CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A005000250001-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 20, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 29, 1960
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A005000250001-8.pdf | 877.85 KB |
Body:
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Khrushchev offers "nothing new" so far
in talks with De Gaulle.
0
New Delhi continues its support to Tibetan
2
resistance leaders in India. O
Indonesia- -Communist influence enlarged
in new parliament appointed by Sukarno;
some military and civilian elements op-
pose it.
South African official says union will
leave AN if riots issue is inscribed on
Security Council agenda.
New political grouping in Kenya fore-
shadows increased pressure for inde-
pendence.
British Somaliland- -Local government to
demand independence for 1 July.
Other French African areas likely to
follow up quickly on Madagascar's lead
for independence.
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l.tN I KAL IN I tLL1ht:NL~t bULLt I IN
29 March IL960
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first series of talks between Khrushchev and De Gaulle could
be summed up in two words, "
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IIo ASIA-AFRICA
USSR-France. [Prench Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
told the American ambassador in Paris on 25 March that the
India-Tibet: The Indian Government, while officially dis-
sociating itself from the Tibetan resistance movement, con- 25X1
tinues to give limited support to its leaders in India,
In addition, he has ap-
parently made no effort to force postponement of a nonofficial
Asian-African convention on Tibet which is. scheduled to be held
in New Delhi 8-11 April, ten days before Chou En-tai's arriv)
Indonesia: Differences between President Sukarno and the
army over. the composition of the new parliament, which was an-
nounced 27 March, are reported sharp and unresolved. Commu-
nist and extreme leftist membership in the new body, which
Sukarno envisages as a rubber-stamp legislature, may amount
to as much as 25 percent of the total. Some military and civilian
elements continue to press the arm leadership to take action
against Sukarno,
South Africa: CA, high official in the South African Ministry
of External Affairs has told the American ambassador that if
the issue of the recent riots is. inscribed on the Security Coun-
cil's agenda, South Africa will have no choice but to leave the
UN. The Security Council is likely to inscribe the issue on its
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/genda at the 30 March meeting. The African bloc is press-
ing for a strong condemnatory resolution, while key Western
members are advocating some type of investigative machinery
which would keep the UN involved with race relations without
111
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*The work stoppage on 28 March has led to serious rioting in
the Johannesburg'and Cape. Town:"areas. Police have been evacu-
ated from several African townships in the Johannesburg vicinity,
but they remain in control outside the immediate native areas.
specifically condemning South Africa
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Kenyan f1hauguration of the Kenya African National Union
party--a coalition of various nationalist groups--foreshadows
increased pressure for independence and could transfer con-
trol of the independence movement to irresponsible elements.
Establishment of the new party was only reluctantly supported
by Tom Mboya, who probably recognizes it as a threat to his
leadership. Statements by party spokesmen that recent African
constitutional gains are only steps toward full independence, to-
gether with the Mau Mau connections of some of its leaders, ap-
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pear certain to increase apprehension among Kenya's Europeans.
British Somaliland. [-British hopes for a period of three
years to prepare. the. Somaliland Protectorate for independence
(Page 6)
French Africa: The success of the Malagasy Republic
(Madagascar) in negotiating its independence without sacrific-
,,,,(o ing French aid and membership in the French Community vir-
tually. assures early requests for "international sovereignty"
29 Mar 60
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are unlikely to be realized. The local government, controlled
by representatives of the UAR.-supported nationalists who re-
cently won an. overwhelming electoral victory, will demand in
early April that London agree to the protectorate's independence
in time for union with. Somalia on. 1 Jul
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from other autonomous Community states. Paris' reported in-
sistence on the maintenance of political and strategic solidarity
with France probably will not immediately trouble the present
pro-French regimes in most of these states. However, this re-
quirement is apparently causing difficulties in the negotiations
which representatives of the Mali Federation have been conduct-
ing in. Paris since mid-January.
(Nap)
IS
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NOW
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
I l. ASIA-AFRICA
Indian Government Continues to Suppo t Tibetan
Resistance Movement
(Nehru apparently has made no effort to force postponement
of the nonofficial Asian-African convention. on Tibet, even thoug7
SECRET
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.29 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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v
[the anti-Chinese rally is scheduled to be held in New Delhi
only ten days before Chou En-lairs arrival on 19 April. In
February, when the international convention was first sched-
uled, Nehru had persuaded Indian Socialist leaders to put off
the meeting in order to avoid antagonizing Peiping. Although
New Delhi has officially dissociated the government from the
convention, Nehru may feel that such a demonstration of Indian
public opinion, backed by representatives from other Asian
countries, will strengthen his hand in presenting India's case
to the Chinese premier F7 I
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Indonesian Army Has Not Challenged New Parliament
Differences between the army and President Sukarno over
the composition of the new parliament, which was announced
27 March, are reported sharp and unresolved. Communist
and far leftist membership in the new body, which Sukarno
personally appointed and which he envisages as a rubber-stamp
legislature, may amount to as much as 25 percent. Although
the new parliament actually may have little governing function,
it will offer the Communists a privileged platform from which
to expound ideas and permit the reproduction of these ideas
through mass media.
The army leadership has given no indication that it plans
to move against Sukarno at this time, Parliament is not sched-
uled to be installed until early June, when Sukarno returns from
his round-the-world tour, and some action may be under con-
sideration to prevent or postpone installation.
During Sukarno's absence, civilian and military elements
can be expected to intensify pressure on Army Chief of Staff
and Security Minister General Nasution for some anti-Sukarno
move. Civilian pressures will be channeled through the new
organization recently formed by the large anti-Communist
Masjumi and several small parties, the Democratic League,
which is poorly represented in the new parliament. Junior
officer groups, dissatisfied for various reasons, may attempt
to use the parliamentary issue to crystallize anti-Djakarta
feelings, and further armed incidents, similar to the 19 March
attack on an arm school in Bandung, could occur.
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NOW, NWMW
South Africa Threatens to Leave UN
/ .high official in the South African Ministry of External
Affairs has told the American ambassador that if the question
of the recent riots in the Union. is inscribed on the UN Security
Council's agenda, South Africa will have no choice but to with-
draw from the UN. In 1955 South Africa withdrew its delega-
tion from the General Assembly on the grounds that UN discus-
sion of its apartheid policy was in violation of Charter provi-
sions which forbid UN. interference in matters essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of a member states In the
1954, 1956, 1958, and 1959 sessions the Union refused to par-
ticipate in the assembly's discussion of the apartheid issue but
did participate in other assembly matters. This is the first
time the Union's policies have faced Security Council action,
The Security Council is likely to inscribe the issue at its
30 March meeting. The African. bloc is pressing for a strong
condemnatory resolution, while key Western members are advo-
cating, some type of investigative machinery which would keep
the UN involved with. the country's race relations without specif-
ically condemning. South African internal affair
LIn the Union, meanwhile, the one-day work stoppage on 28
March, sponsored by the African National Congress (ANC) as a
memorial for the Africans killed last Monday, resulted in seri-
ous rioting in the Johannesburg. and Cape Town areas. The Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC), a militant African group whose dem-
onstrations touched off the riots on 21 March but which had dis-
associated itself from the 28 March strike, reportedly instructed
its members to join. the ANC demonstrators. Police were evacuated
from several Johannesburg African townships, and the townships
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have been sealed off. South African security forces remain in con-
trol outside the native areas
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Kenya Africans Form New Party
[The inauguration on 27 March o e enya rican a-
tional Union (KANU)--a coalition of leading nationalist groups--
appears to presage stepped-up agitation for independence in
the British colony. The new party, dissatisfied with agree-
ments reached in London last January providing for increased
African representation in Kenya's legislature and cabinet, is
pledged to work for immediate and full independence. A reso-
lution disavowing the London agreements was voted down by
KANU, but the party described the new constitution as a transi-
tional step toward "immediate" independence
rEstablishment of KANU represents a threat to the politi-
cal leadership of Tom Mboya, who was a leader of the African
delegation to London and is associated with the London agree-
ments in the public mind. Mboya appears not to have been
consulted in the party's formative stage, and his appearance
at the inaugural rally as a member of its constitutional com-
mittee brought a mixed reaction from African spectators pres-
ent.]
The inauguration of KANU appears likely to increase
apprehension among Europeans in Kenya, many of whom have
already made preparations to sell their holdings in antici-
pation of African rule. Its demands will serve to dramatize
the accelerated pace of African independence activity, while
the Mau Mau connections of some of its members--includ-
ing Chairman James Gichuru--will inspire widespread un-
easines
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Somali Nationalists Increasing Pressure
LNationalists in Britain's Somaliland Protectorate are in-
creasing their pressure to gain the early independence of this
area and its union with the Italian trust territory of Somalia
when the latter obtains independence on 1 July. The national-
ists, who control the protectorate's ministerial council and
legislature, plan to have the legislature request London on 6
April to grant independence by July
he British governor's efforts to point out the difficulties
that will arise from the early departure of British civil serv-
ants and the border tension with Ethiopia have been unsucess-
ful. The governor hopes, however, that the Somalis may
adopt a more moderate attitude after a proposed visit by pro-
tectorate leaders to Mogadiscio and may go along with Brit-
ain's plan for slower political evolution. While Mogadiscio
leaders officially espouse a union of all Somali tribesmen in a
Greater Somalia. state, actually many of them fear that such
a union would increase the strength of tribes opposing the
present government,
LUnfulfilled Somali nationalist demands may lead to dis-
orders in the next few months in the protectorate, as well as
cause growing Ethiopian apprehension of suspected British
backing for Somali expansion
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ra African
FRENCH AFRICA
Department
Autonomous Republic
(French Community)
Overseas territory
Trust territory
Mali
Rep
(Mad
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Most, if not all, of the 11 autonomous states of the French
Community appear headed for early independence following. the
success of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) in negotiating
its "international sovereignty" without sacrificing French eco-
nomic aid. The negotiations, along with similar talks still in
progress involving the Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan,
have been watched as a possible model by the remaining Com-
munity states.
Under the agreement, announced in Paris on 26 March and
expected to be implemented this summer, the Malagasy Republic
will continue to be a member of the Community, which now is to
be transformed into something akin to the Commonwealth. Changes
in the De Gaulle Constitution necessary to make the new arrange-
ment possible are expected to be presented to the French National
Assembly when it convenes next month.
L French Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on the eve of
the Paris announcement that, in addition to the Malagasy Republic
and Mali, the four Community states in equatorial Africa (Gabon,
Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic) would become in-
dependent as a unit this year and that the Ivory Coast and possibly
Mauritania would attain similar status. He said negotiations would
begin next with the equatorial Africans who recently reached agree-
ment- -apparently with French encouragement- -to establish a loose
confederation
Paris' requirement- -revealed by Premier Debrd last fall--
that independent Community states demonstrate real political and
strategic solidarity with France probably will not immediately
trouble most of the generally pro-French regimes now in power
throughout the Community. Apparently, however, it has already
caused difficulties in the Mali talks. Mali's leaders--the most
nationalistically inclined of present African leaders of Community
states--were recently reported to be resisting French demands
for assurances of support in the UN and for retention of control
over the naval base at Dakar.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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