CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004900410001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 19, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For F ,lease 200710P CI E
S T75 0 4900410001-2
25X1
DOCUMENT U
NO CHANQE IN CLA2S. p .
^ DEGLAS$IfUIo
!LASS. CHisojz Tor 11 $ Q
NEXT RLViL?w DATki
A11T1tt NA 74.2
8 JUN 1980
19 February 1960
--
Copy No.
25X1
Ii
67
[PLINowl WWI
IMMIL
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
////////////////////////////////////////////////////0
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
 25X1
19 FEBRUARY 1960
Approved For Fj~el~ase 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO975
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's visits to India and Burma
have failed to allay suspicions of Sino-
Soviet bloc policies. ? ^e^
Unrest in Iraq likely to increase because
of mismanagement of land reform program
and poor harvests; government may be
trying to blame Communists. . 0
South Korean vice president considering
withdrawing candidacy for re-election in
protest against President Rhee's extra-
legal electioneering practices.
?Italian Government faces possible crisis
if Liberal party withdraws support.
5?Pro-Cuban propaganda demonstrations
being planned in Latin American capitals
which the President will visit.
?Ecuador--Former president's return on
20 February may spark outbreak of vio-
lence.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04900410001-2
 Approved For Lelease 2002/10/21 CIA-RDP79TOO975AOO 900410001-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 February 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ehrushchev Visits to India and Burma: Ehrushchev's visits
to India and Burma apparently have done little to advance Soviet
policy objectives in those countries. Both New Delhi and Ran-
goon went on record in official communiquds as approving some
Soviet policy positions such as those on disarmament and the
cessation of nuclear tests, but Ehrushchev's boastful attitude,
his caustic criticism of the West, and the behavior of some of
his entourage antagonized some government off irials and the
press. I I
Il. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq; Unrest among the Iraqi peasants and urban dwellers
is likely to grow out of a sharp increase in the cost of living due
to mismanagement of the land reform program and two successive
years of poor harvests. Because spring sowing thus far this year
is less than half of normal, harvest prospects for 1960 appear un-
usually poor, and this may contribute substantially to pressures
against the Qasim regime. The dismissal on 16 February of the
pro- Communist minister of agricultural reform suggests that the
regime is trying to lay the blame on the Communists.
(Page 2)
South Korea: Vice President Chang Myon, leader of the ma-
JOr party in opposi ion to President Rhee is seriously consider-
1~~i 2
ing withdrawing his candidacy for re-election on 15 March in pro-
test against the repressive tactics and fraudulent practices of1the
25X1
Rhee administration. Rhee, who is unopposed for the presidency 25X1
as a result of the death of Cho Pyong-ok, has mobilized all gov-
ernment agencies down to the lowest level to assure the victory
of his party ticket. He has informed the voters he will not toler-
ate an opposition vice president by publicly stating he will refuse
to serve if Chang, is elected-~
J
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04900410001-2
 25X1
111. THE WEST
Italy: The Segni I government faces an imminent crisis as
a result of the Ldberal party directorate's decision to withdraw
its support. The Liberals are pressing the Christian Democrats
to maintain the government's present rightist alignment rather
than, as the Ldberals increasingly fear, form a center-left cab-
inet dependent on Nenni Socialist abstention. The Liberals ob-
ject to a number of the government's domestic programs and to
foreign policy trends., and unless a working agreement can be
reached before the Liberal national council meets on 20 and 21
February, Segni may be forced to resign. F
(Page 4)
Latin America: [While there are continuing indications of
plawTio-r pro-Cuban propaganda demonstrations during President
Eisenhower's visits to Brazil, Argentina., Chile, and Uruguay
from 23 February to 3 Mrch, security elements are aleirted
to the situationJ-
1 OWN
_jrnere have been reports of stepped-up travel to
South America by Prensa Latina-correspondents and other Cubans.
The Cuban issue is considered susceptible of exploitation for prop-
aganda. purposes in the four countrie the President Will
25X1 Visit] [
Ecuador: Violence may break out on 20 February in Guayaquil
--Ecuador's largest city--when controversial former President
Velasco returns to begin his 1960 presidential campaign. Leaders
of a rival, ommunist-influenced coalition., whose strength is
concentrated in Guayaquil, apparently intand to disrupt the recep-
tion being planned by Velasco's followers. Such a mel6e would
afford President Ponce an opportunity to discredit two sets of po-
litical enemies at once. F
25X1
19 Feb 60 DAILY BRIEF
25X1
25X1
25X1 IM
MON/M0111
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO04900410001-2
 Approved For Lease 2002/10/21 CIA-RDP79T00975AO04 0410001-2
25X1
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES 0
(Available during the preceding week) IN,
Outlook for Iran. NIE 34-60. 16 Feb 1960.
25X1
I
19 Feb 60 DAILY BRIEF iii
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004900410001-2
 Approved For FuL I
se - 410001-2
1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's Visit to India and Burma
According to the American Embassy in New Delhi, Khru-
shchev's visit to India went badly from the Soviet point of view,
despite efforts by the Indian Government to create the impres-
sion that his welcome was of the same spontaneity and magni-
tude as that. given President Eisenhower. Early reports on
Khrushchev's stopover in Rangoon also indicate an apathetic
reception and "correct" treatment by Burmese officials.
One influential Indian editor informed Ambassador Bunker
that Khrushchev's visit had been wonderful because it had com-
pleted Nehru's education. He said the Nehru-Khrushchev talks
had gone badly and that both men had become angry. The editor
believed these talks precipitated Nehru's strong speech in Parlia-
ment on 12 February, stating that at present there is no opening
for fruitful negotiations with Peiping.
In view of India's policy of friendship toward all, press re-
action to Khrushchev's criticism of the West and to the rough
behavior of some of his entourage has been relatively mild.
Nevertheless, the American Embassy notes a barbed flavor
and a perceptible undertone of innuendo and criticism in the
Indian press. One editorial actually compared Khrushchev to
a snake. The embassy feels that the contrast between Khru
shchev's braggadocio and President Eisenhower's humility will
not be lost on the Indian public.
One report from Rangoon indicates that Burmese Premier
Ne Win was "barely polite" in his discussion with Khrushchev
and that he made no bones about his dislike for his official wel-
coming chores. The Burmese public also appeared unenthusi-
astic about the Soviet premier. F_ I
25X1
25X1
19 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page .1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
 25X1
Approved Fq
H. ASIA-AFRICA
25X1
Decline in Iraqi Agriculture May Stimulate Peasant Unrest
Iraq's poor 1959 grain crop, following a disastrous crop
in 1958, is likely to lead to unrest among the peasants and
workers in the cities. An equally bad harvest is likely this
year.
Since the 1958 revolution, Iraqi grain harvests have de-
clined about 50 percent. Under normal conditions Iraq is an
exporter of grains; in 1959, however, it had to import over
400,000 tons of wheat for internal consumption. Wheat pur-
chases abroad--mostly in Turkey and the USSR- -cost almost
$50,000,000, about 10 percent of Iraq's annual earnings of for-
eign exchange.
Much of this difficulty springs from the Agricultural Re-
form Law of 1958 and its exploitation by the pro-Communist
minister of agricultural reform, Ibrahim Kubba, who was dis-
missed from the cabinet on 16 February. Land was requisi-
tioned, and the supervision and planning formerly done by
landlords was taken over by Communist-dominated peasant
committees. As a result, harvests have been poor, peasants
have migrated to the towns, increasing already extensive un-
employment, and the cost of living has increased sharply. The
wheat import program, designed to alleviate grain shortages,
has been bungled. Drought and locusts have taken their toll.
Prospects for 1960 are grim. Planting is far below re-
quirements. Peasants have spent the cash and eaten or sold
the seed given them under a governmental loan program.
Graft in official quarters has complicated the problem.
Peasant unrest, added to existing dissatisfaction among
the intelligentsia and army officers, and the general economic
stagnation, will contribute substantially to pressures against
the Qasim regime. The dismissal of Kubba suggests that the
nist allies
regime is pre aring to lay the blame on him and his Commu-
25X1
19 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 2
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
 Approved - 00410001-2 25X1
Opposition May Boycott South o an Elections
25X1
South Korean Vice President Chang Myon leader of th
opposition Democratic party, informed American Ambassa-
dor McConaughy on 16 February that he is considering with-
drawing his candidacy for re-election in protest against the
.repressive tactics and fraudulent practices of the Rhee ad~-
ministration. Some Democratic leaders have been giving
serious consideration for some time to such a course of
action. Chang's remarks probably were also calculated to
induce American support for his party.. While Chang on 17
February publicly denied that he might withdraw, a final de-
cision probably will be delayed until after an assessment of
the full impact in Korea of the death in Washington on 15 Feb-
ruary of Rhee's only opponent for the presidency, Democratic
candidate Cho Pyong-ok.
Rhee, who will run unopposed since Cho's death came two
days after the filing deadline, has publicly indicated that he
will not again tolerate an opposition vice president. The gov-
ernment has been mobilized down to the lowest level to assure
election of Rhee and his running mate, Yi Ki-pung. Should
Chang withdraw under such pressure, it would give new im-,
petus to criticism of Rhee's election tactics both at home and
abroa
5i, who is seriously ill, is opposed for the vice presi-
dency by two minor party. candidates in addition to Chang.
They have little following of their own, have long been asso-
ciated with Rhee, and at this juncture seem unlikely to affect
appreciably the outcome of the election. Sould Yi Ki-pung's
physical incapacity force his withdrawal, Rhee might one of the two as vice president)
25X1
19 Feb 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
 Approved F
25X1
25X1
25X1
III. THE WEST
Threat of Liberal Defection Jeopardizes Italian Government
Premier Segni may be forced to resign if--as seems in-
creasingly likely--the Liberal.party carries out its directo-
rate's decision to withdraw its support from his government.
Although Segni's minority all-Christian Democratic (CD) gov-
ernment, with the Monarchists and the neo-Fascists, still
has a parliamentary majority, the CD leadership is probably
reluctant to be completely dependent on the two extreme right-
wing parties, with local elections so close.
The Liberals.fear that they are undermining their own
popular appeal by supporting Segni without representation and
giving the Christian Democrats time to prepare for a center-
left cabinet dependent on abstention of the Nenni Socialists.
The Liberals, disturbed by pending. legislation and foreign
policy trends, hope to press Segni to broaden his government
to include themselves and his other rightist supporters.
The Democratic Socialist party directorate announced on
11 February that the Nenni Socialists' offer to support a cen-
ter-left government without asking concessions in return "e-
liminates one of the most serious obstacles to political change"
Democratic Socialist leader Saragat, who remains opposed to
a renewal of the old quadripartite government of center parties
including the Liberals, urges the center-left formula, which
the Liberals fear.
US officials in Rome cite as possibly significant a report
from a Christian Democratic source that former Premier
Scelba, heretofore a die-hard advocate of the quadripartite
approach, has shown interest in heading such a center-left
government. They doubt that such an arrangement would
work, but think it might if enough votes, including those of
independent deputy Olivetti and a few Monarchists, could be
scraped up to provide atechnical majority which would make
the government less obviously dependent on Nenni Socialist
abstention.
19 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004900410001-2
 Approved For t
25X1
Plans for Pro- u an g a ion During PresictentS rip
Communist leaders in Argentina, Brazil., Chile, and
Uruguay continue public statements indicating that they will
refrain from any openly aggressive acts during President
Eisenhower's visit from 23 February to 3 March, but they
are reported encouraging other groups--especially pro-Cuban
elements--to make the President "feel unwelcome" through
propaganda. Increased travel to South America by corre-
spondents of Castro's Prensa Latina news agency and other
Cubans has been reported, although there.is little informa-
tion on definite plans other than propaganda.
25X1
25X1
The police in all four countries are keeping a close watch
on groups favoring the Puerto Rican ultranationalists as well
as Cuba in view of reports that they also may try to promote
demonstrations
[Communist-influenced groups in Brazil, where capital pun-
ishment is prohibited, may try to present to the President or
some member of his party petitions on such diverse subjects as
the Chessman case and international disarmament, among others.
There also may be demonstrations on these issues.
25X1
25X1
19 Feb 6d
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 5
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
 Approved For %`
Presidential Campaign Activity May Provoke
Unrest in Ecuador
The scheduled return of former President Velasco to
Guayaquil on 20 February to begin his presidential campaign
for the June elections may touch off violence. His followers
are preparing a mass reception, which a rival coalition com-
posed of Communists, leftist Socialists, and the demagogic
Concentration of Popular Forces is reportedly planning to dis-
rupt. The coalition is launching its own presidential campaign
about 19 February in Guayaquil--Ecuador's largest city, cen-
ter of the coalition's strength, and scene of frequent political
turbulence in 1959.
Velasco is considered a slight favorite in the 1960 race,
and the impression he makes on arrival could be a decisive
factor in the outcome of the elections. He has lived abroad
since completing his 1952-56 presidential term. A previous
visit to Ecuador in 1957 failed to spark either the anticipated
widespread popular acclaim or a reported revolutionary move-
ment to return him to the presidency.
25X1
Ecuadoran security forces are believed capable of con-
trolling any serious violence in Guayaquil if they act promptly.
With this in mind., President Ponce might welcome or even seek
to bring about riots between the Velasquistas and supporters of 25X1
the coalition as a means of discrediting his bitter enemy Velasco
and the parties in the coalition, which have constantly attacked
his administration. However, political clashes could quickly get
out of hand in the politically explosive city of Guayaquil.
25X1
25X1
19 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Page 6
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
 Approved For Re ease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Aaministration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs-
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO04900410001-2
 Approved F6fteljFG*2/SK- TP79T009f%004900410001-2
A
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004900410001-2