CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A004900220001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 28, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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USSR--Poor Kazakh harvest blamed on
exodus of farm workers because of poor
living conditions.
Q
Peiping renews demands on Djakarta to
end "persecution" of Overseas Chinese. 2Q
UAR assumes more rigid position on
Israeli shipping through Suez Canal.
Indonesia- -Economic deterioration may
lead Sukarno to make cabinet changes as
face-saving gesture; army uneasy over
his apparent de-emphasis of the military
role and appointment of Communists to
regional posts.
Congolese get "conditional" acceptance of
30 June date for Belgian Congo independ-
ence.
0
De Gaulle shows no sign of yielding on
basic Algerian policy but may modify
position on manner of reasserting his
authority.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 January 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
j
II. ASIA-AFRICA
ME,
USSR: The newly appointed Kazakh party first secre-
tary has placed primary blame for`Kazakhstan's disappoint-
ing harvest in.1959 on the flight of farm workers from the
area. In the past two years, he revealed, 141,000 farm work-
ers left the new lands because of poor living conditions. Khru-
shchev,,who is closely identified with the new lands program,
has intervened personally with a series of personnel and organ-
izational changes designed to cope with the human factor.
Communist China - Indonesia: Peiping's renewal of pres-
sure on Djakarta to halt "acts of persecution" of Overseas
Chinese is likely to intensify Sinn-Indonesian frictions. The
Chinese Communist ambassador in Djakarta has handed the
Indonesian foreign minister a new note demanding an "imme-
diate" end to the "forcible evacuation" of Chinese from rural
areas. In view of its concern over the current flight of Chinese
capital from Indonesia, Djakarta is unlikely to respond favor-
ably to Peiping's demand that dispossessed Chinese be given
the time to sell their pro erty and the right to carry back the
proceeds to China. (Page 1)
UAR-Israel: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has
failed to resolve the dispute over Israeli shipping through the
Suez Canal, and the UAR's position has become more rigid.
on Israeli-flag and Israeli-chartered ships, will not allow through
Cairo "reserves
the right" to seize any cargo coming from Israel regardless of
the terms of its shipment, and, in addition to its previous ban
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25)
25
5
canal any ship owned even in part by Israeli interests.
e Israelis, who have awaited results of Hammarsk'old's
efforts, probably now will submit a formal complaint to the
j UN Security ounce
a c m ee Conclusions: [rhe following develop- 25)
menu are susceptible of 'rect action by Soviet/Communist 25X1
hostile action. which could jeopardize the security of the US
j in the immediate future
F
j
/
aqi political groups continue to maneuver for power,
and an attempt to assassinate Qasim could occur at an time.
] 25"
Indonesia: President Sukarno is widely rumored to be
considering changes in the Indonesian cabinet as a face-
saving gesture over growing popular criticism of the gov-
ernment, largely deriving from economic deterioration.
:Sukarno?s recent assumption of General Nasution's post as.
V central war administrator and his appointment of Commu-
nists to several significant regional posts, at the second
echelon, are causing uneasiness among army leaders and
non-Communist political circles. Sukarno may be attempt-
ing to readjust the political balance of power by de-empha-
sizing the role of the military while continuin his assur-
ances of good will toward the Communists. 25)
(Page 2)
Belgian Congo: African nationalists, conferring with
Belgian officials in Brussels, have gained "conditional" ac-
ceptance of 30 June as a date for the proclamation of Congo-
lese independence. This constitutes a tactical success for
the coalition of nationalist parties, which had maintained that
the setting of a date for independence should take precedence
over discussion of the structure of the new Congolese state as
desired by the Belgians. Belgian agreement, however., may
have been contingent on African acceptance of the Belgian po-
sition on other issues. The conference still faces serious
problems, including the definition of responsibilities for de-
fense and foreign affairs and the setting of election dates.
(Page 3)
28 Jan 60 DAILY BRIEF
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 I
III. THE WEST
*France -Algeria: The cease-fire continues in downtown
Algiers. De Gaulle's failure thus far to take decisive meas-
urs against European settlers and army elements opposed to
his policy of self-determination in Algeria is reported to have
weakened his prestige.in France. It has discouraged political
party leaders who wish to support him but fear that the Algerian
situation may be escaping his control. Nevertheless there are
increasing signs that French public apathy ij ending and impor-
tant elements are prepared to rally be hind him. De Gaulle
shows no sign of yielding on his basic Algerian policy but may
modify his tough position at least in regard to the manner of
reasserting his. authority. F I (Page 4)
28 Jan 60 DAILY BRIEF
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I4 THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping Sends New Protest Note to Djakarta
On Overseas Chinese
The Chinese Communist ambassador in Djakarta has re-
quested the Indonesian Government to end the "persecution"
and "forcible evacuation" of Overseas Chinese from the coun-
tryside in implementation of the Indonesian ban on alien rural
merchants. This representation is likely to revive Djakarta's
anger over what it considers Chinese Communist interference
in an internal problem and set off another round of recrimina-
tions over the Overseas Chinese issue.
Although apparently reconciled to the Indonesian ban,
Peiping asked that Chinese faced with removal be given time
to decide between evacuation and return to China. It further
called on Djakarta to release immediately from resettlement
camps and compensate those Chinese already removed from
rural areas of West Java.
The Chinese Communists ask that dispossessed Chinese
who elect repatriation be permitted to sell their property and
take the proceeds out of the country. Because of the sharp
currency depreciation, caused primarily by the flight of Chi-
nese capital since enactment of the ban, Djakarta is unlikely
to agree to this provision.
To convince Overseas Chinese of the sincerity of Peiping's
offer of a warm welcome to returnees, Chen Yi has announced
that ships will be sent to Indonesia this month to pick up Chi-
nese desiring repatriation. Peiping also will probably utilize
meetings of the joint committee for implementing the new Sino-
Indonesian citizenship treaty to show its continuing interest
in the well-being of Overseas Chinese.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesian Situation
Speculation and rumors are circulating in Indonesia
concerning changes in the cabinet and shifts in top Indo-
nesian leadership. Much of the speculation arises from
the country's economic difficulties. Inflation has reached
a new peak, despite corrective measures taken last August,
and the government is under mounting pressure to take re-
medial action.
Sukarno's recent reorganization of the nation's martial-
law administration and his appointment of Communists to
several significant regional posts has intensified the specu.
lation and is causing considerable uneasiness among army
leaders and non-Communist circles. A new decree govern-
ing the state of emergency or martial law, now prevailing
throughout Indonesia, made President Sukarno "central war
administrator" in place of Army Chief of Staff and Defense
Minister General Nasution. Nasution, in his capacity of de-
fense minister, becomes second assistant to Sukarno pre-
ceded by First Minister Djuanda as first assistant. Although
Nasution's actual influence may not be immediately affected,
the change de-emphasizes the role of the military and prom-
ises increased interference by Sukarno.
Sukarno may be following his usual tactics of attempting
to keep political forces in Indonesia balanced. He has re-
cently appointed Communists or pro-Communists as depu-
ty mayor of Djakarta, deputy governor of West Java, and may-
or of Surabaya.
Meanwhile, the Communists are increasingly loiting
popular dissension over spiraling prices,
28 Jan 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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Congo Conferees Reportedly Agree on Independence Date
Apparent agreement between African nationalists and
Belgian authorities on a target date of 30 June for Congo
independence represents a tactical success for the Africans
in the round-table talks in Brussels. The Africans had in-
sisted that no further business could be transacted until a
date was agreed upon.
The Belgians have thus demonstrated their good faith
and encouraged the Africans to see the conference through
to a successful conclusion. Brussels probably hopes that
such conciliation will improve prospects for compromise
on sensitive issues such as the governmental structure of
a Congo state and. the division of responsibilities for de-
fense and foreign affairs. Belgi=an authorities appear to en-
vision "independence" as amounting primarily to internal
autonomy accompanied by political and economic links with
Belgium.
The common front among African groups at the confer-
ence was broken on 25 January by Joseph Kasavubu, leader
of the powerful Abako party, who walked out following a dis-
pute concerning the agenda. Although Kasavubu was followed
by only two other members of the Abako delegation, his boy-
cott could mean that the Abako will not be bound. by decisions
reached at the conference, and suggests that he expects to
benefit politically from dissociating himself from its delib-
erations.
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The French-Algerian Situation
De Gaulle's failure thus far to take decisive measures
against European settlers and army elements opposed to hi-
policy of self -determination in Algeria is reported to have
weakened his prestige in France. It has discouraged polit-
ical party leaders who wish to support him but fear that the
Algerian situation may be escaping his control. De Gaulle
shows no sign of yielding on his basic Algerian policy but maybe
modifying his tough position at least in regard 'to the manner of
reasserting his authority. An apparently imminent cabinet
split over measures for dealing with the insurgents was a-
verted on 27 January when the cabinet approved orders to the
chief civil and military authorities in Algeria. De Gaulle
also probably has taken into account the 27 January editorial
warnings of the influential morning dailies Figaro, Aurore;
and. Combat that no blood must be shed in reasserting the gov-
ernment's authority. These papers had. previously sharply
criticized the settlers.
There have been increasing signs that French public apathy,
partially due to censorship, is ending and that important ele-
ments are prepared to rally behind him. The President has
received numerous public messages of support from a wide
variety of political, labor and religious groups. The major
afternoon newspapers, on 27 January, presumably at official
request, published assurances of public support.
In addition to the already solid backing of the major left-
center and center parties, De Gaulle on 27 January also re-
ceived pledges of cooperation from important elements of the
Union for the New Republic and the independents
]which have been
rega.:'c'ed as possible centers of 'opposition on the Algerian is-
sue. The first overt signs of Moslem support for De Gaulle
appeared on 27 January with a demonstration at Mostagnem and
a public statement in Paris by Algerian deputy Mustapha Chelha.
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. De Gaulle in his radio and television address scheduled
for 29 January may capitalize on the public support for his
position by calling a special session of parliament to reapprove
his Algerian policy. Announcement of his intention to seek
special emergency powers or propose a referendum on his
Algerian policy also remain possibilities.
Meanwhile, an apparent move to increase pressure on
De Gaulle occured when General Challe, in an appeal for the
restoration of order, stressed that "the French army is fight-
ing so that Algeria will remain definitively French;'
One European extremist organization in Algiers has called
for a demonstration today, including a march into the Casbah,
in an evident attempt to rally Moslem support for the settler
insurgents' cause. Such a move could precipitate a clash with
French troops who have been stationed around the Casbah in an
attempt to isolate the Moslem quarter of the city from the fer-
ment in downtown Algiers.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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