CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 23, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 October 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Dominican Republic: Armed forces increase pressure
for action against opposition. (Page i)
2. Situation in the Congo. (Page i)
3. France-Algeria: France is strengthening security forces
in Paris and Algeria; resumption of official negotiations
with PAG may soon be announced. (Page ti)
6. Ruanda-Urundi: New flare-up of tribal violence in Ruanda.
(Page i v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 October 1961
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Dominican Republic: The antigovernment rioting that
began on 16 October in the capital and spread. to several
other Dominican cities has increased pressure in the armed
forces for wholesale action against the opposition. In the
early stages of the rioting, police showed unaccustomed re-
straint, but there has since been some bloodshed. The fact
that gangs of thugs identified with the previous regime have
participated in action against the rioters brings another po-
tentially explosive element to the situation. According to
the American consul general, the rioters are mostly revolu-
tionary-minded youths acting without centralized direction.
Leaders of the university students' federation as well as of
the major opposition groups are taking no public part in the
disorders, and. the consul general sees no evidence that they
are clandestinely supporting the rioters.
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In this disturbed climate, the government plans to take its
long-deferred action against the pro-Castro Popular Democratic
Movement by deporting key members of the group. If this ac-
tion is intentionally or unintentionally extended to other elements
Congo: UN headquarters in New York has instructed its
representatives in the Congo to ratify the cease-fire protocol
which was worked out last week in UN-Katanga negotiations, ac-
cording to Under Secretary Bunched However, the UN has stiu-
lated that the agreement be construed as having no implications)
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acceptance is also contingent on an understanding that the
protocol must not contravene UN resolutions and must not
affect the territorial limits of the Congo as previously un-
derstood by the UN. The latter stipulation apparently is
an effort to dispel any impression that the cease-fire is a
de facto recognition of Katanga's independence. Bunche made
no mention of the UN's policy should central government
forces invade Katanga, a sore point in the negotiations last
week.
Bunche said that Adoula had accepted the protocol on
these terms. The Katangans, however, who have been using
the cease-fire negotiations to further their pretensions to in-
dependence and who remain confident of their military superi-
ority, are unlikely to agree to these restrictions. 1
(According to Bunche, Tshombd's emissaries to Leopold-
vile-have reiterated earlier Katangan demands for political
autonomy within a Congolese economic and customs union.
Bunche expressed the hope that this was a "bargaining posi-
tion" and would be received as such by the Adoula government.
Congolese officials in Leopoldville, however, have no confi-
dence in Tshombd's good faith and are unlikeI to enter negotia-
tions with him on such unfavorable terms. -11
demonstrate its influence over the Moslem population
taining 1 November as its target date for an all-out effort to
The provisional Algerian government (PAG) appears to be mad
forced in both Paris and. Algeria in anticipation of new violence
France-Algeria: French security forces are being rein-
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Meanwhile,
ere are indications that..resumption of official negotia-
tions may soon be announced. . Although the PAG may feel
that successful mass demonstrations will strengthen its nego-
25X1 tiating position, the negotiations can hardly proceed smoothly
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peans or if the security forces intervene in strength.
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Ruanda-Urundio new flare-up of tribal violence on Oc-
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tober in the Ruanda area of the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-
Urundi has increased the danger of the "generalized anarchy" en-
visioned recently by the Belgian political affairs officer in Usum-,
bura. He believes that in such a situation, the 2, 500 Belgian
security forces in the trust territory would be unable to maintain
control because of their small numbers, the difficult terrain, and
communications problems. In Urundi, the extremist leader
elected to replace the moderate premier assassinated earlier this
month may embark on a hostile policy toward Belgium and Ruanda.
(Backup, Page 3)
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France-Algeria
PAG preparations for 1 November--the anniversary of the
outbreak of the rebellion in 1954--appear to be well along. Ac-
cording to Moslem sources of the American Consulate in Algiers,
word is being spread for the Moslems to gather in three pre-
dominantly Moslem quarters in the city, locations which will
make it easier for the rebel leaders to control the demonstra-
tions and display their influence over the Moslem population.
Although the PAG maintains that the demonstrations are intended
to be peaceful, European extremists probably hope to provoke
clashes in the belief that large-scale fi tin now would impede
new attempts to negotiate a settlement.
This week's mass Moslem demonstrations in France aroused
indignation, shock, and fear throughout the metropole. The Amer-
ican Embassy in Paris estimates that these events will make more
remote the possibility of achieving De Gaulle's aim of creating
an independent Algerian state willing to cooperate with France
and. to guarantee minority rights. Moreover, by hastening the
growth of anti-Algerian prejudice among metropolitan French-
men, the Parisian disorders will make it easier for the OAS to
find additional support in the army, especially among the draftees.
Speaking about the possibility of renewing formal negotiations
on 18October, a French representative at the UN indicated that
PAG demands for sovereignty over the Sahara were still causing
difficulties. He said the PAG is asking Paris to make a statement
in effect saying the French "were sorry they had ever mentioned
the Sahara and would not raise the problem againo' In a public
statement on 20 October, Premier Debr6 announced that France
would be prepared to yield the Sahara and its oil to an independ-
ent Algeria under certain conditions.
The Algiers apartment of an American oil geologist was bombed
on 20 October, presumably by OAS terrorists. Press reports that
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the recent US-PAG conversations in Tunis dealt extensively
with the question of foreign petroleum interests in the Sahara
have aroused suspicion among French rightists that American
oil interests were making a deal with the PAG.
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Situation in Ruanda-Urundi
The coming to power of a tribal extremist in Urundi and
the outbreak of tribal violence in Ruanda suggest that Ruanda-
Urundi will become a growing problem for both Belgium and
the United Nations. The new Urundi premier, Tutsi extremist
Andre Muhirwa, is likely to eliminate non-Tutsi representation
from his cabinet and to pursue a tough policy toward the Hutu
peasant majority of Urundi's population and the Hutu government
of neighboring Ruanda. Furthermore, Muhirwa, who has been in
contact with General Lundula and radical forces in the Stanley-
ville area of the Congo, will probably favor the pan-Africanism
and anticolonialism of the radical African states.
The new violence in Ruanda apparently is mainly instigated
by u u leaders who desire to drive as many Tutsis as possible
from Ruanda. Some Tutsi extremist bands are countering with
their own violence, hoping to get UN invalidation of Ruanda's
25 September election. Even before the present violence, close
to 10,000 Tutsi tribesmen had taken refuge in Uganda--recently
some 500 refugees daily were counted by British officials--and
many others sought safety in Urundi or in religious missions.
Violence has been occurring in Ruanda for several months, and
the area has been unstable since early 1960 when the ruling Tut-
sis were overthrown by a Belgian-supported Hutu revolt.
Ruanda-Urundi's problems are due for consideration in No-
vember by the General Assembly. Although there has been dis-
cussion of independence for the territory next April, there is
growing agitation in UN circles for a longer period. of trustee-
ship to prepare the area for independence. The Haitian chairman
of the UN commission which visited Ruanda-Urundi last Septem-
ber believes that independence should. be delayed some five or
six years, during which time Belgium, while remaining behind
the scenes, would turn over political responsibility to the Africans
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but would control economic and. social services. He said that
it was a poor country with no promising resources except coffee,
and added he "had never encountered so many backward
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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