CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 2, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 March 1961
CENTRAL,INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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2. India-Congo: Nehru warns Ehrushchev solution to Congo
problem impossible unless the issues of Hammarskjold's
status and the Congo are separateA-1. (Page t)
2
4. France: New nuclear test will coincide with resumed kN
US-UK-USSR test ban talks in Geneva. (Page ttt)
5, Communist China: Peiping revives 11100 flowers" con-
cept; calls for limited increase in scientific freedom of
expression. (Page ttt)
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Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga threatens to resign;
S
opposes President Velasco's increasingly favorable policy
A
toward Cuba. (Page tv)
8. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page tv)
NZERN,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
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India-Congo:[ehru's reply to Khrushchev's letter of 22
February on the UN and the Congo reaffirms the strong sup- C
port the UN which he has Previously expressed.j
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Subsequent discussion by the subcommittee indicated
that both Nehru and Defense Minister Menon are thinking in
terms of sending a brigade-size unit (about 3,000 men) of In-
dian soldiers to the Congo. A final decision, however, awaits
assurances from Hammarskjold that Belgian personnel are in
fact being withdrawnfrom the Congo. In addition, Nehru is
awaiting a reply from Nasir to a letter sent on.26 February in
which the Indian leader sought to persuade Nasir of the desir-
ability of reinforcing the UN. forces in the Congo. Furthermore,
Nehru is reported especially concerned about avoiding clashes
between Indian troops and any African troops which might be 25X1
sent unilaterally to support the Gizenga regime.
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are to be resumed in Geneva beginning 21 March. De Gaulle,
determined to obtain "full membership in the atomic club," 1 J
continues to maintain that France would not agree to a test ban
unless it were bound up with agreements on the destruction of
nuclear weapons stockpiles. Paris is apparently willing to face
the increasingly 'hostile reaction which is expected from African
and Middle Eastern states, including a censure move in the 25X1
United Nations. The announcement that later French tests will
be underground is unlikely to calm this hostile reaction.
France: [The fourth French nuclear weapons test in the
Sahara expected to be a tower shot in late March or April.
The test will coincide with US-UK-USSR test ban talks which
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"communist china: Peiping appears to ee a nee ora
limite liberalization of scientific thought and an increase in
freedom of expression among the country's intellectuals. An
Lila1 LAC 1111U1i1gb V1 bL:1CUL1mC bi1VUlU LJC WC1l:V111CU CVCIl 11 U1Cy
lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." The Chinese Communists
Red Flag, reviving the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom," states
.editorial published in the 28 February issue of the party journal,
have recently released and allowed to appear in public several
prominent intellectuals who were arrested in the aftermath of
the 1957 liberalization fiasco. Remembering the campaign
against those who had expressed themselves too freely before,
the intellectuals will be extremel wary about the new invitation
to "bloom and contend.' F_ I 25X1
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Ecuador Foreign Minister Chiriboga
25X1 ntends to resign at the cabinet meeting on 3
March, unless President Velasco agrees to change his in-
creasingly favorable policy toward Cuba. Chiriboga's resigna-
tion could provoke a cabinet crisis. The foreign minister's
stand is directly related to the return from Havana of the pro-
Cuban, pro-Soviet former minister of government, Manuel
Araujo, a key.. lieutenant of Velasco who publicly denounced
Chiriboga on 21. February as a "State Department servant."
Araujo reportedly plans to promote mass unrest and may have
gained a dominant influence over Velasco in regard to policies
r- I
toward both Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
A. No change from last week.
B. No change from last week.
C. No significant military activity has occurred in Laos dur-
ing the last week. There are no indications that the Com-
munist forces in the Plaine des Jarres intend to launch
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Ca counter-offensive in the immediate future, although
they have the capability to do so. There is an uncon-
firmed report that the Communists have a plan to
initiate operations at an, unspecified time in the south
of Laos. They have the capability to initiate such ac-
tion on a small diversionary basis using Pathet Lao
Kong Le resources. Large-scale action would require
outside resources such as Viet Minh; we consider this to
be unlikely at this time. Meanwhile, the Communist bloc
continues its buildup of Souvanna Phouma as the "legal"
prime minister and persists in its refusal to negotiate
except on its term
D. /None ofthe contending factions in the Congo seems able
at present to impose a military solution, although the
situation appears to favor whichever faction is willing
to take the initiative. Out of fear of each other and dis-
trust of the UN, the factions will go as far as they think
they can get away with in resisting any UN move to neu-
tralize their forces. Under the impetus of the Kasavubu-
Kalon3i-Tshombe agreement, the start of political. com-
promise is possible, but there is no evidence Gizenga is
willing to enter into political negotiations with the other
factions.
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Peiping Announces New "100 Flowers" Campaign
Where previously the slogan was "let politics take com-
mand," the 28 February issue of Red Flag says that science
and politics "are not the same thing" and that however help-
ful a correct world outlook may be, "Marxism-Leninism
cannot replace actual study in the various branches of science."
Scientific work, states Red Flag, must not merely repeat
"successes achieved by our predecessors;' but should strike
out in new fields. The withdrawal of Soviet technicians last
summer probably brought home to the Chinese the extent of
their dependence on the USSR for scientific and technological
information and their pressing need to expand their scientific
capabilities. If a modicum of freedom of expression will help
achieve this end, Peiping finds the risk worth taking. Red
Flag rationalized the acknowledgment that non-Marxists can
m e valuable contributions to research by stating that such
individuals "lean toward materialism" without knowing it.
Peiping admits that the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom"
may spill over from the academic into the political sphere but
somewhat defensively states that "Marxists-Leninists are not
afraid... because of that" In 1956-57 when Mao Tse-tung
originated "100 flowers," the criticisms voiced by the intel-
lectuals obviously shook the leaders. Mao was termed "hot-
tempered, imprudent, reckless, and desiring to be a benev-
olent god:' The anti-rightist campaign which followed saw the
arrest and imprisonment of many intellectuals and the creation
of a stultifying atmosphere in academic circles. Presumably
neither the intellectuals nor the re ime desires a repetition of
the 1957 excesses. F
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Violence May Break Out in Ecuador Over the Cuban Issue
Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum in early February
that he was greatly concerned over the Ecuadorean political
situation, and predicted. another postponement of the eleventh
Inter-American Conference now set for Quito on 24 May. He
noted President Velasco's desire for closer relations with
Cuba, his friendship for Araujo, and his refusal to take action
against Communist or Cuban activities in Ecuador.
The potential for violence over the Cuban issue was indi-
cated recently by Communist-backed student unrest in both
Quito and Guayaquil which caused demonstrations against
Chiriboga and the incumbent minister of government.' The
Castro regime has cultivated relations with Velasco, particu-
larly by expressing support for Ecuador in its long-standing
boundary dispute with Peru.
Chiriboga also stated to an American official on 28 Febru-
ary that a military coup was being planned in Guayaquil. Such
an attempt has been considered by a group of about 50 high-
ranking officers, under the leadership of the former army com-
mander, who were retired soon after Velasco was inaugurated
last September. As minister of government, Araujo accused
these officials of treason--a move which touched off a political
controversy and helped precipitate his resignation. Although
Velasco has a substantial following among the officer corps, he
might alienate it if he reappoints Araujo to a top government
position and follows a pro-Castro, pro-Soviet policy. Chiriboga
said he had information that at a cabinet meeting. last 'Saturday
Velasco agreed to repudiate Araujo and threaten him with jail
if he continued his activities; but Chiriboga also said he was
certain Velasco will not follow through on this.
Araujo recently spent about three weeks in Cuba, and he
has reportedly maintained close contact with the Cuban Embassy
in Quito. An advocate of close, relations with the bloc, he pos-
sibly contacted one or more bloc missions while in Havana.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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