CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A006000130001-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 3, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 12, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A006000130001-0.pdf645.17 KB
Body: 
/ 25X1 Approved For Rel% TOP/1 S E1 00975A00 +00130001-0 CRE 12 October 1961 Copy No, 12 F&M - - -MIMI / State Dept. review completed TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 4 or, Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 j Approved For Rel e - 75A000130001-0 25X1 12 October 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS HE/ 5. UAR: Some Egyptian Army officers reportedly discussing the prospects of ousting Nasir. (Page tit) 25X 25X6 7. Great Britain-. British attitudes toward Berlin crisis. (Page tv) 8. Finland: USSR trying to influence forthcoming presidential election in favor of Kekkonen. (Page tv) 25X1 O / //// / , Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 j Approved For Rel se 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T0097 A00J0130001-025X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 complaints against the regime, although he probably does not have a large following among Egyptian officers UAR the Syrian revolt has led to talk among Egyptian Army officers about the prospects of ousting Nasir. the disaffected officers are consid- ering whether they should attempt to oust Nasir or merely seek the removal of his advisers, whom they hold largely respon- sible for the loss of Syria. Nasir is aware of the lotting. The E yptian Army has long been considered personally loya o Nasir and the mainstay of the regime. Nasir's reported intention to fire Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amir--UAR vice pres- ident and commander in chief--for bungling in Syria may have stirred some disaffection. Firing Amir might add to the army's 12 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 ~~ e VEN FBI Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000130001-0 W/ 0/10M, moll Approved For Rel 5e 21000310- K - A000130001-0 25X1 M I ri - er in: 4n assessing current British opinion on the Berlin situation, the US Embassy in London reports that the current mood is one of relief that the US is engaged in ex- ploratory talks with the Soviet Union. The view is widely held that de facto recognition of East Germany is the price the USSR seeks for a Berlin settlement and that the West can and should pay this price. Resolutions to this effect were enthu- siastically accepted at the recent annual conferences of the Labor and Liberal parties, and similar views are likely to 25X1 be expressed at the Conservative party confepence this weed. } 25X USSR- Finland: The USSR is trying to influence the Finnish presidential election, scheduled for 15 January 1962, in an ef- fort to ensure the re-election of President Kekkonen. The re- cent good-will tour of Soviet President Brezhnev, in which he lauded Kekkonen for maintaining good relations with the USSR has strengthened Kekkonen's position, as have the continuing negotiations on the offer by Moscow to lease its portion of the Saimaa Canal connecting the Finnish lake system with the Gulf, of Finland. As early as last March the Soviets indicated thei dislike of Kekkonen's leading rival, Olavi Honka, the candidate, 12 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000130001-0 25X1 Approved For Rel a 2003/04/17 :CIA-RDP79T0097 A00130001-0 25X1 i 4 i% of the Social Democrat, Conservative, and Liberal parties. Kekkonen's forthcoming visit to the US is probably intended to balance out these Soviet endorsements. Honka has been waging an "uphill fight," and most observers in Finland be- lieve that the election will be fairly close. j j 12 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF v 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000130001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 Approved For Rel 2003/04/17 m - 0130001-0 Finland-USSR President Kekkonen's strongest appeal is the widespread belief in Finland that he has handled Finnish-Soviet relations skillfully. Kekkonen's supporters are playing on the fear of a recurrence of the 1958 crisis when the Soviet Union forced the fall of a cabinet objectionable to it. His re-election pros- pects will also be improved if, as rumored, he visits Moscow prior to the presidential election on 15-16 January to sign an agreement for leasing the Soviet portion of the truncated Saimaa Canal. The commander of the Finnish defense forces, General Simelius, left on 10 October for a private vacation in the USSR on an invitation given by Marshal Malinovsky when he visited Finland last April. The Soviets' desire for the re-election of Kekkonen prob- ably reflects their conviction that he is more likely to support Soviet foreign policy objectives than his leading rival, Honka, particularly in regard to recognition of the East German re- gime and creation of a neutral zone in northern and central Europe. When the 1962 trade negotiations begin late this month, the USSR can exert strong pressure to gain such sup- port.y..iet President Brezhnev implied during his recent visit that Kekkonen's defeat. would lead to a deterioration in Soviet-Finnish relations and went out of his way to identify Kekkonen personally with the current "friendly relations!' Brezhnev implied that Finland had a role to play. in making a peace treaty with East Germany. A high Finnish Foreign Ministry official has denied that Brezhnev privately put any pressure on the Finns to recognize East Germany. Finland, however, was one of the four nonbloc countries to send a del- egation to the 12th anniversary celebration in East Berlin of the founding of the East German Communist regime. The pres- ident of the East German parliament told the delegation that "no international obligation" prevented Finland from conclud- ing a peace treaty with East German Brez.hnev, according to the West German commercial re resen ation in Helsinki, also encouraged Kekkonen to promote 12 Oct 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000130001-0 Approved For Rel ase 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006 0130001-0 25X1 the idea of a Scandinavian and central European neutral bloc ing his forthcoming visit to the United States and Canada. Since 1952 Kekkonen and other Finnish officials have peri- odically referred to the desirability of a Scandinavian neutral bloc, believing Finland could better maintain its neutrality if the neutral area could be extended. The Finns wish to pre- vent the USSR from invoking the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the two countries under the terms of which the Finns are obliged to resist an at- tack across Finnish territory on the USSR by Germany or a state allied to Germany. While the Finnish Government has not actively promoted a Nordic neutral bloc, there are indica- tions that a number of prominent Finns have broached the idea to their Nordic associates. There is little likelihood that th Danes or Norwegians would be willing to withdraw from NATO_ 25X1 25X1 12 Oct 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000130001-0 Approved For Re ease 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006 0130001-0 25X1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000130001-0 i Approve or ReleaseTOP175 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO0600013000