CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004900330001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 10, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For
10 FEBRUARY 1960
Khrushchev's foreign travel plans markin-
tensification of his "personal diplomacy:' Q
Indian Government negotiating with Brit-
ish firms for purchase of ground-to-air
guided missiles and long-range radar.
Indonesia-- Growing differences reported
between President a Sukarno and Army
Chief of Staff Nasution.
Burma--U Nu states he will continue Ne
Win government's domestic and foreign
policies.
Iraqi Communist party "orthodox" faction
suffers setback in effort to achieve legal
status; splinter faction licensed.
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?Cypriot independence indefinitely post-
poned following stalemate in negotiations
over size of British bases.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 February 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Premier Khrushchev's travel plans--his 20-day
Asian trip beginning today, French trip in March, and
the summit in May--offer ample opportunity for the personal
diplomacy which has characterized the Soviet leader's conduct
of foreign policy. Khrushchev also has accepted an invitation
to visit Guinea, and probably would like to extend this, trip,
which is unlikely to take place before midsummer, to include
Ghana, Ethiopia.. and some of the newly independent African
states. He may well include at least stopovers in Cairo and
Baghdad. While these visits are designed to expand foreign
contacts and project a favorable image of the USSR in these
areas, Moscow probably also hopes partially to offset the im-
pact of President Eisenhower's recent trips.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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India: he Indian Government has been negotiating with
British firms for the purchase of "Bloodhound" ground-to-air
guided missiles and long-range radar equipment. Indian de-
fense officials, who reportedly set aside funds for such equip-
ment last year, evidently feel that as a result of the increased
Chinese Communist military threat along the northern frontier
India's air-defense capabilities must be strengthened. Nehru
told Congress party legislators on 8 February that more would
have to be spent on defense because of the Sino-Indian dispute,
and was quoted by party sources as saying the government could
no longer afford to postpone purchase of certain defense equip-_
me nt.
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Indonesia: Several reports are circulating in Indonesia
of growindifferences between President Sukarno and Army
Chief of Staff General Nasution. Sukarno is said to be consid-
ering further steps., including cabinet changes, to diminish the
army's political influence, possibly by granting a few more con-
cessions to the Communists. Such developments would. be in
line with Sukarno's usual tactics aimed at preventing either the
army or the Communists from becoming too powerful. These
reports apparently stem both from Sukarno's recent moves to
e-emphasize the civilian role in government and from the con-
rejudice Sukarno against the chief of staff.
"tinuing efforts of Communists and possibly other leftists to
Burma; U Nu, the prospective premier, has stated that he
plans to maintain the Ne Win government's domestic and inter-
national policies. Although his party's popular and parliamen-
tary majority is overwhelming, he says that he favors two-party
democracy in Burma and that the "Stable" party opposition pro-
vides a non-Communist alternative to the Communist-dominated
National United Front, which won almost one third of the pop-
ular vote in 1956 but has made an inconsequential showing thus
far in the current balloting. U Nu plans to continue the Amer-
ican aid projects in Burma, but prefers loans to grants. Recog-
nizing General Ne Win's supra-political stature,, U Nu notes
that, should his government again become inefficient and cor-
rupt, "there is the possibility of the army's takin over again:'
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Iraq: The "orthodox" faction of the Iraqi Communist party
has sured a setback in its efforts to achieve legal status as
a political party. The party's application was not accepted by
the Interior Ministry, probably at Qasim's orders, ostensibly
because of objections to the phraseology in the application form.
After complying with the ministry's objections, the party resub-
mitted its application. However,, the Qasim regime may inter-
pose further objections in an effort to give a boost to the Commu-
nist splinter faction led by Daud Sayigh, whose application, along
with those of the National Democratic and Kurdish parties, re-
portedly has.been approved. 25X1
10 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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in occasional acts of violence.
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violence, but a prolonged stalemate will result in new bitterness
toward Britain by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots and possibly
is the question of size of the two bases Britain wishes to retain.
Archbishop Makarios apparently feels he can win further con-
cessions which he believes are needed to pacify his critics on
Cyprus. There is little likelihood of a renewal of widespread
III, THE WEST
Cyprus: he 8 February announcement of the indefinite
postponement of Cypriot independence, which had been sched-
uled for 19 March, follows a breakdown in negotiations between
British and Cypriot representatives. The major stumbling block
10 Feb 60
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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II, ASIA-AFRICA
Serious Differences Repor_ ted Between Sukarno and Indonesian
Chief of Staff
Reports have circulated in Indonesia for several weeks
that there are growing differences between President Sukarno
and Army Chief of Staff Nasutiono Sukarno is said to be con-
sidering cabinet changes, to be effected some time after early
March, which would diminish the army's political influence
and reduce the power of General Nasution, who is also min-
25X1 ister of defense. F_ I Sukarno may
be planning the inclusion of ommunis s in ins cabinet j
These reports apparently stem both from Sukarno's re-
cent moves to re-emphasize the civilian role in government
and from the persistent efforts of Communists and possibly
other leftists to prejudice Sukarno against Nasutiond Other
contributing factors are Sukarno's recent appointments of
Communists to regional posts and his long-standing policy
of keeping any one element from becoming powerful enough
to challenge his own position.
First Minister Djuanda told the American ambassador in
late January that cabinet shifts are expected in the near fu-
ture, but that there was "absolutely nothing" to press stories
of disagreement between Sukarno and Nasutiono Colonel Su-
kendro, deputy army chief of staff for special affairs, told
the American army attache on 4 February that although Sukarno
and Nasution disagreed on major issues, he did not feel their
differences 'were serious.
Although firm evidence is lacking to support or refute the
reports, Sukarno clearly is emphasizing a gradual return to
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as well as occasional political concessions to the Communists,
[which will probably include attempts to bring them into the
cabinet Regardless of Sukarno's motives, his actions prob-
25X1 ably will diminish the influence of the anti-Communist Indo-
nesian Army.
10 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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U Nu Plans Continuation of Current Burmese Policies
. Former Premier Nu says that when he resumes the pre-
miership in April he plans to continue the domestic and foreign
policies of Premier Ne Win. He has stated that he will con-
tinue the American grant-aid projects for university and high-
way construction, although he believes that grants undermine,
rather than build, relations between recipient and donor. He.
says he approves Ne Win's border agreement and friendship
treaty with Communist China and expects no difficulty in com-
pleting the final boundary treaty.
Nu plans to continue Ne Win's domestic reforms and intends
no negotiations or new amnesty offers to the Communists or eth-
nic insurgent groups. He plans no coalition with his former dep-
uties in the "Stable" party but hopes, instead, that it will become
the loyal opposition in parliament. However, it has elected none
of its leaders and is. expected to have a maximum of only 30 mem-
bers in the 250-seat lower house of parliament, while the "Clean"
party and affiliates will have about 200 seats, Before the Anti-
fascist People's Freedom League split into "Clean" and "Stable"
factions, the Communist-dominated National United. Front, which
drew one third of the popular vote in 1956, was the only alterna-
tive, but in these elections it has made an inconsequential. show-
ing.
In the past, Nu's frequently expressed good intentions were
not matched by his government's performance, and he proved him-
self an inefficient administrator who failed to check corruption in
his regime. In addition, Nu has been less wary of relations with
the bloc than is Ne Win. He concedes that if this government has
faults of his last one, "there is the possibility that the army may
take over again."
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Iraqi Political Parties
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.The Iraqi Interior Ministry has reportedly accepted the
applications for legal status of three political parties, in-
cluding a Communist splinter faction led by Daud Sayigh, but
has sent. back the- original application of the orthodox Iraqi
Communist party for revision.
Rejection of the orthodox Communists' application, prob-
ably.on Qasim's orders, was based on use of the word "revolu-
tionary" to describe the party; the ministry also demanded an
explanation of the term "Marxism-Leninism." The application.
has now been resubmitted, omitting the word "revolutionary"
--now apparently pre-empted by Qasim to describe his own re-
gime--and describing Marxism-Leninism not as a dogma but a
scientific theory guiding the party.
Iraqi law gives the Ministry of Interior another 30 days
to accept or reject the revised application, and in any event,
parties do not attain full legal status until their programs have
been published in the official gazette. The Qasim regime.. may.
continue. to interpose obstacles to discredit the orthodox faction
and thus boost the. faction led by Sayigh, who has a long record
of deviation from the party and has been preaching an Iraqi brand
of Communism much closer to Qasim's view of what the Iraqi
Communists should be.
Applications for licenses by the socialistic National Demo-
cratic party and the United Democratic party of .Kurdistan have
met with no objection during the 30 days since they were made.
Slayigh's splinter group, despite the withdrawal of several found-
ing members, has called for a "National Front:' If the orthodox
Communists eventually' are denied a license they may attempt to
take over the Sayigh faction, which has little organization or fol-
lowing.; In any case, the Iraqi Communists cannot be considered
as seriously weakened.
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10 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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 III. THE WEST
Cyprus
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[Britain's termination on February of talks in Nicosia
with Cypriot officials and its unilateral postponement of in-
dependence for Cyprus for an indefinite period beyond 19
March have been criticized by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot
leaders. Greek Cypriots continue to back Archbishop Makarios
on the size of the military bases to be retained by Britain af-
ter independence. Turkish Cypriot newspapers have expressed
considerable apprehension of a return to violence on the island
[While the latest postponement will create new bitterness on
Cyprus, it is unlikely to lead to widespread unrest unless the
British fire Cypriot laborers working on British bases or apply
other economic pressures If the deadlock is protracted, how-
ever, individual acts of violence cannot be precluded.
UExcept for the extent of the bases, recent negotiations have
largely resolved outstanding problems--such as administration
of the base areas and financial aid to Cyprus from Britain. On
these issues, London has made substantial concessions since
mid-January.
F,Makarios apparently hopes that the difficulties created for
the local British administration by changes in the timetable for
independence will help him obtain further concessions. British
officials, however, particularly military leaders, have refused
to consider a further reduction in the total of about 120 square
miles they demand for the bases-.-I
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Off ices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Gperations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Aaministration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs-
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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