CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005000250001-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
16
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 20, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 29, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005000250001-8.pdf877.85 KB
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Approved For Re1easTO3P2/2, ~CjtET~T009,7`5A00500025 25X1 Copy No. C vetuxur Na, 2' NA ORANGE IN CLASS. 0 UECLA$SIFIEG CLASS. CNxNGaxt T01- TS S t NEXT H VIWW GATE: -t&- AuTNs NR 7 u-? VAT118 J REVIEWER4 0 25X1 25X1 1 -1 ' 'A P- -1 1 C A, TELL!16E...- E State Department review completed Approved For Releasef OP/2 ILVIO(00975A005000250001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000250001-8 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000250001-8 Approved For rR lease 100310-11-17 - 04-RDR79T009 A0050002500z01-8 Khrushchev offers "nothing new" so far in talks with De Gaulle. 0 New Delhi continues its support to Tibetan 2 resistance leaders in India. O Indonesia- -Communist influence enlarged in new parliament appointed by Sukarno; some military and civilian elements op- pose it. South African official says union will leave AN if riots issue is inscribed on Security Council agenda. New political grouping in Kenya fore- shadows increased pressure for inde- pendence. British Somaliland- -Local government to demand independence for 1 July. Other French African areas likely to follow up quickly on Madagascar's lead for independence. Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000250001-8 25X1 25X1 i 25X1 Approved Fr Releas 2003/02/27. CIA-RDP79T00 005000250001-8 j/ l.tN I KAL IN I tLL1ht:NL~t bULLt I IN 29 March IL960 25X1 1. 1'fri l:VMV1NYIU141b'1' 13LVU 25X1 first series of talks between Khrushchev and De Gaulle could be summed up in two words, " 25X1 IIo ASIA-AFRICA USSR-France. [Prench Foreign Minister Couve de Murville told the American ambassador in Paris on 25 March that the India-Tibet: The Indian Government, while officially dis- sociating itself from the Tibetan resistance movement, con- 25X1 tinues to give limited support to its leaders in India, In addition, he has ap- parently made no effort to force postponement of a nonofficial Asian-African convention on Tibet which is. scheduled to be held in New Delhi 8-11 April, ten days before Chou En-tai's arriv) Indonesia: Differences between President Sukarno and the army over. the composition of the new parliament, which was an- nounced 27 March, are reported sharp and unresolved. Commu- nist and extreme leftist membership in the new body, which Sukarno envisages as a rubber-stamp legislature, may amount to as much as 25 percent of the total. Some military and civilian elements continue to press the arm leadership to take action against Sukarno, South Africa: CA, high official in the South African Ministry of External Affairs has told the American ambassador that if the issue of the recent riots is. inscribed on the Security Coun- cil's agenda, South Africa will have no choice but to leave the UN. The Security Council is likely to inscribe the issue on its Approved For Relea 25X1 25X1 25X1 . 0 PP 005000250001-8 25X1 j 25X1 ~~ Approved For el ase 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975 005000250001-8 /genda at the 30 March meeting. The African bloc is press- ing for a strong condemnatory resolution, while key Western members are advocating some type of investigative machinery which would keep the UN involved with race relations without 111 25X1 *The work stoppage on 28 March has led to serious rioting in the Johannesburg'and Cape. Town:"areas. Police have been evacu- ated from several African townships in the Johannesburg vicinity, but they remain in control outside the immediate native areas. specifically condemning South Africa 25X1 Kenyan f1hauguration of the Kenya African National Union party--a coalition of various nationalist groups--foreshadows increased pressure for independence and could transfer con- trol of the independence movement to irresponsible elements. Establishment of the new party was only reluctantly supported by Tom Mboya, who probably recognizes it as a threat to his leadership. Statements by party spokesmen that recent African constitutional gains are only steps toward full independence, to- gether with the Mau Mau connections of some of its leaders, ap- 25X1 25X1 pear certain to increase apprehension among Kenya's Europeans. British Somaliland. [-British hopes for a period of three years to prepare. the. Somaliland Protectorate for independence (Page 6) French Africa: The success of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) in negotiating its independence without sacrific- ,,,,(o ing French aid and membership in the French Community vir- tually. assures early requests for "international sovereignty" 29 Mar 60 DAILY BRIEF ii N E Approved For Re ease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO 5000250001-8 25X1 j are unlikely to be realized. The local government, controlled by representatives of the UAR.-supported nationalists who re- cently won an. overwhelming electoral victory, will demand in early April that London agree to the protectorate's independence in time for union with. Somalia on. 1 Jul 25X1 25X1 25X1 M M "1 Approved F rel ase 2003/02/27. CIA-RDP79T00975 005000250001-8 25X1 from other autonomous Community states. Paris' reported in- sistence on the maintenance of political and strategic solidarity with France probably will not immediately trouble the present pro-French regimes in most of these states. However, this re- quirement is apparently causing difficulties in the negotiations which representatives of the Mali Federation have been conduct- ing in. Paris since mid-January. (Nap) IS 29 Mar 60 DAILY BRIEF WE 25X1 Approved For ReI ase 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO 5000250001-8 25X1 p Approved F rRelease 20039A-RDP79T00975A005000250001-8 NOW 1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC I l. ASIA-AFRICA Indian Government Continues to Suppo t Tibetan Resistance Movement (Nehru apparently has made no effort to force postponement of the nonofficial Asian-African convention. on Tibet, even thoug7 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000250001-8 .29 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 100310-11-17 - 000250001-8 25X1 v [the anti-Chinese rally is scheduled to be held in New Delhi only ten days before Chou En-lairs arrival on 19 April. In February, when the international convention was first sched- uled, Nehru had persuaded Indian Socialist leaders to put off the meeting in order to avoid antagonizing Peiping. Although New Delhi has officially dissociated the government from the convention, Nehru may feel that such a demonstration of Indian public opinion, backed by representatives from other Asian countries, will strengthen his hand in presenting India's case to the Chinese premier F7 I 0 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Relbase 200 2/27~C,I," RDP70T00075A005000250001-8 29 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 05000250001-8 25X1 Indonesian Army Has Not Challenged New Parliament Differences between the army and President Sukarno over the composition of the new parliament, which was announced 27 March, are reported sharp and unresolved. Communist and far leftist membership in the new body, which Sukarno personally appointed and which he envisages as a rubber-stamp legislature, may amount to as much as 25 percent. Although the new parliament actually may have little governing function, it will offer the Communists a privileged platform from which to expound ideas and permit the reproduction of these ideas through mass media. The army leadership has given no indication that it plans to move against Sukarno at this time, Parliament is not sched- uled to be installed until early June, when Sukarno returns from his round-the-world tour, and some action may be under con- sideration to prevent or postpone installation. During Sukarno's absence, civilian and military elements can be expected to intensify pressure on Army Chief of Staff and Security Minister General Nasution for some anti-Sukarno move. Civilian pressures will be channeled through the new organization recently formed by the large anti-Communist Masjumi and several small parties, the Democratic League, which is poorly represented in the new parliament. Junior officer groups, dissatisfied for various reasons, may attempt to use the parliamentary issue to crystallize anti-Djakarta feelings, and further armed incidents, similar to the 19 March attack on an arm school in Bandung, could occur. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000250001-8 29 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 - - 005000250001-8 NOW, NWMW South Africa Threatens to Leave UN / .high official in the South African Ministry of External Affairs has told the American ambassador that if the question of the recent riots in the Union. is inscribed on the UN Security Council's agenda, South Africa will have no choice but to with- draw from the UN. In 1955 South Africa withdrew its delega- tion from the General Assembly on the grounds that UN discus- sion of its apartheid policy was in violation of Charter provi- sions which forbid UN. interference in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a member states In the 1954, 1956, 1958, and 1959 sessions the Union refused to par- ticipate in the assembly's discussion of the apartheid issue but did participate in other assembly matters. This is the first time the Union's policies have faced Security Council action, The Security Council is likely to inscribe the issue at its 30 March meeting. The African. bloc is pressing for a strong condemnatory resolution, while key Western members are advo- cating, some type of investigative machinery which would keep the UN involved with. the country's race relations without specif- ically condemning. South African internal affair LIn the Union, meanwhile, the one-day work stoppage on 28 March, sponsored by the African National Congress (ANC) as a memorial for the Africans killed last Monday, resulted in seri- ous rioting in the Johannesburg. and Cape Town areas. The Pan- Africanist Congress (PAC), a militant African group whose dem- onstrations touched off the riots on 21 March but which had dis- associated itself from the 28 March strike, reportedly instructed its members to join. the ANC demonstrators. Police were evacuated from several Johannesburg African townships, and the townships 25X1 25X1 have been sealed off. South African security forces remain in con- trol outside the native areas 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 - CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000250001-8 29 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 25X1 Approved For Flelease 9003109197 ? C IA-RnRZ9100a7Sn005000250001-8 INW Kenya Africans Form New Party [The inauguration on 27 March o e enya rican a- tional Union (KANU)--a coalition of leading nationalist groups-- appears to presage stepped-up agitation for independence in the British colony. The new party, dissatisfied with agree- ments reached in London last January providing for increased African representation in Kenya's legislature and cabinet, is pledged to work for immediate and full independence. A reso- lution disavowing the London agreements was voted down by KANU, but the party described the new constitution as a transi- tional step toward "immediate" independence rEstablishment of KANU represents a threat to the politi- cal leadership of Tom Mboya, who was a leader of the African delegation to London and is associated with the London agree- ments in the public mind. Mboya appears not to have been consulted in the party's formative stage, and his appearance at the inaugural rally as a member of its constitutional com- mittee brought a mixed reaction from African spectators pres- ent.] The inauguration of KANU appears likely to increase apprehension among Europeans in Kenya, many of whom have already made preparations to sell their holdings in antici- pation of African rule. Its demands will serve to dramatize the accelerated pace of African independence activity, while the Mau Mau connections of some of its members--includ- ing Chairman James Gichuru--will inspire widespread un- easines 25X1 25X1 Approved For R 29 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For I elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T009 5AO05000250001-8 Somali Nationalists Increasing Pressure LNationalists in Britain's Somaliland Protectorate are in- creasing their pressure to gain the early independence of this area and its union with the Italian trust territory of Somalia when the latter obtains independence on 1 July. The national- ists, who control the protectorate's ministerial council and legislature, plan to have the legislature request London on 6 April to grant independence by July he British governor's efforts to point out the difficulties that will arise from the early departure of British civil serv- ants and the border tension with Ethiopia have been unsucess- ful. The governor hopes, however, that the Somalis may adopt a more moderate attitude after a proposed visit by pro- tectorate leaders to Mogadiscio and may go along with Brit- ain's plan for slower political evolution. While Mogadiscio leaders officially espouse a union of all Somali tribesmen in a Greater Somalia. state, actually many of them fear that such a union would increase the strength of tribes opposing the present government, LUnfulfilled Somali nationalist demands may lead to dis- orders in the next few months in the protectorate, as well as cause growing Ethiopian apprehension of suspected British backing for Somali expansion Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000250001-8 29 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000250001-8 ra African FRENCH AFRICA Department Autonomous Republic (French Community) Overseas territory Trust territory Mali Rep (Mad Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000250001-8 25X1 Most, if not all, of the 11 autonomous states of the French Community appear headed for early independence following. the success of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) in negotiating its "international sovereignty" without sacrificing French eco- nomic aid. The negotiations, along with similar talks still in progress involving the Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan, have been watched as a possible model by the remaining Com- munity states. Under the agreement, announced in Paris on 26 March and expected to be implemented this summer, the Malagasy Republic will continue to be a member of the Community, which now is to be transformed into something akin to the Commonwealth. Changes in the De Gaulle Constitution necessary to make the new arrange- ment possible are expected to be presented to the French National Assembly when it convenes next month. L French Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on the eve of the Paris announcement that, in addition to the Malagasy Republic and Mali, the four Community states in equatorial Africa (Gabon, Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic) would become in- dependent as a unit this year and that the Ivory Coast and possibly Mauritania would attain similar status. He said negotiations would begin next with the equatorial Africans who recently reached agree- ment- -apparently with French encouragement- -to establish a loose confederation Paris' requirement- -revealed by Premier Debrd last fall-- that independent Community states demonstrate real political and strategic solidarity with France probably will not immediately trouble most of the generally pro-French regimes now in power throughout the Community. Apparently, however, it has already caused difficulties in the Mali talks. Mali's leaders--the most nationalistically inclined of present African leaders of Community states--were recently reported to be resisting French demands for assurances of support in the UN and for retention of control over the naval base at Dakar. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000250001-8 29 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved For. a ease - 5000250001-8 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved Fot Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO050QO250001-8 25X1 25X1 7 IA Approved For Releasl2~302/2?: T00975A005000250001-8 Approved For Release-WAa[ff27& 00975A005000250001-8