CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005700050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 May 1961 25X1
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1 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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2. Congo. (Page t t)
3. Communist China', Health conditions reported deteri-
orating because of malnutrition. (Page t t)
4. Japan. Ikeda government criticized for rising consumer
prices and deficit in trade accounts, (Page tt)
5. Singapore: Prestige of ruling People's Action party dam-
aged by defeat in by=election. (Page in)
8. Britain ? West Indies: Constitutional talks opening in
Trinidad on 2 May; independence likely in 1962. (Page t v)
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public of the Congo
ETHIOPIA
1,500
TUNISIA
3,200
NIGERIA
400
CONGO
Brazzaville
INDONESIA
870
INDIA
800
MOBUTU
3,400
MOBUTU
800
jC EQUATEUR
Coquilhatville ?Boende
ETHIOPIA
200
NDONESIA
280
MOBUTU
7,200
Scattered -Forces
Leopoldvj
ysville
Mata i luabourg
let, ? Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Luanda Kasavubu Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tshgm~e r m ? y+'
Ai/0n t}c
00 Unrted Nations Forces (Service Forces
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
ETHIOPIA
NIGERIA
80 J 900
MALAYA
300
TSHOMBE
7,000
NIGERIA
500
_Ire
crxgn:r:i o
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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that between 20 and 3 percent of the population in Communist
China had symptoms of nutritional edema--a disease which is
411
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*Con oo Resolutions passed by the Coquilhatville confer-
ence of Congolese leaders, as announced by Foreign Minister
Bomboko yesterday, appear to reflect primarily the opinions
of Leopoldville-based politicians; the_ resolutions critical
of both the Tshombd and Gizenga regimes, seem unlikely to
find significant support in either Elisabethville or Stanleyvill
Ambassador Timberlake commented on 29 April that the "un-
sophisticated" effort of the Congolese Army to keep the leaders
in Coquilhatville until agreement is reached could hardly be suc-
cessful and was likely merely to prolong the stalemate and widen
the differences among the various Congolese factions. Tshombd
is still under detention; yesterday Congolese government spokes-
men said he would be detained indefinitely, would be removed to
Leopoldville, and his release would depend upon "events." The
disarming on 28.April by Congolese forces of a Ghanaian unit
of UN troops at Port Franc ui appears to have been done on local
initiative. (Map)
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2
Communist China:
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cent of her patients were suffering from "excruciating neuralgic '
pains" brought on by inadequate diet. F_ I 25X1
25X1 estimates on the basis of his
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fatal if not properly treated. 25X1
Japan: Rising consumer prices and a deficit in Japanese
trade accounts during the first three months of 1961 have cre-
ated an undercurrent of uneasiness about the Ikeda government's
economic program. Within the past week, two influential. business O k
associations which normally support the government party have
charged the government with aggravating the situation by unneces-
sarily yielding to labor's demands for wage increases. Limited
1 May 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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price rises and trade deficits were expected to result from Ikeda's
long-range economic development program, but they have oc-
curred sooner and. are larger than anticipated. While the situation
has not become critical, a worsening during the next several
months could affect the standing of the present government.
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ing blow'to the party's moderate socialist leadership, which ha
Sin aporeo The decisive defeat of Singapore's ruling Peo-
ple's ction_party (PAP) in a 29 April by-election is a damag-
committed its prestige to the outcome, Ong Eng Guan, a for-
mer PAP leader and cabinet officer who was expelled from his
party and government posts in mid-1960 after he charged that
the leadership had lost its socialist and anticolonial fervor, won
a personal triumph in the election as an independent and now is
in a position to appeal for defections among the party's rank and
file. To avoid demoralization within the party, the PAP leader-
ship may call for a new general election, which it would probably
win but with a reduced majority and at the price of concessions
to nro-Communists who control much of the party's mass base]
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pp
4
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ence to the West Indies, probably in 1962] 25X1
Britain - West Indies Federation: C T he premiers of Jamaica
and Trinidad fear the demands of the smaller islands in the West
Indies Federation for strong central powers may seriously af-
fect the constitutional talks opening in Trinidad on 2 May and
continuing in London on 31 May. Anticipating difficult negotia-
tions, Colonial Secretary Macleod has solicited US public state-
ments which would support a loose federation. He also wants
the US to indicate that such a federation would receive more aid
than would the separate units if the constitutional talks were to
break down. London, which hopes to compromise the differences
between the smaller and larger islands, aims to grant inde end-
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(Backup, Page 12)
,ngno
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MEN
ION
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The Situation in the Congo
The arrival at Port Francqui of a Congolese provincial
official from Luluabourg to investigate the increasing tension
between members of the Lulua and Baluba tribesmen appar-
ently instigated the attack by the Congolese Army on the UN
units. The Congolese apparently believed the UN was either
behind the inspection or would protect the official in his probe.
At least three of a 60-man Ghanaian unit were killed and the
remainder' captured by the numerically superior Congolese
unit. The incident is indicative of Congolese sensitivity to
what they feel is UN interference in their affairs.
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Cn Leopoldville, relations between the UN and the Kasa-
vubu government are expected to worsen after the return of
UN representative Dayala The government has indicated that
when Dayal returns, it intends to issue a release labeling him
an "uninvited foreigner" and strongly implying that it may call
for popular demonstrations "to dissipate any doubt which might
remain in Mr. Dayal's mind concerning the usefulness of his
presence in Leopoldville, which can only obstruct the success
of UN operations in the Congo,'
LJn Katanga, anti-Belgian sentiment is reported to be grow-
ing within the Katanga Government. Interior Minister Munongo,
25X1 is reported to have joined a pro- 'renc
c ique o angan ministers. The Belgians in Katanga apparent-
ly believe that if Munongo should attain power, he would replace
Belgian advisers with French or other foreign technicians pro-
posed by the UN:-)
The US consul in Elisabethville reported on 29 April that of-
ficial and public reaction to the news of Tshombe's detention had
been slight. The Katangan Council of Ministers had been meeting
three times daily, but the only important decision was the proc-
lamation of a limited state of emergency--a move apparently aimed
at preventing the movement of Balubas and other Africans hostile
to the government and the mass exodus of Belgians. Munongo and
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the other ministers have not assumed power. Although Na-
tional Assembly President Charles Mutaka announced that he
is constitutionally entitled to assume temporary command of
the government when the president's position is vacated dur-
ing an assembly session, UN representatives and foreign con-
suls summoned to a meeting by the Council of Ministers on
29 April were informed that Tshombe was considered absent
for a conference and that no governmental reorganization was
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envisaged.
Monetary problems in Stanleyville, which appeared serious
in February, are now reported partially resolved. Soldiers
and noncommissioned officers are paid regularly and fully;
army officers and civil servants up to 75 percent. Reports
are contradictory regarding the source of these funds.
claim that monetary regulations were effective, while
say that 500,000,000 francs were made available by
I However, no abnormal num-
ber of new bank notes are in evidence. Moreover, with the
exception of two Egyptian telecommunications. technicians to
keep the Stanleyville-Cairo line functionin no foreign techni-
cians have been observed in StanleyvilleJ 7
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Health Problems in Communist China
Mao Tse-tung reportedly told an American journalist last
autumn that the average Chinese peasant currently was lucky
to receive 1,000 calories in food a day. According to a nutritional
study made by the Chinese Communists last year, the average
peasant needs 3,000 calories a day to do his work Refugees
from the mainland have reported a rapid climb in tuberculosis,
liver disease, and stillbirths as a result of substandard diets.
The inadequate diet- -particularly the shortage of fats--is at
least partially responsible also for the apathy now reliably re-
ported widespread in Communist China.
Most of these ailments are progressive. Even if the diet
of the average Chinese were to be substantially improved in the
immediate future, it would take many months before the damage
could be overcome. Labor productivity will continue to be af-
fected by the present extent of malnutrition. F
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Economic Uneasiness in Japan
The average consumer price rise of 4 percent in the past
year equals the total increase during the five-year period from
1955 to 1960. Despite unprecedented economic prosperity in
Japan and a steadily improving standard of living,' this increase
has aroused some public discontent with the Ikeda government,
which had publicly predicted that prices would rise only about
one percent this year.
The trade account deficit of $230,000,000 during the first
quarter of 1961 reflects a very high rate of investment in new
plant and equipment as part of the government's ten-year pro-
gram. for doubling national income. The price rise stems pri-
marily from strong consumer demand and from wage increases.
Profit margins are being cut in some industries as a result of
wage increases. Ikeda has responded to criticism on this point
by contending that for several years labor productivity has been
rising more rapidly than wages.
The prime minister points out also that Japan's foreign ex-
change reserves, which have grown to $2 billion, are sufficient
to withstand the small additional trade deficits expected in the
next several months. He asserts that government action. to
counter the price rise and trade imbalance is not needed. at this
time.
Difficulties of this kind are considered normal in an eco-
nomic expansion program, especially in its early stages, and
are not serious in themselves. However, a recent upsurge in
wholesale prices is likely to. be followed by new increases on
the consumer level which could carry with them important polit-
ical effects. In July, Ikeda will complete his first year in office
and is scheduled to reshuffle the cabinet and major party posts
in a bid to consolidate his power. His intraparty rivals and the
opposition Socialists almost certainly will exploit any economic
discontent at that time in an effort to weaken his leadership or
possibly even unseat him. F
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Singapore Ruling Party's Prestige Damaged
[The defeat of the People's Action party (PAP) reflects in
part the disenchantment of Singapore's economically depressed
workers impatient with PAP's failure during its two years in
office to effect solutions to the island's economic problems. PAP
won 43 of the 51 seats in the Legislative Assembly in May 1959
as a radical socialist and anticolonialist party promising a "new
order" for. the working masses. Its basically moderate and care-
fully planned economic policies have not had spectacular results,
however, and as much as 10 percent of the Singapore working
force remains unemployed. In its preoccupation with creating
an attractive climate for private investment in the economic de-
velopment of the island, the government has attempted to hold
the line on.wages and create stable labor conditions, and this
has led to some popular disillusionment with PAP's image as a
militant party of the left:
[In addition, the party's generally cooperative relations with
the British, who retain broad powers over Singapore's foreign
relations, defense, and internal security, have exposed it to
charges leveled by Ong during his campaign that the party has
become a stooge of the British. One of the immediate effects
of the election may be diminished rapport between the PAP and
the British as the party seeks to refurbish its anticolonial repu-,
tation~.)
CPAP remains the best organized and most widely supported
party in Singapore, however, and its defeat by Ong is primarily
the result of a political miscalculation rather than an indication
of a dramatic shift in the political climate. The PAP leadership
forced a showdown with Ong in his home constituency, a congested
area of low-income and semiliterate workers where Ong, who has
a flair for demagoguery, was widely conceded to be almost un-
beatable:)
,Since its formation in 1954, the PAP has been ideologically
split between the moderates, who control the party's formal or-
gans, and a pro-Communist group which controls the militant)
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Gabor organs and the student groups which form a key part of
the party's mass base. The dimensions of Ong's victory--75
percent of the vote--suggest that the extremists, despite a
display of public support for. the PAP candidate, may have
rested on their oars in order to embarrass the moderates. If
the government resigns, which is a possibility but not consti-
tutionally necessary, the extremists may well be in a position
to demand increased influence in the party in return for their
support in new elections
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B itain West Indies
Jamaica's Premier Manley has been engaging in political
maneuvering designed to ensure that his specifications for a
weak, decentralized federation will be adopted by the confer-
ence. Until recently the trend had been running in.favor of
compromises to retain Jamaican participation. Trinidad's
Premier Williams had backed down as leader of the forces
advocating a strong federation. The principle that federal
powers would be severely limited, at least. initially, had been
accepted at the committee level, and the island ministers had
further agreed that Jamaica's share of the legislative seats
would be upped from 38 to 48 percent to correspond more
closely to the island's 53-percent share of the federation's
populationT
The smaller islands, backed by Federal Prime Minister
Adams from Barbados, are becoming resentful of the increas-
ing tendency of Manley and. Williams together to dominate fed-
eral affairs and have complained bitterly that the current pro-
posals for the conference provide for a federation too weak to
b e effective-)
[Secessionist sentiment is growing in Jamaica. This was
originally based on economic grounds--Jamaica provides about
53 percent of the federation's gross domestic product--and is
now reinforced by artificially fostered racial animosities. If
Manley,. who had been expected to replace the ineffectual Adams
as prime minister, fails to obtain.the concessions he seeks, he
may urge Jamaicans to vote against continued participation in
the referendum he plans to hold on the question in September.
Premier Williams has said he is unwilling to remain in the fed-
eration without Jamaica and claims he turned down a suggestion
by Prime Minister Macmillan to head the federation if Manley
withdraws.
C critical powers which Jamaica seeks to retain-income tax
and industrial development incentives=are recognized in the
current proposals3as subjects of ultimate federal control but are)
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Cleft to island control for the present. Various proposals for
financing the federal budget through customs excises and con-
sumption duties are to be debated. Trinidad's unwillingness
to have its high per capita income downgraded.by a flood of
immigrants has forced a proposal to restrict freedom of move-
ment between constituent territories. With an eye to Commu-
nist-led British Guiana, Jamaica also wants the power to veto
accession of new members:
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
.The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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