CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500350001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 11, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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11 February 1961
Copy No.. C.
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DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
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2. Laos: Vientiane government to hold special cabinet
meeting with King Savang today; may propose neg.
tiations with Souvanna Phouma as tactical gesture.
(Page i)
3. France-Algeria: De Gaulle says preliminary talks
with Algerian rebels under way in Tunis. (Page it)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENC
CONTENTS
IME
11 February 1961
1. Communist China:. Peiping selling silver bullion to
help pay for recent grain purchases. (Page t)
5. Sudan: Opposition groups active against Abboud gov-
ernment. (Page tit)
6. Iran: Attempt to foment general strikes today ex-
pected to have only limited success. (Page tit)
7. British Cameroons: Disorders likely during self-
determination plebiscites on 11 and 12 February.
(Page it t)
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BULLETIN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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11 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
? Reports f from Hon Kan indi.
USSR Communist China: g g
cate the Chinese Communists are selling silver to increase
their foreign exchange holdings in order to pay for part of the
recent grain purchases from Australia. Two British vessels
recently departed China.for London with cargoes of bullion
silver reportedly worth more than $5,000,000. This amount
is less than ten percent of Peiping's commitment to Australia, O?
and goes only a small way toward meeting g its over-all current
foreign exchange obligations. These shipments may foreshad-
ow more substantial sales.
According to the US Embassy in Moscow, a Soviet repre-
sentative in Tirana recently asked the French Embassy if the
Chinese Communists had lived up to their contract covering
purchases of French wheat for delivery to Albania, and par-
ticularly whether Peiping had paid for the wheat on. time. Such
a request suggests that Moscow does not know how the Chinese plan to meet their current balance of payments crisis, and has 25X1
not advanced a hard currency loan for hinese emergency im-
ports from the free world.
Laos: The Boun um government is casting about for ways
d
.
of improving its political standing, both at home and abroa
cabinet meeting, presided over by Kin Savang, is to be
special g, p Y g
held in Vientiane today. General Phoumi has said the cabinet
will propose to the King that while intensifying military pressure
on the Plaine des Jarres area, the government at the same time
should announce its readiness to negotiate with its "enemies and
rivals--even Souvanna Phoumam' There is general agreement
in the cabinet however that negotiationswiththe Pathet Lao
,
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would be futile. Consideration will also be given at the cab-
inet session to broadening the base of the Boun Oum govern-
ment. Peiping on 10 February broadcast a People's Daily
editorial attacking "continued US intervention in Laos,' and
charging that its southern borders are threatened by Chinese
Nationalist irregulars in Laos. Peiping strongly reasserted
its opposition to a reactivated international Control Commis-
sion (ICC) unless the ICC is preceded by an international con-
ference.
I(Map)
the USSR also favors an international conference as
0 osed to Britain's Proposal to reactivate the ICC(
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r 26 Feb-
and De Gaulle will meet either the week end of ~(Backup,
ruaryPage 3
France-Algeria:
De Gaulle said that talks with the Algerian rebel National
Liberation Front (FLN) were under way in Tunis. He cau-
tioned, however, that such talks should not be considered of-
ficial contacts or negotiations. De Gaulle was not optimistic
concerning prospects for negotiations with the FLN, and said
he was "not in a conciliatory mood." He believes, however,
that Tunisian President Bourguiba can be a "useful interme-
diary." According to the Tunisian charge in Paris, Bourguiba
11 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
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u an: Opposition elements in the Khartoum area have
been active in the past few days, and the leaders of impor-
tant political and religious groups who have long been press
ing for a return to civilian government reportedly plan to
submit an "ultimatum" to the Abboud governments This list
of demands was prepared by Siddiq al-Mahdi, leader of the
large and influential Ansar religious sect. Mediation effort
are under way, but it appears unlikely that Abboud will make 25X1
any major concessions. The opposition group, if the regime
remains unresponsive, plans to stage a series of antigovern-
ment demonstrations and strikes. 25X'
Iran: FAn attempt by Iranian nationalists (antiregime non-
Communist elements) to foment a general strike in Tehran,
Isfahan, and possibly other cities today, is likely to meet
with only limited success but may serve to attract sympathy
from the general public. Demonstrations protesting the
rigging of the current parliamentary elections have been going
on s .radically for three weeks ~..
The opponents of the government are calling for a shut-
down of Tehran shops and the bazaar and are urging high
school and university students to join.the strike. The nation-
al railroad system and the textile mills of Isfahan may also
participate. The tobacco workers have indicated that they
are ready to strike, but the nationalists are reported to be 25X1
reluctant to accept this support because of the strong Tudeh
Comm ist influence among those workers.
i i am -r ns: isor ers may occur in. the r s h-
administered UN trust territory of Cameroons as a result o-13
DAILY BRIEF
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.separate self-determination plebiscites being held in the ter-
ritory's southern and northern sectors on 11 and 12 February.
Pursuant to resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly,
the alternatives posed in both areas are union with newly in-
dependent Nigeria or union with Cameroun, a French trust
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pect the northern sector to opt for Nigeria despite an inten-
sive last minute effort by the Cameroun government to win
support there. British officials anticipate that southern vot-
ers will favor Cameroun, probably by a small margin.=
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Neng Lgp?
Mang PaU
?~ M T tir\ Muong Sali '
CU ANG' 7
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Antigovernment
Antiuvenunent Pu nec'nl ratiins
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rl Main route number
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Trail
A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
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Situation in Laos
The Boum Oum government, since its formation in mid-
December,. has failed to generate enthusiasm in Laos or wide-
spread international support,
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lit is es-
sentially a regional government rather than a national one; it
.is overloaded with individuals from southern Laos, associated
with Boun Oum and. Phoumi in their Savannakhet Revolutionary
Committee. It is doubtful that Souvanna Phouma can be lured
into any broadened government- -mainly because of the animos-
ity between him and Phoumi. However, the inclusion of repre-
sentatives from the Vientiane area, from Luang Prabang, Nam
Tha, and Phong Saly provinces in the north, and from Xieng
Khouang Province in the east would make the government more
truly national, putting it on more competitive terms with the
Communist-supported shadow government in Meng Ehouang.
The government's ostensible bid to the Pathet Lao as well
as to Souvanna's followers is probably merely a gesture designed
to erase the impression, widely held abroad, of political inflex-
ibility and a single-minded preoccupation with a purely military
solution to the crisis in Laos.
he government advance along Route 7 toward the Plaine
des Jarres area has been slowed considerably by the systematic
delaying. tactics of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. The col-
umn has advanced only a few miles eastward. from the Junction
with Route 13 near Phou Khoun. 25X1
The enemy has also felled trees up to six feet in diameter, engi-
neered landslides and rockslides in steep defiles, and made
extensive use of landmines. In the Ban Ta Viang - Tha Thom
area of southern Xieng Khouang Province, little action has been
reported; however, there are reports that the Kong Le - Pathet
Lao forces are sending reinforcements of about battalion strength
to Ban Ta Viang
Stating that Communist China takes a "particularly serious"
view of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Laos, People's Daily
on 10 February observes that this development "cannot but
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arouse the serious concern of the Chinese people." While
Peiping seems intent on linking itself more directly with the hos-
tilities by citing the threat it faces from an old enemy, the
editorial contains no warning of action.
People's Daily, however, does reflect Peiping's uncom-
promising mood on Laos. Repeating the now-familiar charge
of US "intervention," the editorial also hits at Britain and
France for having "failed to take any effective action to stop
US aggression." These two countries are implicitly dammed
for favoring reactivation of the ICC before an international
conference is held on Laos.
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The Chinese insist a conference must come first. People's
Daily states that the ICC's terms of reference have "become
obsolete" because the ICC was originally set up to stop fight-
ing between the government of Laos and the Pathet Lao. Peo-
ple's Daily points out that since Souvanna Phouma's "lawful
government" is not fighting the Pathet Lao, a conference is
necessary to issue new instructions. This stand is a reversal
of that held by Peiping in late December, when Foreign Min-
ister Chen Yi urged that the ICC "promptly resume its activi-
ties and fulfill its sacred duties."
CIn recent talks with Western officials, Soviet spokesmen
have reiterated that it is absolutely essential to convene an in-
ternational conference on Laos.
Re-
fleeting Moscow's position on this matter, Polish officials
in Warsaw and Moscow, in conversations with Western am-
bassadors, have expressed their opposition to a reactivation
of the ICC without first convening an international conferences
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De Gaulle Acknowledges That Talks With Algerian. Rebels
Are Under Way
meeting between French and rebel representatives at
Melun last June failed even to resolve procedural problems
involved in preparing an Algerian settlement. De Gaulle ex-
pects FLN leaders to demand the release of FLN Deputy Pre-
mier Mohammed Ben Bella and other imprisoned rebel chiefs
as a precondition to negotiations
Epe Gaulle's invitation to Bourguiba to visit Paris was is-
sued about the date of the conversation concerning talks withthe
rebels. The Tunisian charge in Paris emphasizes: that the
meeting is intended to serve as a steppingstone to conversa-
tions between De Gaulle and rebel premier Ferhat Abbas)
e rebels will resent any intimation that Bourguiba's
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visit involves substantive negotiations on an Algerian settle-
ment. An official representative of the rebel provisional
government told a US Embassy official in Tunis on 9 February
that while the rebels have "full confidence in our Tunisian
friends" and Bourguiba has "every right to go to Paris,"
there can be no substitute for direct negotiations between
the rebel and French governments,.. The rebels may eval-
uate the results of Bourguiba's visit by whether it tends to
nrmmotn or bypass such direct negotiations-t
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Inte nal Pressures Against the Sudanese
lilitary Government
Antiregime plotting has been chronic .in the Sudan since
the 1958 revolution brought General Abboud to power. The
opposition group which is now renewing its demands had pre-
sented a, petition to the government last November calling on
the army to return. the government to civilian control. The
Supreme Military Council--the regime's top ruling body--was
split over what action to take against the signers; it finally
determined.to ignore the petition officially, and contented it-
self with mild harassment of some of the signers
(The opposition, which is by no means unified itself, has
not until now sought to bring about a showdown.. However,
leaders of the group have recently been touring the provinces
drumming up support, and they apparently feel that they now
have sufficient strength to force concessions from the govern-
ment
?he government's greatest strength is its ability to rely
on army support in the event of public disorders. Although
there is almost certainly plotting among junior officers, the
coalition group of civilian opposition leaders does not appear
to have. strong support within the army. In recent months
Major General Hasan Bashir Nasr, deputy commander of the
armed forces, has improved his control. over the army by en-
suring that loyal officers man the key posts. He has. indicated
in the past that he would resist any attempt to displace the mil-
itary regime
It is possible that Abboud will attempt to split the civilian
opposition by letting Siddiq al: Mahdi fill two or three minor
ministerial posts on condition that he withdraw from the anti-
regime coalition. As the head of the 1,500,000 members of
the Ansar sect, the Mahdi in a crisis situation could presum-
ably count on the backing of several thousand primitively armed
tribal warriors. Moreover, a substantial number of Ansar
sect army troops would follow his leadership
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Kaduna
NIGERIA
NORTHERN
CAMEROON
CAMEROUN
GABON
CONDO
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Plebiscite in British Cameroons
&ndon hopes that the vote this week end will lead to a
speedy and orderly termination of its responsibilities in an
area it has ruled under international supervision since the
first World War. Involved is a 34,000-square-mile terri-
tory with a population of some 1,600,000, which has long
been divided for administrative purposes into northern and
southern sectors" .I
Northern Cameroons was governed as an integral part
of Nigeria's Moslem-dominated Northern Region prior to
Nigerian independence last October, and all major political
parties active in the area favor a permanent return to that
status. Such a solution is also strongly desired by north-
ern Nigerian leaders as well as by Britain, which for some
time has been working quietly toward this end. Within the
past year a number of reforms have been introduced to re-
dress local grievances believed to have been largely re-
sponsible for the area's failure to agree in a November 1959
plebiscite to retain ties with an independent Nigeria. At that
time a majority of northern voters chose to postpone a de-
cision on the area's future. Should. the forthcoming vote
unexpectedly also go against Nigeria, a severe crisis, pos-
sibly involving Nigerian intervention to nullify the plebiscite,
could ensue:I
Lime outcome appears to be much more uncertain--and
the likely aftermath more unpromising--in. Southern Camer-
oons, , which enjoys considerable local self-government and
has been treated since 1954 as a potential fourth region of
Nigeria. The governing party--by a slim margin--favors
federation with Cameroun, but public opinion.is sharply
divided with major tribal groups opposing each other on the
issue. The fact that some of these tribes overlap the coloni-
al frontiers with Cameroun and Nigeria enhances the possi-
bility that, in the event disorders do develop, either or both
of those states may feel compelled to step in to protect re-
lated tribesmen. Actually neither government has been anx-
ious to acquire the southern territory, and Cameroun's con-
servative rulers are distinctly unhappy over the prospect o
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gaining more dynamic southern tribesmen while losing the
north. Of particular concern to Camerounian President
Ahidjo are radical elements in Southern Cameroons affili-
ated with the extremist wing of the Communist-influenced
Union of the Cameroons Populations in. Cameroun republic.
These extremists are continuing to carry on terrorist ac-
tivities in southwestern Cameroun against the republic's pro-
Western government
British officials in Nigeria have expressed confidence
that their battalion in the trust territory is capable of coping
with any disorders which might develop. An additional bat-
talion to the territory could be airlifted on short notice if
necessary from the strategic reserve in Britain or Kenya
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department.of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Director, The Joint Staff
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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