CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006300150001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 5, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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5 April 1962
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5 April 1962 p
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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5. Syria. (merge in)
6. France -Algeria: says OAS no longer 25X1
"valid political force" in. France. (Page tv)
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8. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Whitehead and
Banda in agreement to attempt removal of Welensky. (Page vi)
10. Situation Report-. Jamaica. (Page vit)
11. Conclusions of the Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin
- Situation. (Page vt t)
12. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Rage tx)
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M
M
*Syria: Tension and uncertainty evidently continue in Da-
mascus as Syrian officers jockey for position in the new mili-
tary command. Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari, a key leader of last
September's revolt, is rumored to be plotting against the com-
mand. Apparently as a precautionary measure, tanks were
drawn up around army headquarters early yesterday evening
and sand bags were being placed around the building. Ar-
mored cars were placed at strategic points throughout Da-
mascus as if trouble were expected.
In Aleppo, newly arrived army units are patrolling the
city, while the commando and paratroop units which. carried
out the pro-UAR coup on 1 April have been withdrawn from
the city, Tanks are stationed at the perimeter of the city,
and local police and army units are keeping order. As late
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 as noon yesterday some UAR flags were still being flown
on many buildings as insurance against vandalism by pro-
UAR elements, who had still been demonstrating that morning.
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ME
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Cairo's initial satisfaction over the apparent pro-UAR
trend of developments has begun to yield to one of uncertainty
and some anger, Cairo Radio has accused the General Com-
mand in Damascus of sabotaging the "Homs Agreement," which
it had hailed earlier as having averted bloodshed and civil war.
The Egyptians particularly criticized the retention of Air Force
commander Brigadier Assassa, who they allege secured the
release from detention of "reactionary" army elements, -includ-
ing Kuzbari. Cairo describes Kuzbari as a known Jordanian
agent.
LC~ the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
States Intelligence Board on 4 April reached the following con-
clusion concerning the Middle Ei-S74
I/The situation in the Middle East remains precarious, but,
the Syrian crisis has reached a stage- -for the moment at
least--which reduces the likelihood of early intervention by
Egypt, Jordan, or Israel. However, Israeli-Syrian clashes
in the Iake Tiberias area are likely to continiel, I
France -Algeria.-
the OAS no longer exists as a "valid politicaF-fo-rcell in
France even though the danger of isolated acts of terrorism
in. the metropole will continue for. sometime. I I
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the failure of the OAS in Algeria to win over the support j
e local
during raid
O
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svi
spectacular acts of terrorism
ous setback for the OAS, which had hidden its weakness by 25X1 j
.views the
Orleansville
raid as a desperate effort and aseri-
near
r
ean
lle las
week refuted the OAS clam to have
Moslem support. The OAS had expected to gain support in
the Orleansville region
lem, a.Moslem vice president of the Fachf National a . Assem-
bly who owns large tracts. of land near Orleansville and who
has been closely allied in the past with the forces for a French
Algeria, The OAS has for a number of months received some
support from terrorized Moslems and a few willing Moslem 0
m Algiers
t
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j Federation of Rhodesia and
j Nyasaland- a Southern
j Rho esian government o rime nister itehead has ap-
parently realized that African opposition makes, the continu-
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ation of the Federation in its present form impossible and
is negotiating informally with Nyasaland leader Hastings
Banda in an effort to salvage as much as possible of the pres-
ent federal structure. In these. negotiations, Whitehead is
bypassing his party colleague, federal Prime Minister Wel-
ensky, whose bitter opposition to any change in the Federa-
tion's constitution has isolated him from many Southern
Rhodesian whites. Banda has indicated to Whitehead's em-
issary that he would be willing to maintain a wide range of
economic ties and even a common defense force, provided
Welensky left the scene. According to the American Consu-
late General in Salisbury, . Whitehead's initiative may lead to
Welensky's eventual resignation. With Welensky no longer in
a position to arouse African animosities, Whitehead would then
be. in a better position to negotiate a new rel a~onshi with the
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Situation Report--Jamaica'f )Elements. of political and
economic Instability will pro a y become increasingly evi-
dent after Jamaica becomes independent on 6 August. Al-
though the 10 April elections could be won by either of the
two principal political parties- -both moderately conservative
and.pro-US--factionalism may lead to a post-election break-
up of the defeated party and increased influence for leftist ele-
ments. Some members of the government are concerned over
Jamaica's vulnerability after independence: to a Communist
subversive effort directed from Cuba. Such an effort would
exploit discontent among the island's chronically unerimployed.
The. economy, now viable and relatively diversified, is
threatened by British curbs on immigration from Jamaica,
and Britain's expected adherence to he Common Market may
reduce. Jamaica's export opportunftl--p F7
ttsacKup, rage cl
CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The United States Intelligence. Board has. approved the fol-
lowing . conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee
which reviewed the situation for the period. 21 March through
3 April. 1962:
1. The present pattern of Soviet behavior indicates that
Moscow does not intend to precipitate a confrontation with the
West in the .near future and that it wishes. to conduct further
high-level exchanges. with the US on a. Berlin settlement. The
treatment by Soviet public media of the Rusk-Gromyko talks at
Geneva has conveyed an impression that some progress
how-
,
ever slight, was made on the Berlin. and German problems.
2. The Soviets, however, seem to believe that this phase
of negotiations with the US on Berlin continues to Word an
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opportunity. for further efforts to restrict and erode Western
rights. The shift of attention from air access to ground travel
to and within Berlin and to the activities of Western military
.liaison missions in East Germany probably reflects a belief
that advances can be made in these areas with less risk and
greater chances of success.
3. The cessation of scheduled Soviet flights in the air
corridors since 29 March probably is intended.to appear re-
sponsive to private US representations regarding the hazards
of air harassments and to President Kennedy's press confer-
ence remarks on 29 March welcoming the "care" with which
the Soviets are proceeding on Berlin. However, the lull. in
Soviet flights probably does not indicate a decision to termi-
nate. these activities; the Soviets apparently intend to remain
cautious and restrained in this crucial areaat least pending
further developments in negotiations.
4. While. there does not appear to be a marked-increase
in public resistance to the East German regime, bitter public
complaints over living standards continue in some areas, the
workers are more openly opposing regime efforts to step up
productivity without pay increases, and. passive resistance
among farmers remains a serious headache for the regime.
5. Despite the regime's drastic security precautions,
East Germans still succeed in fleeing to the West, although
at a rate slightly below 10 percent of past years. In the first
quarter of 1962, a total of 5,649 East Germans applied for
asylum, an estimated 40 percent of whom had fled since 13
August 1961. Of these, only 920 persons registered in West
Berlin in January and. February. (Berlin figures for March
are not yet available.) In 1961. the comparable figure was
46,367, of whom 34,275 had fled to West Berlin;. total escapes
in.1961 reached 207,026, of 0,458 escaped via West
Berlin.
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 WATCH COMAIITTEE CONCLUSIONS
(On the basis of findings bY itS.Watch Committee. the Unift-d
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direc military action in the immediate futur-
W,; Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
outfus inteiiigence t3oarct concludes tha
provoke military confrontation in the immediate futui
' BERL0r..LThe focus of continuing Soviet harassing and
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probiNgtac~~s against the Allied presence in Berlin may be
shifting temporarily to Western ground access and military
liaison missions. However, bloc military activity in general
suggests that the'Communists do not intend their actions to
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III
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. SOUTH VIETNAM: (Povernment forces are waging increas -
ingly aggressive antigue"ftilla operations. The Viet Cong, how-
ever, generally continue to avoid superior forces and to epncen-
trate upon attacks which they believe arelikely to succeik
INDONESIA: 6-4
. donesian infiltration of West New Guinea
terrftory is likely to continue. Naval and air incidents will
increase as the Dutch patrol capabilities are enhanced by rein-
forcementl~
rt-
F7 AIIDDLE EAST:((Qarried on Page iv of Dai Br
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
A
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the United States Intelligence Board o 4 April approved
the following National Intelligence E stimatee
[SNIE 42-62: "The Outlook for South Korea" dated
4 April 1962,
(Advance conclusions are normally distributed within 24
hours" of approval, and the printed text within five days.
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 Southern Rhodesian Premier Makes Overtures to Africans
In Nyasaland
itehead sent Southern Rhodesian Labor Minister Abra-
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hamson to talk to Banda last week.
the minister told Banda that the whites
in Southern Rhodesia realized that the present Federation
could not be kept together and asked him what ties the Afri-
cans in Nyasaland would agree . to retain. A similar approach
apparently is to be made later this year to the Africans in
Northern Rhodesia. In this, way Whitehead reportedly hopes
to work out new relationships. which could. be put in force "by
telephone 4511s" as soon as the present federal structure is
dismantled',
anda told Abrahamson that he could agree to the main-
tenance of a common currency and central banking system, a
.common development authority, and--for a trial period--a
customs union, in addition to the common defense force. This
position is to a large extent contrary to the widespread Afri-
can opposition. to federation in any form. African opposition
is so strong and ingrained that even Banda's prestige might
be damaged if the switch were made. too quickly. For the pres-
ent the negotiations apparently are to be kept quiet, since Banda
refuses to commit himself publicly until Britain explicitly aban-
dons its support for the concept of federation--a move which
London has been unwilling to make
rt-
ielensky has become more and more of an embarrassment
to his party, particularly to its influential Southern Rhodesian
section. His vague threat to use "force" in connection with the
Northern Rhodesian constitution alienated public opinion both in
the Federation and in Britain; moreover, by calling federal
elections for late April he has embroiled his associates in a
campaign which few of them feel is necessary and which is be-
ing boycotted by all the other parties in Southern Rhodesia. His
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/blunders are cutting into his party's popularity and are adding
to the problems confronting Whitehead, who faces an election
campaign of his own in Southern Rhodesia next October. For
this reason, Whitehead and other Southern Rhodesian officials,
who have considerable influence in federal politics, may try
to ease Welensky out, thereby improving their own position and
their relations with Banda and other Africans.
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 'Situation Report. Jamaica
overnment-fostered industrial development and years
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unemployment now runs at about 14 percen
of r''latively stable administration leave Jamaica well pre-
pared for independence, but prosperity on the overcrowded
island has not permeated to the lower classes. Jamaica is
a major producer of bauxite, and its economy is based also
on tropical agriculture, light manufacturing, and tourism.
It has an average per capita gross national product of $433,
second only to Trinidad of the British isle s. However,
(After the enthusiasm of achieving independence has sub-
sided, basic problems such as surplus population could cause
.increasing difficulty for the government. Prospects for the
high-cost sugar industry are dimmed by its inability to obtain
a larger share of the US marke.
Cremier Manley's ruling People's National party and the
Jam ca Labor party led by his cousin Sir Alexander Busta-
mente have dominated the island's politics for nearly two
decades. Both are committed to upholding provisions of the
1961 Defense Areas Agreement between the US and the West
Indies Federation. These concern the US space and missile
research facility on Grand Turk Island- -a Jamaican depend-
ency--and the right to construct Loran facilities in Jamaica.
Premier Manley's overtures for US assistance to Jamaica's
defense foes will presumably be followed up by whichever
party wins
I
he police force can handle any disorders which might
occur in connection with the election,but it faces a future in-
ternal security problem from increasing numbers of Cuban
refugees, some of whom are believed to be Castro agens.
(mere are differences within the cabinet respecting rela-
tions with Cuba. Because of the position taken by Trade and,
Industries Minister Isaacs, the government rejected a Cuba
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roposal for exchange visits by 50 students, but he and some
6ther cabinet members still fear that local extremist
elements
will be exploited by Cuba after independence. Millard Johnson,
leader of the People'rogressive party, may already have re-
ceived some Cuban aidL
is fearful of a post-independence al-
liance etween various malcontents and Cuban agents7C
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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