CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006300270001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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19 April 1962
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MILIN-99-9141- 11 IL N I
TOP SECRET
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3. Argentina: Political compromise may seat Peronista dep-
uties but deny them governorships. (Page it)
4. Venezuela: Scattered violence by extremists continues.
(Page t t)
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6.
19 Aprill962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Congo. (Page t)
Netherlands., Dutch want UN General Assembly to guarantee
Papuan self-determination before West New Guinea is trans-
ferred to Indonesians. (Page t t t)
7. USSR-Indonesia: Equipment for surface-to-air missile units
en route to Indonesians; operational capability still some
months away. (page iv)
8. Laos: Souvanna's Laotian supporters increasingly concerned
that Pathet Lao may undermine his authority during his ex-
tended absence in Europe. (Page tv)
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10. Yugoslavia- Germany: Belgrade reportedly considering reduc-
tion of its East German diplomatic representation to restore
relations, with Bonn. (Page v)
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UN I KAL IN I tLLIL tNC.t bULLt I IN
1 19 April 1962
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*Congo; Katangan President Tshombd departed Leopold-
ville for Elisabethville early this morning in a UN aircraft. Al-
though Tshombd left without the formal approval of the central
government, Congolese Army forces offered no resistance to
Nigerian UN troops who removed fire trucks which had been
placed on the runway to prevent his departure.
off negotiation
Last-ditch efforts by the central government to prevent
Tshombd's departure from Leopoldville on 18 April reflect its
sensitivity to possible charges by anti-Adoula elements that
Adoula. is incapable of coping with the problem of Katanga's se-
cession. Adoula himself recessed his talks with Tshombd on
16 April and left for a tour of the provinces on 17 April. There
were I reports that Adoula. left instructions that
Tshombd was not to be permitted to leave Leopoldville, despite
UN assurances concerning his freedom of movement. Tshombd
has sought to avoid any suggestion that. he himself is breaking
doula told the US Ambassador that he and Tshombd had
agreed to resume discussions when Adoula returns on Saturday.
UN representative Gardiner is informing Tshombd that he ex-
pects talks to resume no later than 24 April and that he expects
T
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0 MOMMEMEM i
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Argentina: A compromise formula for alleviating the po-
litic, crisis is evolving from secret discussions among ele-
ments of the Intransigent Radical Civic Union and the. People's
Radical Civic Union, despite the two parties' public insistence
that all elected Peronistas be installed on 1 May. The formula
calls for the Chamber. of Deputies to seat the 47 new Peronista
deputies and for the Peronistas to agree to the federal govern-
ment's taking control of the provinces where Peronistas won
the governorships. Political .jockeying continues, but the for-
mula. would afford a solution within constitutional bounds. and
may gain stronger support.
man c,sv,v,t+man ~vetr malnr rAtln'I
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Venezuela: Isolated incidents of violence by extremists
are continuing, amid reports of antigovernment plotting by both
leftist and rightist groups and public dissatisfaction over recent
economic measures. Several National Guardsmen have been
killed in Caracas during the past week, and student outbreaks,
armed assaults on police stations, and attempted sabotage of gas
lines and other utilities have been reported.from several cities.
he US Embassy reports that the Venezuelan security forces
obably do not have the capability to deter or prevent "either
planned or spontaneous acts of extremist violence" but that they 25X1
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19 Apr 62
DAILY BRIEF
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Netherlands: The Dutch Government is willing to consider
the Bunker. proposs as a basis for further negotiations with In-
donesia in the dispute over West New Guinea, but is proposing
amendments to prevent the automatic transfer of administration
to Indonesia before the native Papuans exercise free choice. The
Dutch want this plebiscite guaranteed, in effect, by a UN General
Assembly resolution spelling out that the future of the territory
will be determined by a Papuan plebiscite under UN control by a
specified date. They also assert that a UN security force will be
required to demonstrate the authority of the UN during the pre-
paratory perioCAA
19 Apr 62 DAILY BRIEF
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 pprove or a eas
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transferred to Djakarta in 1966
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I,ndonesia has accepted the Bunker proposals "in principle"
but still maintains that New Qgpeals administration must be
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
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further small-scale clashes are likely, and both sides con-
tinue preparations to increase the scale of oaerationT I
cerning Indonesia
States Intelligent. Board reached the following conclusion con-
USSR-Indonesia
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for the air force andOfor the army
The USSR reportedly has shipped to Indo-
nesia. equipment suffint for a surface-to-air missile (SAM)
unit of =launchers. This suggests that the missiles them-
selves will be supplied in the near future. It will be. several
months, however, before even this first unit can be operational.
Soviet engineers and technicians have been working on the con-
struction of a. SAM training center and launching site at Kalijati
air base, near Bogor southeast of Djakarta, since November of
last year. Under the arms agreement signed with Indonesia
since early 1961, the USSR is to provide 0 similar SAM units
scow apparently has already delivered some air-to-
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I to carry -
surface missiles for TU-16 jet medium bombers, and the MIG-21
jet fighters scheduled to be supplied this year are to be equipped
with air-to-air missiles. Indonesian naval personnel now are
being trained in the USSR to operate motor torpedo boats designed
OS., a continuing political deadlock in Laos is causing in-
creasing concern among neutralist Laotian supporters of Souvanna
Phouma who fear that, with Souvanna in Europe for an extended
stay, the Pathet Lao will broaden their military and political con-
trol at his expense, Some Souvanna officials, fearing violence,
have sent their families to Phnom Penh. 25X1
19 Apr 62 DAILY BRIEF
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thus far prevented an open break]
Lao, common purpose against he-Vientiane Government has
leftist fac-
tion is gaining support within ouvanna s own camp. Despite
the difficulties at the headquarters level and a long history of
friction in the field between pro-Souvanna forces and the Pathet
the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
Stat`s Intelligence Board on 18 April reached the following con-
clusion concerning Lao
litary activity probably will be limited to small-scale at-
tack(Mi
y both sides ? , owever a buildup of materiel for Commu-
ist forces continues
Yugoslavia- Germany.- Yugoslavia is considering reduction
of its representation in East Germany from the ambassadorial to
the consular level, according to a Yugoslav official. Belgrade
apparently believes such a step could lead to restoration of dip-
lomatic relations with Bonn without irrevocably alienating the
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19 Apr 62 DAILY BRIEF v
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bloc, and improve its chances of obtaining West German fi-
nancial assistance to ease an acute foreign exchange shortage.
Belgrade, concerned that its foreign trade- -one third. of which
is with EEC nations--may be hurt by the growing integration
of the Common Market, may also hope that improved relations
with Bonn would facilitate future negotiations with the EEC..
Bonn broke diplomatic relations with Belgrade in 1957
when Yugoslavia became the first nonbloc state to accord East
Germany fulldiplomatic recognition. The West German am-
bassador in Rome told the Yugoslavian, ambassador there in
1959 that before diplomatic relations could be restored, Bel-
grade must at least reduce its East German representation to
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
StatCbQ' the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
Intelligence Board concludes thi~D
6Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate.
diJ(military action in the immediate futur-eD
BERLIN: he Soviets continue to avoid major harass ments
over access, Zd we see no indications that they expect early mil-
itary confrontation over Berll'n~
INDONESIA: ~:Carried on Page iv of Daily Brielf
LAOS: ((6arried on PaLre iv of Brie~T
19 Apr 62
Daily Brief vi
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Argentine Proposals to Ease Political Crisis
The compromise formula is intended to resolve the key
question of dealing with the Peronista victories. Differences
over this question within the Intransigent Radical Civic Union
(UCRI) and the minority People's; Radical Civic Union (UCRP)
have delayed action on the proposed amendments to the law on
presidential succession, which would permit Guido to complete
Frondizi's term and to postpone elections until late 1963. The
Senate, which passed the amendments by a 35-0 vote, could
override any Chamber modifications by a two-thirds vote and
pass the bill into law, according to UCRI Vice President Le-
brero. Chamber approval is expected by Lebrero but not un-
til after Easter.
The formula is a variation of an earlier Peronista sugges-
tion that the federal government take over all provinces where
elections were held on 18 March in order to make it appear that
the interventions were not directed exclusively at the Peron-
istas. Under the proposed compromise the Peronistas would
lose more face, but the apparent alternative would be to pro-
mote the violence which Peronistas have promised if they are
banned from office on 1 May. One of the Peronista leaders
who was returning from visiting Peron in Madrid reportedly
told a Peronista exile in Montevideo on 14 April that Peron was
trying to lull his opposition in Argentina into a false sense of
security with misleading press statements that he would not or-
der violence.
A high Peronista official has informed a US Embassy of-
ficer in Buenos Aires that Peron recently abolished the Peron-
ista Coordinating and Supervisory Council and replaced it with
an executive committee headed by Augusto Vandor, secretary
'
general of the powerful metal workers
unions.
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Possible Shift in Yugoslavia's. German Policy
Since 1957 Yugoslavia has supported .the USSR's German
policies. While. a reduction of the rank of the Yugoslav mis-
sion in East Germany could be viewed as a departure from
Soviet positions on East-West issues, it would not affect Bel-
grade's basic policy that a continuing division of Germany is
desirable.
In recent months, the Yugoslav press has become increas-
ingly critical of East German economic conditions and domestic
policies, and little effort has been made to conceal Belgrade's
view that the East German ? leaders are basically "unregenerate
Stalinists?' In mid-March, Belgrade lodged a "most severe
protest" with the East German Foreign Ministry when six Yugo-
slavs returning from the Leipzig Fair were forcibly removed
from trains. The Yugoslavs had given offense by openly crit-
icizing. the fair.
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Simultaneously, every effort. is being made to improve
Yu oslav - West German relations,
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As evidence, the Yugoslav ci e the
successful visit of Socia
slavia in mid-March and
ocratic party chairman
on West Germany have e
list party leader Carlo Schmid to Yugo-
the likelihood of a visit by Free Dem-
Mende. Yugoslav propaganda. attacks
ased, and Bonn is. reportedly. consider-
ing an exchange of visits by parliamentary delegations.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Warning Center
The Director
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