CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A005600350001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 31, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 10, 1961
Content Type:
REPORT
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10 April 1961
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Mimi Lim
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State Dept.
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10 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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5. Kenya: Delay in formation of government invites
violence. (Page tit)
El Salvador: Disagreements over reform program
probably caused resignations from ruling directorate.
(Page t v)
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Kenya: [several African leaders in Kenya are concerned
that violence may occur if political factions continue to refuse
to form a government until Jomo Kenyatta--convicted for his
role in Mau Mau activities-is released from detention by
Britain. As a result of the elections last February, Africans
predominate in the legislature for the first time and had been C)
expected. to fill most executive posts. The leaders fear that
agitators--capitalizing on the lack of progress in meeting
economic problems aggravated by the political impasse--may
incite disorders among the 80,000 men who have been released
from detention camps. Most of these men have not found jobs.
Meanwhile, the Kenya administration apparently hopes to con-
coct a government from among European, Asian, and minority
African legislators, although such a government would prob- 25X1
ably lack popular support and might precipitate nationalist-
inspired disorders (Backup, Page 7)
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DAILY BRIEF
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El Salvador: The resignation on 6 April of two of the
three civillan~__on El Salvador's ruling civil-military directo-
rate probably stemmed from disagreements over how fast the
government should move in implementing the moderate pro-
gram of social and economic reforms launched last month, A
group of influential young military officers is insisting on more
energetic implementation of reforms,and this may increase op-
position to the program among wealthy businessmen and planta-
tion owners. FA_n extensive cabinet reorganization reportedly is
immineng. I I Page 9)
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Delay in Formation of Government in Kenya Invites Violence
(As a result of the legislative elections held in February
and the later supplementary balloting by the Legislative Coun-
cil for 12 "national" members=-four from each of the African,
European, and Asian groups= =the two leading African national-
ist parties have 35 seats in the 65-member legislature. The
Kenya African National Union (KANU), with 20 seats the larger
group, is led by its general secretary Mboya and its president
Gichuru. The chief opposition group to KANU is the Kenya
African Democratic Union (KADU), led by Ronald Ngala. It
has 15 seats and represents minority tribal groups
[In neither party can the leaders control their legislative
representatives; KANU is particularly faction=ridden. Mboya
is challenged by American-educated Julius Kiano as well as
by pro-leftist Oginga Odinga. Several KANU members are re-
ported dissatisfied with their party's rigid stand on the Ken-
yatta issue and would probably break away and cooperate with
KADU if the latter were successful in forming a government or
if the governor made some face-saving compromise onKen-
yatta7
~KADU leaders appear more willing to cooperate with the
governor in forming a government, provided the party does
not lose its popular backing thereby and provided some KANU
members participate. Ronald Ngala is visiting London in an
effort to obtain some $60,000,000 in grant aid for the resettle-
ment of Africans in the former White Highlands. At the recent
All African People's Conference in Cairo he sought nationalist
support by attacking the United States for colonialist policie
EKANU's attitude threatens to cause increasing difficulties
for London. Mboya recently told American officials that he saw
"no way out" unless Kenyatta were released. Even then, how=
ever, KANU would form a government only with the intention of
demanding a new constitutional conference in the near future
with Kenyatta in attendance. Mboya now demands Kenya's inde-
pendence in 1961; neighboring Tanganiyka is scheduled to
become independent on 26 December 1961.
(Britain remains opposed to releasing Kenyatta, although it
has expressed its willingness to do so as soon as a Kenyj
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jovernment is formed and functioning well. On his recent visit
to Kenya, Colonial Secretary Macleod gave his full support to
Governor Renison for his policy regarding Kenyatta-/
10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
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Changes in Salvadoran Government
The two civilians resigned because of their opposition to
rapid implementation of reform measures. The directorate
will continue operating with its three remaining members
fhanges reportedly will be made in all ministries except
defense, interior, and labor. The US Embassy at San Salvador
believes the prospective appointees were chosen because they
represented diverse groupings and thus would have a broad ap-
peal. One of them, Miranda Lupone, whose appointment as
foreign minister appears almost definite, is known to champion
"reform by decree;' including nationalization of the Central
Bank
Junior army officers believe reforms are not being im-
plemented fast enough because most cabinet ministers are too
much under the obstructive influence of wealthy businessmen
and landowners. Most of the wealthy class became at least
temporarily convinced of the necessity for reforms to improve
the lot of the lower classes after an alarming upsurge of Com-
munist and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador between the coup
in October 1960 and the one that brought the directorate to
power last January. Many of the landowners began to change
their minds, however, after the implementation of the first
reforms, which included a forced reduction of rent for low-
income housing and a paid day of rest on Sundays for agricul-
tural workers. Coffee growers reacted to the Sunday rest law
by dismissing large numbers of workers, and the Communists
are reported working to exploit the resulting peasant discontent.
The government warned violators that the reforms are in
line with recommendations agreed to by 18 Latin American
governments at Bogota, Colombia, last year, and that the army
will be on the peasants' side in the event of any "social explo-
sion:'
The rapidly diminishing influence of the upper class in the
government and the prospects of having the schedule for the
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implementation of social reforms timed by the army's junior
officers increase the probability that some wealthy Salva-
dorans will resort to bribery and subsidized violence in an
effort to frustrate the reforms and, if possible, to bring down
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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