CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600170001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 20, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For a easTOR4/SECRET00975 05600170001-1
25X1
20 March 1961
Copy No. C
III 'LINO
25X1
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 Approved For ease 20001U'41 .1 Z? I - 5600170001-1 25X1
20 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
25X1
2.
Situation in the Congo. (Page t)
3. USSR: Soviet officials hold to pessimistic line on nu-
clear test ban talks, which resume tomorrow in Geneva.
(Page it)
25X1
6. Spain: Madrid takes firm position in dispute with Morocco
over frontier violations in Spanish Sahara. (Page tit)
7. Mali: $44,000,000 economic aid agreement signed with
USSR, (Page tit)
ial
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600170001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 P Iced F r Release 2003/04/17: C1A-RDP79 009755600170001-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 March 1961
25X1
V
FA
Congo: Implementation of the Tananarive conference res
olutions concerning the future structure of the Congo is likely
to prove difficult, as almost every participant has a different
idea as to what was decided. Ambassador Timberlake in Leo
poldville also believes that many of these leaders fail to ap-
preciate the need for obtaining international recognition and
that among those who do, there is disagreement as to the
steps necessary to achieve it. Prospects for a reconciliation
with the Orientale regime on the basis of the new confederal
formula have dimmed as a result of new and seemingly more
categorical denunciations by Stanleyville authorities of the
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 Approhr 4/17 - - 0975~l15600170001-1 j
j j
j
j
j
25X1
resolutions. nevertheless, Congolese factions represented
at Tananarive and elements of the Gizenga regime- -especially
General Lundula--are likely to continue to engage in political
maneuvering looking toward a possible ra-wrochemen
25X1
USSR - Geneva Talks: Soviet officials apparently are un-
der instructions to take a pessimistic view of the prospects
for the nuclear test ban talks, which resume on 21 March.
Chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin is reported to have told the
.Austrian ambassador in Moscow that Soviet reports from
Washington were "not hopeful," and that no new moves could
be expected from the Soviet side on. the main issues. In a sep-
arate conversation with Tsarapkin, the Canadian ambassador
received an impression of Soviet indifference to a treaty. On
the basis of talks with Soviet Embassy personnel in Paris, UK
25X1
officials reported to London that Moscow may plan to raise the
question of French adherence to an agreement. The American
00011 and British delegations feel this could be a tactical maneuver,
probably fn create pressure for early Western concessions.
The British delegation also feels however, that an earl So-
25X1 viet walkout is still
25X1
20 Mar. 61
DAILY BRIEF
U
6K
25X1 ~~~~~~~;
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 - - - - - --- ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~ 2003/04/17 CIA RDP79T0 97 5600170001 1 ?"t
A
2
5
Q
a0
e
e
pprov ase
~
,
25X1
25X1
Spain-Morocco: Madrid is taking a firm position in its
dispute with - Morocco over alleged frontier violations of the
Spanish Sahara, including the recent abduction of 11 oil pros-
pectors and is reinforcing its troops there. Following a talk
25X1
with General Franco, Spanish Army Minister Barroso told Am- O k
bassador Lodge, "We are going to have war with Morocco."
Madrid seems to be. convinced that the abduction of the men
resulted from an aggressive Moroccan policy which includes
inciting and organizing tribesmen for guerrilla fighting. Bar-
roso's reference to war, following Spanish complaints to Morocco
and the UN, is probably a tactical gesture to induce the US to
put pressure on Morocco. However, release of the men will
remove neither Madrid's suspicions of Moroccan intentions nor
S ain's determination to maintain its position in the Sahara.
(Map)
Mali-USSR: The signing in Moscow on 18 March of an eco-
nomic and technical cooperation agreement providing for a long
term Soviet credit of about $44,000,000 marks the first time Mali
20 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 ZZI
ppiT~ti For ase 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00 7515600170001-1 dA
F70mm
has received a specific aid commitment from the bloc. The
accord follows Peiping's agreement in principle earlier: this
month to provide long-term aid to Mali--specifics of which
are to be worked out when a Malian delegation visits Commu-
nist China later this year. Acceptance of the Soviet credit,
which reportedly is to be utilized to finance mineral prospect-
ing, construction of cement works, and navigational improve-
ments on.the Niger River, is in line with the avowed determi-
nation of Mali's. Marxist-minded leaders to offset and reduce
French influence in their country's economy. France this
year- is providing. about $12,000,000 in. economic and technical
aid.
25X1
25X1
IN
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 Approved Fo> elease.2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO09 005600170001-1
MALAYA
150
Gemena
Banana.' Matadi
Kitona
TUNISIA
3.200
MALAYA
210
INDONESIA
1,150
MOBUTU
7,200
Leopoldvi
ysville J
Q Kasavubu?Mobutu
Gizenga
Q Kalonji
Tshombr
GHANA
1600
Now arriving
Approximate area controlled by:
United Nations Forces
Selected road
-Selected railroad
Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
0 STATUTE MILES
Scattered For e
MOBUTU
3,400
400
J
MOROCCO
875
IRELAND
655
MALAYA
400
KALONJI
1,500
LIBERIA
230
ETHIOPIA
600 `
ETHIOPIA
1,800
GIZENGA
7,000
NIGERIA
500
Kongo to
NIGERIA
1,300
SWEDEN
650
TSHOMBE
4,000
20:Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
MOBUTU
800
Approved or Release - -
 Approved For
Situation in the Congo
Following recent conversations in Leopoldville with del-
egates who attended the conference of Congolese leaders held
between 8 and 12 Marc:l at Tananarive, Ambassador Timber-
lake concluded that the participants could be divided into three
broad groupings in terms of their attitudes toward the future
structure of the Congo. One group, of which Katanga's Tshombe
and South Kasai's Kalonji are the spokesmen, consists of "con-
federalists" who favor giving each constituent state a veto power
over the central authority--the concept written into the Tanana-
rive resolutions. A second group, represented by Congolese
President Kasavubu and other Bakongo tribal leaders, is made
up of "federalists" willing to concede somewhat more authority
to the central government.
A third group favors a still stronger central government
with greater allowance for local autonomy than in the highly
centralized system now legally in effect and still desired by
Lumumbass political heirs. Timberlake cited Premier-desig-
nate Ileo, Equateur Province's Bolikango, and the Lumumbist
President of Leopoldville Province, Kamitatu, as partisans of
this third school of thought. The ambassador indicated his be-
lief that while Tshombe's personality and financial resources
carried the day at Tananarive, the representatives of the other
views probably entered the "united front" with every intention
of trying to modify the Tananarive resolutions at subsequent
meetings.
At this stage, the problem of effecting a legal transition
to the confederal arrangement is looming as a difficult one which
could further jeopardize the new regime's chances of gaining
international acceptance, especially among the more militant
African states. Under the Congo's present law, such structural
changes must be referred to the Congolese parliament sitting
as a constituent assembly--a provision on which both the Gizenga
regime and its international supporters can.be expected to insist.
This procedure is apparently envisaged by at least the more na-
tionally minded Congolese leaders including Ileo[who, however,
told Timberlake on 17 March that conditions were still. not favor-
able .to. reconvening parliament
Tshombe, on the other hand, reportedly will have nothing to
do with the assembly elected last year, though he is apparently
20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600170001-1
 25X1
Approved For
willing to consider some type of referendum or election to sanc-
tify the new system. The Tananarive resolutions themselves
were cryptic on this transition problem, specifying only that the
present central government's "mission" would end upon constitu-
tion of the projected new "coordinating organism."
Meanwhile, the continuing arrival of the brigade of combat
troops which India has made available to the UN Command has
been marked so far by a complete lack of incidents such as were
predicted by the Tananarive conferees. when. they asked the UN
last week to cancel the Indian reinforcements. Nevertheless,
the UN is cautiously arranging for the Indian soldiers to be housed
in outlying areas of Leopoldville, where they will be removed as
much as possible from contacts with Congolese. According to
the acting chief of staff of the UN Command, there are no present
plans to deploy the troops beyond the Leopoldville area. Earlier
indications that at least some of the Indian troops might be as-
signed immediately to northern Katanga reportedly prompted
Tshombe to state that in such an eventuality, "there will certainly
be war"--meaning, presumably, clashes with his Belgian-led
forces] 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00MA005600170001-1
Lisbon/
POR'T'.(
Atlantic ,Mediterranean Sea.:
CANARY ISLANDS_,
(Sp.) rNI
o c ~0 TAftFAYA
MAURITANIA
Nouakchott
SENEGAL
31589 10320 3
GIBRALTAR
(U.K.) Ceuta(Sp.)
Melilla(Sp.) Rabat
MOROCCO
STATUTE MILES 500
, I
20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 Approved For lease 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975AO 5600170001-1 25X1
Spanish Reaction to Abduction of Oil Prospectors
In Spanish Sahara
Spanish troop strength in the area, estimated at between
8,000 and 10,000, includes reinforcements of paratroops flown
from Seville in six transport planes on 18 March, 1,000 Spanish
foreign legionnaires moved from Villa Cisneros on the Spanish
Sahara coast, and several hundred other troops dispatched from
the Canary Islands. These moves are the "necessary steps"
which Spain informed Rabat and UN Secretary General Hammar-
skjold on 17 March it had taken in order to be able to repel any
attack on Spanish territory by Moroccan armed contingents con-
centrated near the Morocco- Spanish Sahara frontier.
On 18 March the counselor of the French Embassy in Rabat
informed his American colleagues that according to a reliable
source, the three Americans and the one Frenchman missing
among the abducted men were at the Royal Moroccan Army's
camp in the capital. The official expected the men would be
"momentarily and magnanimously" released with suitable pub-
licity. Failure to include the five Spaniards in such a gesture
would sharpen the suspicion in Madrid that Morocco is prepar-
ing for military and political harassment of Spanish interests in
the area, and might put strong pressure on Franco to order
Spanish forces to retaliate.
In recent months Madrid has become increasingly worried
over the effect political and economic instability in Morocco may
have on Spain's African possessions. Although these territories
have little economic value, the Spanish military set great store
by the maintenance of Spain's "presence" in northwest Africa.
Madrid is particularly apprehensive that the security of the
whole area and of Spain as well will be seriously threatened
when France and the US complete the scheduled turnover of
their bases to the Moroccans.
Spain and France have continued to maintain close liaison
regarding Moroccan developments, with particular emphasis on
military aspects. Munoz Grandes, the chief of the Spanish High
General Staff, visited Paris early in February, reportedly to put
finishing touches to a new military accord between the two coun-
tries. 1 -1
25X1
20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600170001-1
 THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600170001-1
 igoo-
L/ '~005600170001-1 /~
TOP SECRET
~~ III III, III III ; 7.00IIIIIZO~.00
116 =6-4'
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP 0 -