CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005400340001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 9, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 0
9 December 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR: The first private comments by top Soviet lead-
ers on t e Moscow declaration of Communist parties point
up the dilemma Moscow faces in seeking to preserve at
least the facade of bloc unity by making concessions to Chi-
nese Communist demands without jeopardizing the Soviet
goal of arranging new top-level negotiations with the West,
Mikoyan told Ambassador Thompson on 6 December that
the declaration's virulent attack on the US had been a con-
cession to the Chinese but emphasized this does not change
the USSR's desire to improve relations with the US. In ad-
dition, presidium member Kosygin took refuge in the fa-
miliar pretense that this was a Communist party statement
not binding on the Soviet Government and indicated that it
would not affect Soviet policy toward the West. Kosygin
also reaffirmed Moscow's desire to reach agreements and
to establish good relations with the US. Ambassador Thomp,~
son reports that other Soviet officials have given the appear-
ance of being both embarrassed and concerned by the anti-
American tone of the declarationo
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
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Turkey: ITurkey's interim President, General Gursel,
is more seriously ill than reflected in official releases, and
his absence for any. extended period could have an unsettling
effect in Turkey.
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The regime is making a special effort to min-
mize domestic apprehension. During Gursel's absence,
Deputy Premier Fahri Ozdilek, former chief of the Army
General Staff, is the acting chief of state, closely sup-
ported by General Madanoglu, apparently the dominant
member of the Committee of National Union
Como: Tension between UN officials and the Mobutu
regime may increase following Hammarskjold's criticism
of the Congo leader at the Security Council session on 7
December, when he stated that technical and financial aid
outside the UN framework were responsible for the rehabil-
itation of the Congolese Army and Mobutu's strengthened
positionIn the Congo, the UN Command has reacted strongly
against Mobutu's order to control the transport of UN mil-
itary supplies which came soon after announcement of the
impending withdrawal of Ceylonese, UAR, and Yugoslav
forces. The Yugoslav action will deprive the UN Command
of some of its necessary aviation maintenance men; the UAR
withdrawal will strip the hard-pressed UN forces of 500
troops.
Colonel Mobutu has taken measures to attempt to seal
off the Lumumba partisans in Orientale Province, and Pres-
ident Kasavubu has proclaimed a state of emergency in that
province, probably in preparation for militar intervention.
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Chile-USSR: The conservative Alessandri government
has expressed concern to the US Embassy in Santiago over
Soviet trade overtures, particularly offers to supply petro-
leum at well below world prices and to purchase substantial
quantities of copper. The offers, presumably made by Soviet
representatives now in Chile, are presented as straight com-
mercial transactions and not barter. Leftist politicians are
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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding two weeks)
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probably fully aware of the Soviet trade offers and can be
expected to press for increasing Chilean-Soviet trade, now
less than one percent of the value of Chile's total trade.
Chile has no diplomatic relations with the bloc.
Communist China: Current situation in industry and agri-
culture; stability and morale of the party; social conditions;
military strength and potential nuclear capabilities; foreign
relations with USSR, Africa, Asia, and attitude toward the US.
Tables. NIE 13-60, 1 December 1960 ^
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Outlook for Greece: Political prospects of Karamanlis gov-
ernment; strength of Communist- controlled United Democratic
Left; economic situation; foreign relations, particularly with
US
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; an
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armed forces. NIE 32-60. 1 Dec 1960F]
Main trends in Soviet capabilities and policies, 1960-1965.
NIE 11-4-60. 1 Dec 1960, 0026555. I-I
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Situation and short-term outlook in Laos. Strength, weak-
nesses, and intentions of the Souvanna government, Phoumi
and the Revolutionary Committee, the King, Kong Le, and the
Pathet Lao; repercussions in Southeast Asia. SNIE 6860.
6 Dec 1960.
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LATE ITEM
*Laos: Captain Kong L with elements of his Second Para-
troop a-
tt.1ion and some armed support, has, apparently re-
gained control of Vientiane itself. Kong Le is reported to have
arrested Col. Kouprasith
whose early morning coup on 8 Decem-
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ber set in motion the struggle for control of the capital Koupra-
sith's forces remain in control of Camp Chinaimo, a few miles
south of Vientiane; they apparently have been. joined by a company
of paratroopers loyal to Phourni which was dropped on 8 December
some. hours after the Kouprasith coup. Phoumi is said to be
moving additional troops by air and overland to reinforce the
elements at Chinaimo. When these reinforcements arrive, a
showdown struggle between the opposing forces is probable,
with Pathet Lao forces possibly-interceding=o',=Kong Le's behalf.
Some twenty National Assembly. deputies left Vientiane and
went to Camp Chinaimo just before the. Kouprasith coup, and are
thus available for an assembly vote of no confidence against Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma. There is a possibility, however, that
Souvanna may seek to cmgnte h` ct ar y!
new diversionary initiMivp of his own, such as a UN appeal
based on changes of "foreign interference.
(Page 9)
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Soviet Leaders Comment on Moscow Declaration
The first private comments by top Soviet leaders on
the Moscow declaration of Communist parties point up the
problem Moscow faces in seeking to preserve at least the
facade of bloc unity by making concessions to Chinese
Communist demands without jeopardizing the Soviet goal
of arranging new top-level negotiations with the West.
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan told Ambassador Thomp-
son on 6 December that the declaration's virulent attack
on the US had been a concession to the Chinese but empha-
sized that this would not change the USSR's desire to im-
prove relations with the US. He observed to the Swiss
ambassador that the USSR had a "tough negotiating part-
ner:'!
The concern of Soviet leaders not to allow the militant
line of the declaration to nullify recent gestures toward the
US was also evident in First Deputy Premier Kosygin's re-
sort to the familiar pretense that this was. a Communist
party statement not binding on the Soviet Government and
that it would not affect Soviet policy toward the West. He
stated that Moscow was not only prepared but anxious to
reach agreements and establish good relations with the US.)
As the formal meetings were ending and the documents
already completed, Khrushchev made a point of reassuring
Ambassador Thompson of his desire to improve relations
with the US and quietly explore the question of Germany and
Berlin. At the same time, the Soviet UN delegation embarked
on a series of maneuvers to clear the way for establishing
top-level contacts with the new US administration at a spe-
cial session of the General Assembly on disarmament next
spring. In addition, Moscow and most of the satellites went
to some lengths to indicate, by propaganda comments and
friendly gestures, that the declaration's harsh attack on Yugo-
slav revisionism did not signify a shift in the Soviet policy 7
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'LQf maintaining correct governmental relations with el-
grade, despite the ideological dispute
the main result of the meeting for Soviet policy appears
to be a compromise which grants Khrushchev a period of
grace and a relatively free hand to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of his policy in another round of negotiations.
East German party
officials were informed that the Moscow conference did not
result in any change in Khrushchev's intention to resolve
the Berlin question through an early summit meeting. Khru-
shchev reportedly prevailed in the argument with the Chi-
nese over the advisability of summit diplomacy'
Although the declaration's formulations for the most
part are Soviet in tone and reaffirm Soviet primacy in the
bloc, the concessions to Chinese viewpoints could reduce
Khrushchev's over-all freedom of action. The general tone
of attacks on the West, the US in particular, and the advo-
cacy of more aggressive tactics in the underdeveloped areas
appear to commit the USSR to maintain its recent assertive
stand on such issues as Cuba, the Congo, Algeria, and "anti-
colonialism" in general. In particular, the Chinese appear
to have been successful in extracting a more extensive com-
mitment for further bloc consultations and in precluding a
return to the atmosphere which Khrushchev sought to create
following his visit to the US in 1959, typified by "Camp David
spirit" pronouncements.
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Interim President of Turkey Critically Ill
General Gursel's absence from the government for
an extended period could have an unsettling effect in Tur-
key and delay restoration of a civilian regime unless ac-
tive leadership is passed to another member of the Com-
mittee of National Union
urse , who as success u y
projected a "father image" to many Turks, had emerged as
a prime contender for the presidency of the "second repub-
lic"=-to be established after the ratification of a new consti-
tution and following national elections which have been
promised prior to November 1961.
. Deputy Premier Fahri Ozdilek, former chief of the Army
General Staff, apparently is unofficially the acting chief of
state, with General Madanoglu, apparently the dominating
figure on the Committee of National Union, in close support.
Ozdilek was commanding general of the First Army and mar-
tial law commander in Istanbul at the time of the 27 May coup.
He is credited with having prevented major disturbances and
loss of life in Istanbul during the uneasy pre-coup period.
Ozdilek reportedly knew of the intended coup but was not
a participant, although he is credited with expeditiously de-
livering Turkey's largest city to the insurgents. In early June
he was named minister of defense and on 22 October became
deputy premier and minister of state, F_ I
is age an army experience
probably make him Gursel's closest associate in the CNU. }
- Official news releases regarding Gursel's illness have
been designed primarily to minimize popular apprehension
regarding his health. Plans for the early convocation of a
representative constituent assembly will be postponed pend-
ing Gursel's full recovery or abdication
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Chilean Concern Over Soviet Trade Overtures
The conservative Chilean Government has told the
US Embassy in Santiago of recent Soviet trade overtures,
presumably made by two Soviet representatives now in
Chile, to supply petroleum well below world prices and
purchase substantial quantities of copper ingots.and semi-
finished copper products. The offer is presented as a
straight commercial transaction, not barter,
Chilean leftist politicians are believed to be fully
aware of the Soviet offers and are expected to publicize
them soon in an effort to press for increasing Chilean-
Soviet trade, now less than one percent of Chile's total
trade. There are already growing leftist demands to es-
tablish commercial and diplomatic relations with the bloc.
Oil, a state monopoly, is a relatively new industry in
Chile, and the country's two refineries produce about 60
percent of its needs. Venezuela has been Chile's only source
of crude oil.
The Chilean Government is not in principle opposed to
trade with the bloc, and it has been liberal in granting visas
to bloc cultural and trade representatives. Previous Sino-
Soviet bloc offers to purchase substantial quantities of copper
have not been accepted, however, largely because about 90
percent of Chile's copper production comes from US-owned
mining companies and because of the bloc's preference for
barter arrangements.
Chile has no diplomatic relations with the bloc j
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 The Situation in Laos
Captain Kong Le, with elements from the Second Paratroop
Battalion and some armored support, apparently regained con-
trol of the town of Vientiane in the evening of 8 December. Some
hours after Col. Kouprasith's early morning coup, Kong Le FJ
led Vientiane in the company of a
ranking Pathet Lao military leader, which may suggest that
Pathet Lao elements were in his force when he retook the town
that evening. Kong Le placed Kouprasith
under arrest; however, the units which supported Kouprasith in
his coup apparently remain at Camp Chinaimo, a Lao army base
a few miles south of Vientiane.
A company of paratroopers taken from the pro-Phoumi
Luang Prabang garrison was dropped near Chinaimo in mid-
afternoon on 8 December; they have presumably joined forces
with the units at Chinaimo. With Kouprasith's =arrest, leader-
ship of these units may have passed to officers more reliably
loyal to General Phoumi and his Savannakhet group. Phoumi
reportedly plans to drop another company of paratroopers and
to bring a battalion of infantry overland from Pak Sane, which was
captured on.%8 December by Phoumi elements advancing from
Pak Ca Dinh. When these units arrive, a showdown struggle
between the opposing forces is probable, with the Pathet Lao
possibly interceding on Kong Le's behalf.
Just prior to the Kouprasith coup, some twenty deputies
from the National Assembly gathered at Camp Chinaimo, from
where it would be an easy matter for them to`.slip across the
river into Thailand. Combined with an approximately equal
number already out of Vientiane, more than enough deputies
necessary for an assembly qubrm would now appear to be
available for a session either in Luang Prabang or Savannakhet
for the purpose of registering a no-confidence vote against
Souvanna Phouma.
Throughout the confusion of 8 December, Souvanna
showed no sign of being ready to resign, and with characteristic
adeptness chose to consider both the Kouprasith coup and the
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Kong Le countercoup as affirmations of support for his govern-
ment. He almost certainly is concerned over the fact that the
presence of the deputies at Chinaimo poses a threat of an ,
imminent assembly no-confidence vote against him, however, and
this could.: lead him to attempt some new initiative in return.
Soviet Ambassador Abramov is reported to have intimated to
the French counselor on 7 December that "someone" would
be making an appeal in the near future to the UN Security
Council.
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