CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005900380001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 22, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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Co No. 152
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State Dept. review completed
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22 September 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Congo: Provisional cease-fire apparently being observed
for the most part by both sides in Katanga. (page t)
Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin Situ-
ation. (Page tit)
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4. Laos: Ambassador Harriman believes Phoumi does not
intend to negotiate seriously with opposing side. (Page tv)
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7. Netherlands-Indonesia: Preliminary and semiofficial ef-
forts under way to solve dispute over West New Guinea.
(Page
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u bi of the Congo
Bangassou
7 ? Gemena
Aketi uta
Bumba
d ~ U N - ~ ~~ ~ Eake
'"r`"~r 1940 .filbert
tanleyville
0 Coquilhatville
Pointe
Noire
UN
3160
D
Thysvilie
Port FrancgUi
I,---^r r
UN 925
scattered
UN
640
Bakwanga
UN
450
Kamina
-L
UN
120
Mono
UN
120
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+-+- Selected railroad Does not include support troops or
units in the process of redeployment.
-dabo-Selerted airfield
UN
1875
UN
620
UN
1500
UN
2800
bertvi lle
Elisabethville
3
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BUL LETIN
22 September 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Congo: The provisional cease-fire in Katanga apparently
w 'U_
as o, served for the most part by both sides yesterday, al-
though UN officials were pessimistic on the question. of how
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long the cease-fire would last. Only a few incidents of sniper
firing were reported in Elisabethville, but Tshomb6 complained
to the UN about the continuing actions by UN forces in Albert-
ville, including "many arrests" made there yesterday morning
despite the cease-fire agreement.
Tshombd has been informed by UN representative Khiari
that the UN plans to bring jet aircraft into the Congo, a move
TshombLs might regard as a violation of the cease-fire pro-
visions. According to a broadcast from "Radio Katangall on 21
September, Tshombd has put forth two additional conditions for
a "definite" cease-fire. He has demanded the departure of all
UN troops from Katanga and has asked compensation for all
damage caused by UN troops.
I - ~ccording to press reports, the central
government is cont mplating a requisition of Air Congo aircraft
for an airlift to Katanga. I
I
The situation in Elisabethville remains potentially explosive.
There has been a serious food shortage among the some 30, 000
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anti-Tshombd Baluba tribesmen settled by the UN on the out-
skirts of Elisabethville. On 20 September, bands of Baluba
refugees left the camps and attacked both whites and Africans.
The US consul in Elisabethville, in reporting yesterday the
killing of a Belgian farmer the night of 20-21 September, saw
a danger that Belgians might resort to reprisals against the
Balubas, thereby touching off renewed violence. UN officials
have characterized the Balubas as a "critical and dangerous
threat to Europeans of any nationality" should they run wild.
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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached
by its Special Berlin Subcommittee. which reviewed the situation
for the period 15 August through 19 September 1961:
1. Soviet statements over the past two. weeks and the agree-
ment to talk with the US in New York suggest that Khrushchev
has not foreclosed the possibility of a negotiated settlement as
an alternative to proceeding with a separate treaty by the end
of the year. The Soviets, however, have rigidly adhered to
their stated terms--a German peace treaty and.a "free city"--
as the framework for negotiations. Repeated Soviet and satel-
lite statements reaffirming the year-end deadliro for a peace
treaty indicate that the Soviets hope to step up the pace of dip-
lomatic exchanges. The Soviets apparently would prefer a
Western initiative to convene formal negotiations at an early
date, but failing this they will probably try to exploit the UN
session to put pressure on the West to negotiate.
2. As part of their general tactics of intimidation and pres-
sure against the West, the Soviets have made diplomatic threats
against civil air traffic to Berlin. Some limitedharassments,
similar to those in. the past, appear likely, but will probably
stop short of forcible action against air access prior to the con-
clusion of a peace treaty.
3. Within East Germany popular dissatisf action- =particu-
larly among the youth--remains widespread and continues to be
exhibited in a.variety of. minor antiregime incidents which be-
came more frequent as the 17 September election approached.
Refugee escapes to West Berlin and West Germany are at a total
rate of 20 to 30 a day. The regime shows concern about the
latent discontent and continues to move vigorously and ruthless-
ly to maintain control over the population. While self-confidence
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is displayed at the top level of the party, lower echelon party
workers seem nervous, overworked, and edgy. Strikes, pas-
sive resistance, and even severe local demonstrations remain
possible, but the regime presently is prepared to take whatever
rv to prevent serious popular outbursts.
ao . in i
September meeting with Phoumi in Vientiane, he gained the
strong impression that Phoumi has no real intention of purse
other side none. He argued that Souvanna had come too much
ing serious negotiations with the opposing side. Phoumi in-
sisted that thus far he had made all the concessions and the
under the Communist thumb to be trusted. Phoumi also told
Harriman that he did not rule out the possibility of a three-
princes' meeting at Ban Hin Heup, as suggested by Souvanna,
although he still thought Luang Prabang the proper venue
The Vientiane government is stating publicly that Sou-
vanna, in his recent talks with Harriman in Rangoon, failed
to remove doubts concerning his claim to be a "true neutral."
Vientiane's hostility toward Souvanna was also shown in the
omission of his name from a list of possible candidates for the
premiership presented by the government delegations at the
20 September Namone meeting. At this same meeting the
government delegation rejected Souvanna's proposal of Ban Hin
Heup for new high-level talks and instead insisted on Luang
Praban .
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Netherlands-Indonesia?utch representatives are
ing to maintain semi-o ficia contacts with President Sukarno
and other Indonesian officials in an effort to promote a solution
to the dispute over West New Guinea. [In a discussion with .Am
bassador Stevenson in New York recently, Sukarno stated that
emissaries of the governing Catholic People's party as well as
the opposition Labor party in the Netherlands had met with hi
in Vienna on a personal basis to find a face=saving means "to
turn New Guinea over to Indonesia:' In response to growinf
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pressure at home for a new approach to this problem, the
Dutch Government may raise the West New Guinea issue in
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the current session of the UN General Assembly_
(Backup, Page 1
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Dutch-Indonesian Dispute Over West New Guinea
Faced with the possibility of Indonesia's undertaking mil-
itary operations to secure the disputed territory, important
segments of the Dutch public as well as much of the press are
.increasingly dissatisfied with the government's rigid insist-
ence on its policy of preparing the approximately 700,000
Papuans for self determination. Under this policy, the gov-
ernment envisages a period of political tutelage-perhaps 10
or 12 years-after which the Papuans presumably would be
prepared to decide whether they wish to become independent,
join Indonesia, or participate in a Melanesian federation which
would include Pacific islands northeast of Australia.
Since there is little likelihood that Indonesia will accept
a settlement on this basis, Foreign Minister Luns, who is
identified with the group favoring a "hard line" in the dispute,
may propose some form of UN action during the current ses-
sion of the General Assembly. According to a leading Dutch
daily, Luns may suggest that a UN commission visit New
Guinea to observe the situation there. The Dutch are also
reported to be considering a proposal for UN trusteeship over
the area until the natives are competent to choose their own
future.
Those groups in the Netherlands which have been most
active in urging a new approach to the problem--business in-
terests and the socialist and liberal press--are. inclined to
doubt that these proposals will succeed, and instead favor
bilateral talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Im-
plicit in this position is the hope for rem establishment of dip-
lomatic relations, severed by Indonesia in 1960. These groups
advocate at least tacit recognition of Indonesian sovereignty
over West New Guinea in return for an Indonesian guarantee
to provide the Papuans with a special status or give them a
subsequent opportunity to express their own wishes.
The US Embassy in The Hague believes that despite strong
parliamentary opposition to any proposal which waters down
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the principle of self-determination, the Dutch Government
could now perhaps accept a solution. along these general lines
with less controversy than at any time in the pasta
Djakarta has indicated that it is willing. to accept a trustee-
ship of brief duration provided there was an advance guarantee
of the area's transfer 'to Indonesia. The government takes the
position.that the only basis for settlement of the West New
Guinea question. is the "return" of the territory to Indonesia.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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