CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006000040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 October 1961
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2 October 1961.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Syria: Nasir may be stepping up efforts against new
Damascus government. (Page t)
M11
3. Communist China: The 1 October National Day celebra-
tions. (Page it)
4. Austria: Note to USSR will reiterate Vienna's intent to
i)
participate in European economic integration. (Page M)
5. Spain: Franco hints at changes in the US bases agree-
ment. (Page t")
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 October 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Syrriiaa: There are indications that Nasir is stepping up
his e f orts to instigate an uprising against the new Syrian
Government as the result of the Damascus announcement on
30 September that all Egyptian military and civilian officials
are to be expelled. This would, of course, remove a group
which could play a key role should pro-Nasir Syrians at-
tempt to move against the new government.
Nasir apparently remains hopeful that the revolutionary
command may lose control in one of the northern Syrian cities,
such as the port of Latakia or Aleppo, where the Syrian mil-
itary has suppressed small-scale demonstrations by pro-Nasir
students and workers.
small numbers of tanks, trucks, armored personnel carriers,
and antiaircraft guns were being loaded on four Egyptian
freighters at Alexandria on 30 September suggest that Nasir
intends to be prepared to take advantage of such a contingency.
Latakia is 30 to. 36 hours sailing time from Alexandria
The Syrian revolutionary command, while proclaiming
that its control of the country is f irm, noted in a communique
issued the morning of 1 October that "subversive elements"--
which it claims are of non-Syrian nationality--are "penetrat-
ing demonstrations of jubilation with the purpose of changing
the character of these demonstrations:' Radio Cairo, broad-
casting a highly colored version of these "gigantic demonstra-
tions," has called on Syrians to rise in rebellion.
Nasir has broken diplomatic relations with Jordan and
Turkey, the first two countries to recognize the new Syrian
government. Damascus yesterday announced Syria's formal
withdrawal from the UAR. The Cairo press is alleging Brit-
ish connivance in the Syrian coup.
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Communist China: Communist China's entire top leader-
gether with peoples of all other countries" with the US "polic
of hostility" which has prevented Peiping from assuming its
"rightful" place in the UN.
ship, Chou En-lai, speaking at a state banquet on the eve of
National Day, contrasted Communist China's "wish to live to-
In line with Peiping's increased efforts to gain UN member
"Double Ten" festivities, as 10 October will be the 50th anni-
versary of the revolution that put Sun Yat-sen in power( more
important bloc delegations may be sent on that occasion.
ship appeared at the gala 12th National Day celebrations in
Peiping on 1 October, possibly in an effort to quash rumors
that agricultural and economic problems have led to purges.
No major bloc delegations attended the ceremonies; Albania's
was the highest ranking. It is probable, however, that Com-
munist China plans to place principal emphasis this year on
Moscow gave only perfunctory attention to Peiping's anni-
versary. In a speech at the Chinese Communist National Day
reception in Moscow on 29 September, Kozlov reiterated stand-
ard expressions of Soviet support for Peiping's "lawful place"
2 Oct 61
DAILY BRIEF
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bers by stating that the Soviet people prize friendship with
the Chinese people "and with the peoples of other socialist
countries" as a sign of the "unbreakable unity and might" of
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in the United Nations and for the liberation of Taiwan. He
avoided anything that could be construed as Soviet tolerance
of Chinese ideological claims. The congratulatory message
sent by Khrushchev and Brezhnev to the Chinese leaders ap-
peared to place China on the same level with other bloc mem-
tions as are "compatible with its foreign political status.
tober. The note, a response.to a recent Soviet demand that
Vienna declare its intentions respecting the EEC, states that
Austria "cannot remain a nonparticipant in certain economic
developments in Europe" but will undertake only such obliga-
om mon arket -Austria -USSR: Austria's problem as 25X1
a neutral in establishing the ties with the Common Market
(EEC) which it feels are economically imperative is reflected
in an Austrian note scheduled for delivery to Moscow by 2 Oc-
Moscow has taken a generally hostile attitude toward the
Common Market ever since it was founded and, in an effort
to dissuade the European neutral nations from establishing ties
with it, has maintained that the EEC is linked with NATO. It
has been particularly emphatic in its warnings to Austria
(Backup, Page 3)
*Spain: ILnn a speech to military officers during the 1 Oc-
tober cerebration of his twenty-fifth anniversary as chief of
state, General Franco stated that "circumstances counsel re-
vision" of the ten-year US-Spanish defense and bases agree-
ment which runs until September 1963. The treaty provides
for an automatic five-year extension unless one signatory re-
quests revision, but there have been several indications in the
past few years that Spain intended to press for greater con-
cessions on military and economic aid. The US agreement to
quit the bases in Morocco by the end of 1963 leads Franco`to
2 Oct 61
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keel that he is in a much better position. to extract new con-
cessions from the US when the Spanish bases agreement is
renegotiated. In view of his statement in the 1 October speech
that Portugal was being attacked unjustly abroad because of
its African policy, it is possible he has in mind pressing the
US for some expression of support in Africa.
r _~ (Backup, Page 5)
2 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF
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Problems of European Neutrals in Establishing Ties
With .Common Market
EOf the five non-NATO Western European countries, only
Ireland has asked for outright Common Market membership
since it became clear earlier this year that Britain would do
so. As members of the Outer Seven (EFTA), however, Austria,
Switzerland, and Sweden participated in the joint statement of
31 July declaring an intention to examine with the EEC "ways
and means" by which all the Outer Seven could take part in a
"single market:' Moreover, on the same date, Vienna issued
an official communique expressing readiness to open negotia-
tions looking toward participation, in such a market under con-
ditions taking into "special consideration" Austria's trade and
foreign policy. Finland, an EFTA associate, has declared
merely that it will "watch" the outcome of the negotiations be-
tween the EEC and the full members of the Outer Sev
[The problems of the various neutrals in defending their
major economic interests in the EEC are not identical. Austria's
obligations as a neutral are legally restricted to the military
sphere, but it feels itself additionally bound by the injunction
in the Austrian State Treaty against union with Germany. Neu-
trality is so thoroughly established in Sweden and Switzerland
that government leaders are largely agreed that full member-
ship in an organization involving some derogation of sovereignty
or loss of full control over trade policy is probably politically
impossible. Swiss officials have claimed that relinquishment
of jurisdiction to a supranational organization would be incom-
patible with the Swiss system of government, with its widespread
use of popular initiative and referendum. Socialist elements in
all these countries have charged the B EC is geared to the pur-
suit of conservative economic policies.
With the exception of Finland, Austria has appeared the
most concerned over the possibilities of actual Soviet retalia-
tion. Soviet officials have on several occasions and with varying
degress of severity warned Vienna against ties with the EEC. In
its aide-memoire of 31 July, to which Austria is now respoiing,
Moscow reiterated previous charges that the Common Mark
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is an economic and political organization of NATO,in which
West Germany plays a leading role. The aide-memoire also
claimed that the Austrian Government has itself considered
participation in the EEC incompatible with neutrality and the
State Treaty--an evident reference to statements along this
line previously made by Austrian Foreign Minister Kreis~Dy
CIn an effort to develop a common front against such pres-
sures--as well as a common position toward the EEC--Swiss,
Austrian, and Swedish officials recently met in Vienna, and
other such meetings are expected in the next few months.
Austria is clearly hoping that in negotiations with the EEC,
it can follow the lead of the Swiss, whose bargaining position
is comparatively strong, and Sweden may also eventually wel-
come such leadership. Stockholm has long felt itself obliged
to take into consideration the more vulnerable position of Fin-
land in problems of neutrality
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Franco hints at changes in the US bases agreement
LU:nder the 1953 defense agreement Spain granted the US
permission to construct and use air bases located near Madrid,
Zaragoza, and Seville and a naval base at Rota in exchange for
very substantial amounts of military and economic aid. In re-
cent years the Spanish military have been pressing for modern
military equipment, particularly plane
(Spanish officials have expressed anxiety on several occa-
sions over the security situation in Morocco as the US phase-
out in Morocco progresses. Madrid is particularly concerned
over the eventual renewal of Moroccan aggression against Ifni
and the Spanish Sahara and over demands by Rabat for the
surrender of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Spanish offi-
cials have shown displeasure over the US position on Africa
and in this connection have strongly supported Portugal. On
8 August 1961, a high official in the Spanish foreign ministry
vigorously defended Portuguese policy in Angola in a talk with
the US navy secretary Connally. While the official stressed
that he was speaking on a personal basis, he argued that the
US defense agreement should logically lead to US support for
Spain's position in Africa.
n addition to a possible demand for bolstering Spain's
military position in Africa, Franco may also, in the course
of negotiations for a renewal of the bases agreement, ask the
US to accelerate Spain's entry into NATO by putting pressure
on those members of NATO still reluctant to accept Spain as
a member: )
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The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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