CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006000090001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 7, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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7 October 1961
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7 October 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
2. Syria: Some friction may be arising between military com-
manders and Premier Kuzbari's civilian cabinet. (Page i)
5. France-Algeria: Gaullist party spokesman proposes as
possible trial balloon permanent partition in Algeria. (Page iii)
j
IN
9. Dominican Republic: Military officers, angered by Balaguer's
2 October address to UN, again considering a coup. (Page vi)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 October 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Syria: There appear to be indications of some friction be-
tween the Syrian revolutionary command and Premier Kuz-
bari's civilian cabinet. On Thursday evening, in response
to Nasir's relatively conciliatory speech, Kuzbari released
a statement expressing the hope for friendly relations with
the Egyptians "on a new basis of fraternity" and declaring
that Syria would proceed with elections as soon as possible.
Several hours later, however, the Syrian minister of infor-
mation called in newspapermen and told them that Kuzbari
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had made no such statement. Friday morning, Damascus
radio broadcast a sharply different Kuzbari statement, at-
tacking Nasir on many counts and claiming that Nasir had
"backed down," having "finally come to realize the failure
of his policy in Syria" In a press interview broadcast on
Wednesday by Damascus radio, a member of the revolu-
tionary command stressed that the revolutionary movement
had been planned and executed by the military officers alone
and that there had not been "the slightest relation between
.the army uprising and any politician or civilian official."
Dissension at the top levels of the new Syrian govern-
ment would be particularly serious at this stage, in view of
the pressures that may soon be exerted by less conservative
political elements and i j e of the campaign of subversion
which. Nasir has begun.
7 Oct 61
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France-Algeria'. A Gaullist party spokesman, in what may
be a trial balloon, has proposed some form of permanent parti-
tion as the best solution attainable in Algeria.
Alain Peyrefitte, a National Assembly deputy who is con-
sidered an intellectual leader of the Union for the New Republic
party (UNR), argues in a recent series of articles in the Paris
daily Le Monde that rebel reluctance to give effective guarantees
to the Europeans rules out the possibility of a negotiated settle-
ment and that the "repatriation" of the Europeans is morally,
politically, and economically undesirables He would devide
Algeria now into three autonomous regions., one French, one
Moslem, and the Sahara, with their eventual relationship to be
determined when tempers are cooler. He estimates that less
than a million people would have to be moved and notes that this
is less than half those already displaced in Algeria.
.The Algerian rebel regime has consistently repudiated the
idea of partition. French spokesmen in the past have also tended
7 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF
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to dismiss permanent partition as not feasible, but the pro-
posal may now have considerable appeal to De Gaulle because
it satisfies the army's objection to abandoning Algeria and
fulfills France's moral commitments to the Europeans who
want to remain in Algeria. F
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Dominican Republic: President Balaguer's 2 October
address before the UN General Assembly has angered many
Dominican military officers and has led some of them again
to consider a military coup. The address, a plea for world
understanding of his democratization program and for the
lifting of OAS sanctions against his regime, contained strong
criticisms of the late dictator. The- American military liaison
officers in the Dominican Republic report that reaction among
the officers is widespread that the President pulled the rug out
from under them. Convinced, probably accurately, that the
speech had been cleared with General Ramfis Trujillo, they
are critical of Ramfis' having permitted public "abuse" of his
late father. Some of them say that Ramfis is preparing to
save himself and his personal clique and leave the rest of the
officers in the country to "bear the brunt of the people's wrath."
Many Dominican officers are convinced that Balaguer's policies
are leading toward an opposition-controlled regime and that
7 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF vi
El
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the restoration of a military dictatorship is the only way to
save themselves from losing everything.
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during recent weeks)
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Strength and deployment of Soviet long-range ballistic fis-
sile forces. U.S.I.B. NIE 11-8/1-61. Sept 21'61. 142394.
__
F
Nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities of Free World
countries other than the US and UK. U.S.I.B. NIE 4-3-61.
Sept 21161.
Situation and short-run outlook in Laos: political prospects;
military situation and capabilities. U.S.I.B. SNIE 58-3-61.
Sept 28'61.
7 Oct 61
DAILY BRIEF vii
A
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Communist China in 1971: estimate of China's position as
a world power based upon its probable political, economic,
scientific, and military strengths and weaknesses; likely trends
in Sino-Soviet relations. U.S.I.B. SNIE 13-2-61. Sept 28'610
7 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF Viii
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French Partition Plan for Algeria
Peyrefitte, who accurately assessed in advance De Gaulle's
policy on European integration, claims to offer a program
which will permit France to withdraw politically, militarily,
and financially from Algeria without renouncing its obligations
to either Europeans or pro-French Moslems. He argues that
the Europeans in Algeria have as much right as the Moslems to
remain there, and.that their "collective personality" is suffi-
ciently distinct to warrant political separation from France.
Passions are too inflamed to permit consideration of a single
independent Algeria; therefore the two peoples entitled to live
in Algeria should be allowed to organize their own governments,
the French in the western areas where they are now concen-
trated, and the Moslems in the east. Individuals would be free
to live in either area as long as they accepted the rule of the
majority in the state they chose.
Peyrefitte hopes the PAG will eventually accept a federal
relationship binding the two coastal regions with the Sahara in
a state entirely independent of France. Failing such an accom-
modation, the three autonomous regions would become inde-
pendent states, each with UN membership. He argues that
strict adherence to self-determination would still international
objections, citing the various postwar examples of partition.
He argues that the French Government now is in a position
to impose such a partition plan. He assumes that the FLN would
then return to a relatively orthodox military organization operat-
ing on its own territory and that the French Army would be able
to cope with it more readily than at present when the bulk of
FLN forces are on Tunisian soil.
Peyrefitte insists his plan is applicable within the frame-
work De Gaulle has indicated, and that it would spare the army
and the French public the shame of betraying a trust. He is
also addressing the PAG, however, stressing that negotiations
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are necessary and that wide. leeway is possible in seeking a
solution which would permit the two peoples to share a joint
fatherland.
These proposals will probably arouse considerable sup-
port in France, particularly as the government proceeds with
plans for a 50,000-man Algerian police force of which Mos-
lems will predominate and of which one fourth eventually
wouldbe organized military units of the FLN. Consul Gen-
eral Porter in Algiers questions whether Paris has thought
out the implications of this policing plan, which will expose
.the new police force to strong nationalist influences He cites
postwar Syria, where French-led Moslem troops deserted
en masse on contact with the nationalists. I
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Dominican Military Still Restive
President Balaguer has repeatedly stated his conviction
that General Ramfis Trujillo is the only person capable of
controlling the armed forces during the present crucial period.
General Trujillo privately indicated to the American consul
general last month that the Dominican military had twice last
summer been on the verge of seizing the government. He im-
plied that his own persuasion prevented the action.
General Trujillo's pledge, in an unpublicized letter to the
OAiubcommittee, to resign immediately upon the lifting of
the OAS diplomatic and economic sanctions, has apparently
not yet been made known to the officer corps. When this does
become known, many officers are likely to regard it as "de-
sertion" by Trujillo and a capitulation to the demands of the
opposition. There would then. be even stronger sentiment for
a coup by officers convinced that such a move is dictated by
interests of self preservation ) Trujillo, however, has
expressed contictence mat ne couia retire in --a iew
months" after he has implemented a program of retirements
and other changes in the military.
General Fernando Sanchez, nominally chief of the air force
and actually Trujillo's chief of staff and closest aide, is appar-
ently being groomed for the top armed forces job. Sanchez is
regarded by the American military liaison officers as quite
capable of engineering a coup. It is possible that Sanchez may
lead a military move against the government, conceivably with
the support of General Trujillo if the latter becomes convinced
that this is the only way to preserve armed forces unity. The
American military liaison officers noted on 4 October that in-
creased police patrols have been seen in the capital this week
and that the military airlift capability at the key. base near the
capital has recently been augmented. They find it impossible
to evaluate whether the threat of a military coup is real or
whether these indications are part of a militar pressure tactic,
but conclude that the situation is ominous.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy. Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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