CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000330001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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to play at two Chinas,'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Lebanon: Peiping has closed its
trade mission in Beirut following Lebanon's refusal to
sever relations with Nationalist China. The Chinese Com-
munists have grown.increasingly sensitive to Taipei's dip-
lomatic competition and probably feel that their withdrawal
of the mission in Beirut will put other countries in the area
on notice that Communist China "will not tolerate attempts
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Morocco-France: he Moroccan minister of public
works, who fears the French reaction to demands for the
evacuation of French troops, has asked for American as-
sistance in providing technicians should Paris recall its key
personnel in electric power and civil aviation functions. The
King in his note to De Gaulle last week apparently countered
a French offer of a defense pact and only partial evacuation
with a request for a commitment that France would withdraw
all military forces. Morocco is determined that all fore* n
forces shall be withdrawn. by the end of 196
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III. THE WEST
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for complete independence. Jagan, Communist leader of the
dominant Guianese political party, is making efforts to gain
wider support in the Caribbean area with a current visit to
British Guiana: lCheddi Jagan's dissatisfaction with Lon-
don's offer of internal self-government may lead him to agitate
Cuba. On 4 April he conferred at length with a high-level mem,
ber of the Cuban Communist party and with Cuban Government
officials.
IV., WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostil-
ities against the continental US or its possessions in
the immediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to ini-
tiate direct military action against US forces abroad,
US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the im
mediate future.
C. The following developments are susceptible of direct
sexploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which
could jeopardize the security of the US in the imme?--
date future:
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1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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Communist China Closes Trade Mission in Lebanon
Peiping has given up its four-year effort to obtain rec-
ognition from Lebanon. The Chinese Communists on 1 April
closed their trade office in Beirut because the Lebanese Gov-
ernment refused to sever relations with Nationalist China.
Lebanon's relations with the Nationalists, established in
1954, have been a source of contention since the Communist
mission arrived in 1956. Peiping intends that such trade
missions serve political as well as economic purposes, work-
ing to persuade business and government leaders that recogni-
tion of the Communist regime is financially and politically
desirable. This approach has succeeded elsewhere but has
been noticeably unsuccessful in Lebanon, where trade with
Communist China is negligible and where the Nationalists have
gained in stature. Taipei concluded a $2,000,000 trade agree-
ment with the Lebanese in 1956 and, in 1957, its diplomatic
mission was raised to an embassy. The Nationalist ambas-
sador in Beirut believes accreditation of the first Chinese
Nationalist military attache may have triggered Peiping's
decision to withdraw its mission.
Peiping has grown increasingly sensitive to Taipei's diplo-
matic and trade competition. Guinea, which recognizes the
Communist regime, recently received a stiff protest from
Peiping threatening to break relations if Conakry repeated
the official reception it gave a Nationalist. delegation in Jan-
uary. Withdrawal of the unproductive Chinese. Communist
mission to Lebanon probably is intended to put other African
and Middle Eastern nations on notice that Peiping "will not
tolerate attempts to play at two Chinas.'
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11. ASIA-AFRICA
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Moroccan-French Relations Expected to Worsen
;Moroccan- French relations appear to be entering a "new
and disquieting phase," in the view of Ambassador Yost in
Rabat. Difficulty is likely to center on Moroccan. agitation for
the evacuation of the 17,000 French troops based in Morocco
and to be complicated by other issues such as Moroccan sup-
port for Algerian independence, popular opposition to French
atomic tests, and nationalist claims to large portions of the
Sahara.
!The Moroccan minister of public works, who fears serious
trouble may develop, has asked for American assistance in
providing vital technicians in the event Paris recalls key French
personnel employed in Moroccan electric power and civil avia-
tion facilities. Prime Minister Ibrahim has also recommended
that the minister seek Egyptian or other Arab technicians,")'
,President de Gaulle is reported to have expressed dis-
pleasure to the Moroccan minister of defense, who presented
a message from the King on 31 March, over the promptness
of the King's quick counterproposal to a recent offer by De
Gaulle of a defense pact and partial evacuation. De Gaulle
reportedly believed his offer could not have been seriously
considered. The King apparently replied to the French offer
with a plea for an immediate gesture along the lines of the
American commitment last December to evacuate one air
base almost immediately and the three others by the end of
1963.1114
French Ambassador Parodi, who told Ambassador Yost
that De Gaulle's proposal went beyond earlier French offers
and could have been represented by the Moroccan Government
as a gain, nevertheless urged that Paris honor the King's re-
quest in order to bolster his position in the face of the mounting
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(instability resulting from the political infighting between
left and right factions in Morocco.]
Ambassador Yost comments that the genuine and pas-
sionate Moroccan feeling. on the evacuation question probably
will lead Rabat to push the issue hard. The ring, who appar-
ently now intends to prolong the life of the Ibrahim govern-
ment, may be motivated by a. desire to keep the left with him
rather than a inst him during a showdown with the French'
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II1. THE WEST
New Problems in British Guiana Likely
The recent moves by Cheddi Jagan, minister of trade
and industry in the colonial government and Communist lead-
er of the People's Progressive party, the dominant political
group in British Guiana, suggest that there will be a cooling
of his working relationship with colonial officials. Jagan is
visiting Cuba from 4 to 7 April on the way home from the con-
stitutional conference in London. He conferred at length on
4 April with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a high-level Cuban
Communist who is influential in the Castro regime, and with
major government leaders. This is the first such contact
between British Guiana and Cuba and may lead elements in
the Castro government to support Jagan.1
The constitutional talks broke up on 31 March over ar-
rangements for transitional measures toward internal self-
government, and Jagan said he would strive for early inde-
pendence, which the British had refused to discuss until 1963.
Although Britain's proposal to introduce internal self-govern-
ment in.August 1961 was received favorably, the Guianese
delegation objected to making this advance contingent on satis-
factory interim arrangements involving partial retention of
British control over the police and internal security and provision for safeguarding the future of British officials in the
local civil service. i
The Guianese also opposed allowing the governor to re-
tain the constitutional right to issue decrees in an emergency,
but London believes it should retain certain controls because
Jagan--who will probably become the first prime minister--
is a Communist. Meanwhile, Jagan's control over the People's
Progressive party may be challenged at the forthcoming party
congress by those critical of his and his wife's autocratic dom-
ination of party councils. He probably will be able to fend off
any such attack. Despite his desire to press independence de-
mands, he does not wish to prejudice chances for much needed
foreign investment by attempting to go too far too fast.;
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11
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
..r.r. ------ F
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