CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600150001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 17, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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17 March 1961
IPM
State Dept. review completed
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17 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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4. Cambodia: Sihanouk charges mistreatment of Cam-
bodian minority in. South Vietnam. (Rage it)
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7. Portugal: Salazar may reshuffle cabinet next week.
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IN
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Cambodia - South Vietnam: Cambodian - South Vietnamese
relations have again become strained over the issue of alleged
ill treatment of the Cambodian minority in South Vietnam. In
a 14 March speech, Prince Sihanouk charged that South Vietna
was treating its. Cambodian minority as second-class citizens
and again raised Cambodian territorial claims against South
Vietnam.
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17 Mar, 61
DAILY BRIEF
1AV
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 Portugal: Prime Minister Salazar is consulting govern-
re- emodeling" the Portuguese cabinet next week
ment aders on "r
informed the US Embassy of this de-
velopment believes the p I remier is responding to pressures ex-
erted on him by the Portuguese military. Salazar is probably
also reacting to international criticism of Portugal's rule in
Africa. The anticipated changes suggest that the new cabinet
will be more ready than the present one to make some modifi- 25X1
cations in Portuguese policy. I I (Backup, Page 7)
UK and US. U. S. 1. B. NIE 87.1-61. 14 March 1961.
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE 25X1
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Situation and Prospects in the West Indies: Domestic Polit-
ical Scene, the Economy, and Foreign Policy Especially Toward
17 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF
M
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Morocco .May Resume Campaign for Territorial
Expansion Southward
King Hassan II may view the activities of Military irregu-
lars in the western Sahara as a means not only of implementing
policy but also of diverting attention within Morocco from his
inaction regarding constitutional reform.
Morocco's claims to Spanish-controlled Ifni, Spanish Sahara,
Mauritania, and the western portion of the French-governed Al-
gerian Sahara province of Ain Sefra, were asserted by Istiglal
party leader Allal el-Fassi immediately after independence was
obtained five years ago. The party apparently encouraged raids
on European establishments by marauding nomads, and in the fall
of 1957 tribesmen and Moroccan irregulars attacked the Spanish
garrisons in Ifni and in northern Spanish Sahara. Since then the
Moroccan Army has occupied the outlying areas of Ifni. Spain
transferred to Morocco in April 1958 a substantial strip of
northern Spanish Sahara, now known as the territory of Tar-
faya. Concerted Spanish and French military counteraction
quashed irregular activities farther south.
The captured oil prospectors were operating in a conces-
sion granted by Spain to the United Oil Company, an American
firm.
armed men had been nitrate from'. orocco in o
Mauritania by way of Spanish Sahara to create internal dis-
turbances there when the UN General Assembly reassembled.
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Cambodian Refugees From South Vietnam
The relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam have
deteriorated further since a Saigon daily, Saigon Mai, broke
a press truce between the two countries and launched a series
of inflammatory anti-Cambodian articles in early February.
Prince Sihanouk, who is always suspicious of Vietnamese
intent, is convinced that this attack was government inspired.
He appears to have seized upon the refugee problem as justi-
fication for a retaliatory move. This problem is primarily
the result of unsettled conditions in southern Vietnam and the
clashes between the government forces and Communist guer-
rillas.
Prince Sihanouk's speech, however, went further than
to denounce the Diem government's treatment of its Cambo-
dian minority and raked up the whole.issue of Cambodia's
claims to the former French colonial area of Cochin China,
South Vietnam's southernmost region. He castigated the
French colonial rule both for having consistently sacrificed
Cambodian territory to Vietnamese interests and for having
failed to protect minority rights when the territory was turned
over to the Vietnamese in 1954. His statement that the United
Nations, concerned with the welfare of tens of thousands of
Europeans in Africa, should be even more concerned with the
mistreatment of the several hundred thousand Cambodians in
Vietnam is the first public suggestion that he is seeking UN
intervention in the dispute with Diem.
The US Embassy in Phnom Penh suggests that Sihanouk
may have been attempting to forestall leftist elements from
making political capital of these areas of Cambodian discon-
tent. Regardless of his intent, however, this outburst from
the chief of state threatens to destroy the slow progress toward
rapport which had been under way over the past year.
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Salazar to "Remodel" Portuguese Cabinet
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o embassy officials that General
o e o Moniz, minister of defense, "comes out of the re-
shuffle stronger than ever." 1Moniz, who claims to have
the backing of 90 percent of the military, has been pressing
Salazar since the Santa Maria episode in January and the
February disturbances in Angola to make changes in Portu-
guese policies in Africa or risk the loss of military support
of the regime. Moniz has reportedly felt for some time that
the military might be forced "to take matters into their own
hands.
The events in January and February have also emboldened
the civilian opposition in Portugal. In early February, in an
unprecedented action, Salazar permitted the President to re
ceive three members of the opposition who presented a formal
request for political concessions. Salazar has also felt it was
necessary for the opposition to "let off some steam" in the con-
trolled press. Mounting international criticism of Portugal,
particularly as regards its African policies, and the realiza-
tion that Portuguese Africa has been selected as a target for
special attack by anti-colonialist countries in the UN may also
have led Salazar to believe he must at least make gestures in
the direction of change.
The most significant change slated appears to be a shift
in the Ministry of the Presidency. The holder of this position
.is generally regarded as the most likely successor to Salazar,
and the present incumbent, Theotonio Pereira, is an ultracon-
servative dedicated to continuing Portugal on the path chosen
by Salazar. The reported new appointee to this key post, Dr.
Marcello Caetano, is probably the most respected and popular
figure in Portuguese politics. As a former minister for the
overseas areas, he is familiar with the basic problems at
issue and is reported to have become more liberal in his
views in recent years. He and Moniz have political foes in
common and could be expected to work well together. Moniz
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may have also achieved a victory in getting his supporters into
the Overseas Ministry, and into the three military ministries.
Pereira is slated to take over the Foreign Ministry. The
present foreign minister, Marcello Mathias, ould return
to his previous post as ambassador in Paris.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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