CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006000030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 30, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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30 September 1961
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30 September 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
4. .Angolan Portuguese apparently have failed to regain .control d ~
of areas outside of towns in north. (Page tz)
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have been "substantially accomplished." The announcement
probably will. coincide with the beginning of the rainy season,
which will end Portuguese offensive operations.
The Portuguese apparently have failed to regain control
of the areas outside of towns, and their control of many roads
is tenuous at best. They are therefore unlikely to be able to
restore economic activity in the region; moreover, the rebels
will probably be able to consolidate their -hold on rural areas
in preparation for further offensive action.
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Portuguese to Announce Limited Success in Angola. Offensive
The objective of the Portuguese offensive in northern
Angola was to eradicate major pockets of resistance in the
interior and to close the Congo border. By reinforcing the
border posts, Portugal seems to have reduced rebel move-
ments from the Congo, and the Portuguese forces. did destroy
some rebel centers. Furthermore, the American Consulate
in Luanda reports: that all towns in the northern area have been
reoccupied and all roads have been traveled at least once. The
Portuguese apparently have f ortified the major- towns and .have
.set up a network of airstrips by which the towns can be sup-
plied during the rainy season, when overland movement will
be almost impossible.
It is doubtful, however, whether the development of Por-
tuguese strong points will offset the anticipated rebel consoli-
dation in the countryside. Moreover, by burning plantations
and attacking harvesting parties, the rebels have. disrupted -the
production of coffee, a crop which accounts for half of Angola's
earnings abroad and constitutes Portugal4s main dollar earner.
The fighting has driven the native population, which previously
had done most of the coffee picking, into the bush or across
the border into the Congo. Proposals that this labor be re-
placed by Portuguese "soldier-farmers" who would occupy a
"buffer zone" between the rest of Angola and the Congo have
so f ar -not been implemented.
A~.though the long-term outlook-for the Portuguese is un-
promising, leaders of the Angolan Peoples' Union (UPA), the
principal rebel organization, reportedly are extremely discour-
aged as a result of several difficulties confronting them.
UPA President Holden
Roberto is under increasing pressure to collaborate with the
Communist-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), which allegedly is also supported,by the Gi-
zenga group in the Leopoldville government.
Christophe Gbenye, t e
ongo ese overnment s izengist interior minister, has said
he was willing to help the Angolans, but would not deal with a
series of separate organizations. A merger of the two groups
would greatly benefit the MPLA, which seems to have few ad-
herents. in Angola.
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30 Sept 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Mi I i tary Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of L3efense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U,S, Rep,, Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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