CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005700020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 27, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For leash 0/ MJMAbT0097 005700020 V
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27 April 1961
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27 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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4. Communist China: New loan to Tirana gives Peiping
position formerly held by Moscow in Albanian econ-
omy. (Page fv)
5. USSR: Moscow may be preparing to propose renewed
negotiations on Berlin. (.age z v)
6. Geneva test ban talks: Moscow states it will make
no new compromise proposals. (Page v)
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8. Ceylon: Government mobilizes additional military units.
(Page vi)
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10. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page vt t)
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 Chinese technicians and equipment for the construction of 25X1
25 industrial projects. (Backup, Page 3)
USSR-Berlin: Top-level Communist statements on Berlin
and many over the past two weeks suggest that Moscow is
preparing the groundwork for a formal proposal. to renew negoF
tiations on these issues. The Soviet leaders may see the forth-
coming NATO council meeting in Oslo on 8 May as an oppor-
tunity to justify a new initiative, alleging that this meeting
will. take up the question of nuclear armament for West Ger-
many. In line with Khrushchev's remarks to Walter Lippmann
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Communist China -,Albania*. By granting Albania a
credit o $125,000,000 for Tirana's Second Five-Year Plan
(1961-65), Peiping has taken over the predominant role pre-
viously played by Moscow in the Albanian economy and has
probably encouraged Tirana to continue its intransigent
course. The new. aid agreement points up the serious com-
petition between .the USSR and China for economic and polit-
ical influence within certain areas of the bloc. This large-
scale aid--roughly 80 percent of the new aid Albania was
seeking for its Five-Year Plan--involves the dispatch of
27 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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that :the USSR would raise the question soon, the authoritative
Izvestia "Observer" article on 20 April warned that "all rea-
sonable time limits have expired" for. the conclusion of a peace
treaty and a revision of Berlin's status. East German party
leader Ulbricht. in speeches on 21 and 23 April warned that
East Germany did not intend to wait for a peace treaty until
Bonn had "completed its nuclear rearming:' Izvestia stated
that the opponents of the "immediate conclusion' o a peace
treaty are "grossly mistaken" if they hope that further delays
will work in their favor. 25X1
Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations: The chief Soviet delegate
to the Geneva test ban talks, in press interviews
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given no indication that Moscow will make new compromise
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agreed annual quota of 'inspections. He has emphasized, how-
ever, that the tripartite scheme was "absolutely necessary"
and has evaded the question of whether voting on all issues
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would have to be unanimous-.7 I
administer the control apparatus. At the conference sessions,
the Soviet delegation has sought to undercut Western objections
to the possibility of a Soviet veto on inspections by stating this
issue would not arise in the tripartite council if there were an
proposals to break the deadlock over vital aspects of the con
trol system. He outlined three Soviet positions on which.. he
stated there could be no compromise: a maximum of three
inspections annually in the Soviet Union, a maximum of 15
control posts on Soviet territory, and a tripartite council to
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U
I
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Ceylon: An outbreak of strikes in the island's tea and rub-
ber plantations has forced the Bandaranaike government to
tighten the state of emergency it declared on 17 April to halt
communal agitation. The agitation arose from the government's
efforts to impose the official Singhalese language on the Tamil-
speaking minority in northeast Ceylon. The government mobi-
lized additional military units on 26 April to help maintain es-
sential services as well as to emphasize its determination to
maintain its position. The government is probably capable of
containing any further outbreaks. (Backup,
Page 7) (Map)
i
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27 Apr 61
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Sino-Albanian Economic Aid.Apreement
In expressing gratitude.for Albania's "brotherly" concern
.for China's "struggle," the communique issued on 25 April
makes clear that the new economic aid is Tirana's reward for
supporting Peiping in its dispute with Moscow. The statement
that Sino-Albanian economic relations "fully embody the pro-
letarian internationalist spirit of mutual support and close co-
operation" appears sharply critical of Soviet economic pres-
sures imposed on both China and Albania and of Moscow's
laggard help in the present Chinese economic crisis.
The announcement of the new aid agreement was delayed
for more than two months, probably because Peiping did not
want to publicize its support. for Albania while trade and aid
talks with the USSR were getting under way. The announce-
ment of the new loan to Albania at this time suggests that lit-
tle, if any, progress has been made at the aid talks, which are
still continuing in Moscow.
Chinese agreement to construct complete.industrial in-
stallations for Tirana injects a new element into Sino-Albanian
economic relations. Peiping has similar programs in all three
of the Asian satellites, where Sino=Soviet competition. has be-
come abundantly evident during the past year, but previous
Chinese aid to Albania has consisted almost entirely of grain
and raw material delivered on a credit basis. Since last au-
tumn the Chinese have been delivering increasing amounts of
wheat to Albania, despite critical food shortages in China.
These deliveries, both from China and from nonbloc countries
at Chinese expense, are well in excess of Soviet deliveries and
have provided Tirana with more than enough food grains to meet
immediate consumption requirements.
The new aid agreement underscores the extent of the Al-
banian regime's alienation from Moscow and China's role in
supporting Albanian defiance of the USSR. Since 1956 the USSR
has extended a total of some $140,000,000 in long-term credits
to Albania, of which $75,000,000 remains unused. The Chinese
underwriting of the added credits needed for the new Albanian
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plan will nevertheless make it even more difficult for the USSR
to bring pressure on Tirana to get back in line with the. Kremlin.
Furthermore, dissident elements within the East European re-
gim,es will undoubtedly regard the Chinese Communist loan as
tangible evidence of Peiping's willingness to back heretical
forces within the bloc and of Peiping's stature as an independ-
ent force within the Communist movement.
27 Apr. 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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INDIA
INDIA N
Plantation areas
Tamils dominant
Singhalese dominant
O C E A N
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Communal Agitation Forces Colombo to Step. Up Emergency
Measures
The Tamil-speaking minority, represented by the recently
banned Federal party, has been agitating for nearly four months
against the government's enforcement of Singhalese as the sole
official language. The campaign began as one of "passive re-
sistance" in early January, when the official language act went
into effect. The agitation was intensified in late February;
within several weeks picketing of government buildings had
halted all government operations except food distribution at
most major centers in the Tamil areas.
The government has remained firm in its decision not to
grant the Tamils' demand that their language be granted equal
status with Singhalese, but until recently refrained from using
force. The Federal party's campaign, however, steadily gath-
ered support and momentum. The government's hand was final-
ly forced in mid-April when the party shifted to a "civil diso-
bedience" campaign involving deliberate efforts to break the
law by setting up parallel government services.
The government's show of strength at this point is likely to
discourage a repetition of the communal riots in 1958 over the
I language issue.
The government's prestige may begin to suffer if the emer-
gency regulations are prolonged or appear needlessly stringent.
In addition, should the Tamil-dominated plantation unions be
persuaded to continue their strikes indefinitely, the government
would face serious economic consequences, since the plantations
are the basis of Ceylon's export earnings.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation,
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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