CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005300360001-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
19
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 8, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 12, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005300360001-3.pdf1.22 MB
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ziziziZfiZ-40, ;. rQrO LI ppJUN 0 25X1 25X1 A roved For Release' 27 R 00975A005300360001-3 pp 0p g Approved For Release O /2S EICR T00975A005300360001-3 25X1 25X1 No. C f / 12 October 1960 Copy TELLI EANCF DIA and DOS review(s) completed. '11,0 - -916 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300360001-3 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300360001-3 Approved Fur Release 2003f02f2? . - 005300360001-3 9WW I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev cancels visit to North Korea. ? II. ASIA-AFRICA Laos--Little accomplished at initial talks between Souvanna and Patnet Lao; a Soviet delegation due to arrive in Vien- tiane on 13 October. Israel, with UN approval, has begun dredging Jordan River channel despite strong UAR objections. Congo--UN refuses to allow arrest of Lumumba. 4 Rhodesia and Nyasaland- -Tension likely to increase in wake of Monckton commis - sion report. Ruanda-Urundi--B elgian policies in period prior to independence provoking tribal chiefs and leading to unrest. Niger, newly independent state within French Community, determined to act independently of France. ?Peruvian President ready to break diplo- matic relations with Cuba, ?Britain- -Macmillan does not believe that a serious Soviet attack on Western position in Berlin underlies current harassment, which he sees as "isolated actions" Argentina--Frondizi may be forced by military pressure to take firmer anti- Communist, anti-Peronista line. Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300360001-3 25X1 onroved Foc elease 2003/02/27 ? CID-R~P79T00975G 5300360001-3 25X1 elease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975A 5300360001-3 25X1 Approved Fo CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 12 October 1960 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC 25X1 visit. Meetings between top Soviet and Chinese leaders in Pei- ping, reported to have taken place in mid=September, may have revealed the impossibility of arranging such a meeting. The need for high-level party review of Soviet policy in the wake of Khrushchev's UN venture and for his participation in preparation for the November. conference of Communist par- 25X1 ties probably also influe d Khrushchev's decision to remnin in Moscow. *USSR North Korea; The postponement of Khrushchev's visit to North Korea, scheduled for early October, may stem from the failure of the latest attempt to ease the Sino-Soviet dispute. It seems likely that Khrushchev had hoped to meet with Mao or other top Chinese Communist officials during his IL ASIA-AFRICA 25X1 opening session of the peace talks between the Souvanna Phou- Laos- Little apparently was accomplished during the 25X1 substantive. discussions. A delegation of Soviet officials, pre- sumably to complete the establishment of diplomatic relations, ma government and the Pathet Lao. They are to meet again on 13 October. I-Souvanna has told Ambassador Brown that he will insist on a general cease-fire and on restoration of gov- ernment authority in Sam Neua Province as preconditions for 25X1 (Page 1) Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0053 0360001-3 25X1 is scheduled to arrive in Vientiane on 13 October.n 25X1 : W/MX/ .. ........ 25X1 Approved F ? r Release 2003102127 : UA-KUV1U F!=U0JUUJbUUU1-J 25X1 011 25X1 25X1 elements of danger, Israe]L-UAR.*,' Israel) with the consent of the UN Truce k~,e- Supervision Org nization, has begun dredging 300 meters of the Jordan River channel south of the Banat Yaqub bridge in the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone. The UAR opposes this project, believing it to be part of an Israeli scheme for --y" ultimate diversion of the river despite Israeli claims to the contrary. Syrian troops overlooking the river so far have 25X1 not attempted to stop the dredging, but t *Republic of the Congo: The refusal of the UN Command on 11 October to permit the arrest of deposed Premier Lu- mumba by the Mobutu government has maintained for the time being the uneasy stalemate of political forces in Leopold- ville. Mobutu appears likely to continue to press for UN with- drawal of its protection of Lumumba, and a government spokes- man has threatened a "nationwide uprising" if the UN does not do so. The UN statement that Lumumba could be arrested only if parliament were to withdraw his immunity may prompt Mobutu to reconvene parliament, whose members have lately been increasingly critical of Lumumba. The US Embassy at Accra reports that a planeload of Ghanaian troops departed on the morning of 11 October, but returned, allegedly because of bad weather, without reaching its destination. According to an African diplomat in Accra, the purpose of this mission was to have been to rescue Lumumba in Leopoldville and establLsh -ment-in-exile. I him as lie-ad of q. Congal se Lyovern- Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland~. ~__Tension is likely to increase in the British- controlled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as white settlers react to pro-African proposals of the advisory Monckton commission report released on 11 October. The settlers are already highly incensed at Afri- can rioting this past week end in several urban centers in Southern Rhodesia. They will demand that their government strongly oppose the commission't. recommendations that Afri- can influence be greatly increased in the Federation's legisla- ture and in the administration of Northern Rhodesia. Primez 12 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF' ii on 11 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO01300360001-3 25X1 25X1, Approved F Release 2003/02/27. CIA-RDP79T0097 005300360001-3 j j p p 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 inister Welensky has been assured of the support of the main opposition party if he resigns in order to renew his popular mandate at the polls before taking part in consti- tutional discussions with Britain, probably later this year. (Page 3) Ruanda-Urundi: Belgium's plans for bringing the trus- teesh p territory of Ruanda-Urundi to independence as two separate states by April 1962 appear inadequate to prevent new outbreaks of tribal warfare in the northern state of Ruanda. According to an American official who recently visited the territory, the Belgians there are determined to retain their influence after independence and are prepared to use force if necessary to attain this end. Tribal tension reportedly is at a high pitch as a result of Belgian efforts to replace the extremely conservative tribal rulers with moderate, p ro-Belgian political parties. independent in August and now is preparing to negotiate with Paris cooperation accords such as formally link other mem- Ni er-France: Niger's President Diori, who in the past has been one of the most pro= French African leaders within the French Community, recently indicated to US Charge Norland his regime's determination to act independently of France. Diori told Norland that Niger would not accept French aid if it were conditioned on Niger's following French direction in foreign policy. He also said he was thinking of requesting the departure from northern Niger of French mil- itary elements which he alleged are carrying on pro-French activity among nomadic Tuareg tribesmen. Like Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Upper Volta-Niger's partners in the four-state association known as the Conseil de 1'Entente- -Niger became bers of the Community with France. (Page 5) (Map) _. 12 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 25X1 p 25X1 Approved For R ?lease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05 00360001-3 25X1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ j 25X1 Approved Fo Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975A 05300360001-3 III. THE WEST 25X1 Peru-Cuba: eruvian President Prado has stated that he is ready to break diplomatic relations with Cuba on the grounds that Cuba is supporting Peruvian Communists. Peru hopes that Argentina, Colombia, and certain Central American states will follow suit so that Peru will not be- come a particular target for Cuba and the USSR. Guate- mala and Nicaragua broke relations with Cuba earlier this 25X1 Year 25X1 25X1 25X1 (Page 6) Britaino(Prime Minister Macmillan has told Ambas- sador Phtney that he does not believe a serious Soviet at- tack on the Western position in Berlin underlies present Soviet policy; he considers recent harassments "isolated separate actions." Macmillan accepts Khrushchev's state- ment that he does not intend to bring the Berlin situation to a head before spring. Ambassador Whitney concludes that the current prospects that the British will agree to eco- nomic countermeasures are dim, 25X1 Argentina. President Frondizi is again under military pressure to mo' ify certain "administrative" aspects of his petroleum policy, to take firmer anti-Communist action, and to dismiss advisers who favor wooing Peronista political sup- port from Peron. the army is 25X1 united behind these demands. In several similar crises in the past, Frondizi has adopted a cautious position, meeting most military demands,,: 25X1 12 Oct 60 Approved For DAILY BRIEF iv 01, Approved Fo ease - 05300360001-3 The Situation in Laos 25X1 The first session of the peace talks between the Souvanna Phouma. government and the Pathet Lao, held in Vientiane on 11 October, was probably devoted mainly to procedural matters. The chief Pathet Lao negotiator, Phoumi Vongvichit, took ad- vantage of the occasion to deliver a strong attack on American imperialism. General Ouane, a member of the government del- egation, is quoted as asserting that the Pathet Lao had indicated that real peace could be attained only if General Phoumi's Savan- nakhet movement were crushed. The two sides are to resume their :talks on 13 October. Premier Souvanna. has told. US Ambassador Brown that if the Pathet Lao reject his demands for a country wide cease-fire and restoration of Sam Neua Province to government control, he will simply tell them "to go away" and think about the prob- lem some more. He claims that in any event, he will pursue delaying tactics. in an effort to string the talks out as long as pos- sible. General Ouane, reportedly concerned over the possible out- come of the negotiations, claims that if the. talks go badly he will go to Luang Prabang to resign from the government. Ouane had previously reported that he expected the Pathet Lao would demand fixed enclaves for their military personnel, reinte- gration of their civil functionaries into the government, and re- version to the 1954 Geneva accords and the 1957 Vientiane inte- gration agreements. Reports from Phong Saly Province indicate that the Pathet Lab, in an apparent effort to gain additional territory on which to base their claims in the negotiations, were continuing to exert strong pressure on government posts in the southeastern part of the province, One post reportedly has :fallen to. the Pathet Lao, and a more important post--Sap Nao--is said to be under strong gnemy.".pressure. A senior Laotian Foreign Ministry official has informed Ambassador Brown that a Soviet delegation will arrive in Laos 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300360001-3 12 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 Approved Fo, t 'on 13 October and will probably "not come empty-handed." In addition to completing the establishment of diplomatic re- lations between the USSR and Laos, the delegation will prob- ably extend offers of aid to the Souvanna government. ` Recent Soviet propaganda commentary on the Laotian situation has emphasized the dire consequences of the Thai economic block- ade and has accused the United States of "stifling" the legal government by, suspending aid. Souvanna may be tempted to accept any Soviet offer of aid in order to increase his area of maneuver. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27.: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300360001-3 12 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 LLtelease of the Monckton commission report on 11 Octo- ber is likely to increase racial tension in the British-con- trolled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This advisory report of a largely British study group is designed to prepare for later constitutional discussions in London between rep- resentatives of Britain and the Federation. However, its basically pro-African outlook may so inflame Rhodesian white settlers as to endanger cooperation between Salisbury and London. 25X1 (The report calls for continuation of the federation of three constituent territories but endorses a loosening of their ties and later secession under certain conditions. It also proposes a great increase of African membership in the federal parlia- ment until parity with the whites is attained. Some of its most far-reaching conclusions dealt with the colonial territory of Northern Rhodesia, which was clearly envisaged as a future African state. The report hoped that constitutional advance would lead to full self-government with an African majority in the legislature and an elective African majority in the executive council. Other provisions called for an end to racial discrimina- tion in theFederation. . The federal government of Prime Minister Welensky has previously indicated its opposition to any such proposals, and earlier in October Welensky was assured of support from the Dominion party, the white opposition party, if he chose to re- sign and call new elections to renew his popular mandate. Racial tension is already high following a week end of Afri- can`rots and strikes. On 8 OctobeT_ African rioting in Salis- bury resulted in at least seven deaths, over 80 injuries, and considerable property damage. Later at Gwelo an African na- tionalist meeting erupted into looting and arson. At Salisbury African transport workers struck on 11 October; at Bulawayo 2,000 African factory workers have kept up a wage strike. As a result of these actions, white civilians on 11 October reportedly demanded permission to take the law into their own hands and shouted down the appeals of senior government offi- cials to respect the law. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300360001-3 12 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For R2?ease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T009755300360001-3 RHODESIA AND '- 3129D 01011 MALAGASY REPUBLIC Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300360001-3 Approved For e. ase - 5300360001-3 Unrest Likely in Ruanda-Urundi Belgium's plans for bringing the trusteeship territory of Ruandi- Urundi to independence as two separate states appear inadequate to prevent new outbreaks of tribal warfare in. the northern state, of Ruanda. According to an American official who recently visited the terrif ory, tension between. the Batutsi--Ruanda's traditional, ruling ethnic group--and the numerically predominant Bahutu has reached a high pitch as a result of Belgian efforts to replace the highly conservative Batutsi with moderate, pro-Belgian political parties. Order is now being: maintained, except for a few scattered outbreaks, by three battalions of Belgian troops; however, these are scheduled to depart when the. territory becomes independent. Belgium envisages a program of rapid political advance- ment for the territory, with elections scheduled in both states early next year, to be, followed by the establishment of a na- tional government in each area. The target date. for complete independence is April 1962. However, Belgian officials in the territory reportedly are determined to guide its political de- velopment so as to maintain their country's influence after independence and are prepared to use. force if necessary to attain this end. The Belgians reportedly hope that by follow- ing this policy, they can avoid "another Congo situation and another Lumumba." Governmental structure in both Ruanda and 'Urundi will be. greatly simplified, and Belgium may be able to create a fairly competent African government in Urundi, where there is relatively little ethnic tension. In Ruanda, however, the Bahutu party which will probably form the government re- portedly will be able to function only with the support of Bel- gian administrative personnel and troops; such a government would probably be, unable to maintain its control over the op- position groups :unkess pit- requested continued Bel ian mili- tary assistance, 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300360001-3 12 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved Fo, Niger Rejects French Direction in Foreign Po icy iger, one of eight French Community states in West 25X1 and Equatorial Africa which became sovereign last August, intends to assert its independent status and will not accept French direction in foreign affairs in return for continued economic aid. President Hamani Diori, heretofore one of the most pro-French African leaders within the Community, told American Charge Norland in late September that Niger will not accept French aid if it is conditioned on Niger's fol- lowing French direction in foreign policy, "such as voting for France on the Algerian question:' Nevertheless, Diori indi- cated that Niger and its partners in the four-state association known as the Conseil de 1'Entente- -Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Upper Volta--would begin negotiations with France in mid- October for technical, diplomatic, military, and other bilat- eral agreements. Unlike the other seven French Community states which have gained their "international sovereignty" so far, the Entente states were unwilling to negotiate such "co- operation accords" before being admitted to the UN, a goal attained on 20 September. 3 alleging that "a few stupid French" were causing frequent incidents along the Niger-Algerian frontier by trying to incite nomadic Tuareg tribesmen in northern Niger to "stay with France" by going to Algeria, Diori said he was thinking about requesting the departure of French military elements now sta- tioned in the area. Other French army officers reportedly have made contact with potentially dissident 'Tuaregs in north- ern Mali in the hope of blocking expected efforts by the Mali Government to aid the Algerian rebels. Diori, who is also president of the Entente for the current year, stressed his desire to have an American representative resident in Niger, "since certain French will never understand that we are independent until other diplomatic representatives are at Niamey to prove it:' At present Norland, who resides in Abidjan, represents the United States in all four Entente states. L Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny- -the creator and dominant figure in the Entente--and Upper Volta President Yameogo have also indicated recently that their states would not support France on the Algerian issue at the UN 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/97 ? CIA_Rr11279T00975A00530036 001-3 12 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005300360001-3 0HANNA, LIBFRIA~, = ` ? TOOO