CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 20, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

r ii~iiiiiiiiiiiiii i i~ i i i i i~ i i i i i i i ~
25X1
Approved For F asT*P5/S eT9T00975A9 6200010001-1
20 January 1962
Copy No. C 89
TELLIGE...,- .41
25X1
State Dept. review completed
1.40
Approved For ReleasVQ 5/ T00975A006200010001-1
00
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1
Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1
 20 January 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2
4
25X1
25X1
CONTENTS
1. USSR. Pravda articles suggest further developments in.
Soviet . iii"s-pute with Peiping and Tirana. (Page i)
2~ France-Algeria: Negotiations apparently at a point where
neither side feels there is room for further compromise.
(page t)
3. Latin America: Communists and Castro sympathizers
,planning actions to discredit OAS foreign ministers' meet-
ing. (Page t i)
5. Vietnam: Hanoi announces organization of Marxist-Leninist
party in South Vietnam. (Page t t t)
7. African Conference, Failureto invite provisional Algerian
government results in withdrawal of Casablanca and Tuni-
sian participation. (page tv)
8. Laos. (Page v)
25X1 Approved For Re 11
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 January 1962
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
USSR: Two recent Pravda articles contain new attacks on
the A-M-anians and Chine-s-e-UnTmay foreshadow further. devel-
opments in the Soviet-Albanian dispute, such as the severing
of Tirana's ties with the Warsaw Pact. They may also be in-
tended to impress on the Chinese that continued support for the
Albanians might leadto, a break in party relations. The articles
also may suggest that Molotov and other members of the anti-
party group will be expelled from the Soviet Communist party.
1~ _h1_
France- Algeria:)LBoth the Provisional Algerian government
(PAG) and the French appear to feel that secret negotiations
have reached fundamental issues on which each -feels there is
no room for compromise.
would have to be considered
I negotiations
were at a standstill "for the time being" over French demands
for exclusive control of the referendum to be held in Algeria af-
ter a cease-fire. F the PAG would rather have
negotiations break down than agree to this demand. A French
Foreign Ministry official told a US Embassy officer in Paris on
18 January that government circles feel some agreement must
be reached within the next-few weeks or "other measures"
I the PAG is un-
cerfaMin whether to proceed with negotiations in view of its be-
lief that the influence of the Secret Army Organization (OAS) is
steadily increasing even among conservative Moslem elements
in Algeria. PAG suspicions that De Gaulle is either unwilling
25
or unable to control the OAS are unlikely to be dispelled by thqj
0 A
Approved For 2663t65t 16 . e1A- 0975AO0620001 0001 -1
25X1 7"'
 25X1 Approved For R lease 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00 75A200010001-1
25X1 N
rench Government's "determination" to combat the O
25X1
25X1
Backup, Page 2)
threat announced after the 17 January cabinet meetin
Latin American communists and other elements sym-
pathetic to Castro throughout Latin America are seeking to
discredit the Organization of American States (OAS) foreign
ministers' meeting scheduled to open 22 January in Punta
del Este. They are planning strikes, student demonstra-
tions, parades, and rallies timed to correspond with the open-
ing of the meeting, to demonstrate Latin American solidarity
with the Cuban revolution. In Cuba, a series of rallies and
demonstrations during the ensuing week will culminate on 28
January in the second meeting of the "National Assembly of
the Cuban people," amass rally called to give their "answer" to
any decision reached in Punta del Este. The Bolivian Gov-
ernment is reported to believe that worker demonstrations
in La Paz could reach large proportions, and Argentine
Communists may attempt demonstrations in front of the US
Embassy in Buenos Aires]
Youth groups and students are expected to play a leading
role in the activities. Students from Chile, Argentina, Ven-
ezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil are expected to join
their Uruguayan colleagues in the 97-mile march, which be-
gan 17 January, from Montevideo to Punta del Este. The
march is being escorted by Uruguayan security police, and
is proceeding without incident. The Communists have had
difficulty in recruiting marchers and the column of less than
400 is probably a disappointment. ' .
[There are no indications that Latin American security
forces fear any of the demonstrations will get out of hand. The
Montevideo police recognize that Communists and pro-Cast o-
ites have a potential to cause serious disturbances, but feel
20 Jan 62
DAILY BRIEF
 ^i_I,. V as I vI ~I~c ~cu.~c wvv. vv. Iv vI.-.-Iwo . v vqv. v.-.vvvwvv I # # # I- I
20 25X/
// ryry~~
(Ihhis is a real threat only if workPrq already on strike in the
Vietnam: To encourage the belief that Communists in South
Vietnam are all indigenous patriots, Hanoi has announced .the
organization of a separate Marxist-Leninist party in the South.
The manifesto of the new "Vietnam People's Revolutionary party,"
as broadcast from Hanoi on 18 January, repeats the language
used by the North Vietnamese Communists to describe the Viet
Cong objectives of overthrowing Diem, forming a,coalition gov-
ernment in the South, and negotiating "peaceful, reunification"
with the North. The hard-core Communist elite, who direct
military and political subversion in South Vietnam, will use the
new party to control their semi-overt political vehicle, the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.
20 Jan 62 DAILY BRIEF
25X1
ZOA Approved For Release 2003/05/16 :CIA-RDP79T0 975A006200010001-1'
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1
Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1
 Approveor Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79175A006200010001-1
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS
BROAD
-TRAIL
-TRAIL
O ROUTE NUMPU
620116 3
Kam Keut '
25-X1
Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO06200010001-1
20 Jan 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN D&, p Paige
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1
Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1
 Approved F
Pravda Attacks on Molotov and Chinese Communists
The two Pravda articles strongly attack Molotov, other
members of the antiparty group, and the Albanians and Chi-
nese who share their views. An 18 January article by party
ideologist P. N. Pospelov, marking the 50th anniversary of. the
1912 Communist party conference in Prague, states that the
party will never tolerate either right- or left-wing "liquidators:'
The historic significance of the Prague conference, according
to Pospelov, was that the party was strengthened when it ex-
pelled the Menshevik "liquidators," suggesting by analogy that
the antiparty group can expect the same fate.
Pospelov also notes that Lenin's way of handling deviation-
ist "foreign groups" was to go as far as "a complete organiza-
tional rupture:' Another Pravda article of 17 January sharply
condemns domestic and foreign "dogmatists" for their opposi-
tion to peaceful coexistence and refers, by implication, to the
Chinese as "enemies" of Soviet foreign policies,
25X1
Pospelov's article provides a good indication of the sensi-
tivity of the Khrushchev leadership to the use, by its opponents,
of statements by Lenin to cast doubt on current policies. This
is a practice of the Chinese Communists, and also what Molotov
apparently did in his letter to the central committee last Octo-
ber. The Chinese have indicated that they will not retreat from
these positions nor drop their support for the Albanians, even
in the face of further Soviet intimidations. 25X1
25X1
Approved For - 010001-1
20 Dec 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
 For IasP 2003/05/16 - C1D-RnP79T00975fm16200010001-1
rench-Algerian Negotiations Apparently-
Approaching Showdown
the PAG cannot accept any method
under which France alone controls the machinery of the ref-
erendum to be conducted during a transitional period, since
the PAG feels that in the past, the French.have ensured victory
for themselves by manipulation of voting procedures`]
I the rebels and the French
are lso at odds over when the transitional period would begin.
PAG officials are said to desire this immediately after a cease-
fire, with.the PAG taking over internal security in Algeria as
well as supervision of the referendum. The French want the
transitional period.to begin only after the conclusion of formal
negotiations following a cease-fire. The rebels reportedly feel
they cannot accept this procedure, because should the open ne-
gotiations fail they would find themselves with their guerrilla
bands dispersed and nothing to show for their concessions. A
compromise may be possible whereby the French would acknowl-
edge PAG authority over some areas-areas which French secu-
rity forces hav for all intents and purposes already surrendered
to FLN control,
,The PAG, I has new and grave doubts"
abou(the possibility of reaching any workable accord until Paris
takes "concrete and public action" against the OAS.
the PAG now estimates that at least three fourths
of the non-Moslem population in Algeria, along with 20 percent
of the Moslems, sympathize with the OAS. The PAG is said to
be especially concerned about the "OAS spirit" that is steadily
affecting wealthy, reactionary Moslems opposed to the rebels'
concept of a socialist Algerian
T\The French Foreign Ministry official indicated that it seems
im ossible to drag out secret pre-negotiations much longer while
the situation in Algeria continues to deteriorate. He still held
out hopes that local tension might subside once an agreement be-
tween France and the PAG is reache
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
AppFavedFU F Release 20=05f 16 . CIA-REW?MOMA0062000 1000 t--1
20 Dec 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
 Approved Ford
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved Fo
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Releas /1 C 00975AO06200010001-1