CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005400160001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 18, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2/2 T009A005400160001 4 low
25X1
18 November 1960
25X1 /
Copy No. C /
OF,
/
Oxvoo TELLIGE.,-
CE
0"
DOCUMENT NO.
NO D%,'43dGE IN CLASS,
DE LAS46LIEL
CLAS . T,wI_:dtacaF TO: TS S O
L!LXT F-' LW': DATL: p010
AUTM: HI I+1.2 /
DAAP JUN 1980 REVIEWER: 0 25X1 /
?sr4Tes of -~ /
25X1
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
/ Approved For ReleasdFOp/2S'EI~R 'rOO975A005400160001 4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
 A A F I 540016 0001 4
~: N
LEGNCE
'. pproCENAL IN L
18 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400160001-f
 Approved Fo Iea a 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T0097 05400160001-4 25X1
j
M
25X1
Africa, reportedly discussed ways. of accepting Chinese Com-
jj
rr~
Algeria: the Algerian rebel government, fearing West-
ern reactions to the presence of Chinese personnel in North
of Algerians trained in China have reportedly arrived to
train these units in the use of Chinese arms. The rebels
may also be planning to raise an African volunteer regiment
tions. They have formed new units in Tunisia, and a group
munist material help without any accompanying technicians
or advisers during its 4-10 November meeting in Tunis. The
rebels reportedly are preparing to step up military opera-
25X1 in Guinea.
Laos: Radio Vientiane announced on 17 November that
agreement had been reached between the government and the
Pathet Lao on the dispatch of a, government good-will mis=
sion to Hanoi.and Peiping, the establishment of postal rela-
tions with Hanoi, and the establishment of "friendly relations"
with Peiping. Fulfillment of this agreement would carry Laos
further along the road to closer ties with. the Sino-Soviet bloc
than Premier Souvanna Phouma had previously indicated he
was prepared to go. It may reflect his lessening ability to
resist pressures from the extreme left in the face of the ero-
sion of his support from the right, as most recently evidenced
by General Ouane's apparent defection to General Phoumi's
Savannakhet group. There is some possibility, however, that
Souvanna himself proposed these steps as a means of eliciting
stronger bloc diplomatic and propaganda support in. his strug-
gle to remain in office. F7 I
Burma: (Conflict among Burma's top military leadershi
25X1 over tie arm. 's political role appears to be deepening. II
Chief of Staff General Ne Win, who
persua e the army to accept the return of civilian government
25X1
last February, continues to insist that the army avoid any ac-
ion offensive to civilian political leaders or to Communist
China. His close adviser, Brigadier Maung Maung, is pro-
testing that this is creating an "impossible situation" and that
18 Nov 60
DAILY' BRIEF ii
25X1
25X1
j Approved For Rel ase 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T0097 A005400160001-4 25X1 j
 ''~ A roved F Ie se 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T0097 005400160001-4 25X1
25X1
e will resign unless a more "realistic stand" is taken,
Brigadier Aung Gyi, third-ranking member of the army
leadership, thus far has taken no position. Growing
pressure from the officer corps may ultimately force
Ne Win to renew intervention in governmental affairs
ence voters more than foreign policy.
alities and domestic economic issues will probably influ-
25X1
Japan. Leading independent political commentators
in Japan are predicting that in the 20 November election,
Prime Minister Ikeda's conservative Liberal-Democratic
party may slightly increase its strong majority in the
lower, more powerful chamber of parliament. Japanese
observers warn against interpreting a conservative vic-
tory as a strong popular mandate for the US-Japanese
security treaty, however, even though the question of neu-
tralism has become a .major issue of campaign debate
among national party leaders. Local issues and person-
III. THE WEST
25X1
West German : All-German Affairs Minister Ernst
Lemmer has to merican officials in Berlin that Eco-
nomics Ministry Under Secretary Westrick was scheduled
to meet secretly with East German representatives on 17
November to initiate new interzonal trade negotiations. Al-
though Bonn may claim that Westrick is merely an alternate
for Kurt Leopold, Bonn's low-level representative of. the
semiofficial so-called "trustee office" established in West
Berlin to handle trade with East Germany, such a meeting
would be a high-level government contact with the East
Germans, who could exploit it in their drive for recogni-
tion. By this shift in policy, Adenauer may hope to obtain
East German guarantees of civilian access to Berlin.
18 Nov 60 DAILY' BRIEF
iii
125X1
25X1
I E2
%~ Approved For Rel ase 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T009 5A005400160001-4 25X1
%ii
 M
25X1
Approved Fo(ije4e 2C 3/02/27 CIA-RDP79TOO975A305400160001-4
/10
N
25X1
25X1
1v
M IFES
.4
/m
Argentina: CArmy Commander in Chief General Carlos
Toranzo Montero, key. figure in the mid-October crisis
prompted by army complaints over President Frondizils
advisers and policies, intends to renew pressure soon for
specific action on these complaints. Toranzo Montero may
attempt a coup if, as he expects, Frondizi refuses such kz-
demands as the removal of Economy Minister Alsogaray
and imposition of federal control over several provinces.
While most of the military agree to pressure on Frondizi,
they oppose any coup attempt and will try to dissuade the
hot-headed Toranzo Montero from setting back constitutional
governmentj 25X1
Honduras: The government of Honduras is alert for pos-
s "ble oTtF)re s inspired by recent revolutionary activities
e
in other Central American countries and by Communists and
dur
ndF
a
s
s-
Castro supporters who plan. to intensify their agitation dur-
v
I
f
n
I
.M
r
s
'I 1mme
ing a "Pro-Cuba week" to begin on 20 November. An imme
diate cause for the government's concern is the decision of
the International Court of Justice on the bitter Honduran-Nic-
t
p
araguan border dispute, to be announced on 18 November,
s
which will have especially strong political repercussions in
0
i
t
0
whichever country considers it has lost the dispute.
I I
18 N 60
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
 ProvisionTFA-lgerian Government Discusses
Communist Aid
he Algerian provisional government, during its 4-
10 November plenary session in Tunis, reportedly dis-
cussed ways of accepting Chinese Communist materiel
without the technicians or advisers that usually accom-
pany it. the rebel government be=
lieves acceptance of Chinese Communist materiel might
have a desirable psychological effect on the West, but
that the presence of Communist personnel could have.
a counterproductive reaction.
Press reports that rebel units are already employing
Chinese mortars in attacks on the electrified barriers
along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders are unconfirmed.
no sign of Chinese Communist elements among rebel forces
along the Moroccan frontier:
The rebels are probably preparing to step up military
operations. The winter months provide favorable weather
for guerrilla activity, and the rebels may wish to demon-
strate their strength prior to the UN debate on Algeria. C
the rebels plan to open a
military ron in the Sahara- a order area to coincide
with the debate.
New units for the rebel army have been formed in
Tunisia, where there are already 10 000 rebel.troops, and
F a group of about 40
Algerians trained in China has arrive to train these units
in the use of Chinese weapons. The rebels may also be plan-
ning to form and train a volunteer regiment in Guinea.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
18 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
25X1
 Approved Fa elease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A 5400160001-4
The 31tuation . in. Laos
Radio Vienna e announce
d on 17 November that the
royal government. and the Communist-dominated Pathet
Lao had agreed on the following points: the dispatch of
a government good-will mission to North Vietnam and
Communist China; the commencement of postal service
between Laos and North Vietnam; and the establishment
of "friendly relations" with Communist China. Fulfill-
ment of the agreement would carry Laos. further along
the road to closer. ties with the bloc than Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma.had previously indicated. he was prepared
to go, suggesting he now may feel himself unable, due to
erosion of his support from the right, to resist the de-
mands of the. Pathet Lao and other extreme leftist ele-
ments.
25X1
25X1
There is also a possibility that Souvanna himself
took the initiative in bringing about the agreement as a
means of eliciting stronger Sino-Soviet bloc diplomatic
and. propaganda support in his struggle, against increas-
ingly difficult odds, to retain office. The swing-over Of
northern Laos to General Phoumi's. Savannakhet Revolu-
tionary Committe was a severe blow to Souvanna's posi-
tion, which has been compounded by the defection to
Phoumi of Souvanna's erstwhile armed forces commander,
General Duane. These developments have left Souvanna
in a bitter mood, as evidenced by his threats to take
military action to recoup his losses and by his public at-
tack on the United States for "illegally" supporting Phoumi.,
Whether or not Souvanna retains any real power of
initiative in Vientiane, the odds appear increasingly in
favor of an attack on the Phourni forces southeast of Pak
Sane by Captain Kong Le's paratroopers, in conjunction
with Pathet Lao elements. Couvanna during the past
few weeks has only with difficulty restrained these forces 4
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
10 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
25X1
 Approved For elease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0 400160001-4 25X1
/rom resuming their offensive; he may now be either in
no position or no mood to resist further demands for
military action against Phourni. Although Phoumi has
strengthened and reorganized his forces since their hu-
miliating defeat at the hands of the paratroopers in late
September, it .is believed that they remain vulnerable to
another debacle;
The military situation. in Vientiane itself remains
obscure. It is reported to be. only lightly garrisoned by
regular Laotian Army elements which are divided by con-
flicts of loyalty to Souvanna, Kong Le, or Phoumi. The
capital would thus appear open to occupation. by the Pathet
Lao, strong elements of which are reputed to be close to
the town and in a position to advance from several direc-
tions.
Souvanna s continuation in office is the onl deterrent to
Pathet Lao occupation of the capital.
Approved For - 005400160001-4
18 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For elease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0054 0160001-4 25X1
Burma's Commander in Chief and Subordinates Disagree
On Army's Political Role
I~EMgadier Maung Maung, military training director
and close adviser to General Ne Win, is said to be firmly
opposed to Ne Win's current policy of nonintervention in
Burmese politics.
Maung Maung considers that the army's
inaction is in effect installing Communist China as Burma's
"new master." He has threatened to resign from the army
unless Ne Win allows more forceful intervention with the
government.
,General Ne Win is reluctant to intervene, as he fears
the corrupting influence of political power on the officer
corps. He overrode army objections to permit the Febru-
ary national elections and U Nu's return as prime minister.
Although he is reportedly seriously concerned with the de-
terioration of government administration since he left of-
fice, he has permitted Nu free rein in all areas not directly
affecting the army. The flare-up with Maung Maung report=
edly occurred at a 10 November meeting at which Ne Win
insisted that the army should avoid any action which might
be offensive to the Chinese Communists or to Burma's civil-
ian political leaders. Brigadier Aung Gyi, the third member
of the army top command, although present at the discussion,
is not reported to have taken any position:
Burma's officer corps has been generally restive under
the.Nu administration and, although no one threatens Ne Win's
leadership, criticism of his policies appears to be rising.
Growing pressures from such figures as Maung Maung may
force the general to renew intervention in government affairs."
Approved Fo
j Rei-n-s-! 2eesfev2:7 . e1A-RBP:?99FeE)
25X1
18 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
 Approved For (ease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05 00160001-4 25X1
Japanese Election
Leading independent Japanese political commentators
are predicting that in the election on 20 November, Prime
Minister Hayato Ikeda's conservative Liberal-Democratic
party (LDP) will increase slightly the majority it now holds
in the lower, more powerful house of the parliament. The
LDP, which hopes to win 300 of the 467 seats, now holds
283, and 14 of 19 vacant seats were last occupied by that
party. There has been a.steady decline in conservative rep-
resentation since 4952,',
A conservative gain would enhance Ikeda's prestige and
strengthen his hand in maintaining Japan's alignment with
the West by discouraging dissident LDP faction leaders
from attacking the prime minister and his program. How-
ever, major faction leaders are attempting in the election
to increase their Diet followings to prepare for the even-
tual struggle to succeed. Ikeda as party president and prime
minister. There appears to be no serious threat to Ikeda's
position in the immediate postelection period, but the rela-
tive strength of the factions will influence his cabinet ap-
pointments and the length of his tenure.
Although the question of neutralism became a major
subject of campaign debate after the assassination of So-
cialist leader Inejiro Asanuma in mid-October, Japanese
observers warn that a conservative victory should not be
interpreted as a popular mandate for continuing the US-
Japanese security treaty. Ikeda has defended the treaty
and rejected the Socialists' program of "positive neutral-
ism," but local issues and personalities, plus Ikeda's
program for tax reduction, increased welfare benefits,
and continued prosperity, are expected to influence voters
more than foreign policy.
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
18 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
 Approved F elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005400160001-4
Possible Major Shift in Bonn's East German Policy
All-German Affairs Minister Ernst Lemmer has told
American officials in Berlin that Economics Ministry Under
Secretary Westrick was scheduled to meet secretly with
East German representatives on 17 November to initiate new
interzonal trade negotiations. Although Bonn may claim that
Westrick is merely an alternate for Kurt Leopold, Bonn's'
low-level representative of the semiofficial so-called "trus-
tee office," established in West Berlin. to handle trade with
the East Germans, such, a meeting would be a high-level
government contact with the East Germans, who could ex-
ploit it in their drive for recognition.
Bonn has always taken the view that high-level govern-
mental talks with the East Germans would constitute de
facto recognition of the regime, and it has been careful to
limit all contacts to those between economic and transport
technicians. Adenauer now may hope, in view of recent
improved relations with the USSR, to obtain by this shift in
policy some kind of Soviet - East German guarantee on ac-
cess to West Berlin.
In a press interview on 12 November, Adenauer stated
that Bonn will be flexible. in new negotiations with the East
Germans. He expressed his conviction that a new agree-
ment will be reached and added that if negotiations are con-
ducted intelligently, Bonn might achieve some advantage
for Berlin access. F7 I
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
18 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
 25X1
Argentine Army Chief Planning Coup,
Approved r - 0160001-4
cArgentine Army Commander in Chief General Carlos Toranzo
Montero, key figure in the mid-October crisis prompted by army
complaints over President Frondizi?s advisers and policies, intends
to renew pressure soon for specific action on these complaints.
Toranzo Montero may attempt a coup, if, as he expects, Frondizi
rejects such demands as the removal of Economy Minister Alsogaray
and the imposition of federal control over several provinces. Al-
sogaray told US Ambassador Rubottom a week ago, that the general's
attitude "was becoming intolerable and a showdown was expected.
within two weeks, barring any blunder that might cause it sooner."
The embassy has later information indicating that the army will re-
new its demands after the departure on 20 November of 27 US gov-
ernors now visiting Argentina.",
Toranzo Montero's prestige has dropped sharply since the Octo-
25X1
25X6
25X6
25X1
25X1
ber crisis because the majority of the army wanted merely to pres-
sure Frondizi, not upset constitutional government as was threatened
by Toranzo Montero's actions. E: I
he no longer has e abWty or support to survive the
difficulties which would be certain tofbllow a coup. While three im-
portant army commanders and the commander of the ocean fleet are
reportedly behind Toranzo Montero, less than 30 percent of the
army supports him fully. The US naval attache reported on 7 No-
vember that a group of admirals has decided that the navy would def-
initely resist any army coup "with all means available," and that
they felt the army would have little spirit to continue a coup when
faced by the navy. '.Toranzo Montero, who considers himself "des-
tined to save the nation," apparently does not anticipate such a navy
reaction and counts on reluctance within the army to oppose his plans
with force'
LUnrest in the army is widespread.
Even officers who oppose a coup be-
ieve this situation exists and that only army pressure will force
Frondizi to change it. These officers will probably try to dissuade
Toranzo Montero from upsetting constitutional government' ]
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T009T5A005400160001-4
18 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
25X1
25X1
25X6
25X1
 25X1
Approved F001
Situation in Honduras
The political situation in Honduras is unsettled, re-
flecting recent revolutionary activity in neighboring
Central American countries,nd President Villeda
Morales is alerted for outbreaks The Honduran armed
forces are often at odds with the President over his tol-
eration of leftists and exile activities in Honduras. The
government believes some army officers are conspiring
against it but does not expect a major revolt.
The situation is aggravated by the agitation of Com-
munists and Castro supporters in Honduras who for more
than a year have been assiduously cultivated by the Cuban
Embassy. These elements now are preparing to intensify
their activities during a "pro=C:uba week" to .begin on 20
November. Honduran security forces are prepared to pre-
vent violence, but public sympathy for the Cuban revolution
is substantial, and Villeda probably fears the reaction which
any repression of the demonstrations could generate. The
Honduran foreign minister admitted to a US Embassy officer
on 13 November that pro-Castro groups are showing increased
activity and effectiveness in Honduras.
An immediate cause for the government's concern is the
decision of the International Court of Justice on the emotion-
laden dispute betwen. Honduras and Nicaragua over a sparsely
settled, largely undeveloped area on their border. The deci-
sion is expected to be issued on. 18 November. Neither coun-
try is politically mature enough to accept an adverse judg-
ment, and the government would be held responsible for a de-
feat.
the Nicaraguan Government believes the decision will favor
Honduras and will result in a move into the disputed area by
Hondurans, which Nicaragua will be under popular pressure
to resist with force.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
18 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10
 Approved Fo elease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975 005400160001-4
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International. Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : - 05400160001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400160001-4