CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 13, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved_ ,%r elealf 04SECiM9TOO P-005700420001-2
0001,/
oe4 25X1
I
13 June 1961
25X1
Copy No. C
III
10, --- IM
Rd -
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 Approved Fo elease 2003/04/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00
700420001-2 25X1
13 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
25X1
2. Dominican Republic. (Page it)
3. Portugal: Salazar indicates only minor reforms to
be introduced in Angola. (Page t t
4. France-Algeria.: Comment on Evian talks. (Page t t t)
5. South Vietnam: Communist guerrillas reportedly
plan assassination and kidnaping attempts against
American.personnel. (Page ttt)
6. Ethiopia: Discontent among educated minority con-
t )
tinues. (Page M)
7. Bolivia: Mounting leftist opposition to government
crackdown on Communists. (page t v)
8. Argentina: Frondizi's views on inter-American action
re Castro. (Page t v)
11
IN
j
25X1
j
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 j
Approved F r0eleas 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T 09 A005700420001-25X1
25X1
I subsequent Trujillo-type reprisals.( I
on. the air force intelligence unit for security services in place
of the notorious Military Intelligence Service, which is being
shunted into the background if not dismantled. While the. regime
apparently considers it advantageous at the moment to restrain
its repressive apparatus, its power to exercise dictatorial con-
trol has probably not been seriously affected. Most politically
aware Dominicans would consider it foolhardy to avail themselves 25X1
of any nolitical liberties unless concretely guaranteed against
Dominican Republic: The US consul in Ciudad Trujillo
believes tha General am is Trujillo may be able. to maintain
control of the armed forces for some time, despite his great
unpopularity with many senior officers during his father's life-
time. Ramfis is reported to be advancing air force officers
with whom he had. been associated in the past and to be. relying
13 June 61
25X1
DAILY BRIEF ii
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 j Approved For~r~lease 003/04/17 :CIA-RDP79T0 905700420001-2 25X1
I
01
I
25X1
25X1
25X1
ii
MEZ
I
about 8 June, also got the impression that Portugal plans no
.i~
General Stikker, who talked with both Salazar and Nogueira 25X1
Portugal: Salazar told British Foreign Secretary Home
in Lisbon in late May that it would not be "right" to proceed
now with anything beyond minor reforms in Angola. Home
reports that Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira was consider-
ing sweeping political and socio-economic changes there, but
not until after order had been restored. NATO Secretary
.reign Minister Couve de Murville has
told Am assador Gavin that French and PAG negotiators at
Evian have considered each of the major problems in an Ali
gerian settlement, but that the talks were going "a little slowly."
Representatives for both sides emphasize the need to continue
the talks, but both now seem to be acting on the assumption that
the current talks at Evian will recess on 20 June. Acts of vio-
ence continue in Algeria and France, and anti - De Gaulle
of violence" in the near future to provoke clashes between
Europeans in Algeria are reportedly plotting a "major stroke
Europeans, Moslems and the French Army]
*South Vietnam: [Several recent reports suggest that Amer-
ican personnel will increasingly become targets of assassina-
tion and kidnaping by the Communist Viet Cong movement. Viet
Cong terrorist activities in the vicinity of Saigon are growing,
and there are indications that new actions are being planned for
the capital itself
Ethiopia: The minor reforms so far introduced by the
Emperor since the unsuccessful coup attempt against him last
December have not satisfied the country's young, educated ele-
25X1
25X1
ment, which has become completely open in its discontent. Con-
servative military and civilian leaders, in an effort to consolidate
13 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iii so
25X1
I
F I I
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2
 Approved Fo~~~jj~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A%%oO~5070000~~20000001%%2%%~/~%%%%%%//%%%%%%///%%%%%%
25X1
25X1
25X1
their present dominant position, may be formulating lans to
forestall a possible move against the Emperoro 25X1
Bolivia: Extreme leftists are trying to force the govern-
ment by strikes, which may be accompanied by violence, to
release Communist leaders arrested under cover of the gov-
ernment-fabricated coup on 6 and 7 June. President Paz has
stated that those arrested will not be released before the end
of the 90-day state of siege, which began on. 7 June. The Amer-
ican charge in La Paz believes that the next few days will be
critical. He believes that the government can probably sur-
vive if it is willing to use its armed forces, but that the imme-
diate danger is that the government's nerve will fail and it may
not follow through on its anti-Communist program.
D
velopment. He has little confidence in the present ability of the
Organization of American States to resolve the Cuban problem.
Frondizi and Brazil's President Quadros have agreed that
they should pool their efforts to help Paraguay and Bolivia, where
present conditions are favorable to Castroism. Quadros, how-
ever, is reported to oppose Frondizi's summit proposals and
bid for leadership role.
Argentina - Cuba: In discussing with Ambassador Steven-
son inter-American po _discussing
regarding the Cuban problem, Pres-
ident Frondizi again urged a meeting of the Presidents of the
United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and possibly Chile
to seek agreement on strategy prior to the mid-July meeting of
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Montevideo.
Frondizi believes that a common policy must be devised first
on economic, social, and political problems before tackling the
Communist and Cuban problems. As an alternative to this pro-
posal, Frondizi is prepared to travel through Latin America.
and undertake leadership of an anti-Communist campaign, pro-
vided what he terms the political risk to himself of such action
were reduced by US aid in promoting Argentina's economic de-
25X1
13 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iv N
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 French-Algerian Talks at Evian
The French foreign minister, in talking with Gavin, char-
acterized the Evian discussions as "rather limited and academic.
"
25X1 the present plan is to recess the Evian 'talks
Approved Fo elease 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A00
Similar pessimism is evident
25X1
on 20 June and then engage in "secret talks"- -presumably else-
where and possibly at a different. level--to discover whether
there is a basis for successful negotiations] The US Embassy
in Paris points out that while a break-off at Evian cannot be ex-
cluded, spokesmen on both sides have emphasized the need to
continue.
The first three weeks of talks have been devoted to an ex-
position of respective positions.. The PAG has offered Euro-
peans in Algeria a choice of Algerian or French citizenship
with guarantees as individuals, but the French are seeking
built-in institutional guarantees between the Moslem and non-
Moslem communities. The French continue their unilateral
cease-fire reluctantly in the face of rising FLN terrorism.
The PAG refuses to agree to a cease-fire prior to a political
settlement, fearing both that a cease-fire order might not be
honored by all its own forces, and that it might be interpreted
as "weakness." The French maintain that the disposition of
the Sahara is a separate and distinct question from an Algerian
settlement, while the PAG holds that the Sahara is an integral
part of Algeria. France is pushing for a French-Algerian as-
sociation with cultural, economic, and defense ties, but the
PAG insists that settlement of the nature and extent of Algerian
ties with France must follow the determination of Algeria's
status.
25X1
25X1
The lack of progress at. Evian has probably reduced the
threat of anti - De Gaulle action b European settlers and
I military extremists in Algeria. Nevertheless,
'widespread desperation" among European
se ers and plotting by the secret army organization, led by,_
fugitive insurgent Generals Salan and. Jouhoud. Disturbances,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For'elease 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05T
00420001-2 25X1
[scheduled for mid-June, are reportedly to be coordinated with
similar rightist action in France. While another coup attempt
seems unlikely at present, major acts of violence aimed at in-
creasing the antagonism of the two parties are likely.?
25X1
25X1
13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 Approved For
Military and Politica e e opmen s in South Vietnam
he American army attache in Saigon reports that a French
citizen vacationing at the seashore southeast of Saigon was de-
tained on 20 May by Viet Cong troops of the "Liberation Front"
and told by a courteous, uniformed officer that they were look-
ing for Americans. After his money and other valuables were
taken, he was told that an American would have been held as a
hostage. A second Frenchman boating on the Saigon River the
same week end was similarly detained until he identified him-
self as French. According to a third French source, the Chi-
nese overseer of a French-owned plantation, raided for "trib-
ute" on 18 May, was told by the Viet Cong that American in-
stallations, homes, and personnel were their chief targets;
that these homes and installations were infiltrated by Viet Cong
domestics; and that they would kidnap and attempt to poison
American children. The overseer was also told that the Viet
Cong would soon launch grenade attacks in Saigon on the level
of 1951-1954
resident Diem remains convinced of the need to give pri-
ority to military measures to combat the Communist guerrilla
and subversive threat and normally commits 75 to 85 of the
army's 124 battalions to internal security operations or train-
ing, As a first step toward adding a contemplated 20,000 men
to his 150,000-man force, he has called up 6,000 reservists,
and recently the army has been increasingly aggressive and has
reportedly inflicted heavy casualties among the Communist guer-
rillas. Nevertheless, the estimated strength of the Communist
guerrillas continues to increase and their operations have en-
compassed a growing area'
any Vietnamese observers remain concerned that Diem's re-
luctance to give comparable weight to internal reforms will
eventually undermine the efforts to shore up the South Vietnam-
ese Government. Although the long-postponed government reor-
ganization announced in May gives promise of technical improve-
ment, a well-regarded Vietnamese foreign service officer told
the American Embassy recently that it offers no change from
Diem's present authoritarian methods of rule and had convinced]
25X1
25X1
13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 Approved For
im and several colleagues to resign. Diem is purging some
locally disliked rural officials and is permitting some con-
trolled opposition political activity, but he maintains that no
real liberalization is possible under present circumstances.
However, unless tangible improvement is demonstrated, the
prospect of prolonged insecurity and continued harsh controls
may encourage new plotting against Diem or his government
and the growth of sentiment for political accommodation with
the Communists?
25X1
25X1
25X1
13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 25X1 . Approved F4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Disaffection and Plotting in Ethiopia
Since last December's coup attempt, Emperor Haile
Selassie has relied chiefly on conservative officials of proven
loyalty and has made few changes to mollify the discontent
which led to the uprising. The only major reform to date has
been the appointment on 14 April of a prime minister; the Em-
peror had previously held this office himself. The Emperor
also exhorted government officials not to refer all important
matters to the palace. This change has not significantly af-
fected the government's lethargy and inefficiency; moreover,
civilian morale has deteriorated as a result of a salary cut
which the regime decreed in early May to provide funds for a
military pay increase.
I- I a conservative group in-
cluding Defense Minister Merid, interior Minister Abye, and
Senate President Asrate Kassa is planning some sort of polit-
ical-military action. Merid and Abye were instrumental in
the suppression of the December revolt; however, they have
little popularity either among the troops or with the populace.
The plotters apparently hope to gain control over the Emperor's
successor. F _j has them working with Crown Prince
Asfa Wossen to depose the Emperor.
their aim is to install the Duke of Harar, now in is ear y teens,
as crown prince in place of the notoriously weak Asf a Wossen.
[Haile Selassie, who has never liked the present crown prince,
may be permitting the plotters to continue their activity in order
to make certain of Asfa Wossen's involvement
F
25X1
25X1
25X1
13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 Approved Fo
The Bolivian Strikes
Twelve thousand workers are reported on strike in La Paz
and miners are out in three major areas. The strikers are de-
manding that the President release at least the leaders among
those arrested since 7 June under cover of the government-
fabricated "Communist coup;' Of those under arrest, the two
key figures are probably Irineo Pimentel and Federico Escobar,
who have for some years been in the forefront of labor agitation,
strikes, slowdowns, and featherbedding at the Twentieth Cen-
tury mine, Bolivia's largest tin producer.
Vice President Lechin, who was recently re-elected chief
of the Miners' Federation, is visiting in Venezuela and has been
asked by President Paz to return to Bolivia. Paz on 11 June met
with members of the Miners' Federation including Lechin's dep-
uty, Mario Torres, and apparently discussed the possible release
of the labor leaders. Torres told newsmen that President Paz
had flatly refused "to give in one millimeter."
In.his move against the Communists, President Paz may have
been influenced in part by the ambition he has apparently had since
his inauguration in August 1960 to crack down on all opposition
forces and to re-establish the personal dominance of Bolivian pol-
itics which.he exerted during his first term of office in 1952-56.
A recent Argentine offer of more than $1,000,000 in food in re-
turn for anti-Communist action was probably also influential.
The US charge comments that Paz may also have hoped to
neutralize key Communists in order to decrease the political
risks of raising the price of gasoline. The International Mone-
tary Fund has for some time sought a 50-percent increase in the
current domestic price of 13 cents per gallon on the widely used
68-octane grade of gasoline. Alternatively, Paz may have thought
that action against the Communists would lessen international
pressure on the issue of gasoline prices.
13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2
 Approved For - 05700420001-2
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2
 VIX11,11
ii i~i~iZZ, /Z, /ZZZI /Z, /ZZ i~ii'iiiiiiiii
i/ n.,..,...... ....J r.. 1-- T~j2A/oC~"TTnnn Ten ne7nnAnnnnA if
TOP.-SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/ 4/ - 0 70 4 -