CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600460001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 22, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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22 April 1961
Copy No. C
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State Dept. review completed
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LATE ITEM
The situation in Algeria as of 0630 EST remains unclear
beyond the fact that a military revolt against De Gaulle's liberal
Algerian policy was launched in Algiers last night. The Paris
government admits the insurrection, but insists this morning
that the "coup" is confined to the city of Algiers. The insurrecr
tionists, in a communique signed by four well-known French
generals, claim they control all Algeria and the Sahara. How-
ever, the only military units publicly, identified as supporting
the revolt are the First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment
and the predominently Moslem Seventh Regiment.
he timing of this move against De Gaulle by military
partisans of "French Algeria" is connected with the widespread
belief that a negotiated settlement involving Algerian independence
was about to be achieved. Although the rebel Provisional Algerian
Government (PAG) refused' to initiate public negotiations with the
French government as scheduled at Evian on 7 April--because of De
'Gaulle.rs refusal to recognize the PAG's claim to represent all
Algeria--the fact that behind-the-scenes PAG-French talks have
continued has been an open secret. Moreover, De Gaulle's 11 .April
press conference--in which he emphasized more clearly than ever
before his intention to negotiate Algerian independence-- appeared
to have dispelled PAG doubts as to his intentions and it was expected
that negotiations would soon be announced. The PAG has not yet
commented on the situation, and will probably take a cautious at-
titude until the picture becomes clearer
L "The outcome of the insurrection will depend largely on the re-
actioo of the European settlers, Moslems, and other military units
in Algeria, but also on the reactions in France itself. The settlers
and their rightist sympathizers in France are expected to welcome
the coup as a blow to the "abandonment" of Algeria by De Gaulle.
The Moslem population of Algeria, which was reportedly discouraged
by De Gaulle's 11 April press conference because of fear that it
had reduced chances for an early end of hostilities, could react
violently--with or without PAG incitement--to any indications that
the/French army intends to prolong the war:
De Gaulle's skillful management of military sensibilities and
his-firm stand during the January 1960 insurrection in Algiers; ',
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 in which some army paratroop units wavered in their loyalty,
had for some time apparently discouraged active military
plotting against him. The four generals heading the new in-
surrection- -retired Army generals Henri Zeller and Raoul
Salan (a former French commander in Algeria), retired
Air Force General Edmond Jouhaud? end Air. Force General
Maurice ?Challe (who resigned early this year from the position
as NATO commander for Central Europe)--are prominent
largely because of their anti-Gaullist sentiments and activities.
They are not believed to enjoy widespread support in the armed
services, although much of the French military have sympathized
with their "French Algeria" views. The current insurrection
appears more serious than the settlers' revolt of 1960 in that
this time'some army units are overtly opposed to the government,
and thus openly pose: the problem of "unity of the army." The
new French Chief of Staff of National Defense, General lean
Olie, who took office on 1 March, lacks the prestige of his
predecessor, General Paul Ely, who had played a major role
in maintaining the armed services' loyalty to De Gaulle.
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22 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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3. Angola: Economic breakdown seen if withdrawal of
Europeans from rural areas continues. (page tt)
4. Congo: TshombePs control in Katanga apparently weakens.
(Page i t)
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INDIA
300
SUDAN
200
TUNISIA
3.200
NIGERIA
400
INDONESIA
280 _
MOBUTU
3,400
EQUATEUh-
Cogiiilhatville
?Boende ) GIZENGA
ETHIOPIA G 7,000
200 Ikela,
ETHIOPIA
1,500
anleyville
Bukavu
'Kin u
J MOBUTU
7, P00 Scattere3 Forces
Leopoldv
ysville l
GHANA
1600
_DVILLE
Kalonji
Tshombe
Iuabourg\
to" Bakes
0o United Nations Forces (Service Forces
Selected road not included)
-+--Selected railroad
Selected airfield,
ETHIOPIA
500
ia' A -W (, A
INDIA
2 540
NIGERIA
900.
NIGERIA
500
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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Matadi
Kitona
INDONESIA
870
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Gizenga
MALAYA
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Angola: Rebels in northern Angola are aa to move a
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will through large areas of the countryside. The Portuguese
are continuing their military build-up. The American consul
in Luanda believes that the government's repressive measures
are driving increasing numbers of Africans into rebellion. He
feels that unless terrorist activity in the area can be contained L%
in the next few weeks, most of the European-operated coffee
plantations will be abandoned and almost all. of this year's coffee
crop will be lost. Withdrawal of Europeans from rural areas
could lead to an economic breakdown, which would cause in-
creased unrest among Europeans as well as among elements
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Congo: President Tshombe's control of Katanga appears
more precarious than at any time since the Congo's independ-
ence. The American consulate in E.lisabethville reports that
anti-Tshombe sentiment is rising among the local population,
and that demonstrations-stemming from economic grievances ,) K
as well as resentment against Tshombe's Belgian advisers-
may take place at any time. Tshombe has in large measure
rescinded his boycott against UN troops, but animosity between
the UN and the Katanga government remains strong. 25X1
22 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Situation in Angola
The area of the current disturbances is the source of
most of the coffee crop, which accounted for more than a
third of Angola's export earnings in 1960 and is the princi-
pal dollar earner for Portugal. Considerable coffee is
still on hand from previous crops as a result of Portugal's
commitments to the International Coffee Agreement, but an
American official--whose company recently shut down all
its oil exploration activities in the Cabinda exclave as a re-
sult of the unrest- -believes the economy will run down as
soon as these stocks are exhausted,.
The uncertainty over Angola's future is causing concern
in Lisbon over the stability of the escudo. Serious economic
deterioration in Angola might threaten the stability of the
Salazar regime.
Nationalists, most of them Communist oriented, from
Portuguese territories in Asia and Africa have been meeting
in Casablanca. The final resolution, adopted on 20 April,
announced that an organization will be set up in Morocco to
coordinate the activities of the various anti-Portuguese
groups. This organization apparently will supersede the
Conakry-based Revolutionary Front for the Independence
of the Portuguese Territories (FRAIN), which recently has
been weakened by factionalism and by an inability to obtain
international publicity. Holden Roberto's Angola People's
Union (UPA), which reportedly triggered the current
outbreak, is not affiliated with the new Morocco-based
organization,
The movement of additional troops from Portugal to
Angola is continuing, both by air and by sea. More than
12,000 troops, of whom more than 4,000 are white, are
now stationed in the province. Approximately 35,000
army troops remain in metropolitan Portugal. In addition,
about 8,000 troops, the bulk of them native are stationed
in Mozambique,
22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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Tshombd's Position Deteriorating in Katanga
Tshombd's regime is threatened by a combination of
UN hostility and fading popular support. He has rejected
demands of his recalcitrant legislature that he share his
executive power with a premier, but it is doubtful that he
can continue his one-man rule indefinitely, aided only by
Belgian advisers.
Tshombd's rule in northern Katanga has long been
threatened by hostile Baluba. tribesmen, but until recently
he appeared to enjoy the support of most non-Baluba groups
in the south. Lately, however, there has been an increas-
ing reaction to Tshombd's extensive reliance on Belgians and
his employment of South African mercenaries in the Katangan
armed forces. Popular dissatisfaction with prevailing low
wage levels has stimulated resentment against the Belgians,
who are felt to have monopolized highly paid positions.
Tshombd's difficulties are compounded by his bad rela-
tions with the UN, which recently airlifted Indian troops into
Katanga. One UN official predicted on 20 April that "a show-
down" between the UN and Tshombd was rapidly approaching.
A Belgian adviser to the Leopoldville government, has
opined that Tshombd has become a liability for the Belgians
and that Brussels would take a "hard line" with him. Belgians
in Elisabethville reportedly are apprehensive concerning their
future there in view of renewed UN efforts to secure the with-
drawal of foreign advisers.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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