discuss the state
of Indonesia's negotiations with the Dutch over West
New Guinea and may seek assurances that these ne-
gotiations,,encouraged by the US, do not reflect a
change in Indonesia's attitude toward the USSR. CA
delegation of this stature could also discuss long-
range aspects of relations between the two countries,
particularly in light of Moscow's continued. willing-
ness to provide Djakarta with complicated and ex-
tremely expensive military items despite Diakarta's
heavy indebtedness.
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FRI' *Peru: The military junta which yesterday
f orc6f ully removed President Prado f rorn off ice
and seized control of the government a pears
p
firmly in control. Only minor protest demonstra-
tions have been reported thus far. Additional dem-
onstrations, possibly including widespread strikes,
are likely. Barring an unexpected split among the
armed forces, however, the new regime probably
will be able to contain any outbreaks of trouble.
?R The cabinet installed yesterday consists entirely
of military men without prior experience in political
office. Its first act was to annul the controversial
10 June elections in which none of the presidential con-
tenders received the one third of the vote necessary FRI'
for election. The military, concerned particularly
with keeping Haya de la Torre's APRA party out of the
government, had previously charged these elections N
were characterized by "massive fraud and the imme-
diate cause of yesterday's takeover was Prado's insist-
ence on constitutional procedures and refusal to annul
the elections.
0011
Junta leader General Ricardo Perez-Godoy has
promised new elections in June 1963. He also insists
that the junta members are confident the US will "ap-
plaud" their action once the "true facts" are made
known.
.Prado and several other members of his govern-
ment reportedly are being held on a navy ship not far
from Lima, and may soon be forced into exile. Reports
vary on the whereabouts of presidential contenders Man-
uel Odria and Haya de la Torre; some say they have
taken asylum at foreign embassies. The other major
presidential candidate in the 10 June elections, Fernando
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Belaunde Terry, issued a statement from Arequipa
yesterday expressing approval of the military take-
over and stating that events had proved his charges
of electoral fraud.
The coup in Lima brought prompt and strongly
adverse reactions from much of Latin America. By
late yesterday at least five Latin American nations--
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras,
and Venezuela--had announced that they were suspend-
ing diplomatic relations with Peru. A number of others
apparently were considering similar action. Venezue-
lan President Betancourt has urged that a meeting of
foreign ministers of the Organization of American States
be convoked to consider th9f eruvian situation.
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Iran: The Shah's acceptance of Prime Minister
Amini's resignation may mark the end of postwar
Iran's first serious economic and social reform pro-
gram. It may also signal the return of the Shah to
active day-to-day involvement in government opera-
tions. He had long been lukewarm in his support of
Amini, and any new appointee is likely to be more
under his thumb than was Amini.
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Amini said he resigned because he was unable
to present a balanced. budget; he charged that Amer-
ican refusal to provide necessary financial aid made
his position untenable. Amini has agreed to remain
as a caretaker until the Shah appoints a new prime
minister. It is likely that any new government will
find it difficult to continue a. rPfnrm nro rram I
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Thailand: LThere is widespread discontent in
Thai official circles over Thailand's exposed position
in Southeast Asia and its relations with the West.
Senior Thai political and military leaders, concerned
over the Laotian settlement and angered by the loss
of the border temple case in the International Court,
feel that Thailand has been let down by its Western
allies. As a protest gesture the foreign minister re-
fused to attend the Laos Conference in Geneva, and
Prime Minister Sarit has publicly warned that further
US military aid to Cambodia would have "serious re-
percussions" in Thailand. Although Sarit appears to
be in firm control of his government, he may be con-
sidering reshuffling his cabinet and possibly modifying
Thai foreign policy in the direction of neutrality
Thailand's discontent with its relations with the
West has previously taken two apparently contradic-
tory forms: demands for bilateral defense treaties
as a substitute for SEATO protection, and threats of
rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the establish-
ment of a neutralist foreign policy. While some Thai
leaders are suggesting that improved relations with
Communist China may become necessary, Thailand's
long-standing fear of Chinese domination makes this
unlikely. Nevertheless, Thailand's relations with the
West are likely to become increasingly difficult.~~
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Cairo Conference: CThe ten-day conference of
economic ministers and. specialists from 35 "devel-
oping" countries which ended in Cairo on 18 July
maintained, for the most part, a constructive ap-
proach toward a wide range of problems. Most del-
egates used non-political terms in expressing their
concern over the possible disrupting effect the Euro-
pean Common Market would have on their nations'
established. trade patterns, over the future price
structure of their nations' agricultural and raw ma-
terial exports, and over the need for expanded aid
from more advanced countries. The Cuban delegate,
by contrast, delivered an impassioned anti-US speech
and persistently demanded that the final conference
declaration contain a denunciation of imperialism,
colonialism, neocolonialism, and economic aggression
and blockade by "imperialist countries." These de-
mands received virtually no support and were re-
jected.
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Albania-USSR-China: Albanian Premier Mehmet
Shehu's public criticism of Khrushchev--the first in
several months--in a speech to the Albanian National
Assembly on 16 July indicates that no improvement in
Soviet-Albanian relations has occurred. Shehu charged
Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership with carrying
ideological differences "rapidly and brutally" into the
sphere of state relations by organizing a political and
economic "blockade" and by breaking off diplomatic
relations.
Shehu qualified his thanks to the USSR and the
"socialist camp" for past economic assistance by
carefully attributing Soviet aid to the friendship of the
Soviet "people" for Albania. He spoke frequently of
Tirana's membership in the "camp" and the Warsaw
Pact but--by omission--implicitly acknowledged that
Tirana has ceased to be a participating member in the
bloc's economic organization, CEMA. The speech
also contained several paragraphs of effusive praise
for Communist China and 2&o Tae-tuna. F
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USSR-Cuba: The USSR's failure to issue a com-
muniquO at the conclusion of Raul Castro's talks in
Moscow or to publicize his departure is in sharp con-
trast to the attention given his arrival on 2 July and
his subsequent meetings with Soviet leaders, including
Khrushchev. According to Radio Havana, Castro
arrived in Havana on 17 July.
The composition of Castro's delegation strongly
suggested that its primary purpose was to negotiate
for additional Soviet military aid. The circumstances
of his departure imply that difficulties developed dur-
ing the negotiations; Moscow may have rejected new
Cuban requests for advanced military equipment or a
possible Cuban plea for a firmer Soviet defense com-
mitment. There has been no indication that all of the
mission has returned to Cuba, and negotiations could
be continuing on a lower level.
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USSR: The replacement of USSR State Planning
Committee (Gosplan) chairman V. N. Novikov--
announced on 17 July--probably reflects the con-
tinuing investment difficulties in the Soviet Union.
The choice of a construction expert, V. E. Dymshits,
as the new chairman may mean that Gosplan will give
more attention to construction, which continues to be
a major investment problem.
Investment problems have been increasing in the
USSR in recent years, basically because of competi-
tion among the military establishment, heavy indus-
try, housing, and agriculture, for certain key re-
sources. As a result, planning and supply problems
have been compounded and the rate of increase in in-
vestment has dropped sharply since 1960. Gosplan
has been criticized frequently in the past year for
various disruptions in the economy--most recently in
regard to the poor supply
to Kazakhstan.
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Great Britain:jmbassador Bruce notes that the
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substantially new government Macmillan has created.
in midterm puts greater stress on youth, individuality,
and intellectual competence in all ranks, particularly
at the sub-cabinet level. The "ruthless wielding" of
the ax has created some resentment, particularly
over the summary dismissal of Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer Selwyn Lloyd. The Conservatives remain
sharply divided over the future of Lloyd's policy of
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Bruce believes the immediate problem for the
conservatives is to convey their "new image" to the
electorate quickly. The prime minister has gambled
on the political effectiveness of the drastic shake-up,
but there is little time to make an impact before the
three by-elections scheduled for this fall. If the new
by-elections continue the series of reverses and hu-
miliations for the Conservatives, their party and
Macmillan in particular will be in serious trouble
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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