CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006200450001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 March 1962
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13 March 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR - Disarmament Conference: Moscow may emphasize
prohibition of use and dissemination of nuclear weapons:as
paramount issues at Geneva. (Page 0
4. East Germany - West Germany: Bonn agrees to one-year
extension of settlement of East German interzonal trade
debt. (Page it)
5. South Vietnam: Saigon may be preparing new anti-US press
campaign. (Page tit)
6. Netherlands-Indonesia: Luns said to be willing to give up
West Ney Guinea if face-saving formula can be negotiated.
(Page t t )
7. Communist China - Portugal: Peiping pressures authorities
in Macao in effort to curb Chinese Nationalist activities there.
(Page i v)
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8. Communist China: Production of freight cars declines 80 to
90 percent in 1961. (Page tv)
10. Dahomey: Government experiencing economic and political
strains which could threaten its.pro-Western position. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 March 1962
DAILY BRIEF
*USSR..- Disarmament Conference-. The Soviet Union is em-
phasizing, as two of the paramount issues facing the 17-nation
disarmament conference, which opens on 14. March, the prohibi-
tion of both the use and dissemination of nuclear weapons. In
replies to acting. UN Secretary General U Thant's queries on the
Soviet attitude toward signing a convention banning the use of
nuclear weapons, Foreign Minister Gromyko reiterated Soviet
willingness to sign such an agreement.. Grom.yko also restated
Soviet endorsement of Sweden's non-nuclear club proposal and
said the USSR would assume an obligation not to turn over nu-
clear. weapons. or information relating to their production to
other countries- "provided the US, Britain, and France assume
identical obligations." The Soviet letters also inject the ques-
tion of establishing nuclear-free zones in various regions of the
world.
U Thant's letters=-sent to each UN member nation--re-
quested a reply by April. The content and timing of Gromyko's
letters, dated 10 March and released by Moscow two days before
the scheduled opening of the conference, suggest that one of Mos-
cow's primary tactics. during the initial phase of the conference
will be to press for confidence-building partial measures.
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*East - West Germany: onn has agreed to a one-year ex-
tension of the 30 June deadline for settlement of the East Ger-
man debt under interzonal trade (IZT), thus opening the way
for East Germany to obtain badly needed equipment and ma-
terials from West Germany. This move represents a concessi r
r--
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guarantee for access to Berlin
LCY West Germany and will permit a higher level of trade than
would otherwise have been possible. Bonn hopes that the con-
tinuing advantages of IZT to EAst Germany will serve as a
//In an effort to reduce the trade gap before 30 Jun, East
Germany had. stepped up deliveries to West Germany, espe-
cially of brown coal and petroleum products, while withhold-
ing orders for West German hard coal, steel, and machinery.
In this way, the debt had been reduced as of 8 March from be-
tween 65,000,000 and 70,000 0DM ($16,200,000 to $17,500,000)
to 50 600 000DM ,'12 600,000)
South Vietnam'. (Another anti-American .press campaign,
similar to that instigated last November by President Diem's
brother and political adviser Ngo Dinh Nhu, may have begun
in Saigon. In. a speech on 11 March, obviously directed at the
US, Nhu's wife strongly criticized "pseudo-liberalism" in the
free world for paralleling the Communist claim that dissidence
in. South Vietnam is due to the government's failure to attract
mass support. Madame Nhu. argued that the growth of world
neutralism is favored by "the -inability of Western democracy
to protect those whom Communism covets" She stated that the
''only reason for the insecurity" in South Vietnam is "irre-
sponsible Western assistance" which. denied Diem's request
in 1955 for a. buildup of paramilitary forces in rural areas.
IvIadame Nhu was injured in the recent bombing of Diem's
palace, her remarks that "it is criminal" to incite to mur-
der and disorder suggest that she believes the attar, k was stim-
ulated in part by US criticism of the Diem regime
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Netherlands-Indonesia'. ( he foreign affairs spokesman
in the lower chamber of parliament for the governing Catholi
if
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T eople's. party_ and. .close ;associate.. of, Foreign.. Ministe~r!..J~uns, `told
S officials on 10 March that he is convinced .the Dutch Gov-
ernment must "give" West New Guinea to Indonesia and that
this would be politically feasible if Djakarta were prepared to
make reasonable concessions to Dutch sensibilities and pres-
tige. He said that if bilateral talks take place, a formula might
be worked out providing for continuing Dutch administration -
for the remainder of 1962 and joint Dutch-Indonesian adminis-
tration for the following 2-3 years, during which time the Dutch
would gradually phase out. In a subseq e t plebiscite, he be
lieves the area would opt to join Indonesi
The spokesman emphasized that Luns' views. were close
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to his own and that there should be no doubt. as to the foreign
minister's willingness to give up West New Guinea
Communist. China - Portugal: Communist China is bring-
ing pressure to bear on Portuguese authorities in Macao in an
effort to curb Chinese Nationalist activities there. Peiping's
People's Daily on 11 March reported that Portuguese officials
had been warned to take "effective measures" to prevent the
use of Macao to support sabotage operations against the main-
land. The Chinese Communists claimed the capture of a.Na-
tionalist sampan on 7 March in waters near the olony and
alleged that another vessel escaped to Macao.
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p pings warning is designed to play upon Lisbon.'s uneasiness
over the.Portuguese future in Macao, which? has increased since
1961, a decline of 80 to 90 percent. The production slump,
Communist China: Production of freight cars inCommu-
nist China fell from 09870 in 1960 to between .2,000 to 4,000 in
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began in mid-1960.
By the second half. of 1961, production of new boxcars, gondo-
la cars. and.refrigerator cars had practically ceased. I I
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I J the annual. capacity of the freight
car industry in China is at least 32,000 units, and may be as
high as 38~000. The fact that only about .10 percent of this
p9ints,Lin the severity of in-
proven.capacity was used in 1961 points, u
dustrial cutbacks in Communist China.
Dahomer he government of Dahomey, one of the 12-nation
r,
Paris= orientedtb~-'Brazzaville group, is experiencing strains that
could threaten i ts pro-Western posture. Discontent arising
from severe economic difficulties, including lack of cash for
salaries and government- supported agricultural plantings
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SENEGAL
UPPE=
VOLTA
..t--DAHOMEY
IYWR 'a_
COASTi
Porto-Novo - sV CENTRAL AFRICA
AMEROOI)REPUBLIC
GABON f
iii CONGO
AFRICA
THE "BRAZZAVILLE GROUP"
MALAGG
/ REPUB
1 -1
620313 32268
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/ as been aggravated by an austerity budget adopted in Jan-
Mary. An ambitious and. politically necessary development
plan has not yet received the required Western financial sup-
port. President Maga last month reorganized his cabinet in
an apparent attempt to reduce the influence of ambitious and
leftist-oriented Vice President Apithy. Maga has thus far
resisted the vice president's advocacy of close ties with rad-
ical. African states. and.the Soviet bloc,, but. on 8 March, in
conversation with the US ambassador, he bitterly criticized
what he felt was failure of Western support, and said he was
under great pressure from "young Turks" to seek assistance
from the Soviet bloc. The Western-oriented President of
neighboring Niger, under similar pressure, recently c lud-
ed trade agreements with both Poland and Czechoslovakia
E ackup, Page 2)
(Map)
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Pressures on the Government of Dahomey
President Maga's control of the government does not ap-
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Maga controls the army and security forces
pear to be in immediate danger. The US.Embassy in Cotonou
reports. that although there is considerable dissatisfaction with
the government among supporters of Vice President Apithy,
they at present lack the necessary leadership to overthrow the
government. Apithy himself is in Paris for. medical. treatment.,
and there have been recent indications that Maga is not consult-
ing or informing him on governmental affairs. However, Maga
was sufficiently concerned about growing unrest to make a spe-
cial broadcast on 6 March urging the public not to believe un-
settling rumors. Ambassador McLlvaine fees that, in any case,
he President's criticism of We stern. assistance. may have
bloc presence in Dahomey]
resul ed from a feeling of the moment, as he had just returned
from an exhausting 20-day tour of Dahomey to whip up support
for the government's austerity budget and four-year development
plan.. The ambassador, however, who notes signs of open dis-
couragement -within: ,the;governmeht, p.~iints out that Maga is capa-
ble of a sudden policy shift that would open the way for Soviet
Dahomey's economy, based on subsistence farming and agri-
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cultural products, will not support the present political adminis-
trative structure. Consequently, the government depends on
direct French subsidies for a major portion of its budget, and
has been attacked by extremist groups for its failure to achieve
"economic independence:' This criticism is likely to increase
because of Maga's apparent determination, despite the auster-
ity program, to press for rapid completion of a lavish presi-
dential palace. He is still going forward with plans. for a costl
Independence Da celebration in August
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 Approved F
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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