CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
DIA and DOS have no objection to declassification and release
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
2. Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow scheduled for 28 March,
day after SEATO Council of Ministers meeting opens in
Bangkok. (Page i)
5. Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi says
Peiping will not enter UN until US ends "occupation"
of Taiwan. (page tit)
7. Ethiopia: Troops in Addis Ababa protest against low pay;
Emperor promises investigation to rectify inequities.
(Page ftv)
8. Morocco: King Hassan II exploiting recent capture
and release of foreign oil technicians to further his
claims to Spanish Sahara. (Page tv)
9. Watch Committee conclusions. (page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 March 1961
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Moscow probably feels that the Laotian situation is moving
into a new and decisive phase which may require high-level
coordination of future bloc steps and which in any event makes
desirable a new demonstration of bloc solidarity. Yester-
day's TASS announcement refers, as did the announcement
prior to a similar session last year, to a meeting at the "top
level. " This suggests that Eastern European party leaders
and premiers may again attend along with the foreign and
defense ministers, who are specifically mentioned in the
*Warsaw Pact: The chief purpose of the Warsaw Pact
meeting announced for 28 March in Moscow is to create a
forum from which to respond to Western moves on the Lao-
tian situation. This meeting of the Pact's Political Consult-
ative Committee is timed to follow the current meeting in
Bangkok of SEATO military advisers and the opening on 27
March of the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers.
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ANO
announcement. Such a meeting could provide an occasion
for Khrushchev to break his long public silence on foreign
affairs. It is probable that next week's session will cover
the Berlin question, at least on a pro forma basis, and
possibly in a more threatening context.
(Backup, Page 2)
MM"
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Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in an inter-
view published in Hungary's party newspaper, has said that it
will not be possible for Peiping to enter the UN until the US end
its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws its armed forces front
the area. Heretofore, Peiping's public statements on UN repre
sentation have not gone beyond insistence on the ouster from the
UN of the Chinese Nationalists. While Peiping has not issued
an official policy statement along these lines, the Chinese
Communists may believe that international pressures for their
participation in the UN have reached a point that encourages
them to press their demands for a US withdrawal from Taiwan
with new vigor. (Backup, Page 4)
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FIN
Ethiopia: The Emperor on 21 March 'Met a deputation of
500 unarmed enlisted men representing all army units in the
Addis Ababa area, following peaceful demonstrations by these
troops who were protesting against low pay scales. The troops
dispersed peacefully after the Emperor promised to institute
a full probe to rectify inequities in army pay scales. They re-
portedly remained dissatisfied, however, and reconvened into
smaller groups to discuss further moves. The Emperor ap-
pears reluctant to yield to the soldiers' demands despite warn-
ings from senior army leaders that they will be unable to control.
the troops unless concessions are forthcoming. The populace
in the canital is an-oarent1v becominLr more svmDathetic to demands
tor rexorm.
/ A
A
ish Sahara: King Hassan 11 is exp
Morocco-~Pan loiting
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11 foreign oil technicians--in
the capture and release of Che
eluding three Americans--to further Morocco's claims to
Spanish Sahara, in the opinion of the American charge d1af
air.
an invading Moroccan group and are attacking it from land and
Morocco's claim to the Sahara with Spain and France.
The Spanish command in the Canary islands claims that
Spanish forces in northeastern Spanish Sahara have surround
spective embassies, contains a clear threat that other oil pro
pectors in northern Spanish Sahara will get similar treatment
At the same time, Hassan indicated he was willing to negotiat
faires and the British ambassador in Rabat. These official
believe that the King's communiqud, issuedsimultaneously
with his theatrical release of the captured men to their re-
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On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. No change from last week.
B. No change from last week.
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Warsaw Pact Mpetin
On antra-bloc m.atterp, the Soviet leaders could use next
week's meeting ris an opportunity to apply new pressures de
signed to bring Albania baok-xrito line with the' USSR. In the
military field,' discussion 6f.--.a- possible reduction-in Soviet
forces in Hungary might be on the agenda, as might also
plans for Warsaw pact combined-training excercises later
this year.-
Meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Com-
mittee have been used since the Pact's formation in 1955 as a
forum for discussion of a wide range of pressing political matters
by Soviet bloc leaders. These meetings have been attendedy
observers from Communist China; last year's session was at-
tended also by observers from North Vietnam and North Korey..
The final communiques of these various meetings have annoue`d
a unified bloc position on the questions at issue.
Thus the meeting in February 1960, although marred
sharp Sino-Soviet differences, issued a statement which ibrde-
fully. restated the Soviet position on -the Berlin and German
issues and outlined those topics the USSR intended to discuss
at the then-forthcoming Big Four "summit" meeting. 'The com-
muniqu? following the April 1959 meeting was directed toward
the issues to be considered at the Big Four foreign ministers'
conference that spring. The May 1958 meeting was used to
attack the theses issued a month earlier by a. congress of the
Yugoslav patty and to widen the break in party relations between
the bloc and Belgrade. The meetings in 1958 and 1960, though
not the one in 1959, were attended by Soviet bloc party leaders
and chiefs of state, in addition to the foreign and defense min-
isters.
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Peiping Expands Conditions for UN Seat
[eiping's reported new demand is a logical expansion of
its thesis that "imperialism --especially US imperialism--'"'is.
the greatest danger in the world and that the Communist
bloc's efforts must be devoted to a no-holds-barred struggle
against it. This attitude is reflected in Peiping's current in-
sistence on the withdrawal of US forces and the recognition
of its claim to Taiwan as a necessary preliminary to the set-
tlement of all Sino US ,p.robbem_]
[Following the 103rd Sino-US ambassadorial meeting in
Warsaw on 7 March, Peiping said it would be difficult to
reach agreement with the US on any matter until the US ends
its "occupation" of Taiwan. Peiping now may be seeking to
take the issue outside the field of bilateral Sino-US relations
and force its consideration in the UN. The Chinese Commu-
nists may also intend through this maneuver to make it more
difficult for any consideration in the UNof a "two Chinas"
solution
Ehe new condition may not reflect a firm policy position.
Peiping may be employing the familiar tactic of setting a
high price in preparation for bargaining later. Chou En-lai
may have been hinting at the nature of a compromise accept-
able to Peiping when he told Edgar Snow last November that
the US must agree to withdraw its forces but added that as
to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, "they are
matters for subsequent discussion."
CAUny UN members which now support Peiping's entry
into the UN would Probably be unwilling to attempt to accom-
modate the Chinese Communists beyond voting to seat Pei-
ping's representative. These members believe that UN mem-
bership is a privilege as well as a right and therefore would
consider Peiping's demands demeaning to the organization.
Britain's recent announcement that Communist China should
be seated in the United Nations has subsequently been am-
plified by a Foreign Office private view that no condition
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fould be attached by Taipei's supporters to the seating of
Peiping. On the other hand, the Foreign Office would oppose
the Chinese Communists if Peiping advanced such conditions
as UN recognition that Taiwan belonged to China or that
charges of aggression against Communist China be expunged
from UN records.
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Army Dissidence Threatens Ethiopia
Ambassador Richards indicated on 22 March that while
an uneasy calm has returned to Addis Ababa, trouble could
break out again unless the Emperor acts quickly to accom-
modate the army dissidents' demands.
The Emperor's attempts to date to reduce the growing
criticism of his regime appear to have failed. He sought to
alleviate army, discontent on 14 March by announcing a mod-
est increase in its pay scales and to quell. dissension among
junior and middle-level officers the next day by promoting 73
army officers. The pay increase, however, which is to come
from the present army budget, falls considerably short of that
promised by the rebel leadership last December. Moreover,
air force, police, and navy personnel will be aroused over be-
ing denied a pay raise equal to that given the army, while army
officers are likely to. regard their promotions simply as a
counterbalance to those given air force officers last month. Po-
lice officials are also displeased because the Emperor recently
appointed an army officer instead of a career police official as
commissioner of police.
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Handbills, which may have originated in the Ministry of
Defense, were circulated in the capital on 20 March setting
forth the demands of the dissidents. These included--in addi-
tion to the pay raise--the dismissal of Chief of Staff Kebede
and other, high government officials, threatening direct action
if. they are not complied with.
The American army attache notes that the dissidents ap-
parently have succeeded in establishing organizational ties
through several if not all local army units. A leader capable
of directing action against the regime is not yet known to have
emerged, however. Although. army officers reportedly have
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secured all arms in unit armories, the troops could recover
these weapons through muss action if the situation were to get
out of hand,
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Moroccan Claims to Saharan Territories
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Soon after Spain published regulations on 15 June 1959
for the exploitation of petroleum resources in the Spanish
Sahara, the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid made known Mo-
rocco's claims of sovereignty over the region, The Moroccan
economic counselor in Madrid indicated at that time that he
thought American oil companies should be advised this was a
contested area and that they might subsequently have to rene-
gotiate their status with another government. The following
year, nine American firms obtained concessions from the
Spanish Government, and by January 1961,38 American teams
were engaged in exploratory work. Emphasis was placed on
the northwestern part of the Spanish Sahara because of the
availability of supply lines and water. Thee .United Oil Company,
whose 11 employees were captured--apparently by Moroccan
irregulars at the direction of the Moroccan Army--on 11 March,
had recently ceased operations in Latin America to.concentrate
on exploratory work in Spanish Sahara and Australia.
The Moroccan press, meanwhile, continues to play up
charges of Spain's aggressive intentions, reporting on 21 March
the arrival of Spanish reinforcements not only in Spanish Sahara
but also in the Spanish-held presidios of Ceuta and Melilla on
Morocco's Mediterranean coast. It also claims that Spanish mil-
itary aircraft created havoc among the population by flying low
over the southern Moroccan town of Tarfaya on 20 March, and
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continues to charge Spanish authorities with kidnaping a team
of four Italian oil prospectors operating in the Tarfaya area.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
-Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Derr:irtment of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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